ML20053D178

Amend 71 to License DPR-19,authorizing Increase in Setpoint of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Trip Level During Hydrogen Addition Test Scheduled During May & June 1982

ML20053D178
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	05/13/1982
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20053D179	List: ML20053D178 ML20053D181 ML20053D187
References
NUDOCS 8206040159
Download: ML20053D178 (11)

Text

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'~g UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I

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.,E WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-237 t

DRESDEN STATION, UNIT'NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 71 License No. DPR 19

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1.

The Nuclear R,egulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

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A.

The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated February 11, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

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B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisins of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; 0.

The issuanc'e of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Conaission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

m 8206040159 820513 PDR ADOCK 05000237 P

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Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specificatic,ns as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-19 is hereby amended to read as follows:

s's Technical' 56ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 71, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Dennis M. Crutchfield hief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

May 13, 1982 M

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 71 PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-19 DOCKET NO. 50-237 Change the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages described below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by.the captioned amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 23 23 24 24 29 29 30 30*

38 38 39 39

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47 47 48 48*

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• Overleaf pages; no changes involved s

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f TA B LE 3.1.1 D P R-- 19 REAC'lVII PROTECTION SYSTEh! (SCRAht) INSTRUa1ENTAT!ON REQUIRE 51ENTS Stodes in Which Function Slinimum Number Alust De Operable.

of Operable Inst.

Channels per Trip Sta rtuiVilot (1) System Trip Function Trip Level Setting Refuel (7)

Standby Run Action

• 9 1

Stode Switch in Shutdown X

X X

A 1

Stanual Scram X

X X

A i

1R31 3

liigh Flux 5120/125 of Full Scale X

X X(5)

A 3

Inoperative X

X X(5)

A A P R31 f

2 liigh Flux Specification 2.1. A. I X

X(9)

X A or D 2

Inoperative X

X(9)

X A or D 2

Downscale 35/125 of Full Scale X(12)

X(12)

X(13)

, A or B i

2 Ifigh Flux Specification X

X X (14 A

(15% scram) 2.1.A.2 f

2 liigh Reactor Pressure 51060 psig X(II)

X X.

A 2

Iligh Drywell Pressure

$2 psig.

X(8), (10)

X(8), (10)

X(10)

A 2

Reactor Low Water Level

?1 inch *"

X X

X A

2 Iligh Water Level in Scram Discharge Tank 550 gallons X(2)

X X

A 2

hrbine Condenser Low Vacuum 223 in. lig Vacuum X(3)

X(3).

X

^ A or C l*

2 Alain Stoamlinelligh Radiation $3 X Normal Full

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Power Background X(3)

X(3)

X (15)

A or C

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4 (G) hiain Steamline Isolation 1

Valve Closure 510% Valve Closure X(3)

X(3),

X A or C 2

Generator Load Dejection X(4)

X(4)

X(4)

A or C 2

hrbine Stop Valve Closure

$10% Valve Closure X(4)

X(4)

X(4)

A or C 2

Turbine Control-Greater than or X

X X

A~or C' Loss of control' equal to 900 oil pressure ps ig"- -

Amendment No.

71 23

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i-j TA11LE 3.1.1 (cont)

I Notes-1.

There shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for eact; function.

2.

Permissible to bypese, with conttol rod block. for reactos protection system reset in refuel and shutdown postaloits of the reactos mode" switch.

3 Permissible to bypass when tractor pressure 64< t,00 p.lg.

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4.

Peiminable to bypass when far t stage :Jrbine pressure is leu than that shich corresponds to 4Y:. tated steam flow, t

5.

IRal's arc b}pJsicd stice APitM's a:e onseale and the reactor moJe switch is in it.e run positivn.

The design perrni:s closure of any o*ie valse without a. cram bcong instaared.

6 WI.cn the ec ctor is subcritwal Jnd the feJClot wJter temperJtufe is ICst t i-n 210of. only thC lollowing trip fontflons need to bt opetJble:

a.

