ML20054D865

Exercise Controller Manual for 820319 Exercise of Emergency Plans

ML20054D865
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/19/1982
From:	CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO., NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20054D860	List: A02072, Forwards Exercise Controller Manual for 820319 Exercise of Emergency Plans ML20054D865
References
PROC-820319, NUDOCS 8204230458
Download: ML20054D865 (40)

Text

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'o TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL AFTER MARCH 20, 1982 EXERCISE CONTROLLER's MANUAL FOR IHE t

MARCH 19, 1982 EXERCISE OF THE EMERGENCY PLANS FOR IHE MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION FOR LOCATION:

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CONTENTS 1.

INTRODUCTION 2.

DEFINITIONS 3.

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 3.1 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR PLANT AND CORPORATE OFFICE 3.2 STATE OF CONNECTICUT AGENCIES 3.3 LOCAL COMMUNITY 4.

SCENARIO 4.1 PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION, DATES 4.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AT THE MILLSTONE NUCLEAR PLANT 4.3 OVERALL EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE 5.

EXERCISE CONTROLLER'S ORGANIZATION AND RULES 6.

EXERCISE PLAYERS' RULES 7.

VISITORS' RULES ATTACHMENT 1 - YOUR SPECIFIC PLAYER'S SCENARIO SCRIPT ATTACHMENT 2 - YOUR SPECIFIC PLAYER'S MESSAGES ATTACHMENT 3 - YOUR SPECIFIC BACKUP MATERIAL (IF NECESSARY)

ATTACHMENT 4 - MAP TO GET TO YOUR SPECIFIC PLA'YERS LOCATION ATTACHMENT 5 - EXERCISE CONTROLLERS CRITIQUE SHEETS I

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This manual contains the necessary information to document the events being planned and which are expected to occur during the Emergency Exercise for the Millstone Nuclear Station in which the State of Connecticut, the local communities within 10 miles of the nuclear stations and some evacuee receptor area communities will participate along with the staff of the nuclear station and its Corporate office.

This is the Exercise Controller's Manual.

It contains certain common information for all Controllers, e.g., Sequence of Events at the Station, Controller's Rules, etc.

It also contains specific infor-mation for you, the Controller, e.g., map of your player's location and your player's scenario script, and the messages that you will issue to your players.

FOLLOW THE RULES AND THE EXERCISE PLAYERS' SCENARIO SCRIPT.

KEEP YOUR CONTROLLER CO MAND POST INFORMED AT ALL TIMES AND GOOD LUCK I I I 1-1

.i 2,0 DEFINITIONS Alert (Charlie-One)

- An emergency classification which is defined as an actual or potential sub-stantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Clock Time

- The real (or clock) time sequence of events.

Controller (Co-ordinator)

- An exercise controller (or co-ordinator) is one (or more) individuals selected from the various participating groups, (e.g.,

local communities, state agencies, nuclear plant staff, etc.) who is knowledgeable in that groups emergency response functions and procedures; The Controller helps develop the list of actions (scenario) his group is anticipated to take or simulate in response to a sequence of initiating events. The Controller will issue as necessary messages, cue cards, data such as radiation levels, etc., to his group (exercise players) that will enable the players to carry out their actions with a sense of realism.

The Controller will also be available to clarify the sequence of events to the players.

The Controller will also serve as a liason person between his group and the Federal agency evaluators to ensure the evaluators perceive and understand the ongoing actions.

The Controller is given the authority to take intervening action to ensure the over-all continuity of the exercise (for all groups), without hindering or aiding the players initiative, free play and decision making powers.

l The Controller will also sit with the principal players of his group at the end of the exercise and provide input into the exercise critique process.

The Evaluation sheet provided should be filled out.

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Critique

- A meeting of key participants in an exercise, usually held shortly afte?

its conclusion, during which exercise controllers / evaluators review the operation and the performance of individuals or groups.

Emergency Action Levels (EAL)

- Specific threshold conditions that may be used to designate a particular class of level of emergency.

Evaluator

- An exercise evaluator may be assigned to one or more of the exercise players activities or functions for the purpose of evaluating, recording, and reporting the strengths and weaknesses, and making recommendations for improvements to the player's management.

Agency Federal Evaluators

- These are agents of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) or the Federal Emergency' Management Agency (FEMA) who will evaluate the Player's performance.

Full-Scale Exercise

- An Emergency Exercise which tests all aspects of the Station / State & Local Emergency Plans; tests emergency equipment and communication networks; tests the notification systems; and ensures that emergency organization personnel are capable of assuming their responsibilities and emergency duties.

General Emergency (Bravo / Alpha)

- An emergency classification which is defined as actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential loss of containment integrity.

Media

- A member of the press who will be a Visitor.

Player

- A member of the emergency response organ-ization who responds during the exercise in accordance with the Emergency Plan and Procedures, as if a real emergency has occurred.

Scenario

- A list of exercise players actions that are in response to a hypothetical segence of initiating events.

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,i Scenario Time

- The hypothetical time for the sequence of events.

It can go over many days and correspond to a few hours on the Clock Time.

Site Area Emergency

- An emergency classification which is (Charlie-Two) defined as actual or likely major failures of plant functions -needed for the protection of the public.

Visitor-

- An individual who does not participate but only observes the actions of the players.

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3.1 MILLSTONE STATION AND CORPORATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 4

I.

