ML20056E203

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Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 93-20 on 930602
ML20056E203
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 06/15/1993
From: Chaffee A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Grimes B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-93-020, OREM-93-20, NUDOCS 9308200256
Download: ML20056E203 (20)


Text

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support FROM: Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support

SUBJECT:

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING JUNE 2, 1993 - BRIEFING 93-20 On June 2, 1993, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events Briefing (93-20) to inform senior managers from offices of the ACRS, EDO, NRR, AEOD, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on May 26, 1993.

Enclosure 1 lists the attendees. Enclosure 2 presents the significant elements of the discussed events.

Enclosure 3 contains reactor scram statistics for the week ending May 30, 1993. No significant events were identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.

- original signed by Robert-L. Dennig for -

Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support

Enclosures:

As stated DISTRIBUTION:

Central Files cc w/ attachments: PDR See next page LKilgore, SECY EAB R/F KGray RDennig EGoodwin DSkeen EBenner EAB: DOR :NRR IRB:DO.:AEOD PPD:OIP EAB: DORS:NRR KGray JG Te KHenderson EGoodwin (10/t3/ 93 6 /.){793 h/ /93 f/]/93 EA :NRR A

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T. Murley, NRR (12G18) C. Trammell (PDS)

F. Miraglia, NRR (12G18) T. Quay (PDS)

F. Gillespie, NRR (12G18) W. Huffman (AEOD)

J. Partlow, NRR (12G18) J. Giitter (AEOD)

S. Varga, NRR (14E4)

J. Calvo, NRR (14A4)

G. Lainas, NRR (14H3)

J. Roe, NRR (13E4)

J. Zwolinski, NRR (13H24)

E. Adensam, NRR (13E4)

W. Russell, NRR (12G18)

J. Richardson, NRR (7D26)

A. Thadani, NRR (8E2)

S. Rosenberg, NRR (10E4)

C. Rossi, NRR (9A2)

B. Boger, NRR (10H3)

F. Congel, NRR (10E2)

D. Crutchfield, NRR (11H21)

W. Travers, NRR (11B19)

D. Coe, ACRS (P-315)

E. Jordan, AEOD (MN-3701)

G. Holahan, AEOD (MN-9112)

L. Spessard, AEOD (MN-3701)

K. Brockman, AEOD (MN-3206)

S. Rubin, AEOD (MN-5219)

M. Harper, AEOD (MN-9112)

G. Grant, EDO (17G21)

R. Newlin, GPA (2GS)

E. Beckjord, RES (NLS-OO7)

A. Bates, SECY (16G15)

G. Rammling, OCM (16G15)

T. Martin, Region I W. Kane, Region I C. Hehl, Region I S. Ebneter, Region II E. Merschoff, Region II S. Vias, Region II J. Martin, Region III E. Greenman, Region III J. Milhoan, Region IV B. Beach, Region IV B. Faulkenberry, Region V K. Perkins, Region V bec: Mr. Sam Newton, Manager Events Analysis Department Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-5957  !

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  • W ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS FULL BRIEFING (93-20)

JUNE 2, 1993 NAME OFFICE NAME OFFICE F. MIRAGLIA NRR J. HOLMES NRR B. GRIMES NRR R. PIERSON NRR A. CHAFFEE NRR T. KIM NRR E. BENNER NRR D. SCALETTI NRR K. GRAY NRR G. ZECH NRR E. GOODWIN NRR -

R. GALLO NRR S. WITTENBERG NRR R. ECKENRODE NRR P. ENG NRR G. BAGCHI NRR W. LYON NRR H. CONRAD NRR G. THOMAS NRR W. HUFFMAN AEOD S. LONG NRR J. GIITTER AEOD T. COX NRR V. BENAROYA AEOD C. ROSSI NRR L. PLISCO OEDO W. SCOTT NRR D. COE ACRS E. THROM NRR D. KIRSCH RV TELEPHONE ATTENDANCE (AT ROLL CALL)

Regions Resident Inspectors Region I Palo Verde Region II Region III Region IV Region V IIT/AIT Team Leaders Misc.

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OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 93-20 LOCATION: 10 B11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 1993, 11:00 A.M.

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PALO VERDE, UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (AIT - UPDATE)

NAR0RA ATOMIC POWER STATION FIRE AND BLACK 0UT q

l PRESENTED BY: EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT, NRR

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93-20 PALO VERDE, UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (AIT - UPDATE)

MARCH 14, 1993 PROBLEM STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (SGTR) OCCURRED.

