ML20056E885
| ML20056E885 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1993 |
| From: | Burdick T, Frank Ehrhardt, Hansen J, Lennartz J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056E879 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-OL-93-02, 50-295-OL-93-2, NUDOCS 9308250265 | |
| Download: ML20056E885 (13) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-295/0L-93-02(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 I
Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Zion Generating Station Examination Administered At:
Zion Generating Station; Zion Training Center Zion, Illinois l
Examination Conducted: Weeks of July 12 and 19,1993 RIII Examiners: I ff/S/f]
J. Hinsen Date
'f 4
8/n / 93 F. Ehrhardt Date Tk 2lltl43 Chief Examiner:
A J. Lennartz Date b
Approved By: 36%
'b [l6 ' T )
T. Burdick, Chief Date j
Operator Licensing Section 2 l
Examination Summary Examination administered on July 12 - 21. 1993.
(Recort No. 50-295/0L-93-02 (DRS)) Initial written and operating examinations were administered to four reactor operator (RO) candidates and four senior reactor operator (SRO) candidates; and a simulator retake examination was administered to one R0 candidate.
Additionally, a requalification examination was administered to one SR0; and a written retake requalification examination was administered to one SRO.
Results:
Regarding the initial examinations: Four R0 candidates passed the examinations; one R0 candidate passed the operating examination and failed the 9308250265 930818 PDR ADOCK 05000295 V
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written examination; three SR0 candidates passed the examinations; and one SR0 candidate passed the written examination and failed the operating examination.
l Regarding the requalification examination: Both SR0s passed.
The following is a summary of strengths and weaknesses noted during performance of this examination:
Strenaths Training staff support during examination validation and administration (Section 4).
l Weaknesses e
Reference material provided to the NRC for examination development (Section 4).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Examiners J. Lennartz, NRC, Chief Examiner J. Hansen, NRC F. Ehrhardt, NRC T. Vehec, PNL 2.
Persons Contacted Licensee Representatives
+ R. Tuetken, Site Vice President
+ E. Broccolo, Jr., Station Manager
+ D. Wozniak, Technical Superintendent
+*L. Laspisa, Zion Training Supervisor
+*T. Koleno, Zion Training
+*N. Valos, Operating
+ K. Hansing, Operating Engineer
+ G. Beale, Regulatory Assurance
+ H. Logaras, Safety Quality Verification
+*D. Selph, Zion Training
+*K. Gerling, PWR Training Supervisor
- J.
Schleif, Simulator Instructor
- G.
Smith, Simulator Instructor
- D. Phillips, Simulator Instructor
- M. Lindemann, Simulator Instructor U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission (NRC)
- J. D. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
+*J. Kramer, Examiner, NRC Region V
+ Present at the management exit meeting on July 21, 1993.
- Present at the training staff exit meeting on July 21, 1993.
3.
Initial License Proaram Observations The following information is provided for evaluation by the licensee via their SAT based training program. No response is required.
a.
Written Examination Strenaths The examination pre-review conducted by the facility was e
thorough and considered valuable in the development of a plant specific valid examination. These efforts were reflected by the small number of post review comments.
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b.
Job Performance Measures (JPMs)
Weaknesses e
Candidates had difficulty finding specific requirements in the administrative procedures. The_ candidates were considered weak regarding knowledge of and familiarity with plant administrative procedures.
]
o Many candidates incorrectly determined Technical l
Specification minimum shift staffing requirements for one i
l unit at 100% power and the other unit conducting a startup.
c.
Dynamic Simulator Scenarios Strenaths e
Communications between candidates was considered improved from previous examinations.
l 4.
Trainino. Operations. Security. Radiation Protection. Other Strenaths_
e The licensees' training staff support and efforts during dynamic simulator and JPM examination validation and administration was I
excellent.
e The examiners received complete cooperation from security and i
health physics personnel to expedite entrance to the plant. This j
precluded any unnecessary delays in examination administration.
i Weaknesses
]
e The reference material provided to the NRC for examination development was considered poor. This resulted in difficulty in developing a plant specific valid examination based on_ licensee l
learning objectives. The following are examples of identified I
reference material deficiencies:
1.
P& ids _ and logics were not included with the original shipment of requested material.
2.
Original shipment of material included ten System Descriptions that contained only odd numbered pages of material. This was identified to the licensee and new material was requested. However,- the second shipment of material also contained only odd numbered pages for some System Descriptions.