Mode $s etcle in Shutdosn b.

Manual 5,; ram

. Itagh fium IRM i

d.

Scram Di.chaigc Volu se High 1.esel 8.

Not requitsd to be operable *Sen primary containment integrity is not required.

v.

Not acquired while penlottnis.g;lo= po.er phpics tesp Jt Stmospt:crie PM. Lure during or after refueling at power le*els not to exceed 5 MWit).

May be b pas.cd wisen sicces.ar) (using pu:png for contunment anertin; er deincraing.

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y 11 Not ecc,uitsd to be opcrable when the reactor pressure sesset heae is net bolt <J to the sessel.

l Tbc Al%M do.incale trip fu.ct:on s. au:om4&all) bypls.ed wheti t3e rescior moot switch is in the refuel'and startup/ hot s:ar.dby positions.

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e 13.

The APKM t*oa naCJIC Irlp IJr.ction i. autornJtlCJli',. D)pasP;d khtn the Ih! instruir.entation is operable and not high.

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14. The APRX 15Y. scram is bypassed in the run mode.

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If the first co".u nn c nnot bc r.et for one of the taip rptern. :Mt tr:p s3uem 6 hall he tripped.

if the first colurnn cannot bc est fer both trip sp: ems. ihe approp:s.:te actions listed below shall be taken:

A A.

Ir.its.te n:ssunor. of epc*.blc :ocs and complc:e in.estion of all operabla rode within four hours.

B.

Aeduce po= ct lesci 80 IRM s ngc an,! piece er.cee.s *ct. is al-s kart.phlos 5t.ndby position within P hours.

C.

neducs ru.ong to.J anJ slusc main stearnline !.o*ai.cn v lws w. hir. hes:6 o

An APdM wit bs sun.icsrsc..opstab!c if there are Ic.s i: a ; LPR.: inp :ta p(e Icsel or there are lesi ti.an W,of the normst complement of LntM's to an APitM.

c 1 ingh on it.c sater lesel tes :.mcrtation is 2. 504" above vessel O (See Bases 3.2).

i Inps upon actu : son of tl.c fast clo>ure soleno J shich trips the turbarie control valves.

I 15.

During the proposed Ilydrogen Addition Test, the normal background radiation level will increase

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by the following rates:

IJydrogen Addition Rate (SCFM)

Radiation Invel Increase (% Normal) 0 0

8 15 1

13 25 31 300 62 800 Therefore, the Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Trip Invel will be raised to _f 'three times the increased rad levels.

Amendment No. E, 71 24

T DPR-19

'ths. c..ntrol rod drive. sera'm system 18 desi;:ned so stop valve closure scram aikd'eauses a scram -

t$.it ali of the water which is discharged from the before the stop valves are closed and thus the re-reacter bv a scram can be accommodated in the sulting transient is less severe. Scram occurs at discharge piping. A part of this piping is an in-23" lig vacuum, stop vals e closure occurs at strument volume to-tube in tiie piping) which accom-2n" lig vacuum and bypass closure at 7" lig modates in scess of 50 gallmes of water and is the s acuum.

im. p si: t in the piping. No credit was taken for th:- solume in the design of the discharge piping as liigh radiation levels in the main steamline tunnel i

es.ccerns the amtsunt of water which must be ascom-above tha'. due to the normal nitrogen and oxygen

'I m qSted darin;t a scram. Dorin;; normal operation radioactivity is an indication of leaking Scl. A t'r d:, charge volume is empt); however, should it scram is imtlated whenever such radiation lesel

'l lill v.ith water. the water discharged to the piping exceedsthrcetimes normal background. The pu r-f r.m the reactor could not he accommodated which

. pose of this scram is to reduce the source of such f

s.nabl result in slow scram times or partial or no radiation to the extent necessary to prevent exces-i centrol rod inses tion. To tereclude thi's occurrence, site turbine contamination. Discharge of excessive 6

level switches have been provided in the instrument amounts of radioactivity to the site environs is pre-volume which alarm aml scram the reactor when ver ted by the air ejector off-gas monitors which th.. volunn of water reaches 5e gallons. As indi-cause an isolation of the main enndenser off-gas cated ah ve, there is sufficient volume in the pipin;?

