ML20056H133
| ML20056H133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056H131 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 NUDOCS 9309080268 | |
| Download: ML20056H133 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES y 3; 7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0001
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ENCLOSURE SjjpPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CONFORMANCE TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 l
l ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-313 AND 50-368
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated June 25, 1984 and May 31, 1985, the licensee submitted information regarding the implementation of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1). The NRC staff provided its Safety i
Evaluation (SE) dated December 3,1986, of the licensee's proposal for compliance with RG 1.97.
By letters dated April 13, 1984 and July 1,1985, the licensee submitted information regarding the implementation of RG 1.97 for ANO-2.
The NRC staff provided its SE dated October 23, 1986, of the licensee's proposal for I
compliance with RG 1.97.
j During the period of April 23-27, 1990, Region IV conducted an inspection of ANO-l&2, to examine the licensee's implementation of RG 1.97.
One deviation i
was found and documented in the inspection report dated May 14, 1990.
The licensee responded to the deviation by letter dated June 13, 1990.
In addition, the licensee committed to provide the results of an evaluation of AN0's approach for compliance with RG 1.97.
By letter dated July 24, 1992, the licensee submitted a report regarding the implementation of RG 1.97, Revision 3.
2.0 EVALUATION The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and has concluded that the licensee either conforms to, or is justified in deviating from, the guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 3, for each post-accident monitoring variable. The staff also concluded that the licensee's proposed changes described below are acceptable:
a)
For Category 1 instrumentation, RG 1.97 states that an instrumentation channel should be available prior to an accident except as provided in Paragraph 4.11, " Exception," of IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for 9309080268 930823 PDR ADOCK 05000313 P
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Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," or as specified in the Technical Specifications (TS).
In addition, for Category 2 instrumentation, RG 1.97 states that, where applicable or where specified by other requirements, the out-of-service interval should be based on normal TS requirements for the systea the instrumentation serves. AND Category 1 and 2, out-of-service intervals are limited to these specifically designated by TS. Unless the TS specify otherwise, the licensee has committed to return all RG 1.97 instruments to service in the following refueling outage, or sooner, if the instrumentation is available and accessible. The staff has reviewed the licensee's compliance with channel availability and found it to be acceptable.
b)
For Category 1 and 2 instrumentation, RG 1.97 states that Type A, B, and C instruments designated as Category 1 and 2 should be specifically identified with a common designation on the control panels so that the operator can easily discern that they are intended for use under accident conditions. During the April 23-27, 1990 inspection, the NRC inspectors found' that all of the applicable instruments in Unit I and approximately 12 of 32 of the. applicable instruments in Unit 2 were not specificQy identified. By letter dated July 24, 1992, the licensee has stated tut all RG 1.97, Category 1 and 2 analog indicators have been properly labeled. The remaining CRT displays and open/close indicators are not labeled due to the nature of their control room display. The staff ha; reviewed the licensee's compliance with equipment identification and found it to be acceptable.
c)
For Category 1 and 2 instrumentation, RG 1.97 states that the transmission of signals for other uses should be through isolation devices that are designated as part of the monitoring instrumentation and that meet the provisions of RG 1.97.
Where an entire instrument loop is included with the indication device, no isolation is necessary. Where Class IE instrument loops are interfaced with non-Class IE loops, the licensee has provided appropriate isolation. The staff has reviewed the licensee's compliance with instrumentation interfaces and found it to be acceptable.
d)
For Category 1, 2, and 3 instrumentation, RG 1.97 states that servicing, testing, and calibration programs should be specified to maintain the capability of the monitoring instrumentation. The licensee has stated that, for Category 1 and 2 variables, the design considerations for service, testing, calibration, removing channels from service, and setpoint access control follow the guidance of IEEE-279 for protective systems.
The licensee has stated that, although IEEE-279 was not applied to Category 3, RG 1.97 variables, the instruments are typically designed to allow service, testing, and calibration capability. The staff has reviewed the licensee's servicing, testing, and calibration programs and found them to be acceptable.
' I e)
For Category 1, 2, and 3 instrumentation, RG 1.97 states that instrumentation should be designed to facilitate the recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning components or modules. The licensee has performed a detailed human f.ctors engineering design evaluation of the control room workspa ',
instrumentation, controls, and other equipment in accordance with the i
guidance of NUREG-0700. The staff has reviewed the licensee's human factors engineering design consideration program and found it to 19 in compliance with RG 1.97.
f)
For Categories 1, 2, and 3 instrumentation, RG 1.97 states that, to the extent practicable, monitoring instrumentation inputs should be from sensors that directly measure the desired variables. The licensee has stated that, with the exception of Type D cooling water flow to Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems, the ANO RG 1.97 variables are provided in the range units recommended by RG 1.97.
The deviation for Type D cooling water flow to ESF systems was granted by the NRC in an SE dated December 3, 1986. The staff has reviewed the licensee's direct measurement of RG 1.97 variables, and found it to be in compliance with RG 1.97.
g)
During the Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection for ANO-2, the inspectors noted that, approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> into a station blackout condition, inverters 2Y13 and 2Y24 could be potentially shed.
Shedding would in turn cause power to be lost to the instrumentation supplying the RG 1.97 variable " degrees to subcooling." The licensee has r
stated that core exit thermocouple or Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hot leg temperature and RCS pressure can be used to calculate saturation temperature. These instruments are powered by Class IE uninterruptible power and are not shed under station blackout conditions. The staff has reviewed the licensee's use of alternate instrumentation for determining degrees to subcooling and found it to be acceptable.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Based on our review of the licensee's submittals, we find that ANO-l&2 design is either in conformance with, or justified in deviating from, the guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 3 for each post-accident monitoring variable.
Principal Contributor:
H. Rathbun, HICB t
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