General

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A.

Demonstrate the capability of the Emergency Organization to implement the Station Emergency Plan and Procedures.

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B.

Determine any deficiencies in the Plan, Procedures,-Emergency Equipment and Training.

II.. Incident Assessment and Classification A.

Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Organization to assess l

the incident conditions, to determine which emergency action levels have been reached and to correctly classify the incident i

in accordance with the Incident Classification Scheme.

III. Notification and Ca==nnications i

i A.

Demonstrate the ability to notify key officials in the Emergency Organizations (Station, Corporate, State and Local Communities) within 15 minutes of classification.

B.

Demonstrate the ability to notify onsite personnel using the Station Alarm /PA System.

C.

' Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Organizations to communicate:

1.

Direct lines between Station Emergency Centers.

2.

Direct lines between Station Emergency Centers and Corporate Emergency Centers.

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. Direct. lines between Station Emergency Centers and State i

, and Federal Emergency Centers.

4.

Radio communications between Station Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the Radiological Emergency Teams.

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D.

Demonstrate the ability to classify in accordance with the Federal Classification Scheme and notify the NRC within one hour of occurrence.

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E.

Demonstrate the ability of the Station / Corporate Emergency i

Organization to provide accurate and timely information to the l

Media Center.

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IV. Radiolonical Consequence Assessment i

A.

Demonstrate the ability of the Station / Corporate Emergency Organization to perform an assessment of the Radiological Consequences.

B.

Demonstrate the capability to dispatch and communicate with the.

Emergency Teams.

C.

Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Teams to use the emergency equipment to perform radiological surveys and analyse samples.

D.

Demonstrate the ability to assess the survey information and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective actions.

V.

Emergency Facilities Activation and Operation A.

Demonstrate the ability to activate the Emergency Organization and staff the Station Emergency Centers (Control Room, Onsite Operational-Support Center, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility) 'and the Corporate Emergency Operations Center.

B.

Demonstrate, through discussion and staff planning, the method to perform a~ shift change in each of the Emergency Centers.

VI.

Emeraency Direction and Control

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A.

Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to direct the Emergency Organizations in the implementation of the Emergency Plan &

Procedures.

B.

Demonstrate the capability to technically evaluate the incident conditions and. implement appropriate corrective actions.

C.

Demonstrate ability to perfone personnel accoun'tability, search and rescue and station evacuation as required.

VII. Recovery Operations A.

Demonstrate, through discussion and staff planning, the ability to activate the Recovery Organization and plan recovery operations.

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11/23/81 3.2 STATE OBJECTIVES

1. Notification and Alerting of Officials and Staff

a. Demonstrate receiving notification within 15 minutes of classification of the incident; call-back information provided for key officials.

b. Demonstrate that the emergency operations center can be activated after being notified of an incident.

c. Demonstrate that the emergency organization can be alerted and then fully activated.

d. Demonstrate notification of designated host consnunities.

e. Demonstrate providing infonnation to contiguous states as necessary.

2. Motification and Alerting of the Public

a. Demonstrate that, timely, and official information can be provided to the public through the media and emergency broadcast system.

b. Demonstrate that the emergency broadcast system can be operational within 15 minutes of State Officials' being notified of an incident.

3. External Consnunications Capability between Sites

a. Demonstrate that the following comunications systems (radio / telephone /

messengers) are available and operational between:

(1)Stateandutility (2)StateandFEMA (3) State and towns (4) Commissioners and their field personnel (5)Stateandcontiguousstates i

b. Demonstrate that the consnunications systems are capable of continuous operation.

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4. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Facility (Space, Comfort, etc.)

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a. Verify that the EOC has the equipment available and the facilities for continuous operation.

5. EOC Internal Communications and Displays (Message Handling, liaps, etc.)

a. Verify that comunications systems (telephone / messenger / face-to-face) are provided between E0C personnel, including interagency.

b. Demonstrate that status boards and display maps are maintained and kept current.

c. Demonstrate that records of events are available for review by E0C staff.

6. Adequacy of Staffing (Multiple Shifts, Competency. e'tc. )

a. Demonstrate that the state can staff the EOC and the media center, provide access control, and conduct other necessary functions with personnel during the emergency.

b. Demonstrate the capability to have a shift change.

c. Verify that state personnel are available to suoport utility, local, and federal emergency operations centers and staffs.

7. Facility Access Control / Security

a. Demonstrate the capability to control access to the Emergency Operations Center in order to maintain security during an emergency.

b. Verify that only authorized personnel have access to emergency equipment and infonnation.

8. Support by Responsible Elected or Appointed Public Officials

a. Verify that personnel designated by the RERP's are available to perform appropriate actions.

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9. Direction and Control (Timely Decision !!aking, Management. etc.)

a. Verify that state agencies provide recomended protective actions to the Governor's office and to local governments.

b. Demonstrate that state officials make timely and accurate decisions regarding the' direction and control of all activities and actions required to respond to' the emergency, effectively comunicate requirements to emergency forces, and support all levels of government.

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10. Coordination (Between Officials, Agencies, Federal Agencies, etc.)

a. Demonstrate that state officials coordinate, with utility and local officials, the activities and actions required to respond to the emergency.

b. Demonstrate the capability to coordinate outside (federal and contiguous state) assistance.

11,. Emergency Plans (Procedures and Checklists Consulted)

a. Demonstrate the capability to take actions in accordance with applicable procedures.