'line provided the limit specified in Specifica-3 19 accommodate the scram without impairment of tion 3.t1 is exceeded, the scram times or amount of insertion of the control r ds. 'nus function shuts the reactor down while During the one month Ilydrogen Addition Test, the sufficient volume remains to accommodate the dis-normal background Main Steam Line Radiation Level f

ch,rned water ami precludes the situation in which.

is expected to increase by as nuch as 800% at the a scram wonid he required but not be able to per-maximum Ilydrogen addition rate, as indicated in form its function ailerpiately, note 15 to Table 3.1.1.

A Scram will be initiated

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at three times the new nornal background radiation I..n of condenser vacuum occurs when the con-level.

c..Her c:in no Ir.nger h.mdle the heat input, loss r,I condenser vai:uom initates a closm e of the tur-I t,u:o stop valves and turbine bypass valves which De main steamline isolation valve closure scram climinates the he.it input to the condenser. Clnsure is set to scram when the isolation valves are 10'i of the tuihine stop amt hypass valves causes a pros-closed from full open. "Ihis scram anticipates the

. sure transient, neutron flux rise, and : n inercase pressure and flux transient, which would occur.

l in surf ace heat flux. To prevent the clad safety when the valves close. Ily scramming at this set-limit f rom bein:t exceedeel if this occurs, a reactor ting the resultant transient is insignificant.

scram necur on turbine stop valve closure. %c y

turbine stop valve closure scram function alone is odequate to prevent the clad snfety limit from being A reactor mode switch is protided which actuates cxceeded in the event of a turbine trip transient or bypasses the various scram functions appropriate with bypass closure. Itei, rection -1. l.3 Salt. %c to the particular plant. operating status. lief. t;ee-condenser hne vacuum scram is a back-up to the tion 7. 7.1. 2 SA fl.

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Amendment No. W 71 f

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%c manual scram function is netive in all modes-

%c requirement to have all scram functions except 5

thus providing for a manual means of rapidly insert-those listed in Note 8 of Table 3.1.1 operabic in the ing control rods thiring all modes of reactor Refuel mode is to assure that shifting to the Hefuel i

oliera tion.

mode during reactor power operation does not diminish the need for the reactor protection system.

%c IHM system p'rovides protection against cxces-sive power levels and short reactor periods in the

%c turbine condenser low vacuum scram is only re-l, start-up and in 8.crmediate power ranges. Ref.

quired during power operation and must be bypassed Sections 7.4.4. 2 and 7.4.4.3 SAR. A source range to start up the unit. At low power conditions a tur-monitor (SRM) system is also provided to supply bine stop valve closure does not result in a tran-additional neutron Icvel information during start-up sient which could not be handled safely by other i

but has no scram functions. Hef. Section 7.4.3. 2 scrams such as the APHM.

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i SA II. Hus, the IRM is required in the " Refuel" and " Start /Ilot Standby" modes. In the power tant;c

%c requirement that the IRM's be inserted in the U

the APRM system provides required protection.

core when the APRM's read 5/125 of full scalc lief. Section 7. 3. 5.2 SAR. Hus, the IRM system.

assures tliat there is proper overlap in the neutron is not required in the " Hun" mode. He A PRM's monitoring systems and thus, that adequate cover-

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cover only the power range, the IRM's provide ageis provided for alp ranges of reactor operation.

adequate coverage in the start-up and intermediate

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range.

