ML20054G940

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Forwards NRC Final Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation Sys
ML20054G940
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 06/15/1982
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Fiedler P
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR LSO5-82-06-048, LSO5-82-6-48, NUDOCS 8206220429
Download: ML20054G940 (45)
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{{#Wiki_filter:- (/?O g June 15,1982 LS05-82 06-048 Docket flo. 50-219 !!r. P. B. Fiedler Vice President and Director - Oyster Creek Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 00731

Dear fir. Fiedler:

SUBJECT:

FORWARDIllG FINAL EVALUATI0ft REPORT OF SEP TOPIC VI-4, C0flTAlfiMErlT ISOLATI0fl SYSTEM FOR THE OYSTER CREEK flUCLEAR GEllERATING STATI0fl Enclosed is a copy of our final evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System. This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-219, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. The staff has reviewed the GPU fluclear's letter dated liarch 10, 1982, which provided connents on SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating-Station, Unit flo.1. ~,The licensee stated that Regulatory Guide 1.11 for instrument lines should apply to the isolation provisions on all valves in lines which are one inch in diameter whether or not they are instrument lines. Accordingly, the licensee proposes that all test, vent, drain and sampling lines as well as valves V-21-19, V-21-20, V-38-2, V-38-3, V-38-1001, V-38-9, l V-38-1001, V-38-10 V-28-23. V-38-22, V-38-16, and V-38-17 be isolated in accordance with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.11. The staff's position on test, vent, drain and sampling lines between the inboard and outboard isolation valves is that they should have O sealed closed barriers under administrative control in accordance with b SRP 6.2.4.II.6. With respect to the other valves listed, the staff's w position is that for those lines which are legitimate instrument lines, M the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.11 do apply. Pump test lines and y sample lines do not qualify as instrument lines. g,, Y The staff's position on leak detection provisions for engineered safety 4& feature systems is provided in SRP Section 6.2.4.II.6.b, which states q that containment isolation provisions for lines in ESF systems may include remote-manual valves, but provisions should exist to alert operators to possible leakage from these lines outside containment. The containment and core spray systems utilize remote-manual valves outside containment and should be provided with leak detection capability. I saoi>22c m --l-l- , ;on avoca ong, .... ~.. . - -. -. -. ~.. pa m. OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usm isei-maa nac rosu sts ia nacu caa

e A liith respect to the potential modifications outlined in the conclusion in this report, a determination of the need to actually implement these changes will be made.during the same integrated assessment. This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assess-ment is completed. Sincerely, D.ennis H. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure: See next page I i l l l

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r. The licensee stated that leak detection capability is not needed for either the containment or core spray systems since these systems are low pressure systems. The licensee believes that leak detection capability is best utilized in areas where high energy lines are located and its use for the above systems would not enhance safety.

The staff's position on leak detection provisions for engineered safety feature systems is in accordance with SRP Section 6.2.4.II.6.b, which states that containment isolation provisions for lines in ESF systems may include remote-manual valves, but provisions should be made to detect possible leakage from these lines outside containment. The containment and core spray systems utilize remote-manual valves outside containment, and thus should be provided with leak detection capability. With respect to the potential modifications outlined in the conclusion in this report, a determination of the need to actually implement these changes will be made during the same integrated assessment. This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if HRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assess-ment is completed. Sincerely, I Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure: See next page 1 l l I i l M SEPB:D SEPB:DL p - SEPB:DL ORB #5;PM ORB #5:BC AD : S. A: DL.... SEPB:DLf omcr >.............M,..............;,L l .k. Brown;dk RFellpL,, RHermann WRussell ,, J Lom,ba rdo,,,,, DC,ru tch f,i,e' d., GQ i na,s,,,,, sunswe ) 6/,,[,,/82 p/,/,,/82.. _#/,f,/,82.. .hl../E2.. .. 6/... 482...... .. 6/...../.82.. . 6/..../82..... l our> I sac ronv ais oa m sacu ma OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usc e m - m,=

g' Mr. P. B. Fiedler cc G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Resident Inspector Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge c/o U. S. NRC 1800 M Street', N. W. Post Office Box 445 Washington, D. C. 20036 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 J. B. Lieberman, Esquire Commissioner Berlack, Israels a Lieberman New Jersey Department of Energy 26 Broadway 101 Commerce Street New York, New York 10004 Newark, New Jersey 07102- . Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsyl.vania 19406 J.. Knubel BWR Licensing Manager GPU Nuclear 100 Interplace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Deputy Attorney General State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety ~ 36 West State Street - CN 112 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-Mayor Lacey Township 818 Lacey Road Fo.rked fiver, New Jersey 08731 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza' New York, New York 10007 r. Licensing Supervisor ~ Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 f f ? r

