ML20052B102
| ML20052B102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1982 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8204300025 | |
| Download: ML20052B102 (98) | |
Text
-. _ - -
l' N REGULATORY COMMISSION n!@,l ge[I@
I.
Wi T
',!!)u ulg L r
nu a
l COMMISSION MEETING r
l In *6a Ma:etar of:
'PUBLIC MEETING DISCUSSION OF REPORT ON TASK FORCE ON EVALUATION OF GINNA EVENT l
1 I
t April 14, 1982 PAGES:
1 - 84 DATg.
Washington, D. C.
n.
- -(RE.PORTLTG ALDRMY L
400 viry ad a Ave.., S.W. W=*d ag =n, D. C. 200 24 d
j Talachene: (202) 554-2345 82 04 300 OM
j 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 DISCUSSION OF REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON 5
EVALUATION OF GINNA EVENT 6
7 PUBLIC HEETING 8
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1130 H Street, N. W.
10 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
11 Wednesday, April 14, 1982 12 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, a t 13 2:00 p.m.
14 BEFOREs 15 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission 18 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner JOHN AHEARNE, Commissioner 17 TH0EAS ROBERTS, Commissioner 18 STAFF MEMBERS GIVING PRESENTATIONS AT MEETING:
19 S. CHILK F. REMICK 20 S. TRUBATCH W.
DIRCKS 21 H. DENTON T. MARTIN 22 R.
HAYNES G.
HOLAHAN 23 S. REYNOLDS J. NEHEMIAS 24 J. WIGGINS R. ZIMMERMAN 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, M MDFfRDQ 6 N M FK'iOJK?MfthMH3
^
DISCI. AIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission held on April r4,1982 in the Comission's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Wasnington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
Tnis transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general infomational pureoses.
As provided by 10 CFR g.103, it is not part of the forinal or infomal
- record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in
.this. transcript do not necessarily reflect final deteminations or
.' beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Comission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any'orize.
statement or argument contained herein, except as the Comission may auth i
l
I 2
I 1
EEQCEEEIEGE 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 The meeting will please 3 come to order.
4 The Commission meets this af ternoon to hear a 5 briefing on the NRC report for the January 25, 1982, 8 steam generator tube rupture at R. E. Ginna nuclear 7 power plant.
8 The report is the product of an NBC task force 9 composed of representatives of the Office of Nuclear to Reactor Regulation, the Office of Inspection and 11 Enforcement, the Office of Analysis and Evaluation of 12 Operational Data and the Regional Offices of Region I 13 and Region III.
14 The licensee was not provided an opportunity 15 to review or recommend changes to th e report but 16 coopera ted fully with the task force effort and provided 17 inf ormation as requested.
18 The report documents the circumstance *s 19 surrounding the January 25th steam generator tube 20 rupture event at the Ginna plant.
It focuses on the 21 period from 9:25 a.m. of January 25 when the tube 22 rupture occurred to 10:45 a.m.
on January 26 when the 23 plant entered the recovery phase.
24 The report is intended to describe factual 25 information and significant findings associated with the ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
3 1 event and thereby provide the required information for 2 detailed analysis and recommendations by the various NRC 3 offices.
This latter effort,and the resulting 4 dissemination of information will ensure that NRC and 5 the nuclear industry continue to profit from operating e an accident experience.
7 Unless 'my fellow Commissioners have any other 8 opening remarks they would like to make, I suggest 9 turning the meeting over to Mr. Dircks.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I have a question I 11 would like to ask Mr. Dircks.
12 Bill, is this report the response to the 13 Chairman 's request of task force for the evaluation of 14 January 29th?
15 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What the Chairman had 17 asked for is an interim report to the Commission with 18 findings, conclusions and recommendations.
I had 19 difficulty coming across the conclusions and 20 recommendations.
I don't think they are there.
21
, MR. DIRCKS :
Let me talk about that right 22 a w a y.
This is in response to the Chairman's memo of 23 January 29th.
I talked to Ron Haynes on February 1st 24 and give him a co-ahead on the thing.
In the meantime 25 we had several other activities underway, the ALDERSoN REPORTINo COMPANY. INC,
g 1 longer-term look at steam generators by the Steam 2 Generator Task Force and the review of those problems in 3 tha t area.
4 What the task force has done was to do as 5 complete a f actual summary of the event at Ginna as 6 possible.
The offices have reviewed the f actual summary 7 thus far and they have no immediate recommendations for 8 immediate action.