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%c high reactor pressure, high drywell pressure.

l reactor low water level, and scram discharge l

volume high level scrams are required for Startup/,

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Ilot Standby and Hun modes of plant operation. %cy are, therefore, required to be operational for thesc modes of reactor operation.

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4' Amendment No. 71

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TABLE 3.2.'1 l

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INSTRUMENTATION Ti!AT INITIATES PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS

!l l.,

Minimum Ho. of l

Operable Inst.

Channels per

• l Trip System (1)

Instruments Trip I4 vel Setting Action (3) 2 Reactor Low Water

>144*above top of active fuel * -

A

'F I

2 Heactor Low las Water 2 84'*above top of active fuel

• A 2

liigh drpvell pressure

$2 psig rated (4), (5)

A 2(2) liigh Flow Main Steam line 81207 of rated steam ftpw B

2 <>f 4 in each Illgh Temperature Mala Steam Line Tunnel (200*F B

of 4 sets 2

liigh Radiation Main Stamm Line f 3 times normal rated power back-l Tunnel (6) (7)

ground D

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l 2

I;)w Pressure blalh Steamline 7850 psig B

i i

Illgh Flow Isolation Condenser Line 1

Steamline Side (20 pst diff, on steamline side C

1 Condensate fleturn Side f 32;' water diff. on condensate

eturn side C

2 Illgh Flow IIPCI Steam Line y150" water D

4 liigh Temperature llPCI Steam Line Arca 5200'F D

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T Notes:

g Whenevee primary containment intervltF a required. there shall be two opeisble se tripped tsIp systems fee each fenellen, eucept feelow peemense main t

l 3.

steamline which only need be available in the RUN positten.

2 Fee each steamilne.

3.

Actlen: If th. nrot eolema esanot be snet fee ese of the telp systems. that talp system shall be tilpped.

• Top of active fuel is defined as 360" above vessel zero for all water levels used in the LOCA Analysis (See Bases 3.2).

Amendment No. 18 38 e

g TA DLE 3.2.1 (cont) t If the Erst column cannot be met foe both trip systems, the approgelate actions listed below shall be taken:

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A.

Inltiste en orderly shutdown and have reactor in cold shutdou n condition'In 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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B.

Initiate an orderly load reduedon and have reactor in flot Staridby within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

C.

Oose leo!ation valves in Iso!stion condenser system.

D. Oose isoletion valves in llPCI subsystem.

4.

Need not be operable when primary containment integrity is not required.

5 May be bypaned when necenary durln;; purging for conutament inening and d.einerting.

6.

An alarm actting of 1.5 times normal background

. 28/19 at rated power shall be established to alert the operator to abnormal radiation levels in the primary coolant.

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7.

The trip level setting will be nointained at S 3 times nornul rated' power background. See note 15 to Table 3.1.1 for trip level settings during the one month Ilydrogen Addition Test.

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l Revised w/ Change No, 28, 19 dated 4/19/74 39 Amendment No. 71 4

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DPR-19 Temperature monitoring Instrumentation is The Instrumen-provided in the main stean:llne tennel to't'etect ta:irm also cevers the full ram.;e or spectrum of leaks in this area. Trips are provided on this in-f

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brea;;s :ad mcc!s the above criteria.

ttrumentation and when exceeded cc.use closure of Group 1 tsolation valves. Its setting of 200*r is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 5 to 10 f te hl;h dryvell pressure Instrumentation is a back-ann: thus, it is capable of covering 1.:e en are rp ta t' e "ea'er ! cycl instrumer.tstion anti in ail:lition specman of bi caks. I or late breaks. p. is a h

to initic.:in:; r,CCS It causes tsola:ica of Group 2 Iso-back-up to hi;;h ste.im flow instrumentation dis-latina valves, for the breaks dir russett abo ec, this cusscal abcve, ami I >r small breahn jvith the result-In :ren:entation will initiate ECCS er.cration at about ant small rcyase of radioactivity.1;ives isolation

e r.i

re the.c as the invi iow.ea:r c level Instrumen-bcTure the guitfelines of 10 C1'll 100 are exceeded.