12. Public Infomation (Interface sith News Media)

a. Verify that'the news media can be provided facilities from which to operate.

b. Demonstrate that the. state government can provide accurate and timely information to the media.

13. Accident Assessment (Monitoring, Reporting, Projecting, Coordinating)

a. Demonstrate that state officials and emergency response staffs can evaluate the nature and seriousness of the accident.

b. Demonstrate that the state can verify utility field monitoring recorts.

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c. Demonstrate capability adequately to sample and to analyze drinking

' water, milk, and food in processing plants and stores.

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14. Protective Actions (Evacuation, Shelter, Reception)

a. Demonstrate that state officials can make decisions and give orders regarding evacuation, shelter, and other protective measures required to protect emergency. workers and the general population from unnecessary hazards.

b. Verify that state parks and recreation areas within affected areas have access and crime controls.

15. Exposure Control (Access and Traffic Control, Use of KI, Record Keeping)

a. Verify that state officials can provide protection to state emergency workers and to the general population.

b. Demonstrate that dosimetry equipment is disseminated to state emergency workers.

c. Verify that decontamination facilities are avaliable for state emergency workers and equipment, as applicable.

d. Demonstrate the capability to record exposure information for sthte emergency workers and the general population,

e. Demonstrate state emergency personnel control and use of (simulate) KI.

16. Recovery and' Reentry

i. Demonstrate that, based on field team reports and utility information, the method of performing recovery and reentry can be determined.

b. Demonstrate that equipment and personnel are available to control reentry.

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Nsvemb3r 23, 1981 3.3 LOCAL COMMUNITY OBJECTIVES 1.

Notification and Alerting of Officials and Staff a.

Demonstrate receiving notification with 15 minutes of classiff-cation of the incident; call-back infonnation provided for key officials.

b.

Demonstrate that the town emergency operations center can be activated after being notified of an incident.

c.

Demonstrate that the emergency

• organization can be alerted and then fully activated.

2.

Notification and Alerting of the Public a.

Demonstrate that when directed by the Chief Executive Officer, simulation of notification of the public can be implemented.

b.

Verify that mobile public alerting systems are available.

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3.

External Communications Capability Between Sites Verify that the following comunication systems (radio, telephone, a.

and messengers) are available and operational:

(1)'Townandutility (2) Town and State (3) Town and neighboring towns

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(4) Agency heads and their field personnel.

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o b.

Demonstrate that the communication systems are capable of continuous operation.

4.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Facility (Space, Comfort. etc.)

Verify that E0C has the equipment available and the~ facilities for a.

continuous operation.

5.

EOC Internal Communications and Displays (Message Handling, Maps, etc.)

Verify that communication systems (telephone / messenger / face-to-face) a.

are provided between EOC personnel, including interagency.

b.

Demonstrate that status boards and display maps are maintained current.

6.

Adequacy of Staffing (Multiple Shifts, Competency, etc.)

Demonstrate that the town can staff the EOC, provide access control, a.

and conduct other necessary functions during the emergency.

Demonstrate or indicate th' capability to have a shift change.

b.

e 7.

Facility Access Control / Security a.

Demonstrate the capability to control access to the EOC in order. to maintain security during an emergency.

b, Verify that only authorized personnel have access to emergency equipment and information.

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8.

Support by Responsible Elected or Appointed Public Officials Verify that personnel designated by the RERPs are available to a.

perform appropriate actions.

9.

Direction and Control (Timely Decision Making, Management, etc.)

Demonstrate that local officials make timely and accurate decisions a.

regarding the direction and control of all activities and actions required to respond to the emergency, effectively communicate requirements to emergency forces, and support their agencies.

10.

Coordination (Between Officials, Agencies, Federal Agencies, etc.)

Demonstrate that local officials coordinate, with State and a.

neighboring town officials, the activities and actions required

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to respond to the emergency.

b.

Demonstrate the capability to maintain dialogue with contiguous local governments.

11.

Emergency Plans (Procedures and Checklists Consulted)

Demonstrate the capability to take actions in accordance with a.

applicable procedures.

12.

Public Infonnation (Interface with News Media)

Demonstrate the capability to coordinate media releases through a.

the State media center.

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Accident Assessment (Monitoring, Reporting, Projecting and Coordinating) a.

Demonstrate that the capability to assist, as requested by State Officials, in the collection of samples of surface water supplies and milk exists.

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14.

Protective Actions (Evacuation, Shelter, and Reception) a.

Demonstrate take shelter capability by either simulation or table

• top exercise discussion.

b.

Demonstrate evacuation capability by either simulation or table top exercise discussion.

c.

Verify that the local Chief Executive Officer can detennine protective actions for emergency workers.

d.

Identify that transportation facilities are available, as applicable, to evacuate personnel, including sick and injured.

15.

Exposure Control (Access and Tr'affic Control, Use ri KI, Record Keeping) a.

Verify that access control is maintained as necessary, b.

Verify that local emergency workers are provided personal dosimetry as necessary and exposure records are maintained.

c.

Verify that decontamination facilities for emergency personnel and/or equipment are available, as applicable.

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Recovery and Re-entry a.

Demonstrate that the method of perfonning recovery and re-entry, based on State infonnation, can be planned, b.

Demonstrate that equipment and personnel are available to control re-en try.