9 The next step in this phase is for the offices 10 to go through a more in-depth look at this report and 11 see if there are any longer-term actions to be taken.
12 In addition to that, what we want to do is turn the 13 report over to the Steam Generator Task Force and for 14 them to review it f rom their perspective.
15 Another point that Harold wants to do is to 16 distribute the report videly to all the licensees to 17 take a look at the operator actions involved.
18 So there are no immediate recommendations in 19 here.
The longer-term recommendations will follow as 20 each office goes through the report in a very in-depth 21 manner.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE But I guess what you 22 23 are saying is that a conclusion is that there is no 24 immedia te action tha t you can see being needed and so 25 the recommendation is to support that conclusion to take ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
5 1 no immediate action and then to turn this report, as you 2 say, over to the longer-term effort.
3 ER. DIRCKS:
Yes.
4 These ace the only points in response to your 5 question that I wanted to make.
It is a factual 6 summary.
There is no need to take any immediate 7 actions.
If there were, we would have made those 8 recommendations even before you got the report today.
9 CHAIBMAN PALLADINO:
This is a factual report 10 of just th e period that I described?
11 MB. DIRCKS:
Yes.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It does not go into the 13 f acts that were obtained as a result of later 14 inspections and therefore doesn ' t include metallurgical 15 information and the like.
16 MR. HAYNES:
We do cover some post-event work 17 there and we do have some photographs of where we stand 18 a t this time on the metallurgic aspects.
19 MR. DIRCKSa There is certainly information in 20 here tha t the Steam Generator Task Force should be 21 reviewing d uring the course of their deliberations.
22 Ron.
23 MR. HAYNES:
May I just lead off.
Mr.
24 Chairman and Commissioners ---
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINOa For the benefit of the ALDERSoN REPCRTING COMPANY,INC,
1 public it might be well just to identify yourselves 2 since we didn't introduce all the people at the table.
3 MR. HAYNES:
My name is Ronald Ha ynes and I am 4 the Regional Administrator at the Philadelphia Office of 5 the NRC called Region I.
6 On last January 28th I provided a preliminary 7 briefing to you about the Ginna steam generator tube 8 rupture event which occurred on January 25th.
I had 9 just then returned from the Ginna site and my report to 10 you was necessarily brief and limited to a broad look at 11 the major operational and radiological events which had 12 occurred.
13 On January 29th, Mr. Chairman, that you spoke 14 to earlier, you directed Mr. Dircks to establish a task 15 force to review and evaluate the Ginna event.
On 16 February 1st Mr. Dircks discussed this assignaent with 17 me and then later he confirmed our discussion in a I
18 memorandum of February 5th which appointed me to l
19 organize and direct this ef fort.
l 20 Now to carry out this assignment I functioned 21 as chairman of a five-person steering group comprised of 22 senior managers from the Offices of NBR, OIE, AEOD and 23 Region I.
On February 4th the steering group met for 24 the first time in Bethesda and documented a charter for 25 the task group effort.
This charter delineated the ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
y 1 scope of the work, as you described previously, Mr.
2 Chairman, and a preliminary outline of the report was 3 then developed to document it.
4 The effort was really to obtain and report the 5 relevant facts of what occurred during this period 6 between 9:25 on the 25th and about 10: 45 on January 7 26th, plus bring in some post-event activities that took 8 place that were of interest, particularly with respect 9 to the steam generator, and what was found at that time 10 with what happened to the tube and the cruse of the 11 leakage as best could be determined.
What we wanted to 12 do with this report was then to be able to provide a 13 data base, if you can, for detailed analyses and 14 consideration by the other offices in the NRC.
15 On February 8th with advice and concurrence of 16 the steering group I a ppointed Mr. Tim Martin as the 17 leader of the task. force and detailed him f ull time to 18 the assignment.
Mr. Martin is a Senior Manager in 19 Region I.
He is Director in charge of Division of 20 Engineering and Technical Programs.
21 He was on leave in Hawaii during the event 22 when it occurred and so the task force was his first 23 involvement with this incident.
He came on that Monday l
24 and got the assignment.
25 (Laughter.)
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
8 1
MR. HAYNES:
Now during the execution of this 2 assignment the steering group met several times with Mr.
3 Hartin and members of th'e tas,k, force and provided 4 guidance.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Jim, he really didn't 6 have to throw that in, did he?
7 (Laughter.)
8 HR. HAYNES4 They provided the guidance as 9 requested and this report which we have here, NUREG 10 0909, also includes inf ormation and input from the 11 Federal Emergency Management Acancy.