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l-9, l ' TABLE OF CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION f II REVIEW CRITERI A III RELATED SAFETY TOPICS IV REVIEW GUIDELINES V EVALUATION VI CONCLUSIONS VII REFERENCES 9 i ENCLOSURE f M, (

Containment Systems Branch Evaluation Report on SEP Topic VI-4 Containment Isolation System for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-219 I Introduction The Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (0yster Creek) began com-mercial operation in 1969. Since then the safety review criteria have changed and, as part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), the con-tainment isolation systems at Oyster Creek have been re-evaluated. The purpose of this evsluation is to document the deviations from the current safety criteria as they relate to the containment isolation systems. The

significance of the identified deviations, and recommended corrective meas-ures to improve safety, will be the subject of a subsequent integrated as-sessment of Oyster Creek.

II Review Criteria The safety review criteria used in the current evaluation of the contain-ment isolatior, system for Oyster Creek are contained in the following references: 1-10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (GDC 5 4, 55, 56 and 57). 2-NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for tne Review of Safety Analysis Reports for :iuclear Power Plants (SRP 6.2.4, Containment Isclation System). 3-Regulatory Guide 1.11, Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor l-Containment. E 4-Regulatory Guide 1.141, Revision 1, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systens.

  • III Related Safety Topics The review areas identified below are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion of the re-evaluation of the containment isolatiton system for Oyster Creek. These review areas are included in other SEP topics or ongoing Generic Reviews, as indi-cated below:

III-1, Classification of Structures, Components and Systems 1 (Seismic and Quality) III-4.C, Internally Generated Missiles 2 3 III-5.A Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Components Inside Containment 4 III-5.B, Pipe Break Outside Containment III-6, Seismic Design Considerations 5 6 III-12 Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment VI-6, Containment Leak Testing 7 8 VII-2, Engineered Safety Feature System Control Logic and Design 9 VIII-2, Onside Emergency Power Systems - Diesel 3enerator 10 - V III-4, Electric Penetrations of Reactor Containment 11 - NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, Item II.E.4.1, Containment Isolation Dependability 12 - NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident, Item II.E.4.4, Containment Purging and Venting Requirements 13 - NUREG-0803, Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping.

. IV Review Guidelines The containment isolation system of a nuclear power plant is an engi-neered safety feature that functions to allow the normal or emergency passage of fluds through the containment boundary while preserving the ability of the boundary to prevent or limit the escape of fission pro-ducts to the environs that may result from postulated accidents. Gen-eral Design Criteria (GDC) 54, 55, 56 and 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 pertain to the containrent isolation system of a nuclear power plant. GDC 54 establishes design and test requirements for the leak detection provisions, the isolation function and the containment capability of the isolation barriers in lines penetrating the primary reactor contain-ment. From the standpoint of containment isolation, leak detection pro-visions should be capable of quickly detecting and responding to a spectrum of postulated pipe break accident conditions. To accomplish this, diverse parameters should be monitored.to initiate the containment isolation function. The parameters selected should assure a positive, rapid response to the developing accident condition. This aspect of the containment isolation system review will be addressed during the review of the post-TMI requirements approved for implementation, as stated in NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2. Leak detection capability should also be provided at the system level to alert the operator of the need to isolate a system train equipped with remote manual isolation valves. The Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.2.4, Item II.B.q, provides guidance in this regard. 1 l

, With respect to the design requirements for,the isolation function, all non-essential systems should be automatically isolated (with manual valves sealed closed), and valve closure times should be selected to as-sure rapid isolation of the containment in the event of an accident. The review of the classification of systems as essential or non-essential, and the automatic isolation provisions for non-essential systems by ap-propriate signais, will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TMI requirements as stated in NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2. The closure time of the containment ventilation system isolation valves will be evaluated in conjunction with the ongoing generic review of purging practices at operating plants (see NUREG-0660, Item II.E.4.4). The elctrical power supply, instrumentation and control systems should be designed to engineered safety feature criteria to assure accomplish-ment of the containment isolation function. This aspect of the review is covered under SEP Topics VII-2 and VIII-2. Also, resetting the iso-lation signal should not result in the automatic re-opening of contain-ment isolation valves. This will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TMI requirements approved for implementation, as stated in NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2. With respect to the capabilities of containment isolation barriers in lines penetrating primary containment, the isolation barriers should be designed to engineered safety feature criteria, and protected against missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement. Typical isolation barriers in-clude vales, closed systems and blind flanges. Futhermore, provisions should be made to permit periodic leak testing of the isolation barriers. l l