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3.
Lesson plans with learning objectives were not provided in the original shipment for many procedures including Abnormal Operating Procedures, Dr.:.rgency Operating Procedures, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and Administrative l
Procedures.
4.
Many Administrative Procedures applicable to the Operations Department were not provided in the original shipment.
Several procedure deficiencies were identified by the NRC. None of the identified deficiencies precluded successful completion of the related tasks by any of the candidates. These deficiencies were identified to the licensee for their evaluation and determination of any applicable corrective actions. The following are examples of procedure deficiencies identified by the NRC:
1.
ECA-0.0, " Loss of All AC Power," Appendix G, " Local Operation of SG A Atmospheric Relief Valve," did not contain a step to open the regulator outlet isolation valve. This valve must be opened in order to accomplish the task.
2.
SOI-1E, Section 5.5, " Starting or Bumping D Reactor Coolant Pump," required the operator to verify an annunciator that did not exist. The procedure required verification that "RCP D Seal Water Bypass Flow Low" annunciator was not energized prior to starting the RCP. However, this annunciator has been removed from the control board annunciator panels. This deficiency was also present in the applicable sections for l
the other three RCPs.
l S.
Reaualification Trainina Proaram Observations No strengths or weaknesses regarding the requalification examinations were observed.
NUREG-1021, " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," Section 601,
" Administration of NRC Requalification Program Evaluations," requires a minimum sample size of 12 licensees to conduct a requalification program l
evaluation. Only two licensees were administered requalification I
examinations (one being a written retake only) and therefore a program i
evaluation will not be conducted.
6.
Written Examination Review l
Licensee representatives reviewed the written examination prior to l
administration and appropriate changes were incorporated into the 4
examinations by the NRC. Following examination administration the l
facility was given a copy of the R0 and SR0 examinations and answer keys l
for review. The facility's post examination comments and the NRC resolutions are noted in Enclosure 2.
5 i
The post examination review of the written examination by the NRC identified the following deficiencies in the candidates' knowledge. A majority of the candidates failed to provide the correct response for each particular knowledge area examined.
The maximum allowable concentration of hydrogen or oxygen in the e
Waste Gas System. (SRO question 009) e Plant conditions that would invalidate the containment radioactive 3
release form prior to starting the containment purge. (SRO l
question 023; R0 question 032) e The adverse effects of air entering the stator water cooling tank.
(SR0 question 045; R0 question 058) e Parameters that would be utilized by the operator to diagnose a steam generator tube rupture in a faulted steam generator. (SR0 question 049; R0 question 066) e Reactor coolant system (RCS) conditions that would require a reactor trip in accordance with Standing Order 92-14, revision 2, for decreasing RCS temperature. (SR0 question 088; R0 question 094) e Indications of reactor coolant pump number three seal not fully a
seated. (R0 question 047) e The cause of reactor coolant system pressure response based on given conditions. (R0 question 042)
The NRC post review of the written examination also identified that the R0 examination answer key was incorrect for question 024. The answer key indicated choice "a" as the correct response when it should have been choice "b". The answer key was modified to reflect choice "b" as the correct response and the examinations were graded accordingly.
l 7.
Simulation Facility Observations Simulator fidelity discrepancies were identified during the examination and are noted in Enclosure 4, " Simulation Facility Report."
8.
Exit Meetina i
Exit meetings with the Zion Generating Station management and training staff were held on July 21, 1993. Those attending the meetings are listed'in Section 2 of this report. The following items were. discussed during the exit meetings:
Strengths and weaknesses noted in Sections 3 and 4 of this report.
e Simulator items as noted in Enclosure 4, " Simulation Facility Report."
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i FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTION OF COMMENTS R0 OUESTION 067/SR0 OVESTION 050:
WHICH ONE (1) of the following is an indication of a loss of condenser vacuum per A0P-3.4, " Condenser and Circulating Water Malfunctions"?
a.
Increasing flow from the gland steam condenser.
b.
Increasing output as indicated on the Generator Megawatt meter.
c.
Decreasing circulating water inlet temperature, d.
Decreasing condenser hotwell level.
ANSWER:
a.
[1.0]
REFERENCE:
1.
Zion - A0P - 3.4, Symptoms 2.
Zion - PSC-23c, Obj. 6, Pg 18 3.