12 As you know, we did this to be able to obtain 13 a fuller understanding of the governmental response to 14 the event.
As you know, FEMA did respond to the site on 15 January 25th and worked with us to the 26 th, and I am 16 happy to say that their cooperation has continued 17 throughout this period on the work of the task force in 18 developing the information.
19 Mow if I can at this time, I would like to 20 turn over the msjor part of the presentation to Mr.
21 H artin.
As most of you know, Tim is well known an 22 experienced leader in investigating technical events at 23 operating nuclear power plants.
He performed a key role 24 at several investigations associated with the Three Mile 25 Island II sccident as well as the Indian Point II ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
9 1 flooding event and as well as security problems we h j
2 out at the Beaver Valley f acility.
3 Tim, if you will.
4 HR. MARTIN:
Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, my 5 name is Tim Martin.
I as the Director of the Division 6 of Engineering and Technical Programs in Region I.
I 7 received this assignment on a Sunday back in February.
8 I met with the steering group and received my 9 charter on the following Monday, and I want to reiterate 10 that we were to document the f acts and findings of 11 f acts.
We were not to make recommendations and we were 12 not to come to conclusions.
This was to be a mother 13 document, a document to be provided to other offices who 14 would do more detailed review, evaluation and ultima tely 15 to develop recommendations.
That was the charter we 16 operated under.
l 17 I will take exception to one thing relative to 18 the steam generator tube documentation in the document.
19 Obviously all the examination of events was done 20 post-event and all the things that are reported in there 1
21 reflect back to that period.
The tube did rupture 22 during the period we were chartered to look at and l
23 therefore we provided the best information we had about 24 the tube rupture that occurred during th a t e ven t.
So 25 the document basically reflects that period.
l j
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
r 10 1
Now the Section 7 in the document does reflect 2 some post-svent s:tivities, but they are necessary to 3 put the earlier event into pe,rspective and they were 4 therefore provided for that reason.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Tim, since you do end 6 up discussing some of the examination of the tube, this 7 is information current as of?
8 NR. MARTIN:
I have to turn to Sam Reynolds.
9 Mr. REYNOLDS:
As of three weeks ago.
10 MR. MARTINa The NUREG was put together by a 11 task force of 13 principal authors and I want to in a 12 spirit of regionalization let you know that we had four 13 representatives from NRR, we had one from AEOD, we had 14 three f rom ICE, we had two from Region III and three 15 f rom Region I.
16 We were also assisted by FEMA, by our 17 con tactor, Ba ttelle Northwest, by th e Je t P ropulsion I
18 Laboratory and their computer enhancement of our video, 19 and also we had abundant assistance from all the offices 20 represented by the members who provided us calculations, 21 analayses, reviews and recommendations.
It was a team 22 ef fort of all NRC and we are very appreciative of the 1
23 coopera tion we got.
24 We also had three excellent techical editors 25 provided by Mr. Besaw' shop who worked some damn long ALDERSoN REPORT 1No COMPANY. INC,
11 I hours and they really deserve a lot of credit.
2 The information that you see in this document 3 was generated as a result of a two-week visit to the 4 site.
We made observations, we performed some tests, we 5 made some measurements, we conducted interviews, we 6 analyzed data, we monitored audio tape generated both by 7 the licensee and by us, we took video tape that was 8 generated by the licensee and subjected it to computer 9 enhancement, we took some procedures and walked through 10 them to sea what the problems might be with them and we 11 reviewed a lot of documents.
12 Basically the first two weeks was spent on 13 site to gather the data which was then brought back to 14 the offices to do the analysis.
15 The final document was ready on the 8th of 16 April.
At that time I send it to the printers.
I sent l
17 it to the various NRC staffs who would need to review it 18 in preparation for this briefing today and I sent it to 19 the licensee and the vendor.
That was the first time 20 they saw it.
It was sent to them with a cover letter 21 saying this is for proprietary review only.
We did not 22 solicit any further review.
In fact, it was being 23 printed as they were reviewing it.
24 We got our release on Monday the 12th for the 25 proprietary purposes.
The Ginna plant did coordinate ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
12 1 the vendor review and report to us.
The safeguard 2 release was done by our Nuclear Material Safety and 3 Safeguards Office and we got that about the same time.
4 So at this time the green document is ready 5 for releasa.
There are minor differences between the 6 yellow document and the green document.
Section 572, we 7 noted an error on Friday.
I think it was about the 8 9th.