. The adequacy of the missile, pipe whip and jet impingement protection will be covered under SEP Topics III-4.C. III-5.A and III-5.B. The ac-ceptability of the design criteria originally used in the design of the containment isolation system components will be covered in SEP Topics III-1, III-6 and III-12. The adequacy of the leak testing program will be covered under SEP Topic V I-6. The acceptability of electrical penetrations will be covered in SEP Topic VIII-4. GDC 55, 56 and 57 establish explicit requirements for isolation valving in lines penetrating the containment. Specifically, they address the number and location of isolation valves (e.g., redundant valving with one located inside containment and the other located outside containment), valve actuation provisions (e.g., automatic or remote manual isolation valves), valves position (e.g., locked closed, or the position of greater safety in the event of an accident or power failure), and valve type (e.g., a simple check valve is not a permissable automatic isolation valve out-sidecontainment). Figures 1 and 2 depict the explicit valve arrangements specified in GDC 55 and 56, and GDC 57, respectively. GDC 55 and 56 also permit containment isolation provisions for lines pene-trating the primary containment boundary that differ from the explicit re-quirements, provided the basis for acceptability is defined. This proviso is typically invoked when establishing the containment isolation require-ments for essential (i.e., safety related) systems, or there is a clear improvement in safety.

i GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 55 AN) 56 ISOLATION VALVE CRITERIA l MISSILE PROTECTION CONTAINMENT l INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE OUTSIDE r l l p.- -g- {.. b ,'.o SEALED CLOSED SEALED CLOSED . o,, .,e l a.. AUTOM TIC -4/ l I k - SEALED CLOSED C 4. OR aa' L -/ b 3_a o 4M- , M. 4'6.* AUTOMATIC SEALED CLOSED 5. 4 g p '..o ~ AUTOMATIC AT f

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l s GENERAL DESIGN CRITERl0N 57 ISOLATION VALVE CRITERIA MISSILE PROTECTION CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE INS!DE OUTSIDE AUTOMATIC ^' REMOTE MANUAL l Q p .4 '.? AUTOMATIC CLOSED r.a og .}. f o SYSTEM REMOTE MANUAL g 6'. h ~ .r o s y.., -a-p N. e' SEALED CLOSED ,h }& y .:, o 6 CLOSED '4 g h SYSTB ll8 SEALED CLOSED s- ~ 4 ~ ~ Figure 2

. SRP 6.2.4, Item II.6 presents guidelines for acceptable alternate con-tainment isolation provisions for certain classes of lines. Contain-ment isolation provisions that are found acceptable on the "other de-fined basis" represent conformance with the GDC and do not constitute exceptions. The following evaluation addresses deviations in the containment isola-tion provisions from the explicit requirements of the GDC. V Evaluation The containment isolation provisions for the lines penetrating the prf-mary reactor containnent of Oyster Creek are listed in Table 1. This information was obtained from the documents and piping and instrumenta-tion drawings referenced in Section VII. There was insufficient infor-mation to complete certain elements of Table 1, therefore, the licensee is requested to provide the missing information and make any necessary corrections. The containment isolation provisions, as listed in Table 1, were evalu-ated against the requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57 ( Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50), and the supplementary guidance of SRP 6.2.4, Contain-ment Isolation System, where applicable. Deviations from the explicit requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57, and the acceptance criteria of SRP 6.2.4, are tabulated in Table 2. The evaluation of containment system deviations from the current licens-ing criteria is best summarized by listing the areas of non-conformance as follows:

. 1 Insufficient administrative control; 2 Insufficient leak detection capability on remote manual valves in ESF systems; 3 Use of check valves as isolation valves outside of containment; 4 Use of local manual valves as isolation valves; Use of remote manual isolation valves outside containment on non-5 ESF systems; and Use of two automatic isolation valves outside containment on non-6 ESF systems. Administrative Control All test, vent, drain and sampling lines between the inboard and outboard isolation valves shall be sealed closed barriers, which may be used in place of automatic isolation valves in accordance with SRP'6.2.4.II.6. Sealed closed barriers include blind flanges and sealed closed isolation valves which may be closed manually, closed remote manual valves, and closed automatic valves which remain closed after a LOCA. However, with respect to the test, vent, drain and sampling lines, pipe caps are not j suitable isolation barriers; two locked closed isolation valves in series l should be provided for these lines. In any case, sealed closed isolation ( valves should be under administrative control to assure that they cannot be inadvertently opened. Administrative control includes mechanical de-vices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevent power from being sup-plied to the valve operator. The following list of test, vent, drain and sampling lines at Oyster Creek deviate from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and 56 from the I standpoint of valve type. The valves on these lines will be acceptable

. if they are under administrative control as specified in the SRP Sec-tion 6.2.4.II.6. This list was compiled using the available piping and instrumentation drawings as well as Reference 6. These references indi,- cate that many of the valves on the test, vent, drain and sampling lines are normally closed, however, there is no indication that they are under administative control. Valves Required to be Urider Administrative Control Penetration No. Valve Identification X-2A V-1-127 X-2A V-1-115 i X-28 V-1-114 X-2B V-1-126 ~ X-3A V-14-26 X-3B V-14-21 X-3B V-14-22 X-SA V-14-28 X-5B V-14-39 X-7 V-17-21 X-7 V-17-65 X-7 V-17-76 X-8 V-17-51 X-8 V-17-52 X-8 V-17-66 X-8 V-17-68 X-8 V-17-83

, Valves Required to be Under Administrative Control Penetration No. Valve Identification X-9 V-16-4 X-10 V-16-65 X-128 V-20-42 X-15 V-6-394 X-16 V-38-7 X-16 V-38-8 X-22 V-38-18 X-22 V-38-19 X-61 V-15-32 X-66 V-21-66 X-70 V-20-44 X-72 V-1-136 X-72 V-1-137 X-74 V-14-75 I X-74 V-14-78 Leak Detection SRP Sections 6.2.4.II.6.b and c state that containment isolation pro-visions for lines in engineered safety feature or engineered safety-related systems may include remote-manual valves, but provisions should be made to detect possible leakage from these lines outside containment. Also, isolation provisions for lines in systems needed for the safe shutdown of the plant may include remote-manual valves,

. but again provisions should be made to detect possible leakage from these lines outside containment. The containment isolation provisions for the lines identified above nor-mally consist of one isolation valve inside and one isolation valve out-side containment. If it is not practical to locate one isolation valve inside containment both isolation valves may be located outside contain-ment. For this type of isolation valve arrangement, the valve nearest the containment and the piping between the containment and the valve should be enclosed in a leak-tight or controlled leakage nousing. If, in lieu of a housing, conservative design of the piping and valve is as-sumed to preclude a breach of piping integrity, the design should con-form to the requirements of SRP Section 3.6.2 (SEP Topic III-1). In any event, the design of the valve and/or piping compartment sh.ould provide the capability to detect leakage from the valve shaft and/or bonnet seals and terminate the leakage. The following list of essential systems in which remote manual valves are located outside containment deviates from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and 56 from the standpoint of location, actuation or both (see Table II), but will be acceptable if provisions exist to alert the operator of a need to isolate a penetration in accordance with SRP Section 6.2.4.II.b and c. The adequacy of the present plant design to inform the operator of a need to isolate a penetration will be evaluated as part of the integrated assessment. I I

. System Penetration - Valve Number 4 Emergency Condenser System X-3A V-14-30* X-3B V-14-33 X-SA V-14-35 X-5B V-14-34 Containment Spray X-63 V-21-11 d-Containment Spray to Torus X-51 V-21-18 l X-51 Y-21-15 Containment and Core Spray X-68A V-21-1 Suction X-698 V-21-3 X-69 V-21-7 V-20-9 V-20-32 V-20-3 V-20-4 V-20-33 Check Valves as Isolation Valves GDG 55 and 56 specify that one valve should be located inside contain-ment and one valve should be locaed outside containment, and that a simple check valve may not be used as an automatic isolation valve out-I side containment. The following list presents those systems in which the use of a check. valve deviates from the explicit requirements of the GDC from the stand-point of location and type of valve in use. l