tat:oa: 1::es the ie:; ult, r.iven atrw a re applicabic j_

h - 7.- ~

• n. Greep 2 Inola:Ica valv: - Inc!ede the liigh rattiation momtors in the main steamline t

dry. c;l ven'.. purge, an l su:np lse.iation v::lves, tunnel have been proviileil to eletect gross fuel failure.

f.

iii,;: dr7xtil prennure activa:es on'y these valves This lustrumentation causes closure of Group 1 1:e :m.e high stry.vell 1 ressere coel l cccur as the valves, the only valves re guired to c!use for this rc: dt of i:en-safety r"In'ed cau:e ';ach en not pur.;ia.: :he ilr:. welt air shiring r las :t's. Total sys-accialent.' Will) the established setting of 3 times normal background, anel main r.teamline isolation l

turn i;tila:lon i:: n 31.!": ircl In inr l'iese cc nditions valve closure..fissirm prothict release is timited so

m! talj i'.c v.tives in Group 2 are regnired to that 10 Cl it 100 guii'clines are not exceeded for this i

clo:t e. The f ew Itu " s'er leve! ie.trumenta!!cn accident. Itef. Sec)!on 11.2.1.7 Salt. The per-f ini:!ates pre.ectiun for the full rpr :trane of loss of formance of the process rachation monitoring system j

entr* acciih nin and cauren a tri i of Group 1 pri-relative lo de:ceting fuel leahat;c shall be eva uated j

l en r*. sy. e:o isolation s alves.

thiring the first five years of operation, lhe renclu-g-

s;s"s of thin evaluatinn will be reported to the j

\\*e"*Pris a re pruvii!r el in the rnain t.*camiinea e s a

-. ns c.! n.ca..iria:; :"1m ihre, ar ' also limitir;-

Atomic I:nergy Cummission.

J tl e ! css ol imtss i c.cntm v lin:n th" sertcl <! urin;;

During the one month Ilydrogen Addition Test, the 1 r.:ra:ulire he i.sh.";t:i.* r$1. In a l.;it!'<ci t. meni-normal background Main Steam Line Radiation Invel t -.

ea a flaw. :c: tt umer.'.ati<'r er prevh!c 1 is expected to increase by as toch as 800% at the

.d it ecu:es a trip of G: a :p ! isn'.-!!ca v.;lv"5.

maximum Ilydrogen addition rate, as indicated in T1 nr!marv hinclina of the instrmeentation is to n te 15 to Table 3.1.1.

The Group I isolation

d-ct a brcak ln 1:.e riain n:ca nline. ws orh will be initiated at three times the new normal G:rr; 1 valver are closeil. :'er l'" worr.t ca s'e background radiation level.

j re ti ce, inain s!camliac breal. on : ide the if rv"ecil'.

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.< tri;i se:tm:; of 120i of raical :. tram flerv in con-l'ressure instrument.ition is proviileil which trips pmrtirer, v.i:h the flanv timiters and main steamline

~ when main steanilire pressnre alreps below $5ry psig, valse clo:.ure, limit the ma.ss inventory loss such A trip of this instrumentation results in closure of ih.i fuel is not uncnscred. !act temt.cratures re-Group 1 isulation valves, in tiic "Itefuel" aml

....in less th: n 1300*1'. mil release of redir. activity "Starttip/Ilot Standby" mode this trip function is by-to Oe c::v:r9 is is well helmv 10 CI'll 100 guiilclines.

p355CdE ThiS I"3CII'm is provideal primaril} to pro-

!. Fer::e.n-l :. ". :t.:n :: nil 14. 7. :t. I's FA li, 47 I.

Amendment No. '11 4

i vide protection against a pressure regulator Dny trip on one'of the six nPRM'u, 8 I RM ' s, o r '. ' ;

nuslhinclinn which v.onh1 cause the control and/or 4 SP.ii's will result in 0 rod block.