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14, 0 SCENARIO 4.1 Dates Times, Places, Participating Organizations The full-scale qualification exercise will be initiated from the Millstone Nuclear Plant on Friday, March 19, 1982 The primary exercise will be approximately eight hours in duration with a recovery / reentry phase of. approximately one hour.

Following the exercise, a critique for the player groups and the Controllers / Evaluators will be held at selected locations.

A critique will be held on Saturday, March 20, 1982 by the NRC and FEMA from 1100 to 1300 at the Waterford To' n Complex on w

Rte. 85 in Waterford, Connecticut.

Those organizations expected to participate include the following:

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Millstone Nucle'ar. Power Station, Waterford, Connecticut.

Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO), Corporate Headquarters, Berlin, Connecticut Connecticut Governor's Office Connecticut Office of Civil Preparedness Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Connecticut Department of Health Connecticut State Police Cunnecticut Department of Agriculture Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection Connecticut Department of Transportation.

i Connecticut Department of Social Services Connecticut National Guard Town of East Lyme Town of Fishers Island, New York l

l City of Groton l

Town of Groton Town of Ledyard l

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Town of Lyme Town of Montville City of New London i

Town of Old Lyme Town of Old Saybrook Town of Waterford Plum Island & Suffolk. County, New York Receptor Area Comunities Norwich Wethersfield Windham/Willimantic 4-2

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4.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AT THE MILLSTONE NUCLEAR STATION Scznario C1cck Time Time 0500 0500 Exercise starts.

Unit I turbine generator trips, reactor scrams,

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and loss of normal power (LNP). Diesel generator fails to start.

0502 0502 Isolation condenser put in service.

0503 0503 Transformer explosion and fire in the Unit 1 transformer yard reported.

0506 0506 Declares an Unusual Event (ECHO Incident) based on loss of normal power and Transformer fire.

0516 0516 Level I radiopager notification of Unusual Event (ECHO incident).

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0520 0520 Gas turbine trips off line resulting in a station blackout.

l 0530 0530 D(clares Alert (CHARLIE-ONE incident) based on loss of off-site and on-site power.

0545 0545 Level II radiopager notification of Alert (CHARLIE-ONE incident).

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i Secnario Clock i

Time Time j

0550 0550 Declares Site Area Emergency (CHARLIE-TWO incident) l based on loss of off-site and on-site power for greater than 15 minutes.

9 0615 0615 Isolation condenser trips on "high flow" while l

being throttled.

0620 0620 Level II radiopager notification of Site Area Emergency (CHARLIE-IWO incident).

(Delayed by Exercise Controller to allow for FEMA requirement f

I for declaration of all Emergency Incident j

i Classifications.)

0635 0635 Reactor pressure increases. A safety relief valve opens and begins to blowdown to'the torus.

0637 0637 Isolation condenser returned to service.

0640 0640 Pressure in the reactor vessel continues to drop.

Acoustic monitor and torus level indicates that the safety relief valve failed to completely i

close.

0645 0645 Isolation condenser secured to minimize coolant i

shrinkage.

d 0652 0652 Reactor water level near the top of the core.

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Scenario Cicek Time Time

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0700 0700 Declares General Emergency (BRAVO incident) based

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on a loss of coolant accident and failure of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS).

0704 0704 Reactor water level reaches 2/3 core height.

0715 0715 Level II radiopager notification of a General Emergency (BRAVO incident).

0810 0810 Diesel generator returned to service.

Blackout terminated. Reactor water level still dropping.

0811 0811 Low pressure ECCS begins injecting water into the reactor vessel. Torus to drywell vacuum breakers indicated open.

0812

.0812 Automatic Pressure Relief Valves are timed out.

0814 0814 core covered.

0815 0815 Level II radiopager update of General Emergency (BRAVO incident).

0816 0816 Torus and drywell pressure peak at 20 psig.

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0820 0820 Torus area radiation monitor off scale. Drywell area radiation monitor reads 3.5 x 105 R/hr.

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ScInario C1 ck Time Time 0830 0830 Torus spray actuated.

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0835 0835 Increasing radiation levels indicated by the reactor building area monitors. Monitors have alarmed. The reactor building to torus vacuum relief piping has cracked due to thermal stresses.

0840 0840 Gas turbine returned to service.

0840 0840 High Range Stack radiation monitor indicates an increasing rate of radioactive gas releases.

REVE radiation monitors indicate above trip setpoint of 11 mR/hr. Stack monitor off scale.

0845 0845 RBVE vent dampers stuck open.

0915 0915 Level II radiopager update notification of General Emergency (BRAVO).

0930 0930 EMTs measure 10 R/hr. @ site boundary.

0940 0940

. Declares General Emergency (ALPHA incident) based on stack monitor off scale and EMTs detect levels of>5 res/hr. offsite.

0955 0955 Level II radiopager notification of a General Emergency (ALPHA incident).

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o' Scenario Cleck Time Time 1055 1055 Level II radiopager update of General Emergency (ALPHA incident).

1155 1155 Level II radiopager update of General Emergency (ALPHA incident).

1255 1255 Level II radiopager update of General Emergency (ALPHA).

1800 1315 ENTs measure 400 mR/hr. at the. site boundary.

1805 1320 Declares Site Area Emergency (CHARLIE-TWO incident) based on less than 1 R/hr. whole body dose rate at the site boundary.

