ML20058E477
| ML20058E477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1982 |
| From: | Letsche K KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8207280246 | |
| Download: ML20058E477 (18) | |
Text
I, July 26, 1982 DOCKETED USliRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ' '82. JJt. 27 K0 5c, Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Ei[a^r~dY ij 'd l]H M i <
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1 In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
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(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
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SUFFOLK COUNTY OPPOSITION TO LILCO'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF SUFFOLK COUNTY TESTIMONY ON SUFFOLK COUNTY CONTENTION 22 -- SRV TEST PROGRAM LILCO's Motion to Strike Portions of Suffolk County Testimony on Suffolk County Contention _22 -- SRV Test Program,. seeks to strike three portions of the County's
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SC Contention 22 testimony.
For the reasons stated below, Suffolk County opposes the Motion.
SC Contention 22 deals with LILCO's failure to demonstrate adequately that the safety / relief valves (S/RV's) at Shoreham meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix A, GCD 14 and 30, and 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B,
Sections III and XI.
It also concerns LILCO's failure to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1,
" Performance Testing of Boiling-Water Reactor and Pressur-ized-Water Reactor Relief and Safety Valves (NUREG-0578, 8207280246 820726 PDR ADOCK 05000322 h
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Section 2.1.2)."
As indicated in their testimony, Messrs.
Bridenbaugh and Minor believe that LILCO's non-compliance with NUREG-0737 is primarily based on two f actors:
(1) LILCO's failure to perform a plant-specific analysis of the Shoreham S/RV's, piping configuration and related structures and instrumentation, or to provide a compar-ison of the Shoreham as-built plant and operating and accident conditions at Shoreham with those used in the generic test program; and (.2 ) LILCO's failure to provide test configurations " designed to accommodate ATWS conditions" as required by NUREG-0737.
The portions of testimony which LILCO seeks to strike all relate to these concerns of Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor, which clearly are relevant to SC Contention 22.
1.
Use 'of the term " reliability. '.'
In its Motion, LILCO seeks to strike each line of testimony that contains the word " reliable" or one of its derivatives.
The Motion is based on the fact that the word " reliability" does not appear in the text of SC Contention 22 or in NUREG-0737, Item II.D.l.
LILCO's argument should be rejected.
The " reliability" concept is, in fact, relevant toi the issues addressed in SC Contention'22. GDC 14, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, specifically referenced in
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the contention,
/ states:
The reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, or rapidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture.
(. emphasis,added)
It is clear that GDC 14, with its emphasis on " extremely low probability," establishes a reliability requirement that is applicable to S/RV's.
Accordingly, the discussion by Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor or LILCO's failure to demonstrate the reliability of S/RV's is perfectly proper in the context of SC Contention 22, which rests, at least in part, on LILCO's failure to comply with GDC 14.
Similarly, a discussion of " reliability" is relevant to any discussion of the requirements of NUREG-0737 Item II.D.l.
The term "functionabilityj ',' which appears in the contention and NUREG-0737, does concern reliability, as evidenced by the background to this 0737 item.
We submit that LILCO's narrow interpretation of " function-ability" is simply not correct in light of the history of this item.
NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1 was derived from NUREG-0578, Section 2.1.2, which discusses the NRC's concerns
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The reference to GDC "4" in the prefiled testimony of Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor is a typographical error; the reference should be to GDC 14. _
arising out of the TMI accident relating to the reliability of S/RV's.
This is indicated by the direct reference i
to NUREG-0578 which is included in the title to this NUREG-0737 item.
(See pg. 1 of this response which quotes the NUREG-0737 title).
A copy of Section 2.'.l. 2 of NUREG-0578 is attached hereto.
It states, in pertinent part:
"To date, there have been a number of instances of improper operation of. relief and safety valves.
It is not clear whether these past instances of improper operation resulted from inadequate qualification of the valve or from a basic unreliability of the valve design.
Appropriate qualification testing of the relief and safety valves can verify the capa-bility of these valves to function under the required conditions, thereby minimizing the possibility of multiple common mode failure of these valves due to challenges from conditions for which the valves are not qual-ified.
Qualification testing will also provide some of the information necessary for assessing the basic ~ reliability of the valve design since failures or successes'of qualified valves ~will be a partial indication of the valve reliability.
(emphasis added).