.. Systems with Check Valves outside Containment System Penetration Valve Number Feedwater X-4A Y-2-72 X-4B V-2-71 Containment Spray X-22 V-21-19 Pump Test Line X-22 V-21-20 Cleanup Demineralize Relief System X-74 V-16-84 The feedwater penetrations X-4A and X-48 contain simple check valves as isolation valves outside of containment. An acceptable isclation bar-rier for this penetration would consist of the simple check valve outside of containment along with an added remote manual valve. The containment spray pump test line discharge into the torus through simple check valve located on penetrations X-22, while the cleanup de-mineralizer relief system discharges through a simple check valve into the torus through penetration X-74. These isolation valves are properly located outside the torus due to the possibility of pool swell loads on these valves if they were inside the torus. However, a judgment regard-ing the acceptability of the simple check valve outside containment as a bonafide containment isolation valve will be made in conjunction with the integrated assessment of the plant. Local Manual Isolation Valves GDC 55 and 56, as it relates to lines that penetrate the primary contain-ment boundary and either are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or connect directly to the containment atmosphere, requires that isolation

. valves be either automatic inside and outside containment, check inside and automatic outside or sealed closed inside and outside containment. The containment isolation provisions that differ from the explicit re-quirements of GDC 55 and 56 may be acceptable on some other defined basis, if the basis for that difference is justified. For example, Regulatory Guide 1.11 describes acceptable containment isolation provi-sions for instrument lines. The staff does not believe that local man-ua? valves are justifiable alternatives to the provisions of GDC 55 and 56 and, therefore, these systems should be automatically isolated. The f ollowing list presents those systems in which the use of a local manual valve deviates from the explicit requirements of the GDC from the standpoint of type of valve in use. Systems with Local Manual Valves Outside Containment System Penetration Valve Number Torus Level X-49 V-20-63 X-51 V-20-62 Drywell Pressure X-50 V-38-2 X-50 V-38-3 Torus Pressure X-56 V-38-1001 Remote Manual Isolation Valves j The use of remote manual valves as containment isolation valves deviates from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and 56, however, is permitted i on engineered safety systems or safety related systems, and on systems

. needed for the safe shutdown of the plant, or on closed systems outside of containment. The staff believes that the use of remote manual vales on the systems listed below deviates from the explicit requirements of the GDC, since these are non-essential systems using remote manual valve actuation outside of containment. In order to be in conformance with the GDC, these valves should be automat!cally isolated. Non-Essential Systems with Remote Manual Valves outside of Containment, System Penetration Valve Number Reactor Shutdown Cooling X-7 V-17-1 Supply X-7 V-17-2 X-7 V-17-3 Reactor Shutdown X-8 V-17-55 X-8 V-17-56 X-8 V-17-57 Reactor Head Cooling X-62 V-31-2 Two Automatic Isolation Valves Outside Containment The use of two isolation valves outside containment represents a devi-ation from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and 56, but is permitted on ESF or ESF-related systems by SRP Section 6.2.4.II.6.d. Provisions must be made to detect leakage from these lines outside containment. The following list present those systems which have two automatic valves outside of containment and which are not classified ESF or ESF-related systems. These non-essential systems, therefore, deviate from the ex-plicit requirements of the GDC with respect to location, and in order to

. be in conformance with the GDC should have one automatic isolation valve inside of containment. Non-Essential Systems With Two Automatic Valves Outside Containment System Penetration Valve Number i l Drywell Oxygen Sample X-16 V-38-9 X-16 V-38-10 Drywell Oxygen Sample X-57 V-38-23 X-57 V-38-22 Containment Particulate X-22 V-38-16 Monitor X-22 Y-38-17 I VI Conclusions The following summarizes the deviations from review guidelines that have been identified and described in Section V of this report: 1. The isolation valving arrangement of the following containment penetrations differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and L 56 from the standpoint of valve type: Penetrations X-2A, X-2B, X-3A, X-38, X-SA, X-58, X-7, X-8, X-10, X-12B, X-15, X-16, X-22, X-61 and X-66. The valves identified with these penetrations in Section V are required to be under administrative control. 2. The isolation valving arrangement of the following containment penetrations differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 4 ~~ and 56 from the standpoint of location, actuation or both: X-3A, X-38, X-5A, X-58, X-51, X-63, X-68A, X-698, and X-69. The valves identified with these penetrations in Section V are associated with essential systems and will be acceptable if adequate