1820 1335 Level II radiopager notification of a Site Area Emergency (CHARLIE-TWO incident).

1825 1340 Activate Recovery Organization at the Station EOF.

Day 2 Day 1 1350 1350 Radioactive noble gas release rate has decreased.

Low Range Stack monitor reads 104 cps.

1400 1400 Declares an Alert (CHARLIE-ONE incident) based on l

site boundary whole body dose rate of less than l

l 50 mR/hr.

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j e-Sc:nario Cicek Time Time 1400 1400 Reentry operations initiated.

1415 1415 Level II radiopager notification of an ALERT (CHARLIE-ONE incident). Termination of the Emergency Phase.

1500 Recovery Phase terminated.

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11.3 OVERALL 8CENARIO NARRATIVE SUMARY The Millstone Unit 1 Nuclear Plant Figure 4.3-1 has a series of unlikely, though not inconceivable equipment failures that degrade its ability to keep the reactor core cooled with water and to contain radioactivity.

These series of failures are necessary to provide enough tasks and off-site radiation levels to test the emergency response capabilities.

EVENTS The sequence of events begin at the Millstone Unit I nuclear plant in the early morning hours (about 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />) with a turbine generator trip (see Figure 4.3-2, Location #1). This causes a reactor scram (automatic shutdown) and there is also loss of normal offsite AC power.

One of the two standby emergency power sources, the diesel generator, fails to start. The Control Room operators are informed that there is a transformer explosion and fire in the Unit I transformer yard.

The operators declare a State Incident Class ECHO (UNUSUAL EVENT) and notify simultaneously, through the radiopager system, station management, Corporate office management and the State Department of Environmental Protection.

The operator has also called the Waterford Fire Department to provide assistance to the site fire brigade.

At about 0520 hours0.00602 days <br />0.144 hours <br />8.597884e-4 weeks <br />1.9786e-4 months <br />, the other source of Unit l's emergency power, the gas turbine, trips offline.

This results in a total " blackout" at Unit 1.

There is no electric power to operate emergency pumps, valves, etc. Only station battery power is available to supply power to some key instruments that indicate reactor pressure, temperature and radiation levels. A " blackout", which is a CHARLIE-ONE (ALERT) incident is declared at 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br />. All station, Corporate office, state and local officials are notified simultaneously through the radiopager system by about 0545 hours0.00631 days <br />0.151 hours <br />9.011243e-4 weeks <br />2.073725e-4 months <br />. This class of incident requires assembly of all station and Corporate office emergency response staff in their Emergency Operations Centers. The state and local community emergency response staff are put on standby status.

The method used to remove heat from the reactor core is the isolation l

condenser. This is being operated but trips due to h.igh flow. This removes the only means of operator' actions to cool the reactor core which, although shutdown, has heat buildup due to radioactive decay.

The reactor pressure increases and a safety relief valve (Figure 4.3-3, Location #1) opens and begins to blow down (release) steam to the torus (see Figure 4.3-3, Location #2). This b: gins at about 0635 hours0.00735 days <br />0.176 hours <br />0.00105 weeks <br />2.416175e-4 months <br />.

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. - ~.. -. - _

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-,-.~.--,_..~..-_.--,,-c Since the " blackout" is estimated to extend for a long period, a CHARLIE-TWO (SITE AREA EMERGENCY) is declared. A radiopager message is issued to all parties at 0620 hours0.00718 days <br />0.172 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.3591e-4 months <br />. The local comunity and state officials are now required to assemble in their Emergency Operation Centers. There are no immediate public protective actions necessary.

The state and local officials will use the Emergency Broadcast System 4

to inform the public about what is occurring.

Field monitoring teams i

will be assembled by both the nuclear station and the state agencies and placed on standby.

The isolation condenser is put back in service. The reactor pressure continues to drop. However, to further complicate matters more equip-i ment failures occur. Acoustic monitors indicate that a safety relief 1

valve has failed to close. This is now causing a loss of reactor cooling water to the torus. At 0652 hours0.00755 days <br />0.181 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.48086e-4 months <br /> the water level in the reactor vessel is near the top of the core.

At 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> the station declares a BRAVO (GENERAL EMERGENC.Y) incident, based on a loss of coolant accident and failure of the emergency core cooling system. Attempts to restore power are underway. No radioactive releases have occurred.

Radiopager notification of the BRAVO incident occurs at 0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br />..

i Local community and state officials immediately initiate access control and take shelter actions to protect the public in a two mile ring and a five mile downwind area.

In addition, the two mile ring evacuation j

will occur if there are no constraints, such as severe weather conditions.

The public is notified of these actions through the public alerting system and the Emergency Broadcast System. The Red Cross in the evacuee receptor communities of Wethersfield and Windham-Willimantic will begin to set up shelters. Buses with schoolshildren will be sent from Waterford to the receptor area of Wethersfield.

The reactor water level reaches about 2/3 of the reactor core height at about 0704 hours0.00815 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.67872e-4 months <br />. Reactor fuel damage occurs. Highly radioactive water i

and steam are being released to the torus. All radioactivity is contained.

j No releases occur.

At 0810 hours0.00938 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.08205e-4 months <br /> the diesel generator is returned to service terminating the " station blackout."