As noted above, NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1 was derived from the NUREG-0578 concern.
Thus, Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor were correct in characterizing the NRC's concerns about S/RV's as relating to their reliability.
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Furthermore, despite the fact that the term
" reliability" does not appear in the text of NUREG-0737 l,
Item II.D.1, a discussion of whether the generic test pro-gram has demonstrated the reliability of S/RV's is certainly relevant to a discussion of compliance with that Item.
If the purpose of the S/RV testing required in NUREG-0737 is not to demonstrate that S/RV's can be relied upon both to function and to function properly under l
various operating and accident conditions, then the required test program would be meaningless, particularly in light of the explanatory discussion of the NRC's concerns 3
stated in NUREG-0578.
LILCO's argument that " reliability" has "a longer-term, more probablistic" connotation than does "functionability" or " operability," even if true, does not provide a basis for the motion to strike.
First, according to LILCO's argument (at' p.
3 of its Motion), the S/RV test program was set up to demonstrate only that the particular S/RV being tested actually operated -- once -- when subjected to a postulated condition.
Neither LILCO,'in its pre-filed testimony on SC Contention 22, nor G.E.
in its description of its generic test results contends that the S/RV test program had such an unrealistically l
limited goal.
Indeed, in its summary of " Valve Operability I. - - -
Results," G.E.
indicates' that " rep'ea'tability of valve operability" was one of the factors analyzed in the test program.
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Clearly, if the G.E. S/RV test program Vas to address the NRC's concerns expressed in NUREG-0578 and -0737, it would have to go beyond the mere demonstra-tion that a given valve operated when tested; it would have 'to provide data going to the reliability of the valves operation.
Second, LILCO's semantic argument also conflicts with one of its own witness' characterization of the S/RV test program.
In-his Statement of Professional Qualifications, John J.
Boseman, who is employed by G.E.,
states that he " formulated, directed, and participated in the design, tests, evaluations and programs to improve the reliability or safety / relief value designs for BWR applications."
In its Motion to join Mr. Boseman to support LILCO's testimony on SC Contention 22, LILCO states that Mr. Boseman "has been heavily involved in the S/RV testing program."
In light of LILCO's own witness' characterization of the test program as relating to the
" reliability" of S/RV's, the lack of basis for LILCO's Motion to Strike Suffolk County testimony containing a
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NEDO-24988, " Analysis of Generic BWR Safety / Relief Operability Test Results", at 4. (emphasis added).
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similar characterization becomes even more evident.
Finally, LILCO's Motion to Strike is out of place because this is a matter for cross examination, not for a motion to strike before the witnesses have had an opportunity to explain what they meant when they used the word " reliability" in their testimony.
Indeed, it would be improper and unfair to force upon Messrs.
Bridenbaugh and Minor the interpretation or connotation assigned to that word by LILCO's counsel, and then to decide based upon that LILCO interpretation, that the use of the word in the County's testimony constitutes;a basis for striking their testimony.
Only after cross examination designed to establish'the precise meaning of the term would LILCO's counsel even be in a position to consider such a motion ~.
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As demonstrated above, the use of the term " reliability" by the Suffolk County witnesses is both reasonable and relevant to SC Contention 22, in light of GDC 14, NUREG-0578 l
and NUREG-0737,. common sense, the G.E.
test results, and the statements of one of LILCO's own witnesses.
Therefore, Part 1 of LILCO's Motion to Strike should be denied.
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For the reasons given previously, however, the Motfon must be rejected in any case, even if the County's witnesses mean the same as LILCO's counsel suggests.
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2.
The NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1 requirement that ATWS testing be considered.
In part 2 of its Motion, LILCO seeks to Ltrike four portions of testimony that address the requirements of NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1 relating to S/RV testing under ATWS conditions.
LILCO argues that this testimony should be stricken because (a) NUREG-0737 does not require a
" commitment to perform ATWS testing during the pendency of the proposed ATWS rulemaking," (LILCO Motion at 4),
and (b) the witnesses' testimony concerning the ATWS testing requirements should be litigated with SC Contention 16.
Neither ground is a sufficient basis for a Motion to Strike.
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NUREG-0737 Item II. D.1 clearly states, in pertinent part, as follows:
C.