CAUSE CAUSE OF TUBE DEGRADATION AND FAILURE IS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -

SGTRs CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT OFFSITE RELEASES IF Ul1 MITIGATED.

.S_EQUENCE OF EVENTS (ALL TIMES ARE MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME) 04:25 OPERATORS NOTE DECREASING PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE. THIRD CHARGING PUMP IS STARTED.

PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTINUE TO DECREASE.

04:47 REACTOR TRIPPED MANUALLY. UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED.

04:48 SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNALS INITIATED AUTOMATICALLY AT 1837 PSIA.

05:02 ALERT DECLARED BASED ON TUBE LEAK GREATER THAN THE CAPABILITY OF ONE CHARGING PUMP (44 GPM) .

CONTACT: E. BENNER, NRR/ DORS AIT: YES

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50.72 #25255, SIGEVENT: YES PN59309, AND PN59309A-C

O o PALO VERDE, 93-20 UNIT 2 05:35 PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE STABILIZED AT 8% AND 1900 PSIG, RESPECTIVELY, USING ALL THREE CHARGING PUMPS AND HIGH-PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION. MINIMUM PRESSURE REACHED WAS 1687 PSIA.

06:05 LICENSEE INITIATED C00LD0WN AND DEPRESSURIZATION USING STEAM BYPASS AND PRESSURIZER SPRAY.

07:28 STEAM GENERATOR 2 ISOLATED.

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08:00 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE REDUCED TO 1160 PSIG AND 496*F, RESPECTIVELY.

FOLLOWUP '

AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM NOTED THE FOLLOWING WEAKNESSES:

s SGTR WAS A SIMULATOR TRAINING SCENARIO; HOWEVER,  !

TRAINING INDICATED THAT RADIATION MONITORING (RM)

ALARMS WOULD OCCUR PROMPTLY UPON EVENT INITIATION.

  • RM SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE RELIABLE INDICATION OF SGTR:

SG BLOWDOWN: ISOLATED FOR MOST OF EVENT MAIN STEAM LINE MONITORS: CEASED ALARMING DUE TO H-16 DECAY.

AIR EJECTOR: HIGH SETP0 INT AND CALIBRATION ERRORS WASTE GAS AREA: UNDOCUMENTED SETPOINT CHANGE e WHEN CLASSIFYING EVENT, SOME OPERATORS DISCOUNTED INITIAL INDICATIONS OF A LEAK IN EXCESS OF CHARGING CAPACITY BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO DETERMINE LEAK SOURCE.

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O O PALO VERDE, 93-20 e INABILITY TO EXIT THE FUNCTIONAL REC 0VERY PROCEDURE l INTO THE SGTR OPTIMAL REC 0VERY PROCEDURE RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANTLY LONGER C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION.

PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT BRANCH PROVIDED CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY OF GENERIC SGTR:

7.7x104 . l

NRR ACTION PLAN

o CONFIRM EDDY-CURRENT TESTING SKILL 0F ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE (APS) AND CONTRACTOR.

e UNDERSTAND AND INFORMALLY ASSESS APS PLAN FOR DETERMINING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE TUBE FAILURE. AGREE ON THE SPECIFIC TUBE PULLS AND THE REMAINDER OF THE EDDY-CURRENT TESTING TO BE DONE.

e EVALUATE THE ROOT CAUSE OF TUBE DEGRADATION AND FAILURE.

e EVALUATE AN APPROPRIATE OPERATING INTERVAL FOR THE NEXT CYCLE BASED ON THE ROOT CAUSE.

REGION V IS CONSIDERING ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT FOR THE INAPPROPRIATE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION.

AN INFORMATION NOTICE IS BEING DRAFTED ON THE INABILITY OF EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (E0Ps) TO IDENTIFY A SGTR.

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l PALO VERDE, 93-20 UlfIT 2 l

COMBUSTION ENGINEERING HAS INDICATED THAT El4ERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES PROVIDE ADEQUATE DETECTION OF A SGTR.

PALO VERDE E0Ps DID NOT 14EET GUIDELINES IN THAT THERE WERE NO PROVISIONS FOR TRENDING AND THAT ALARii SETP0INTS WERE lion-C0llSERVATIVE.

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O O 93-20 NARORA ATOMIC POWER STATION (NAPS)

FIRE AND BLACK 0UT .