Immediately, the low pressure emergency core cooling system injects water into the reacto-vessel, and begins covering and cooling the core. However, complications occur. The torus to drywell vacuum breakers are indicated open. This causes radioactive gases and steam from the torus to be released to the drywell (Figure 4.3-3, Location #3). The drywell pressure begins to increase. Radiation monitors alarm. The radioactivity is still contained within the primary containment system (drywell). No releases to the environment have occurred. However, field monitoring teams have been deployed.

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However, at 0835 hours0.00966 days <br />0.232 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.177175e-4 months <br /> the reactor building radiation levels increase and monitors alarm.

The reactor building to torus vacuum relief piping has cracked due to thermal stress.

Now radioactive gases from the torus have entered the secondary containment area, the reactor building i

(Figure 4.3-3, Location #4). The radioactive gas filtration and treat-1 ment system (standby gas treatment system) is operating and maintaining the reactor building at a pressure below that of the surrounding

~

atmosphere to prevent the untreated leakage of radioactive gases. Only treated radioactive gases are released from the stack. However, because of the large amount of radioactivity, the stack monitors show increasing levels of radioactive gases at 0840 hours0.00972 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.1962e-4 months <br />.

At 0940 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.5767e-4 months <br /> scenario time, the station declares an ALPHA (GENERAL EMERGENCY) incident based on field team radiation readings at the downwind site boundary. An ALPHA (GENERAL EMERGENCY) event is declared at 0955 hours0.0111 days <br />0.265 hours <br />0.00158 weeks <br />3.633775e-4 months <br /> scenario time (0955 hours0.0111 days <br />0.265 hours <br />0.00158 weeks <br />3.633775e-4 months <br /> clock time) through the radio-pager system. This requires local and state officials to expand the area in which immediate public protective actions are occurring.

Immediate access control and take shelter actions are now taken in a two mile ring and a ten mile downwind area.

In addition, evacuation, if not constrained, will occur in the two mile ring and a five mile downwind area. Longer term public protective actions will also be initiated, by the state agencies, such as putting milk animals in the downwind direction on stored feed, and monitoring food pathways.

The Unit continues to maintain the incident in the ALPHA level until 1805 hours0.0209 days <br />0.501 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.868025e-4 months <br /> scenario time (which is 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br /> clock time).

As the radiation levels decrease, the station downgrades the incident to a CHARLIE-TWO (SITE AREA EMERGENCY) at 1820 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.9251e-4 months <br /> on Day 1, scenario time (1325hoursclocktime).

The Recovery / Reentry organizations are alerted and assembled for briefing at 1825 hours0.0211 days <br />0.507 hours <br />0.00302 weeks <br />6.944125e-4 months <br /> on Day 1, scenario time (1340 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.0987e-4 months <br /> clock time).

l At scenario time Day 2,1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> (1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> clock time), further downgrading of the emergency to a CHARLIE-ONE (ALERT) occurs as field l

teams measure lower levels of radiation.

At 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br /> Day 2, scenario time (1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br /> clock time) the Emergency Phase of the exercise is terminated with the station still in the CHARLIE-0NE(ALERT) incident.

t At 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> clock time the Recovery / Reentry phase of the exercise is terminated.

4-11

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9

5.0 EXERCISE CONTROLLER's RULES D0s 1.

Know the overall Controller's Organization (Figure 5-1).

2.

Remember that there are two clocks, a scenario time and a clock time.

3.

Identify the players by name and function.

Read the Players' Rules.

4.

Identify yourself (wear tag) at all times to all players.

5.

Identify the phone (or radic for field teams) you will use to maintain communications with the Controller Comand Post (Table 5-1).

6.

Position yourself in order to maximize your effectiveness in issuing messages and observing the players.

7.

Know your players' scenario script thoroughly and the master scenario.

8.

Keep the play on schedule by checking your script.

9.

Issue the messages on time. Make sure the players understand it.

Issue the default radiopager and Incident Report Form on schedule if necessary.

10.

Remember to call the Controller Comand Post by phone at least once per 60 to 90 minutes to report on status of players' actions, i.e..

on or off schedule.

11.

Call the Controller Comand Post imediately for advice if in doubt about what to do.

12.

Call Controller Comand Post imediately for advice if players depart significantly from scenario script and this will create major delay.

If necessary, intervene with player action and put play back on scenario track.

13. Allow the players reasonable flexibility to do their functions and demonstrate their skill, knowledge and initiative.

I 14.

Identify the Federal Evaluator (s). Make sure they are reasonably. aware i

of all your actions and those of the players.

15. Make notes on good andbad points of players actions, the strengths and weaknesses and areas for improvement. Use the Evaluators' Critique Sheets (Attachment #5).

16.

Call Controller Comand Post for assistance if you need help to do your job.

1 s

5-1

17.

Identify your players' leader (First Selectman, Director of E0C, etc.).

Work with them at all times.

l 18 If a real emergency occurs and this impacts the players, call the Controller Command Post immediately for instructions.

19. Be at your post at least 20 minutes prior to any player action commences.

Set yourself up.

Check with Controller Comand Post to test comunications.

20 The Federal Evaluators cannot issue " surprise" messages or direct " surprise" detions at the players. They must work through the Controller. This is essential for the success of the exercise.

21.

Controllers and Federal Evaluators do not have to follow the radiation exposure control practices for the radiation levels from the emergency exercise scenario. However, the players must follow the radiation protection rules. Controllers, Federal Evaluators and players entering normal nuclear station radiation areas must observe all normal radiation control practices.

i

22. Organize and attend your players groups post-exercise critique session to provide your coments and recommendations to the lead Players.

