ML20057F213

Amends 19 & 5 to Licenses NPF-87 & NPF-89,respectively, Changing TS to Increase Min Boron Content of Fluid in RWST from 2000 to 2400 Ppm in Modes 5 & 6

ML20057F213
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	10/05/1993
From:	Black S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20057F214	List: ML20057F213
References
NUDOCS 9310140298
Download: ML20057F213 (23)

Text

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UNITED STATES i

• j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY. ET AL.*

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. UNIT I DOCKET NO. 50-445 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 19 License No. NPF-87 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) acting for itself and as agent for Texas Municipal Power Agency (licensees) dated October 19, 1993, as supplemented by letters dated March 17, 1993, April 1, 1993, and August 6, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

i i

• The current owners of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station are: Texas Utilities Electric Company and Texas Municipal Power Agency. Transfer of ownership from Texas Municipal Power Agency to Texas Utilities Electric Company was previously authorized by Amendment No. 9 to Construction Permit CPPR-126 on August 25, 1988 to take place in 10 installments as set forth in the Agreement attached to the application for Amendment dated March 4,1988.

At the completion thereof, Texas Municipal Power Agency will no longer retain any ownership interest.

9310140298 931005 DR ADOCK 05000445 PDR

g.,

i 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in.the attachment to this. license amendment i

and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 is hereby.

amended to read as follows:-

l 2.

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised t

through Amendment No.19

, and the Environmental Protection Plan t

contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented prior to startup for Cycle 4.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W

f>SuzanneC.B1k Gir tor Project Director te JV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

i Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 5,1993 l

t l

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T V'I)

S UNITED STATES

%* g.v NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 20555 4001

....+

TEXAS UTillTIES ELECTRIC COMPANY. ET AL.*

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-446 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 5 License No. NPF-89 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TV Electric) acting for itself and as agent for Texas Municipal Power Agency (licensees) dated October 19, 1992, as supplemented by letters dated March 17, 1993, April 1, 1993, and August 6, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance witt. the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the publi,;

and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• The current owners of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station are: Texas Utilities Electric Company and Texas Municipal Power Agency. Transfer of ownership from Texas Municipal Power Agency to Texas Utilities Electric Company was previously authorized by Amendment No. 8 to Construction Permit CPPP.-127 on August 25, 1988 to take place in 10 installments as set forth in the Agreement attached to the application for Amendment dated March 4, 1988.

At the completion thereof, Texas Municipal Power Agency will no longer retain any ownership interest.

4

g

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.

5, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license.

TU Electric shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ta W

pSuzanneC.Blac(,Di ctor Project Directorittd -2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications i

Date of Issuance: October 5,1993 1

1 l

l s

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that:

(1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients asso-ciated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of j

fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T, at no load operaUn.g temperature, and is asso-ciated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RC'i cooldown.

In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.e% ak/k for Unit 1 (1.3% Ak/k for Unit 2) is required to control the reactiv-ity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this l

limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions.

With T, less than 200'F, a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.3% ak/k provides adequate protechon and is based on the results of the boron dilution accident analysis.

Since the actual overall core reactivity balance comparison required by 4.1.1.1.2 cannot be performed until after criticality is attained, this compari-son is not required (and the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not appli-4 cable) for entry into any Operational Mode within tSc first 31 EFPD following initial fuel load or refueling.

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated will require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison.

The most negative MTC value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC) was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These corrections COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 1-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 6,14

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MODERATCR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued) involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a r conc'ition of all rods inserted (most positive MDC) to an all rods withdrawn condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions.

This value of the MDC was then transformed into the limiting End of Cycle Life (EOL) HTC value. The 300 ppm surveillance limit MTC value represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting EOL I

MTC value.

1 The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning i

and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551*F. This limitation is required to ensure:

(1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum Ri or temperature.

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include:

(1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200*F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths arc required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable.

The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.6% ok/k for Unit 1 (1.3% ok/k for Unit 2) after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.

The maximum expected boration capability requirem.nt occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 15,700 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 70,702 gallons of 2400 ppm for Unit 1 (2000 ppm for Unit

2) borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 1-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 6,44,19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i

BASES B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Baron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of two charging pumps to be OPERABLE and the requirement to verify one charging pump to be inoperable below 350*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The limitation for minimum solution temperature of the borated water sources are sufficient to prevent boric acid crystallization with the highest allowable boron concentration.

The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUT-Du e MARGIN of 1.3% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F.

l Th. condition requires either 1,100 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,113 gallons of 2400 ppm for Unit 1 (2000 ppm for Unit 2) borated water from the RWST.

As listed below, the required indicated levels for the boric acid storage tanks and the RWST include allowances for required / analytical volume, unusable volume, measurement uncertainties (which include instrument error and tank tolerances, as applicable), margin, and other required volume.