It had to be corrected and it had to be right in 9 the document that was printed.
So what you see is a 10 result of my staff pointing out a problem and we got 11 tha t fixed.
There are also some typos that are 12 corrected.
So that is the major difference.
13 With that lead in I would like to start with 14 slide one.
~
15 (Slide presentation.)
16 The first two slides are really for the l
17 purpose of giving you a lay of the land and pointing out 18 the equipment which is a problem.
The reactor vessel is 19 nea r the center toward the bottom.
The things to point 20 out in the reactor vessal are the thermocouples that 21 were located at the exit of the core and in the upper 22 head were of extreme value to the opera tors.
23 Coming out through the hot leg on the B side, 24 and the B side has the faulted steam generator, we have 25 the let-down line to the CVCS system, the chemical ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
13 l
1 volume and control system.
This was the major source of 2 water that ultimately caused the rupture of the 3 pressurizer relief tank disk.
4 Working my way around the reactor coolant pump 5 and then the injection point for the charging flow from 6 the CVCS, this injection point along with the safety 7 injection, which really come in almost on top of each 8 other, are the major source of cool water into the B 9 loop and we will address that later when we talk about 10 how we tried to resolve what kind of thermal transient 11 that the reactor vessel saw.
12 This plant has one peculiarity.
There are no 13 TH or hot-leg indications inside the control room.
Ther 14 do have RTDs located in the hot legs and they do compute 15 a delta T, but they do not bring out hot leg.
The fact 16 tha t that information was not available caused us some 17 confusion over the emergency notification system as we 18 kept asking for the information and they.didn't have it.
19 There is cold-leg information though.
The 20 cold-leg RTDs are located almost right on top of the 21 safety injection and charging points.
The RDT sticks 22 about one inch into the pipe.
This is a 27 and a half 23 inch pipe.
So you don 't get a hell of a lot of good 1
24 information from it.
25 The temperature dropped very low shortly after ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC,
14 1 natural circulation stopped in the B loop and this was 2 probably caused by the cold water coming in.
The safety 3 injection water, by the way, vas running at the tank 4 about 69 dagrees and we believe that it probably heated 5 up to around 90 degrees from pump heat and from the heat 6 tracing, but still there was very cool water being 7 injected at this point.
8 Coming on around the diagram we have the 9 pressurizar.
The pressurizer heater controls tripped 10 the heaters very early in the event as the pressurizer 11 voided.
They will not be restarted until after a 12 decision is made to restart the reactor coolant pump and 13 it will be a while before the pressurizer actually gets 14 a bubble back in it.
15 On the pressurizer you will not'ce there is 16 one pressure transmitter.
That is the narrow-range 17 pressure transmitter.
It is used for safety circuits l
18 for reactor protection and safety injection circuits.
19 It is the.only safety related pressure transmitter 20 indicator on this system.
I will talk about the other 21 one shortly.
It so happens that this one bottoms out at 22 about 1700 pounds.
In the majority of the transient and 23 in the majority of the recovery this instrument was on 24 this lower scala.
It was the only safety indication of 25 pressure tha t they had.
l ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
15 1
Coming off the top lef t of the pressurizer you 2 see a number of valves with motor operated valves in 3 f ront of them.
These are the PORVs, the power operated 4 relief valves.
There are two of them.
They have a dual 5 purpose.
One for controlling transients that you don't 8 vant to challenge your code safeties, and, two, they are 7 used for low-pressure overpressure protection, or low 8 temperature pressure protection.
9 The PCV-430 you see there is the one that did 10 f ail.
It failed in the open position, and I will talk 11 about it a little bit later.
It was due to a failure in 12 the pneumatic system, not the valve itself.
The valve 13 functioned probably three times, but on the fourth time 14 started to shut and then reopened by itself and this was 15 a result of the control system malfunction.
16 The motor operated valve, the block valve did 17 fuction properly.' It takes about 40 seconds for it to l
l 18 close.
So there was some discharge.
Again, I 19 reiterate, it is not the major source of water to the 20 pressurizer relief tank.
In fact, the major source is 21 going to be from the let-down system, and I will talk l
22 about that in a second.
23 On the line from the power operated relief t
l 24 valve there is a temperature element.
The temperature 25 element did indicated elevated temperatures for a ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, i
16 1 significant period of time and caused the operators to 2 suspect that the PORVs were leaking so they shut both 3 block valves.
So both the PORVs were isolated very 4 early in the event.