Fill out the Evaluation Sheet with the lead players.

23. Town & State Controllers should attend the Exercise Controller's Critique v

session in the evening along with your Chief Executive Officer to provide input to the Chief Controller and share experiences.

4 DON' Ts 1.

Don't leave your post at key times.

2.

Don't prompt the players to take action.

3.

Don't coach the players.

4.

Don't criticize the player actions during the play.

5 Don't forget to call the Comand Post to report status at about once per hour or seek advise or help as necessary.

6.

Don't allow the media /other external influences to distract the players.

A time window has been alloted for media picture taking only. No l

interviews with players are allowed outside this time window or if the players express concern.

l 5-2

.- e e

• L g

FIGURE 5-1 D

ORGANIZATION FOR THE PREPARAT10W & RUNNING OF EXERCISES

<b %g R. C. Rodgers d

CHIEF CONTROLLER J. E. Mercuri CONTROLLER COMMAND POST A. 1. Liponoga I

u NU STATE LOCAL COMMUNITY Ralph Brisc CONTROLLER CONTROLLER COORDINATOR l

GordonPartridge,JoAnn$linsMackey l

Michael Woodson, Ann Co R. Brisco Ed Farrell CORPORATE STATION STATE MEDIA STATE EDF EAST LYME Henry Caldwell CONTROLLE R CONTROLLER CENTER CONTROLLER Phil 5alloway CONTROLLER FISHERS ISLAND - John Bogert Bill Mill Mark Birch I

I I

EOC STATE FIELD TEAM GROTON (City)

Anthony DeMarinis CONTROLLER C. ROOM TSC EOF CONTROLLERS Tom McCance CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER C. F. Sears GROTON (Town)

- John Johnson F. Dacimo M. Hills Ed Farrell R. Harris I

Tom Fuller R. Warnock D. Parker J. Sloan L. J. Landry L. Chafnberlain W. Buch L & M HOSPITAL LEDYARD

- Debbie Bessels l

Glenn Arthur ENVIRONMENTAL

- Diesel Gen.

MGR. RAD. CONSEQ.

Dave Stump FIELD TEAM Jack CONTROLLER LYME Gary Reynolds Bill Peterson G. Cheatham

- Chem. Lab D. W. Miller MONTVILLE Paul Suroviack SEARCH l

. Gas Turbine OSC T. Slaga FIELD TEAMS NEW LONDON

- Wayne Vendetto RESCUE CONTROLLER /065ERVER Marc Pearson cto Idg.

M. Clerk Trish Weekley P. Steinmeyer

- Transformer Yard A. Cardllio R. Haynes E. Pyne WINDHAM/

- Tony Keck OLD SAYBROOK

- Robert Kelley E, Allen WILLIMANTIC

- 555A B. Olonne PLUM ISLAND /

- Judy Gilbert J. Nicholas M. Byron UETHER5 FIELD J. McCluskey SUFFOLK COUNTY.

H. Davis NORWICH WATERFORD

- ' Tom Dembek E. J. Molloy Tom Mathews e

D

I TABLE 5-1 o

Controller Phone Numbers Controller Location Name Loca tion Phone Numbers 1.

Controller Comand Post Millstone Nuclear Station -

Reggie Rodgers EOF Joan Mercuri Anna Liponoga 2

Millstone Control Room NP-1, Control Room Fred Dacimo MP-2, Control Room R. Warnock 3

Millstone Technical MP-1~, TSC Support Center MP-2, TSC N. Hills Don Parker 4

Millstone EOF MP, EOF Ed Farrell Jim Sloan Walt Buch 5

Mgr. Rad. Conseq.

MP, EOF Assessment A. G. Cheatham D. W. Miller & Staff 6.

Diesel Generator MP, Unit 1 Tom Slaga 7

Gas Turbine MP, Unit 1 Jack 8

Reactor Building MP, Unit 1 Dick King 9

Transformer Yard Ray Haynes 10 SSSA MP-1 Control Room J. Nicholas i

(

11 Security CAS SAS

12. Health Physics Unit 1 -

Unia P2 -

1

o Controller Location Name location Phone Numbers 13.

Operational Support Center Cand. Polishing Facility M. Clark 14 Search & Rescue (Security)

Cond. Polishing Facility Trish Weekley 15 L & M Hospital Dave Stump 16 Corporate Office (NUSCO)

Ralph Brisco (a) Berlin E0C Bob Harris Fred Sears Len Landry L'. Chamberlain Bill Peterson (b) Middletown Field Team 17.

State E0C National Guard Armory - HTFD.

Gordon Partridge Joanne Mackey Ann Collins Michael Woodson

18. State Media Center National Guard Armory - HTFD.

19.

Local Communities Henry Caldwell East Lyme Phil Sailoway John Bogert Fishers Island Mark Birch Anthony DeMarinis Groton (City)

Tom McCance John Johnson Groton (Town)

Tom Fuller Debbie Bessels Ledyard Glenn Arthur

v i

Controller Location Name Location Phons Numbcrs o

Gary Reynolds Lyme

~

Paul Suroviack Montville Mary Ferris Wayne Vendetto New London Marc Pearson Norwich Capt. Robert Johnson Old Lyme Robert Kelley Old Saybrook Judy Gilbert.