The i

bnia s., valves t o open. With flie trip set at S~,0 psig n i n isau r: instrument channel requirements Inventory lor.s in liniiteil to that foci is not uncovered ossure su.:2icient instrumentation to assure l

and peak clad teroperatures are snuch less than the dingle f a i lu r e c r i te r ic a r e trie t.

The 1500'l*; thus, there are rin hssinn pro:lucts available

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for reto.s.* cther than those in the reartnr water.

tr.ini;nura ins trument channel requi rements for the RDtl 1(c f Section I l. ?. 3 SA R.

Two s D snrs on the isolation condenser supply,nnd ay be reduce'd by one for a short period of fWe'to r e t sa ru ilnes are provided to dettect the failure of allow for maintenance, testinie. nf calibrne t-isolation condenser line and actuate Isolation action. This ti:nc period is only-3% of the operatin t t ir.c Thr s.nsors on the supply and return sides are in a snonth and does not sinalficantly increase the arranged in a 1 ont of 2 lo,,1c and, to racct the risk of preventing on inadvertent control rod with-r.f r.7,le f ailure criteria. n11 sensors and Instru:nen-drawal.

tation are required to be orcrahic. The trip sdttings j

of 20 p ti;t and M'* of water and valve closure titre The APRH rod block function is flow biased and are such as to prevent uncovering the core or ex-prevents a significant reduction in }:CTR cxpecially ceedin;; site limits.

The sennors will actuate due during operation nt reduced flow. The APR4 providps tc. high flow in either direction.

gross cure proteccion; i.e.

limit. the grosswithor&wal

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of control rods l'n th'e nor nal withdrawat sequence.

The PPCL high flow and temperature instrumentation are provided to detect a break in the IIPCI piping.

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~ Trippin;; of this instrueentation results in actuation j

of ih'CL isolation valves.

i.e.,

Croup I. valves.

In the refuel and startup/ hot standby rr. odes, Tripping lonic for this function is the sar e as that the ADRM rod block function is set at 12ii nf

(.,r the isolation condenser and thus all senuors rated power.

This control rod block prevides are required to be operablia to rcect th'c single fall,-

the sanie type of protection in the Refuel and'S crtup/

l ure criteria. The trip settings of 200'F and 300%

llo t Standby mode as the APRM flow biased rod block of design flow and valve closure time are such that does in t he run rnode; J c.,

core uncovery is prevented and fission product

. re t car.c f.: elehin limits, prevents control rod withdrawal before a scram is

[r reached.

't h e-Instrumvatation which initiaten ECCS action is i

arranned in a dual bus system.

As for other vital The R!t:1 rod block function provider. local protection instricicutation arranged in this fashion the Speci-of the core, i.e.,

the prevention of transition fication preserves the effectiveness of the system boiling in a local region of the core, for a sin;;1e even durien period when maintenance or testing rod withdrawal error f ro, a liraiting control rod is bein;, perforned, pattern. The trip pnint is flow biar.cd.

The vorst I

is anal' zed

.J case. single control rod withdrawal error The conr.rni roel block functions, arc.provided to the specific tts'p pett6a d, y' for each reload to v.sure that with

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O r .'e r. t c cr.91ve centro) rod withdrawal so that rod withdrawal is bloc' co bef ire tt.e r:cra reaches the Hera f eet a

1 M.Pa c;t,es not c,o below the iiCPR fuel clud-

• • • d"' '""'*7***#8"""*

e i a19 illtegrit.y safety limit.

The trip actow so percent power, tse worst case withdrawal or a str.ste losjic sur q.113 pU."let10n l a.

y out Og re,.

e.O.'

control rod without rod stock action wit! not violate t!.e ::Cra tuel cladding integrity safety lanit.

Thus the Itn.* tod blocs function is not required below this power levet.

40 knendment No. A

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