5 Coming on around now, right above the 6 pressurizer relief tank which is in the upper-right-hand 7 side you see the line that leads down to it has letdown 8 relief feed into it and seal return relief.
The seal 9 return relief lif ted almost immediately after 10 con tainment isolation because you have cut off charging 11 flow.
12 Your primary system is now bleeding back 13 through the seals.
It pressurizes the line to protect 14 the low-pressure piping downstream and the seal relief 15 opens.
It is about five GPM max and probably closer to 16 one GPM actually.
You can actually watch the level 17 trace on the pressurizer relief tank and you can see it 18 come up, but it is a very small contribution.
The major 19 contribution will be the letdown relief and we will talk 20 about that in a little bit.
21 Going on down, the pressurizer relief tank 22 rupture disk did rupture during the event.
It dumped 23 approximately 1,320 gallons to the containment sump.
I 24 guess that is all I want to say about that.
25 Coming on around now and we are back to the A ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
17 1 loop, you see the other pressure instrument located off 2 the hot log of the A loop.
This one is a wide-range 3 instrument, zero to 3,000 pounds.
It was used by the 4 operators to determine if they had saturation 5 conditions, it was used by the operators to determine 6 the delta P from the primary system to the ' steam 7 generator for leak control and it was used by the 8 operators to determine when they could go into the BHR 9 mode so they wouldn 't pressurize the low-pressure 10 piping.
It was a very important instrument.
It is not 11 saf ety related.
Yet, they had to have it and this was 12 the only one they could use.
13 Slide two, please.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot Can I ask Mr. Dircks a 15 question.
Do we have line diagrams of these of every 16 plant at least in this much detail available?
17 HR. DIRCKSs I don't think we have it in that 18 detail.
I think we should.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes, I think so because 20 this would help.
Thank you.
21 MR. MARTIN:
Mr. Chairman, one of the things 22 we did note from this event.
We expected the l
23 Westinghouse plant to have a TH indication.
It caused a l
24 great deal of confusion as we kept asking for it and 25 they kept not being able to give it to us and we didn't ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, l
l
18 1 understand why.
The ultimately ended up giving us core 2 exit temperatures and that caused further confusion 3 because the core exit was rea, ding less than the cold leg 4 temperatures just because of the calibration problem.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But now you had a cold 8 leg temperature.
7 MR. MARTIN:
Yes, sir.
8 CHAIBMAN PALLADINO:
You had the delta T.
9 MR. MARTIN:
We had the delta T.
Going back 10 to the TMI experience we knew that calculated values are 11 subject to errors.
So we didn't have a great deal of 12 f aith in calculated values.
We wanted the raw 13 information.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINGs In other words, the sum 15 of delta T and T cold did not satisfy you.
16 MR. MARTIN:
It did not.
17 This next drawing is shown for two purposes.
18 One, to show you where the atmospheric relief paths are 19 and also to point out some things that are going to play 20 a major part in the following discussion.
21 The two steam generators, they feed out.
22 There are pressure instruments located on both the main 23 steam lines.
They have an atmospheric relief that is 24 normally set at 1050 pounds.
It has a manual block 25 valve.
Then there are four code safeties.
Three of ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
19 1 them are set at 1140 and one is set at 1085.
So the 2 atmospheric power operated relief valve on this one is 3 around 1050.
Normally you vould use it and it would 4 prevent challenging your code safeties.
If it fails you 5 have always got the block valve.
On the code safeties 6 you don't.
7 We have noted that during this event the 8 operators did isolate the block valve on the f aulted 9 steam generator atmospheric PORV.
It certainly is not 10 going to stop the pressure from increasing.
The code 11 safeties were subsequently challenged.
Had they failed, 12 and we believe that they did f ail to recede on several 13 instances, there was no way to isolate them.
So they 14 removed one line of defense.
15 Release points, obviously to the condenser you 16 have the air ejectors.
Any of the code safeties 17 relieving, and one of them did on the B, so that is a 18 release point.
The exhaust to atmosphere from the 19 auxiliary feedvater pumps was also a release point.
I 20 will show these to you on a diagram later on and how 21 they fit in with the plume.
22 One comment I would like to make on the 23 configuration of the main steam line.
The main steam 24 line comes out of the steam generator and rises several 25 f ee t, turns horizontal, snakes around for a thermal l
l l
l l
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC,
20 1 expansion, goes through the containment wall and then 2 dives down 20 or 30 feet, turns horizontal and then all 3 these connections for the saf,ety valves and the PORY and 4 the tap-off for the feedwater pump are located in a 5 horizontal run.