! provisions exist to alert the operator of a need to isolate a penetration in accordance with SRP Section 6.2.4.II.b and c. 3. The isolation valving arrangement of the following penetrati. 's differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and 56 from the standpoint of location and valve in use: X-4A, X-48, X-22 and X-74. The valves identified with these penetrations in Section V are simple check valves outside of containment. A judgment re-garding the acceptability of a simple check valve outside of con-tainment as a bonafide containment isolation valve will be made in conjunction with the integrated assessment of the plant. 4. The isolation valving arrangement of the following penetrations differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and SE from the standpoint of valve type in use: X-49, X-50, X-51 and X-56. The d. valves identified with these penetrations in Section V are local manual valves, and in order to be in conformance with the GDC should be automatic isolation valves. 5. The isolation valving arrangement of the following penetrations differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and 56 from the standpoing of valve actuation: X-7, X-8, and X-62. The valves identified with these non-essential systems identified in Section V are remote manual valves outside of containment, and in order to be in conformance with the GDC should be automatically isolated. 6. The isolation valving arrangement of the following penetrations differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 and 56 from the standpoint of location: X-16, X-57, and X-22. The valves

. identified with these non-essential systems in Section V are two automatic isolation valves outside of containment; in order to be in conformance with the GDC should have one automatic isola-tion valve inside of containment. VII References 1. 0yster Creek Nuclear Power Plant. Unit 1. Safety Analysis Report, Volume 2. Oyster Creek Nuclear Pcwer Plant. Technical Specification 3. NRC l<. iter of April 17, 1981 frem D. M. Crutchfield to I. R. Fin fro.k 4. JCP&L letter of Septester 23, 1980 from 1. R. Finfrock to D'irector, NRR, " Technical Specification Change Request No. 90." 5. JCP&L letter of April 10,1980 from I. R. Finfrock to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, 'NUREG-C578 Iglenantation." 6. JCPSL letter of January 4,1980 frem I. R. Finfrock to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, 'NUREG-0567 Iglementation.' 7. JCP&L letter of Decenter 14, 1979 from I. R. Finfrock tow. Kane, NRC, " Bulletins and Orders Task Fcree, Long Term Systems Information." 8. JCP&L letter of Noter:ter 20, 1979 frca I. R. Finfreck to W. Kane, NRC, " Bulletins and Orders Task Force, Lcng Ters Systams Informatien." 9. JCPAL letter of August 9,1979 from I. R. Finfrock to D. Fre:en, NRC, "IE Sulletin 7-CS."

10. JCP&L letter of April 25, 1979 from I. R. Finfrock to B. Grier, NRC, "IE Eulletin No. 79-08.*

11. Oyster Creek Plant, Picine and Instrumentation Drawines . a. Core Spray System - GE 885 0781 'b. Cleanup Domineralizer System - GE 148F444 c. Reactor Head Ccoling System - GE 886D403 d. Neutron Monitoring System - GE 148F734 Control Rod Drive.. Hydraulic System - GE 237E487 e. ~ f. Reactor Vessel Level /Fressure/Tegerature instruments - GE 148F712 g. Radwasta Treat:r.snt Plant - GE 148F437 h. Closed Cooling Water System - SAR Drawing 2006 1. Flow Diagram Instrument Service; Breathing, and Bleeder Check Trip Air Systep 'B&R Drawing 2013 J. Reactor Shutdewn Cooling System - GE 148F711 k. Poison System - GE 148F723

1. Drywell and Suppression System - GE 237E726 Flow Diagram Condensate and Domineralized Water Transfer System -

m. BR 2004 rr. Emergency Condenser System - GE 148F262

o. Containment Spray System - GE 148F740 12.