Plum Island /Suffolk County Tom Dembeck Wa terford E. J. Molloy Tom Mathews J. McCluskey Wethersfield Tony Keck Windham/Williman tic I

I I

e 0

...o 6.0 RULES FOR PLAYERS All Exercise Players (at least the leaders of the player groups) must read and follow the rules given below.

This is important to the succcss-ful demonstration of emergency response capabilities.

1.

Remember there are two clocks, the scenario time and the actual clock time.

The Scenario time is more important to you.

Track both times on your status boards.

2.

Know the overall Controllers organization.

Identify your Controller by his Identification Badge (green badge).

These Controllers are also Evaluators.

3.

There are in addition NRC/ FEMA (Federal Agencies) Evaluators present.

Identify them by their Identification Badges.

They are here to judge your performance and approve your Emergency Plan.

4.

There may be Visitors present.

Identify them by their Identification Badges (orange badge).

5 Media will also be present at certain times.

They will wear Media Badges (yellow badge).

6.

Identify yourself by name and function to the Exercise Controllers and the NRC/ FEMA Evaluators.

This will be a big help.

7.

Play out all actions, as much as possible, in accordance with your Emergency Plan and-Procedures as if it were a real emergency.

You the player have the flexibility of playing out actions or simulating them, (i.e., talking about how and when you would actually do them).

Check with your Controller if in doubt.

Identify your actions to the Controller.

State whether you are going to play them out or simulate them.

For your own benefit, it is recommended that you play out your actions as much as possible, as if it were a real emergency.

Stop short of spending money or taking actions that require work beyond the mid-afternoon (clock time).

It is to your advantage to exercise as many of your actions as possible.

8 Periodically speak out loud, identifying your key actions and decisions to the Controllers and Federal Evaluators. This may seem artificial but it will assist in the Evaluation Process, and is to your benefit.

6-1

.,.,. o,

9.

If you are in doubt ask your Controller for clarification.

The Controller will not prompt or coach you.

i 10 The Controller will periodically issue messages or instructions designed to initiate response actions.

You must accept these messages immediately.

They are essential to your successful performance.

i 11.

If the Controller intervenes and recommends you redirect or reconsider your play actions it is for a good reason.

Listen to the Controller. This is more than likely essential to the overall success of the exercise for all participating groups.

12.

If you disagree with your Controller, you can ask him to re-consider or consult with the Controller's Command Center as time permits.

You must however accept his/her word as final and proceed. This is particularly true for the Station Control Room and Station EOF locations as their actions can delay or speed up the entire exercise and impact other groups.

13.

Respond to the Controller's and Federal Evaluators questions l

in a timely manner.

l 14 You must not accept any messages / instructions from the Federal Eval ua tors.

If they want to initiate actions, test your abilities, or give you " surprises", they must work through your Controller.

This is essential to the overall success of the exercise.

15 You must play as if radiation levels are actually present in I

accordance with the information you have received.

This will require that you wear radiation dosimeters, observe good radiation I

protection practices, be aware of and minimize your radiation exposure.

Identify the individuals in your emergency response organization who are responsible for informing you of these items.

Follow their instructions.

16. The Controllers and Federal Evaluators are not subject (they are exempt) from acting as if radiation levels from the emergency exercise are present.

Do not let this confuse you or cause you to act unwisely.

17.

If you are entering normal nuclear station radiation areas, observe all rules and procedures.

No one (even the Controller and Federal Evaluators) is exempt from normal station radiological practices and procedures.

6-2

=

• .e

,' ' J

• e 18 Demonstrate knowledge of your emergency plan, emergency operations and procedures.

19.. Util' Je Status Boards, log books, 3-part interoffice memo's, etc.,

as muco as possible to document and record your actions, instructions and reports to co-players. This is very important.

Remember "Put it in writing".

20.. Do not enter into conversations with the Visitors and Media.

Only certain lead players can do so at certain predesigned times, allotted for this purpose by the Controller.

21.

You may answer questions directed at you by Federal Evaluators.

If the question is misdirected to you or you do not know the answer refer them to your lead player or the Controller.

22 Keep a list of items which you feel will improve your plans and procedures. Provide this to your lead player.

Lead players will ensure these are considered.

If necessary they will identify it to the Controller.

Remember one of the.

main purposes of the exercise is for you the player to assure yourself that you are adequately prepared. Areas for im-provement or lessons learned when identifled will improve your overall emergency planning and preparedness.

23. A critique of the exercise w[ll occur immediately after the exercise is terminated.

Provide your input to your lead player or the Controller. This will help in the overall evaluation which the Controller will present.

REMEMBER T0. RELAX, DO YOUR BEST AND GOOD LUCK ! ! ! !

l l

l l

6-3 l

7 y a 4 ** e i

l 7.0 RULES FOR VISITORS 1.

The event times and scenario are confidential and should be kept confidential during the exercise.

Do not discuss this with the Players.

2.

Visitors should not participate in the exercise.nor interfere in the actions taken by the exercise Players, Controllers and Evaluators.

3.

Identification badges are to be worn on the upper front of the torso, so as to be clearly visible. Badges should be returned at the end of the exercise or critique.

Identify yourself to the Exercise Controllers.

4 If you have questions contact the Controller of the location you are visiting.

I l

i 7-1

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