Then you have got your main steam 6 isolation valve.
7 This configuration resulted in when we had 8 flooding filling that line.
We probably ended up with a 9 gas bubble at the top of the high point and we probably 10 had partitioning of the radionuclides and the volitiles 11 ended up in the gaseous space.
You had water now 12 sitting up against your code safeties.
So when ther 13 ultimately relieved we had water relief versus -: team 14 relief which is assumed in the analysis that we do for 15 steam generator tube rupture events.
16 With that lead in, then I would like to go to 17 slide three.
18 We chose, after examining the event, to divide i
1 19 it into nine phases.
The nine phases were chosen 20 because during each phase similar things seemed to be 21 g oi ng on.
The trends of the parameters were somewhere 22 snd it seemed to divide into that.
23 Initially we were at stead 7 state.
We were 24 o pe ra tin g a t 100 percent power and everything was 25 copacetic.
There was no, and I repeat, there was no ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC,
)
21 1 indication, no warning that there was a leakage into the 2 steam generator.
The blow-down monitors didn't show 3 anything.
The air ejectors didn't show anything.
The l
4 chemistry didn 't show anything.
5 CONNISSIONER AHEARNE And there was no 6 indication of leakage in any previous ---
7 HR. MARTIN:
In years past they had had 8 leaking tubes which they had been able to detect.
9 COHNISSIONER AHEARNE:
But there was none for to this particular tube?
11 NR. MARTIN:
None for this one, sir.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And you are saying tha t 13 just prior to this event there was no ---
14 MR. MARTINS No indication.
l 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Now is there an i
i 16 instrument with a set point at a certain number of 17 gallons per minute that they should have picked 18 something up, or does it alarm at some point?
19 MR. MARTIN:
Roy, can you answer that?
20 MR. ZIMNERMAN4 The air ejector alarm would 21 probably be the most sensitive.
By name is Roy 22 Zimmerman.
I am Resident Inspector at Ginna.
The air 23 ejector alarm would be an aid along that line.
They did
(
24 have some leakage f rom B steam generator in their 25 previous cycle but it was a very small leak.
There was ALDERSON REPoRDNG COMPANY,INC,
~~
22 1 nothing in this present cycle.
2 COMMISSIONER AhtARNE:
There is no instrument 3 that would alert them that there is a lesk in the steam 4 generator at some certain number of gallons per minute 5 loss rate?
6 HR. HAINESs You would do that on a water 7 balance, Commissioner, and there is no direct reading.
8 MR. MARTIN:
They are able to monitor for the 9 tech spec limits on leakage using the water chemistry 10 and also the blow-down monitor which is probably a 11 little less sensitive than the air ejector.
I can't 12 tell you what the alarm on the air ejector equates to in 13 terms of gallons per minute.
Obviously it is strongly 14 dependent upon the activity in the primary system.
15 So Phase I steady state operation.
16 Phase II was the tube rupture and 17 depressurization.
The depressurization, it started at 18 9:25.
The initial indications were the air ejector 19 a la r m.
They had a steam flow feed flow mismatch on the 20 steam generators, on the B steam generator 21 specifically.
They had a pressurizer level alarm, a 22 low-pressure alarm.
They ultimately had at 9:28 a 23 scram.
Shortly thereaf ter there was a safety 24 inj ection.
Shortly thereafter, in fact almost 25 coincidentally, a containment isolation, noting that the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
23 1 safety injection pumps had sta rted, that they were 2 scrammed and pressure was d ropping.
They tripped the 3 reactor coolant pumps at 9:29.
The pressure continued 4 to drop.
It dropped below 1200 pounds, probably at 1150 5 or something like that.
The safety injection pumps were 6 then taking hold and pumping water in.
7 During the Phase III, which we call the 8 natural circulation repressuri:ation, you can see the 9 effect of the safety injection.
You can also see the to effect of the cool-down which is occurring in natural 11 circulation on both A and B steam generators because at 12 least in the initial part of this the generators have l
13 not been isolated.
They are still trying to determine.
1 14 At 9 33 they have already notified the NRC 15 tha t there was a steam generator tube rupture event.
16 They choose at this time not to say that it is in the B 17 generator because they are not confident.
They know 18 they have had one.
They think it is a B but they are 19 doing some further checks.
Some of those further checks 20 includes a radiation reading on the main steam lines.
21 It confirms for them that it is the B steam generator.
22 By 9: 00 they have isolated the B steam generator.
23 The laval continues to rise in the B steam 24 generator and finally goes off scale in another 15 or 20 25 minutes.
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
24 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What was it that led them 2 to conclude it was the B generator?