MARCH 31, 1993 EVEllT i A SEVERE FIRE OCCURRED IN THE UNIT 1 TURBIME BUILDING RESULTING IN AN EXTENDED STATION BLACK 0UT (LOSS OF ALL 0FF SITE AND ONSITE ELECTRICAL POWER). ,

CAUSE ,

CURRENTLY, CAUSE OF THE FIRE AND THE RESULTANT STATION BLACK 0UT ARE UNKNOWN. -

SAFETY SIGi1IFICAllCE -

EXTENDED STATION BLACK 0UT HAS A HIGH POTENTIAL FOR:

- LOSS OF CORE COOLING OR HEAT SINK

- FUEL DAMAGE

- LOSS OF CONTAll1 MENT

- RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS TO THE ENVIRONMENT BACKGROUND e INDIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT ISOLATED FROM THE SUPPORT OF WESTERN NATIONS.

CONSEQUENTLY, INDIA'S REACTOR DESIGNS, COMPONENT MANUFACTURING, AND CONSTRUCTION IS ALMOST TOTALLY INDIGEN0US.

  • MOST OF INDIA'S COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS UTILIZE PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTORS.

CONTACT: W. HUFFMAN, AE0D/IRB ,

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e o l HARORA 93-20 e THE INDIAN REACTOR DESIGNS HAVE EVOLVED CONSIDERABLY i

FROM THEIR EARLY CANDU ROOTS BUT STILL EMPLOY THE BASIC CANDU PROCESS FEATURES OF:

- NATURAL URANIUM FUEL

- HEAVY WATER COOLANT & MODERATOR

- ON LINE REFUELING e SOME OF THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE NAR0RA PLANTS INCLUDE:

POWER OUTPUT OF 790 MWT/235 MWE PRIMARY PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE 1235 PSI & 520 F DOUBLE CONTAINMENT WITH SUPPRESSION POOL INDEPENDENT AND DIVERSE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS HIGH, INTERMEDIATE AND LOW PRESSURE ECCS WITH LONG TERM RECIRC CAPABILITY '

DIESEL GENERATORS FOR EMERGENCY POWER e COMMON DESIGN FEATURES WHICH HAR0RA DOES NOT POSSESS INCLUDE:

STEAM TURBINE DRIVEN EMERGENCY INJECTION OR FEED PUMPS PRIMARY SYSTEM ACCUMULATOR INJECTION TANKS i

Q q NAR0RA 93-20 CHRON0 LOGY OF EVENTS e AT 3:31 AM (LOCAL TIME) ON MARCH 31, 1993, PLANT PERSONNEL REPORTEDLY HEARD A LOUD EXPLOSION IN THE TURBINE BUILDING.

UNIT 1 WAS OPERATING AT 85% POWER UNIT 2 WAS SHUTDOWN IN A MAINTENANCE OUTAGE.

  • A FIRE WAS OBSERVED IN THE VICINITY OF THE UNIT 1 TURBINE GENERATOR. NO FIRE OR SM0KE DETECTORS ALARMS WERE RECEIVED PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSION.
  • THE REACTOR AND TURBINE GENERATOR WERE IMMEDIATELY TRIPPED. (CONFLICTING INFORMATION ON WHETHER TRIP WAS AUT0liATIC OR MANUAL)
  • WITHIN FIVE MINUTES OF EXPLOSION, A COMPLETE STATION BLACK 0UT OCCURRED.

i e A SITE EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED.

  • FIRE FIGHTING TEAMS WERE DISPATCHED TO THE SCENE.  !

l TWO FIRE ENGINES STATIONED AT THE SITE WERE l IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO COMBAT THE BLAZE.

FIVE FIRE ENGINES FROM SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES WERE ALSO CALLED ONTO THE SITE FOR HELP.

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NAR0RA 93-20 e LONG TERM NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLING 0F THE CORE (REFERRED TO AS THERM 0 SYPHONING) ESTABLISHED USING STEAM GENERATORS AS A HEAT SINK AND MAKEUP FROM DIESEL ,

DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS.

o ADDITIONAL SHUTDOWN MARGIN WAS PROVIDED BY MANUAL GRAVITY ADDITION OF B0RON TO THE MODERATOR.

  • FIRE WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AT 5:30 AM AND COMPLETELY EXTINGUISHED BY 8:30 AM.
  • STATION BLACK 0UT PERSISTED FOR 10 TO 12 HOURS. POWER WAS SOMEH0W FULLY OR PARTIALLY RE-ESTABLISHED TO THE CLASS III BUSES.

e EMERGENCY WAS TERMINATED AT 10:45 PM ON MAR"H 31, 1993.  !

  • NO ONSITE OR OFFSITE RELEASE OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL  :

WAS REPORTED.