ATWS Testing -- Although ATWS testing need not be completed by July 1, 1981, the test facility should be designed to accommodate ATWS' conditions.
. with sufficient capacity to enable testing of relief and safety valves.
(emphasis added)
This provision of NUREG-0737 is the basis for the inclusion in SC Contention 22 of the concern that LILCO has not made a " commitment" on ATWS testing.
Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor address that issue in their testimony.
They do not state, as LILCO's Motion implies, that NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1 requires the actual performance of ATWS testing -
O by a date certain.
Rather, their testimony is intended to I
address LILCO's and the BWR Owners Group's failure to design S/RV test facilities to accommodate ATWS conditions as NUREG-0737 does require.
The portions of testimony which LILCO seeks to strike are all related either to that failure (see material LILCO seeks - to strike on pages 5 and 6 of SC testimony) or to the personal opinion of Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor that the NUREG-0737 requirement indicates an NRC intention, which they endorse, i
to require future testing of S/RV's under ATWS conditions (see testimony LILCO seeks to strike on page 7 of SC testimony).
In light of.the plain statement in NUREG-0737 Item II.D.l. requiring test facilities to accommodate testing under ATWS conditions, and the inclusion in SC Contention 22 of the concern about LILCO's I
failure to do so, the referenced portions of the testi-mony are relevant and should not be striken.
Moreover, LILCO's own witnesses on SC Contention 22 have also addressed the issue of whether the S/RV testing done by LILCO or G.E.
includes configurations that would accommodate testing under ATWS conditions.
See pages 12 and 13 of LILCO's testimony on SC 22.
Similarly, the LILCO witnesses purport to provide a justification for not having actually performed ATWS testing of the S/RV's
-9.
O at pages 12-13 of their testimony.-*/
Thus, it is apparent that LILCO's own witnesses believed that the subjects of whether S/RV test configura-tions can accommodate ATWS conditions and whether LILCO has justified its failure 'to perform S/RV tests under ATWS conditions are relevant to SC Contention 22.
In light of that fact, LILCO's Motion to Strike Suffolk County's testimony on those same subjects is particularly anomalous.
Accordingly, Suffolk County submits that Part 2 of the Motion to Strike should be denied.
f LILCO's brief argument that the four references in the Suffolk County testimony to S/RV testing under ATWS conditions should be litigated with SC Contention 16 requires little response.
Clearly, the testimony at issue j
is relate.d only to S/RV test facilities, and not to the broader ATWS issue addressed in SC Contention 16.
As the Board has noted on several occasions, a certain amount of overlap among issues is to be expected in a hearing of this nature.
The limited nature of the so-called " overlap" involved here certainly does not rise to the level that would justify striking the testimony.
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Messrs. Bridenbaugh's and Minor's opinion that such a justification should be provided by LILCO is one of
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the portions of thei~r testimony that LILCO now seeks to strike as irrelevant or subject to litigation under SC Contention 16.
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3.
Discussion of the G.E. generic test results.
Part 3 of LILCO's Motion to Strike relates to a portion of Messrs. Bridenbaugh's and Minor's discussion of the results of the G.E. generic S/RV test program.
Although characterized in LILCO's Motion as "non-probative," that discussion is obviously pertinent to the issues addressed in SC Contention 22.
Since LILCO relies upon the G.E.
test program as the basis for its supposed compliance with NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1, both the scrutability of the results and their applicability to the Shoreham plant are important issues.
As Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor point out in their testimony, the G.E.
results provide little or no actual data to support the broad conclusion that the tests demonstrated the performance capabilities of the Shoreham'S/RV's.
As the pages included as Attachment 3 of the suffolk County testimony demonstrate, the actual data have been deleted from the report.
Significantly, the copy of the results submitted by LILCO as Attachment III to its witnesses' testimony on SC Contention 22 also has the per-tinent data deleted.
In light of LILCO's own submission of such seriously deficient information, allegedly to support its contention that it has demonstrated compliance with the requirements of NUREG-0737 Itam II.D.1, the comments of Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor concerning
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the unscrutability and lack of Shoreham-specific data in such results become even more relevant.
Clearly, the contents and applicability to Shoreham of the G.E. S/RV test results are at issue in SC Contention 22.
The testimony which LILCO seeks to strike contains the opinions of Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Minor concerning the weight which they believe should be given to those results, in light of the deletion of a substantial amount of pertinent data.