Both R0 and SRO.
4.
K/A - 000051G011 (2.7/2.9) 000051G011
..(K/A's)
ZION COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION:
1 The correct answer for this question per the answer key is distractor a l
" Increasing flow from the gland steam condenser."
In reviewing the Annunciator Response Manual (ARM) 12-9C(attached) the immediate actions for the operator on a high flow indication is to place the controller in manual l
and attempt to decrease flow, where the low flow indication at power is l
indicative of a loss of condenser vacuum and will direct the operator to A0P-l 3.4, " Condenser and Circulating Water Malfunctions". The symptoms for A0P-3.4 I
are attached. Through the process of elimination, distractors b and c would be the cause or outcome of an increasing condenser vacuum, the most logical answer would be distractor d " Decreasing condenser hotwell level".
Please review this cuestion for deletion from both examinations. This question was not noted during the pre-exam review.
NRC RESOLUTION:
Comment accepted. This question was deleted from both examinations.
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R0 OVESTION 078/SR0 OVESTION 071 Given the following:
A large break LOCA has occurred.
- The operators are using E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant".
- Adverse containment conditions were identified for radiation and pressure.
- Radiation level is now at 10E4 R/Hr inside containment.
- Containment pressure is now at 4 psig.
WHICH ONE (1) of the following describes when the operators may stop the use of adverse containment numbers in the mitigation of this event?
a.
When containment pressure decreases to less than the adverse containment setpoint.
b.
When containment radiation decreases to less than the adverse containment setpoint.
c.
When an evaluation of total integrated dose is performed by the TSC.
d.
When I&C completes continuity calibration checks on containment instrumentation.
ANSWER:
i c.
[1.0]
I
REFERENCE:
1.
Zion - E-0, Note prior to Step 8, Pg. 10.
2.
SIM-LO-41, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L/P, Obj. 4 3.
Both R0 and SR0 4.
K/A - 0000llA208 (3.4/3.9) 000011A208
..(K/A's)
ZION COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION The given condition in the' question stem stating " Radiation level is now at 10E4 R/Hr inside containment." is of concern. When 10E4 R/Hr is simplified it is 1E5 R/Hr and the threshold at which adverse containment parameters are enforced. The note on page 10 of E-0 (attached) states "if containment radiation level decreases to less than IES R/Hr ADVERSE CONTAINMENT setpoints and limits should be used until an evaluation of total integrated dose is performed by the TSC." This may have caused some candidates to choose distractor b as the correct answer and not c.
We believe the question which was intended to read 1.0E4 R/Hr but an error in the electronic scanning resulted in a value of 10E4 R/Hr. A general statement was made during the pre-exam review of this scanning error but may not have been noted for this specific question. Please review this auestion for possibly havino two correct answers.
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NRC RESOLUTION:
Comment accepted. The answer key has been modified to accept choice "b" or "c" as a correct response.
I R0 OVESTION 091/SR0 OVESTION 085 WHICH ONE (1) of the following describes the use of " BULLET" action steps in the E0P's?
a.
Must all be performed prior to proceeding to the next Action step.
b.
Indicate special cautions which should be carefully considered by the operator prior to proceeding.
l c.
Non-sequential steps which MAY be performed in any order.
c.
Sequential steps which MUST be performed in order.
ANSWER:
l c.
[1.0]
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REFERENCE:
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1.
Zion - ZAP - 300-02b, Use of E0Ps 2.
Zion - SIM-LO-41, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L/P, Obj. 4.
3.
Both R0 and SRO.
4.
K/A - 194001A102 (4.1/3.9) 194001A102
..(KA's)
I ZION COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION:
In reviewing ZAP 300.02B(attached), Zion station does not use the term i
" bullets" to identify how action steps in the E0Ps should be completed.
Per the ZAP, only lower case letters and dashes are used to indicate action step 4
l requirements or performance. This question was not noted during the pre-exam
)
review.
NRC RESOLUTION:
Comment accepted. The question is not valid for Zion Station and has been deleted from both examinations.
R0 OVESTION 045:
WHICH ONE (12) of the following statements describes the turbine trip provided by the ATWS mitigation system?
a.
Actuates OPC to trip the turbine, b.
Actuates reactor protection system to trip the turbine.
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i 3.