1

. DISCUSSION e

INITIAL RESPONSE TO STATION BLACK 0UT WOULD BE T0:

- VERIFY CORE COOLING VIA THERM 0 SYPHONING

- C00LDOWN/DEPRESSURIZE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY

- ESTABLISH A LONG TERM HEAT SINK e

THERM 0 SYPHONING SHOULD OCCUR WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS ASSUMING A NORMAL POST TRIP STEAM GENERATOR WATER INVENTORY.

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O O NAR0RA 93-20 1

o INITIAL SHUTDOWN INVENTORY IN THE STEAM GENERATORS WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT FOR ~30 MINUTES OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL.

. SINCE T'AERE ARE NO STEAM DRIVEN TURBINE PUMPS AT l NAR0RA, THE ONLY METHOD 0F SUPPLYING WATER TO THE STEAM GENERATORS WAS WITH THE DIESEL DRIVEN FIRE WATER PUMPS.  ;

ACTION REQUIRED TO USE THE DIESEL FIRE PUMPS TO FEED SG's DEPENDS ON PLANT DESIGN. MAY HAVE BEEN HARD-PIPED. MAY HAVE REQUIRED INSERTION OF A SP0OL  ;

PIECE; FLANGE REMOVAL; HOSE CONNECTIONS; ETC. l

  • OPERATORS WOULD HAVE INITIATED A " CRASH C00LD0WN" TO DEPRESSURIZE THE STEAM GENERATORS BELOW THE DISCHARGE l I

HEAD OF THE FIRE PUMPS. THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY OPENING THE STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES.

o LONG TERM CONSIDERATIONS RESULTING FROM THE EXTENDED NATURE OF THIS BLACK 0UT.

BATTERIES WERE PROBABLY LOST WITHIN FIRST TWO HOURS OF EVENT. WITHOUT BATTERIES:

o PROCESS MONITORING WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST o BREAKER MANIPULATION COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN PERFORMED MANUALLY IDENTIFICATION OF LONG TERM FUEL AND WATER SUPPLY FOR THE DIESEL FIRE PUMPS WOULD BE REQUIRED.

. q g NAR0RA 93-20 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS HAD REFUELING BEEN IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, COOLING 0F REFUELING MACHINE SPENT FUEL COULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR PROBLEM HOW WAS THE FIRE MAIN HEADER PRESSURE MAINTAINED WHEN THE DIESEL FIRE PUMPS WERE SUPPLYING WATER TO THE SG's?

HOW DID THIS AFFECT THE FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITY?

LOSS OF EMERGENCY LIGHTING WOULD HAVE MADE BUILDING

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MANEUVERING DIFFICULT.

HOW WERE COMMUNICATIONS MAINTAINED?

SUMMARY

o EVENT WAS A CLOSE CALL. MAY HAVE RESULTED IN FUEL DAMAGE IF DIESEL FIRE PUMPS HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE MAKEUP FEED TO THE STEAM GENERATORS.

e THE EXPLOSION AND FIRE DAMAGE TO THE TURBINE GENERATOR INCLUDED: DAMAGE TO TURBINE BLADES; BEARING DAMAGE; AND EXTENSIVE DAMAGE -11) ELECTRICAL CABLES.

REPAIR ESTIMATES RANGE FROM $1.5 TO $47 MILLION REPAIR TIME FROM 4 MONTHS TO ONE YEAR

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' NAR0RA 93-20 o LESSONS TO BE LEARNED WILL HAVE TO AWAIT THE RELEASE OF SPECIFIC DETAILS ON THE EVENT.

  • A FOLLOWUP PRESENTATION WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN THE EVENT DETAILS BECOME KNOWN.

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MO ATOR N E tsATURAL WATER CONDENSATE I i HE AVY WATER COOLANT I v E HEAVY WATER MODERATOR yy;.

MODERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER FIGURE 1.2-3 _ _ , ,

CANDU Reactor Simplified Flow Diagram

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' ' O A w w ENCLOSURE 3 RE ACfDR SCRM teporting Period: 05/24/93 to 05/30/93 YTD Y1D ABOVE BELOW YTD E risNT & Uw!T PMG M Ca J5E r>Ptitaitows , jjj $ TCTat CS/24/93 FILL 5tDhE 2 100 SA Maintenance Error WO 2 1 3 05/25/93 EROWs FEEDY 2 1 SN Operating Error No 0 1 1 C5/25/73 FITU ATRICt 1 6 5A Equipment Failure NO 2 1 3 k

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acte: Year to cate (yid) Tetats include Events within the talendar tear Indicated By the Erd cate of the specified Eeporting period ET$ 10 Fage:1 06/C2/73 I