GPU letter of March 10, 1982 from P. B. Fiedler to D. Crutchfield, NRC, " Review of NRC letter of November 18, 1981 - SEP Topic VI-4."

t. i '1 . TAB L E _ gip TOPJG VI-4 CO INMENT ISOI.ATION SYSTEM 11EVIEW ITEMS ~ PLANT: U ysTr g. Eg. g_ pace 1 0F PfNE-SYSTEM 11AME PElli VALVE VALVE LOCATO POSITION E55-MTUA-l )(-ad "'};/[ H

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TABLE ~L SE P. TOPICyl-4 CONTQINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM REVIEW ITEMS O plAAT-YW 4EE p PAGE OF PENE-SYSTEM NAME PEH VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-ETUA-Nm. sag po3 EN-TION REMARKS TitATI0li AND SERVICE Cl.6% IDENT. TYPE OR NQ LINE, SIZE,.. NO. NUMBER DEscRIPTiot1 0.c. l.c Mn. on tocypvig TIM. rm. v-17-sf cr v' c o c irI at 7") ~ 1 x-8 WC-"G x -? (0 V-l7-56 (T d c o o 6 NE SH V SL &T / c o C 6% NE EH ! i(-7 (8') (y) V-17-Q &T U/ C 0 C AI "' l g_g l ,m y. [# Is'p,H P M y-17-6 G6 / C C C OE ._g (i,) MO x g-g y-l7-4 4 (> 6 t/ C C C-(l'S ! y_y (f') g-l7@.&6 s' C C C ! g V-176/(6 v/ C-C C-HE (j'j-d"j V-I7-83 66 / c-C c 90 y u,u l K.-T X """ "'"fif; Y-I6-1 &T / o o C, AI NE u i f g-1 "' T!"d y / < [ GT V O C C, l yq (gj <f (j', U-164l L (6 tl C C C t,,, ~ l X __q ryW v-Il-L (> T V C 0 C C **Nd, n ,,,gl;- v _p c7 g g g c g at pg 1 r Y-I ww ! X-I C* "" ? "* "(I ") VM-lG U V C. C C ~ ~ (gi, v.ft-s; CC-- v' o o C-HE 'F

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TABLE -t SEP TOPICNI-4 CONT 4lNMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM REV1EW ITEMS PLANT. CJY ETE (L-L4F E. K-7 PAGE OF G ~' PENE-SYSTEM NAME PEH VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-ACTUA-i TilAT100 AND SERVICE CU55 IDENT. TYPE OR EN-TlOM REMARKS - m. siluT Podspus TIM. non. NQ 1,1 N E S IZ E. No. HUMBER DESCRIPTION 0.C. l.C t on io rm.. i 'y-is v t-m se v' o o c n;M;g("a m i ne !. X-/5 .tf;V! 986-d 9 9 9 r <,. c o AL,e L cs idea C R e. Fo ss r e s, u..e. 4m e i I '(- / b Y E[*O V-3Y b Pcu 4 / O O O NE. j !; E-lh A" y;3d H /, C 9 C-K '$ NY- i j l 9-(C 3" v as-I s u~' 7 6 o 7 c tie T.," )M',,."*Crioca l i x-I(, f-v-n-m a.o o / o o ? c ve gy )f"~" ?"" ""' TAM""" l l y-le * " ~,,,, vm-1 8 / c c c c x "{,Q l l X-18 V '"' I"?"e " VJ7-3 6 V c c c c NE {,p / 6esac E mun To g l yg " n " " > v n -13 s / c e c c as 3 . {t ", tw e r - o s to l )(-{ Y 8" V h-l'l b / C. C C C HE %ys ^ s' )(-/R lJ-33-f/

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TABLE i i ~ SE P TOPI VI-4 CONTAI hfENT ISOLATION SYSTEM REVIEW ITEMS / O' og l PLANT: VME' E E' PAGE ~~ PDJE-SYSTEM NAME PEH VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION E55-ACTUA-i l l TitATION AND SERVICE cths5 IDENT. TYPE OR EN-T10H REMARKS nog. san pyo Jpwg TML NQ l.I N E SIZ E NO. NUMBER DEscRIPTm 0.c. l.c m on rm. TW Norsgsounraa" y-M-6 l &8- / / / / of. [ {-E} gp j l y-sv TreiG4 i-ci t/A y # v-5-3 ct. / o e o