Their testimony is relevant (particularly since the LILCO witnesses rely on the same deleted version of the results) and should not be stri~ ken. Accordingly, Suffolk c
County submits that Part 3 of LILCO's Motion to Strike should be denied.
Respectfully submitted, David J.
Gilmartin Suffolk County Attorney Patricia A.
Dempsey Assistant Suffolk County Attorney Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 2d7 Lawrence Coe Lanpher Karla J. Letsche/
KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800
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Washington, D.
C.
.20036 (202) 452-7000 Attorneys for Suffolk County Dated:
July 26, 1982 Washington, D.
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N U R EG-0578 f
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TMI-2 LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE
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SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
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Manuscript Completed: July 1979 l4 Date Published: July 1979
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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4 NRR Lessons Learned Task Force Short-Term Recommendations TITLE:
Performance Testing for BWR and PWR Relief and Safety Valves (Section 2.1.2) 1.
INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 14,15, and 30' of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 require that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed, fabricated, and erected to the highast quaP,ty standards and be tested to ensure an extremely low proba-bility of abnormal leakage, rapidly propagating failure, and gross rupture.
These criteria also require that the design conditions of the reactor coolant boundary not be exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences.
Proper operation of reactor coolant system relief and safety valves is vital for conformance to these design criteria.
The inability of a sufficient number of these valves to open could lead to a violation of the integrity of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
The failure of one' or more of these valves to close results in a direct violation of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity, p
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When the reactor coolant system relief and safety valves open, the flow through these valves is normally saturated steam. " Some reactor coolant system transients and accidents as well as alternate core-cooling methods can result in so' lid-water or two phase steam-water flow thrqugh these valves.
Present qualification requirements for these valves include only flow under saturated steam conditions.
The purpose of this recommendation is to require qualification of relief and safety valves under expected operating conditions, which would include solid-water and two phase flow conditions.
2.
DISCUSSION The reactor coolant system rel.ief.and safety valves are connected to the pressurizer steam space on PWRs and to the main steam line on BWRs.
On PWRs, transients and accidents that result in increasing reactor coolant system temperatures can cause an. expansion of the coolant volume in the reactor coolant system so that the pressurizer fills with water.
As.the system pressure increases, two phase and solid-water flow can occur through the reactor coolant system. relief.and safety valves.
On BWRs, transients or accidents requiring operation of the high pressure coolant injection system or operation of the reactor core isolation cooling system can result in two phase or solid-water flow through the relief'and safety valves if the reactor vess'el level instrumentation malfunctions.
In addition, on both PWRs and BWRs, certain alternative core cooling methods require coolant injection with ECCS systems and coolant discharge through A-6
relief and safety valves.
These cooling methods may result in two phase or solid-water flow through the relief and safety valves.
Solid-water or two phase flow through the relief and safety valve.s can gre,atly increase the dynamic forces on valve internals, piping, and supports over '
those that would be expected from saturated steam flow. conditions.
Present ASME qualification requirements for safety valves include only flow under saturated steam conditions.
Because the safety analyses have not given credit for the pressure-relief capability of the power operated relief valves, the ASME Code also does not address qualification requirements for these valves.
To date, there have been a number of instances of improper operation of relief and safety valves.
These examples include valves opening below set pressure, valves opening above set pressure or failure to open, and valves failing to reseat when open.
The failure of the power-operated relief valve to reseat was a significant contributor to the TMI-2 sequence of events.
It is not clear whether these past instances of improper opcration resulted from inadequate qualification of the valve or from a basic unreliability of the valve design.
Appropriate qualification testing of the relief,,and safety valves can verify the capability of these valves to function under} the required conditions, thereby minimizing the possibility of multiple common-mode failur,e of these valves due to challenges from conditions for which the valves are not qualified.
Qualification testing will also provide some of the information necessary for 4
assessing the basic reliability of the valve des.ign since failures or successes bf qualified valves will be a partial indication of valve reliability.
Current valve test facilities may have to be modified or expanded to test valves under various flow regimes since two phase slug flow and solid-water flow regimes will require higher mass flow rates and can result in greater dynamic. forces.
The time period for completion of this qualification testing has been chosen to allow for modification or expansion of the test facilities.