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COMPAR!$0h DF VEEKLY SCR AM STATISTICS VITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES PERICD ENDING 05/30/93 WUMSER 1993 1992 1991* 1990* 1989*

OF WEKLf WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLT WEELLY Sgpaw taUSE SCE8% AVE R AGE AVERAGE AVE R AGE AVE RA GE . AVE R AGE (YTD)

F06'EP GREATER ThAh OR EQUAL TO 15%

E0V!PMENT FAltuPE' O 2.1 2.6 2.9 3.4 3.1 LESICA/!hSTAttAT1DA IKRDR* 0 0.1 - - - -

0 FEE ATlkG EE ADR* O 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.0 MAthTEhAACE ERROR

  • 1 0.5 0.4 - - -

ENTERNAL* 0 0.1 - - - - l cieER* 0 0.0 0.2 - -

0.1 Subtotal 1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.2

  • 0JER LESS TkAN 15%

E0JIPPEkT F AILURE* 1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 CESIGA/1hSTALLAT10h ERROR

  • O 0.0 - - - -

l Or[aAT!hG EERDR* 1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3  !

PA! ATEAANCE ER ADR* O 0.0 0.1 - - -

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EXTERhAL* O C.0 - - - -

CTHER* 0 0.0 0.1 - - -

Suttotat 2 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 TOTAL 3 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.4 4.8 1993 1992 1991 1990 19P9 ko. OF WEEKLT WEEKLT WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY ttsaw Tvrf SCRAMS AVE R AGE AVERAGE AVE R AGE AVERAGE AVE R AGE iTTD)

TCTA AUTOMATIC SCRAF5 2 2.5 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.9 TOTAL PAWUAL SCRAMS 1 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.9 TCTAi$ MAY DIFFER SECAUSE OF F0aN01kG OFF

  • Detailed breakdo.<n not in database f or 1991 and earlier

- Eh1EE AAL casse included in 1031PMENT FAltuRE

- WAl%TE AAACE EEROR and DES 104/lkST Att AT10N ERROR causes included in OPER AT1hG ERROR

- OTHER cause ircluded in EQUlrME AT I A! LURE 1991 and 1990 l

E75-14 Fase: 1 06/02/93

. . A a w w NOTES

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY.

SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPEPATING LICENSE.

2. PERSONELL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
3. COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
4. "OTHER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.

OEAB SCRAM DATA Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1987 ------------------ 435 Manual and Automatic Scrans for 1988 ------------------ 291 Manual and Automatic Scrans for 1989 ------------------ 252 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1990 ------------------ 226 Manual and Autematic Scrats for 1991 ------------------ 206 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1992 ------------------ 212 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1993 --(YTD 05/30/93)-- 81 l

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T. Murley, NRR (12G18) C. Trammell (PD5)

F. Miraglia, NRR (12G18) T. Quay (PDS)

F. Gillespie, NRR (12G18) W. Huffman (AEOD)

J. Partlow, NRR (12G18) J. Giitter (AEOD)

S. Varga, NRR (14E4)

J. Calvo, NRR (14A4)

G. Lainas, NRR (14H3)

J. Roe, NRR (13E4)

J. Zwolinski, NRR (13H24)

E. Adensam, NRR (13E4)

W. Russell, NRR (12G18)

J. Richardson, NRR (7D26)

A. Thadani, NRR (8E2)

S. Rosenberg, NRR (10E4)

C. Rossi, NRR (9A2)

B. Boger, NRR (10H3) ,

F. Congel, NRR (10E2)

D. Crutchfield, NRR (11H21)

W. Travers, NRR (11B19)

D. Coe, ACRS (P-315)

E. Jordan, AEOD (MN-3701)

G. Holahan, AEOD (MN-9112)

L. Spessard, AEOD (MN-3701)

K. Brockman, AEOD (MN-3206)

S. Rubin, AEOD (MN-5219)

M. Harper, AEOD (MN-9112)

G. Grant, EDO (17G21)

R. Newlin, GPA (2G5)

E. Beckjord, RES (NLS-007)

A. Bates, SECY (16G15)

G. Rammling, OCM (16G15)

T. Martin, Region I W. Kane, Region I C. Hehl, Region I S. Ebneter, Region II E. Merschoff, Region II S. Vias, Region II J. Martin, Region III E. Greenman, Region III J. Milhoan, Region IV B. Beach, Region IV B. Faulkenberry, Region V K. Perkins, Region V bec: Mr. Sam Newton, Manager Events Analysis Department Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway  ;

Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 1

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