Ind.

Unusable Required Measurement I

Tank MODES Level Volume Volume Uncertainty Margin Other (gal)

(gal)

(gal)

(gal)

RWST 5,6 24%

98,900 7,113 4% of span 10,293 N/A 1,2,3,4 95%

45,494 70,702 4% of span N/A 357,535*

Boric 5,6 10%

3,221 1,100 6% of span N/A N/A i

Acid 5,6 20%

3,221 1,100 6% of span 3,679 N/A Storage (gravity i

Tank feed) 1,2,3,4 50%

3,221 15,700 6% of span N/A N/A The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

r

• Additional volume required to meet Specification 3.5.4.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 1-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 5, 19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5 r

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that:

(1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. Verification that the Digital Rod Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within i 12 steps at 24, 48, 120, and 228 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 210, and 228 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurances that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.

Since the Digital Rod Position Indication System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 210 steps, only points in the indi-cated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation.

In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

For Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTIONS b and c it is incumbent upon the plant to verify the trippability of the inoperable control rod (s). This may be by verification of a control system failure, usually electrical in nature, or that the failure is associated with the control rod stepping mechanism.

In the event the plant is unable to verify the rod (s) trippability, it must be assumed to be untrippable and thus fall under the requirements of ACTION a.

Assuming a con-trolled shutdown from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER, this allows approximately four hours for this verification.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T greater than or equal to 551*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating,, ensures that the 44dsured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

(

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more fre-quent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.

These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

C0HANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 1-4 t

m 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

~

BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core pr9vides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The required indicated accumulator volumes and pressures include a 5 percent measurement uncertainty. The indicated accumulator volumes of 39%

and 61% are based on the analytical limits of 6119 gallons and 6597 gallons, respectively, plus a 1% tank tolerance.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered te be

" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required by BTP ICSB 18. This is accomplished via key-lock control board cut-off switches.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consic-eration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of two charging pumps to be OPERABLE and the requirement to verify one charging pump and all safety injection pumps i

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 5-1

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued) i to be inoperable below 350*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The requirement to remove power from certain valve operators is in accordance with Branch Technical Position ICSB-18 for valves that fail to meet single failure considerations.

Power is removed via key-lock switches on the control board.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow i

from exceeding runout conditions chen the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points f

equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injec-tion by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum' volume and boron concentration ensure that:

(1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, (2) for small break LOCA and steam line breaks, the reactor will remain subcritical in the i

cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly, (3) for large break LOCAs, the reactor will remain subtritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all shutdown and control rods fully withdrawn, and (4) sufficient time is available for the r

operator to take manual action and complete switchover of ECCS and containment spray suction to the containment sump without emptying the RWST or losing suction.

The required indicated level includes a 4-percent measurement uncertainty, an unusable volume of 45,494 gallons and a required water volume i

of 428,237 gallons.

[

The limits on indicated water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a long-term pH value of between 8.25 for Unit 1 (8.5 for Unit 2) l and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

j COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 5-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5

l 1

f 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

{

BASES r

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:

(1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a f

uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident i

in the safety analyses.

The value of 0.95 or less for K, boron concentrationincludes a 1%l Similarly, thy conservative allowance for uncertainties.

value of 2400 ppm for Unit 1 (2000 ppm for Unit 2) or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS.

This action i

prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources t

of unborated water.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION 1

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS I

i The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILIT) and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

i 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS l

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling i

station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 9-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5

REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine main hoist and auxiliary monorail hoist ensure that:

(1) the main hoist will be used for movement of fuel assemblies, (2) the auxiliary monorail hoist will be used for latching, unlatching and movement of control rod drive shafts, (3) the main hoist has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly (with control rods), (4) the auxiliary monorail hoist has sufficient load capacity to latch, unlatch and move the control rod drive shafts, and (5) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE AREAS The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in a storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped:

(1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

3 /4. 9. 8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that:

(1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140*F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and at least 23 feet

~

of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is avail-able for core. cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

l COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 9-2

l 1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A boric acid storage tank with:

i 1)

A minimum indicated borated water level of 10% when using the boric acid transfer pump, 2)

A minimum indicated borated water level of 20% when using the gravity feed connection, 3)

A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and 4)

A minimt.a solution temperature of 65*F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

i l

I)

A minimum indicated borated water level of 24%,

l 2)

A minimum boron concentration of 2400 ppm for Unit 1 (2000 ppm l

for Unit 2), and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 40*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

l COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 1-11 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5 i

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1)

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2)

Verifying the indicated borated water volume, and 3)

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 40*F.

h e

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 1-12

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specificatica 3.1.2.2:

a.