The extended time for completion of this qualification testing is considered appropriate since this testing is considered to be confirmatory of valve
' performance capability.
It should be noted that this requirement for qualification testing does not include testing under ATWS conditions at this time.
Analyses of ATWS events have shown that the pressurizer relief and safety valves could discharge two-phase and subcooled water at pressures in the range of 2800 psi to 4800 psi and at temperatures in the range of 650 F to 700 F.
It is possible that the final resolution of ATWS in PWRs.(expected in calendar year 1980) would permit some plants to reach a peak pressure of 3800 psi subject to showing that the integrity of the primary' coolant systems is maintained.
It may be prudent, therefore, that test facility modifications include the capability of testing during ATWS conditions since it is likely that adequacy of any ATWS solution would depend on the verification.of acceptable valve behavior.
A-7
3.
POSITION Pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor licensees and applicants shall conduct testing to qualify the reactor coolant system relief and safety valves under expected operating conditions for design basis transients and accidents.
The licensees and applicants shall determine the expected valve operating conditions through the use of analyses of accidents and anticipated operational occurrences referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2.
The single failures applied to these analyses shall be chosen so that the dynamic forces on the safety and relief valves are maximized.
Test pressures shall be the highest predicted by conventional safety analysis procedures.
Reactor coolant system relief and safety valve qualification shall include qualification of associated control circuitry piping and supports as well as the valves themselves.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
)
Docket No. 50-322 (0.L.)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Suffolk County Opposition to LILCO's Motion to Strike Portions of Suffolk County Testimony on Suffolk County Contention 22 -- SRV Test Program were this 26th day of July, 1982, served on the parties listed below, by first class mail, postage prepaid, or, where indi-cated by asterisks, by hand delivery.
Lawrence Brenner, Esq.*
Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Administrative Judge Cammer and Shapiro
. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
-9 East 40th Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, New York 10016 Washington, D.C.
20555 Howard L.
Blau, Esq.
Dr. James L. Carpenter
- 217 Newbridge Road Administrative Judge Hicksville, New York 11801 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W. Taylor Reveley III, Esq.*
Washington, D.C.
20555 Hunton & Williams P.O.
Box 1535 707 East Main St.
Mr. Peter A. Morris
- Richmond, Virginia 23212 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Washington, D.C.
20555 New York State Energy Office Agency Building 2 Edward M.
Barrett, Esq.
Empire State Plaza General Counsel Albany, New York 12223 Long Island Lighting Company 250 Old Country Road Mineola, New York 11501 Stephen B.
Latham, Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea Mr. Brian McCaffrey Attorneys at Law Long Island Lighting Company P.O.
Box 398 175 East Old Country Road 33 West Second Street Hicksville, New York 11801 Riverhead, New York 11901
- By Hand
Marc W.
Goldsmith Mr. Jeff Smith Energy Research. Group, Inc.
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 400-1 Totten Pond Road P.O.
Box 618 Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 North Country Road Wading River, New York 11792 f
Joel Blau, Esq.
MHB Technical Assoc'iates New York Public Service Commission 1723 Hamilton Avenue
^
The Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller Suite K Building San Jose, California 95125 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Hon. Peter Cohalan Suffolk County l Executive 3
David H. Gilmartin, Esq.
County Executive / Legislative' Suffolk County Attorney Building' County Executive / Legislative Bldg.
Veterans. Memorial Highway Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Ezra I.
Bialik, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney, General Board Panel Environmental Protection Bureau U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York State Department of Washington, D.C.
20555 Law 2 World Trade Center Docketing and Service Section New York, New York 10047 Office of the Secretary U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
' Atomic Safety and L'icensing Appeal Board Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Bernard M.
Bordenick, Esq.*
Commission David A.
Repka, Esq.
" Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. Washington, D.C.
20555-Matthew J.
Kelly, Esq.
Staff Counsel, New York Stuart Diamond State Public Service Comm.
Environment / Energy Writer 3 Rockefeller Plaza NEWSDAY Albany, New York 12223 Long Island, New York 11747 Cherif Sedky, Esq.
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchison 1500 Oliver Building Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 Wa&w
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2 ocw Karla J.
LetschV KIRKPATRICK,vIOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS DATE: July ~26, 1982 1900 M Street, N.W.,
8th Floor Washington, D.C.
20036
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