Lesson plans with learning objectives were not provided in the original shipment for many procedures including Abnormal Operating Procedures, Emergency Operating Procedures, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and Administrative i
Procedures.
l 4.
Many Administrative Procedures applicable to the Operations Department were not provided in the original shipment.
Several procedure deficiencies were identified by the NRC. None of the identified deficiencies precluded successful completion of the related tasks by any of the candidates. These deficiencies were identified to the licensee for their evaluation and determination of any applicable corrective actions. The following are examples of procedure deficiencies identified by the NRC.
1.
ECA-0.0, " Loss of All AC Power," Appendix G, " Local Operation of SG A Atmospheric Relief Valve," did not contain a step to open the regulator outlet isolation valve. This valve must be opened in order to accomplish the task.
r 2.
S0I-1E, Section 5.5, " Starting or Bumping D Reactor Coolant i
Pump," required the operator to verify an annunciator that did not exist. The procedure required verification that "RCP D Seal Water Bypass Flow Low" annunciator was not energized i'
prior to starting the RCP. However, this annunciator has been removed from the control board annunciator panels. This deficiency was also present in the applicable sections for the other.three RCPs.
r 5.
Reaualification Trainina Proaram Observations No strengths or weaknesses regarding the requalification examinations i
were observed.
j NUREG-1021, " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," Section 601,
" Administration of NRC Requalification Program Evaluations," requires a minimum sample size of 12 licensees to conduct a requalification program evaluation. Only two licensees were administered requalification examinations (one being a written retake only) and therefore a program evaluation will not be conducted.
6.
Written Examination Review Licensee representatives reviewed the written examination prior to administration and appropriate changes were incorporated into the examinations by the NRC. Following examination administration the facility.was given a copy of the R0 and SR0 examinations and answer keys for review. The facility's post examination comments and the NRC resolutions are noted in Enclosure 2.
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,_,,-__m
T c.
Actuates electrical overspeed solenoid to trip the turbine.
d.
Actuates auto stop oil solenoid to trip the turbine.
P ANSWER:
b.
[1.0]
REFERENCE:
1.
Zion - PSC-42, Obj, 4b, Pg 10 2.
Zion - Drawing (Reference not provided).
3.
R0 Only.
4.
K/A - 012000K603 (3.1/3.5) 012000K603
..(K/A's)
ZION COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION:
During the pre-exam review question (44) was changed to the written question (45) administered on the R0 exam and the answer was changed to match the revised question. The answer key for the administered R0 exam has the correct answer as b, which was correct for the question (44) prior to the pre-exam review team's revision (attached).
Please correct the answer key to reflect answer d. as the correct response for the revised auestion (45).
i NRC/ RESOLUTION Comment accepted. The answer key has been modified to accept choice "d" as I
the correct response.
A
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i SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT l
f Facility Licensee: Zion Generating Station j
l Facility Licensee Docket Nos.:
50-295; 50-304 l
t Operating Tests Administered On: Week of July 12, 1993.
[
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do y
l not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
i These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the I
simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in j
future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these
~
observations.
t I
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
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l JTEM DESCRIPTION l
- 1. "D" RCP oil lift pump.
The "D" RCP oil lift pump would trip l
immediately after it was started for start of "D" RCP. A simulator work request (No.
'{
004497) has been written by the facility to correct this.
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- 2. Instrument air containment The instrument air containment isolation isolation valves.
valves (IA-01A and IA-OlB) inadvertently I
closed at various times. A simulator work '
l request (No. U04493) has been written by l
l the facility to correct this.
- 3. Steamline radiation monitor.
No abnormal radiation was indicated on "B"
'i SG main steamline with an 800 gpm SG tube rupture event concurrent with two safety i
valves stuck open on "B" SG (1 million lbm/hr flow) and the main steam isolation i
valve closed. A simulator. work' request (No. UO4489) has been written by the j
facility to correct this.
i
- 4. Operators Superbee Computer.
The data on the Operators Superbee Computer listed as PT-6 (containment spray
[
pump test) did not contain the required-pump data. Instead, control' rod bank l
position data was displayed.
IlfM DESCRIPTION l
- 5. Delta-I limits exceeded The Delta-I limits exceeded annunciator annunciator (Panel 8, alarmed with delta-I indicating -5%. The Window 6A) alarm setpoint was +6% to -7% from target value. The target value for the given conditions was -1% and the alarm should not have energized until delta-I was -8%.
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