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TMBLE 4 ' $EP TOPI VI-4CONTAINMENTISOLATION SYSTEM REVIEW ITEMS /3 PLANT. YS'TF tt (E FF JL PAGE OF i-RNE-SYSTEM NAME PEG VALVE VALVE I.0 CATION POSITION ESS-ACTUA-I TilAT1014 AND SERVICE CLh55 IDENT. TYPE OR nog. sag po.gpwg EN-Tl0H REMARKS l Na t.INE SIZE NO. Ntt1BER DEscRIPTiotl 0.c. l.c gxt on inc, rait. TIAL [, )[-73 h Yh V-14 '/'/ 6 6- / O O o sje H Ek % 41W M A sqq y37e '%i, v-It-s 4 ec / c e c. ne PF d+,b. 4 j g fg gg% C6 o O G EE '" ~f'" d '** y-]il yxt yW v-If-7c sf J C. c c. W \\ )(-7l v-ly-R G8 d C c c i e I i I

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TABLE R \\ OYM U"W CdNTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: i i SEP REVIEW FINDINGS / EXCEP770NS / PAGE N OF j SERVICE g p Q,GEWEB COMMENT 4 ) s m m g a fe a.m ;a, siivro-a l x-7 c < ~ ' L erc y Ss x v-n-1 sg 4 i y-7 SS X 0-l'l 1 ( pp u .~ r i 55 x v-n-3 ! r-7 ar l Y-7,rw*Y'Bu..n 55 x v - n-a.I ), as m M - sn.urg-anuou 55 )( V-17 IS i* l K-7 ll )(-] SS X V-l7 -76 3RyATQ y-B 8"""# nit "' 65 x V-17-cI Rf.p" #9 v-n-sc l y8 Es y ss X V '7-57 i 68 I Eg.a u.c,o < mea,vo i o-.ass y 1 A17.s 1 2 g g J A. L x'- B V-17-f2 i &9 Sf X (-8 Ss X V}~ ' 'Vgy'_ 4 ss x V-IJ-83 a, ..ce v

~T A a L E 2_. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: Wk GM'% - SEP REVIEW FINDINGS / EXCEPTIONS / PAGES.-.OF I s$ SERVICE .h s. o,_,QEWERb COMMENTS n e era ss x v-,s se A ' X210 $^',o'"JSI'c'" 55 Y V I'-'S NE*# L f i, (og.L 5 PRAY h0PPL1 t-lRf Trer J,..t 65 K V-0 o '/a MT 6e +mC " m '0* vs. I I m to w T nm. I i X-15 T m 6.eioa 57 X V6-Mi ax ~e.1q~ A,q i on-u' cwus X-lb E8 spec 6.8 X.. V-3I-rk -=, hu p**Wy r A v-n_ X-16 s6 X V-a t-9 l %did ,g [ >c-I6 56 X V-3r-/o ) i [)gy w n L E quif Y-2 Duia To *. 56 X V-a>1 sne JA ~A l eat Y-0 ) 56 X o n-n- x "e V-a a.- Q. } l i p hansu 5c X y_ag_3g l f u um ~.- -ra Cx j y-al u 's6 X v42-61 ) i I-- g, i

TS 8L E 2. i CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLAND 0%M O"L t-SEP REVIEW FINDINGS / EXCEPTIONS / PAGELL of 1 ' - ) SERVICE f s. ,,QEWER5 COMMENTS C Y-2h se.o-Triaa<~r 66 X X ) u m.. _i a om Pu n as V-a l.-li y m,yg.hNiv uv ,o y-a 56 X X V-al* 3memz 1. l Lawav" l >(-ga bcomet(come 66 A, U g wAn } ~ u 4..,._x y-31 6(2 )( V-3rr-TJ J ~ >& 3& Sl, V-32-l7 &[C $""V'* un b x,n vwe a t> o..,..w-4 y -ra se p s._ _ ous. s; ..x Ta e. a s L u s t. 1 X-f Sb )( V-RO43 &n,a n.m mn ;-c. u, y ,1 j X-5) St, 3c v_a o-o a f ) y, a[ Y N mLu w wcoa.(L~J i XS a [** g(, g v-3 tr,3 .,e (A;w >c y au ^~ 4 I n v m. y

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i ~ TAB L E L ( SEP TOPIC VI-4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION S'fSTEM PLAND ASW R-- U" " EVALUATION FINDINGS / EXCEP7~/ONS / PAGE 7 OF p ,,,fEQEWER5 COMMENTS SERVICE o 4 y s. so. sm. cao. _g 55 y v _ i-n y s o. rra, n e a. g_3 55 X V - '- "5 y_ae iN. srw. oe d. 55 X V-l-l/ V t j i-gg N o. sTH. oed. 55 X v-/ la6 ~ ~ l o e e I I i e e e A =' -}}

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