A boric acid storage tank with:

1)

A minimum indicated borated water level of 50%,

2)

A minimum baron concentration of 7000 ppm, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

4 1)

A minimum indicated borated water level of 95%,

2)

A boron concentration between 2400 ppm for Unit I (2000 ppm for Unit 2) and 2600 ppm for Unit 1 (2200 ppm for Unit 2),

3)

A minimum solution temperature of 40*F, and j

l 4)

A maximum solution temperature of 120*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

l ACTION:

a.

With the boric acid storage tank inoperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1.3% ok/k at 200*F; restore the boric acid storage tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b.

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

I l

i COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 1-13 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 6,19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5 s

I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i

i SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1)

Verifying the boron concentration in the water, 2)

Verifying the indicated borated water volume of the water source, I

and t

3)

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution. temperature when it is the source of borated water.

t b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is either less than 40*F or greater than l

120'F.

l t

r i

v I

^

l COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 1-14 a-

-r m

e i

i i

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS COLD LEG INJECTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The discharge isolation valve open with power removed,

+

b.

An indicated borated water level of between 39% and 61%

c.

A boron concentration of between 2300 ppm for Unit 1 (1900 ppm for l

Unit 2) and 2600 ppm for Unit 1 (2200 ppm for Unit 2), and 1

t d.

An indicated cover-pressure of between 623 and 644 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

a.

With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or the boron concentration outside the required values, restore the inoperable accumulator to i

OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

c.

With the boron concentration of one cold leg injection accumulator outside the required limit, restore the boron concentration to within the required limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1)

Verifying the indicated borated water level and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and

• Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 5-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5

u EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) 2)

Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is open.

b.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each indicated solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 101 gallons (12% of span) by verifying the boron concentration of the solution in the water-filled accumulator; At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1000 psig c.

by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is removed.

4.5.1.2 Each accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days by the performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL a.

OPERATIONAL TEST, and b.

At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CAllBRATION.

J j

i C0KANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 5-2

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T;y < 350'F SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3.2 All safety injection pumps shall be inoperable.

Modes 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTION:

I With a safety injection pump OPERABLE, restore all safet'y injection pumps to an inoperable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.3.2 All safety injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable

• by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 325'F, whichever occurs first and at least once per 31 days thereafter.

• An inoperable pump may be energized for testing or for filling ccumulators provided the discharge at the pump has been isolated from the RLS by a closed isolation valve (s) with power removed from the valve operator (s), or by a manual isolation valve (s) secured in the closed position.

1. xcept when Specification 3.4.8.3 is not applicable.

E COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 5-9

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS L

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum indicated borated water level of 95%,

b.

A baron concentration of between 2400 ppm for Unit 1 (2000 ppm for Unit 2) and 2600 ppm for Unit 1 (2200 ppm for Unit 2) of boron, c.

A minimum solution temperature of 40*F, and d.

A maximum solution temperature of 120*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1)

Erifying the indicated borated water volume in the tank, and 2)

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40*F or greater than 120*F.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 5-10 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that'the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:

a.

A K,,, of 0.95 or less, or b.

A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2400 ppm for Unit 1 (2000 ppm for Unit 2).*

Additionally, either valve CS-8455,or valves CS-8560, FCV-111B, CS-8439, CS-8441 and CS-8453 shall be closed and secured in position.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6.

ACTION:

a.

With the requirements a. or b. of the above not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration,Ts restored to greater than or equal to 2400 ppm for Unit I (2000 ppm for Unit 2), whichever is the more restrictive.

b.

If either valve CS-8455 or valves CS-8560, FCV-1118, CS-8439, CS-8441 and CS-8453 are not closed and secured in position, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and take action to isolate the dilution paths.

Within I hour, verify the more restrictive of 3.9.1.a or 3.9.1.b or carry out Action a. above.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a.

Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and b.

Withdrawal of any control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

4.9.1.3 Either valve CS-8455 or valves CS-8560, FCV-IllB, CS-8439, CS-8441 and 05-8453 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days to verify that dilution paths are isolated.

• During initial fuel load, the boron concentration limitation for the refueling canal is not applicable provided the refueling canal level is verified to be below the reactor vessel flange elevation at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 9-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 44,19 i

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 5

REFUELING OPERATIONS 3 /4. 9. 2 INSTRUMENTATION i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.2 As a minimum, two source range neutron flux monitors shall be OPERABLE, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6.

ACTION:

a.

With one of the above required monitors inoperable or' not operating, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

b.

With both of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, determine the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.9.2 Each source range neutron flux monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

a.

A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, b.

An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and

)

c.

An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.

C0HANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 9-2

Y '

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS.19 AND 5 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-87 AND NPF-89 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-10 3/4 5-10 3/4 9-1 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3 8 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 i