3 MR. MARTIN :
The initial thing that told them 4 was they got a steam flow feed flow mismatch on that 5 generator, a slight perturbation in level.
I think one 6 of the things that probably confused them and didn't 7 make them take immediate action was on the subsequent 8 scram both steam generators observed shrink to about the 9 same level.
It was only then the subsequent radiatiors 10 reading on the main steam lines confirmed f or them that 11 it was the B steam generator.
So at 9: 40 they did shut 12 the main steam isolation valve and that was really the 13 last thing, the isolator on that generator at that 14 time.
The taps were all isolated and the auxiliary feed 15 was all isolated and everything clse was taken care of.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Do you find disturbing 17 or not much of a problem that it took 15 minutes to 18 reach that conclusion?
19 MR. MARTIN:
No, I do not find it disturbing.
20 Quite f rankly, I find these operators extremely well 21 trained.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am not talking about 23 the operators.
24 MR. MARTIN:
That it took them 15 minutes?
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That it took them 15 ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
25 1 minutes.
2 HR. HARTINa No, I don't think so.
If they 3 had bottled the wrong one and then had to bottle the 4 other, you know tha t would cause them a significant 5 problem.
I think they took prudent action.
6 COMNISSIONER AHEARNE:
But in that type of 7 time period you had reached the conclusion that it was 8 which generator ---
9 MR. HARTIN:
I am sure for them this vent by 10 in about a half a minute.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am not asking that.
12 HR. MARTIN 4 I do not find fault.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I recognize that.
I 14 have read your report, I have recognized that you have 15 reached the conclusion that the operators did very 16 vell.
That wasn't my challenge.
My question really was 17 do you find that to take 15 minutes to reach that 18 conclusion, do you think that that is an adequate amount 19 of time?
Let's say our procedures or the procedures are 20 such that they lead you on every.one of these scenarios 21 you go through to conclude it will take 15 minutes.
Are 22 you satisfied?
Is that a reasonable amount of time?
23 HR. MARTIN:
I have no problem with it.
I can 24 also point out tha t the FSAR assumes an hour would be 25 nice but four and a half hours is okay.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
26 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is the 15 minutes 2 dependent on a number of f actors?
Could it have been 3 longer or shorter?
4 HR. MARTINa I think if it had been a smaller 5 leak it would have been more difficult to determine.
6 This turns out to be probably your bounding leak.
We 7 vill talk about it later, but it comes out at about 760 8 gallons per minute initially.
If that is not right on 9 the maximum, it is awf ul close.
to CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What do you mean if that 11 is not right on the maximus ?
Why couldn 't it be more?
12 MR. MARTINS You would hr.ve to shear more 13 tubes.
You are basically at the critical flow.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s More tubes is what I was 15 thinking about.
16 HR. MARTINS I want to point out here that in 17 a review of the data af ter the event in the quite of our 18 offices we were able to say that there was probably a 19 bubble formed in the top of the reactor vessel during 20 this initial depressurization.
We wouldn't expect the 21 operators to spot it.
It wasn't there very long.
22 The temperature indications in the upper head 23 show that during the repressurization had there been a 24 bubble formed early it would have gone away very 25 quickly.
Because the pressurizer level was dropping ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
27 a
1 like a rock because of the break they would have never 2 been any perturbation in the pressurizer level.
3 Containment isolation was reset at about 4 9:57.
They needed that to regain instrument air so they 5 could regain control of valves inside containment and l
6 also to gain control of the saf ety injection system.
(
7 This initial part, their main thrust is to do 8 a very rapid cool-down to no-load temperatures, around 9 490 degrees, so they then can subsequently 10 depressurize.
Unfortunately, natural circulation 11 doesn 't give you very good mixing in the upper head and 12 so the temperature up there vill remain hot.
13 At approxinately 10:07 they had met all the 14 conditions they felt necessary to start i
15 depressurization.
They are going to use the power 16 operated relief vsive on the pressurizer because the 17 reactor coolant pumps had been tripped much earlier.
So 18 they don 't have that spray available to th e m.
19 They successfully cycle it three times.
Nov 20 the reason they have to go through a cycle operation is 21 there is like six or ten feet between the instrument 22 they have got to read and the switch you have got to 23 con trol.
So there is a two-man operation.
The guy 24 bumps it, how is that; you know, he bumps it, how is 25 tha t.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
i 28 1
After three successful operations they try the 2 fourth one, the valve opens, they go to shut and the 3 valve starts to shut and then reopens by itself.
4.
Our investigation subsequently has determined 5 that this probably was related to a restriction that the 6 licensee had put in the exhaust from a solenoid valve 7 which controls the power operated leak valve.
The 8 restriction was put on the exhaust port.
If you look at 9 the technical manual associated with that solenoid it 10 says do not put a restriction on that because it can 11 lead to malfunction.
12 To get the type of transient that was seen in 13 this valve there had to be some particle or something 14 blown into the restriction.
Basically what you have to 15 have is a down-pressure transient followed by a 16 repressurization.
The valve did stroke partially 17 closed, then reopened, stayed open for two days and then I
18 vent shut by itself.
I 19 They were removing the shield blocks on top of 20 the pressurizer cubicle when it finally went shut and 21 this could hahecaused vibration which shook it free.
22 But that is pare speculation and I have not got the 23 piece of dirt in my hand to show you.
24 So after the fourth operation, had they been l
25 successf ul and had the valve shut, it probably would I
h i
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
29 1 have secured safety injection right there.
They had met 2 all the requirements.
But the with the stuck-open PORV 3 and the block valve traveling shut, they probably had no 4 consideration of stopping the safety injection at that 5 point.
Safety injection repressurized the system and 6 now you see we enter into the Phase 5 which is prolonged 7 saf ety injection.
8 At this point they got a pressurizer which is 9 going full scale and reading off scale high.
They knov 10 they have a bubble in the top of the reactor vessel.
11 They verified the thermocouple readings in the upper 12 head.
They show a saturation condition.
The pumps are 13 essentially sitting there on a shut-off head.
We have 14 been able to do the calculations from pre-op test data 15 on the pumps and the charging just about ma tches wha t we 16 calculate is the flow through the break.
I think that 17 came out about 400 gpm.
18 During that period, if you note the B steam 19 generator transient, you will notice that during the 20 power operated relief valve opening you see that the 21 steam generator pressure did drop.
There was actually 22 reverse flow through the break during that period.
23 Subsequently you will see two more dogs before 24 the end of the prolonged safety injection.
Those were 25 actually reliefs of the code safety on the B steam ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGtNIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
30 1 generator, the lowest set point, the one that is set at 2 1085 pounds.
3 Af ter the first ope,ning you will notice a long 4 period of essentially flat pressure in the B steam 5 generator.
We believe this is during a period where you 6 have steam leak out that code safety.
7 The subsequent transient you will see it as a 8 slow build-up.
So basically we see the valve as 9 completely receded during that period.
10 The third opening which occurs right at the 11 end of the prolonged safety injection phase at about 12 10:38 you will notice that the pressure drops much 13 further than the two previous openings.
We believe at 14 this point that the code safety har seen two-phase 15 flow.
As the valve opens this is the time when they l
16 terminate safety injection in trying to cut down 17 releases to the atmosphere.
18 At about 10:40, right at the end of the 19 prolonged safety injection, they have secured the last 20 condensate pump on the condensers.
This causes the 21 steam generator ejectors to trip off the line.
This 22 causes them now to shif t to using the A steam generator 23 steaming to atmosphere through its power operated relief 24 valve.
25 Interviews indica te that the reason they did ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVEm S.We WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 G20@ 554-234t,
31 1 this was to pervent further contamination of the in-line 2 polishers, the domineralizer system and also the 3 condensate storage tank.
4 During the following period, which we call 5 Phase 6, leak reduction, here they are trying to reduce 6 the leakage between the primary system and the secondary 7 system.
They are in a paradox.
They are in a procedure 8 which says you have got to secure safety injection and 9 you have got to regain normal pressurizer level control 10 bef ore you restart the reactor coolant pump.
11 They know they have a bubble in the top of the 12 reactor pressure vessel and they want to deal with 13 t h a t.
They don't want it to grow too large so that it 14 would hamper natural circulation.
A good demonstra tion 15 that the core is cool the thermocouples indicated.
The 16 pressure in the A steam generator and the f act that they 17 are able to steam the A stream generator clearly 18 indicates that natural circulation is occurring.
The 19 delta T indicates natural circulation is occurring.
20 So they want to start a reactor coolant pump 21 to re-establish some normalcy in the primary system and 22 to expedite the cool-down and recovery phase.
About 23 11:19 they start a safety injection pump for the purpose 24 of an anticipated pressure transient which they expect 25 when the reactor coolant pump is started.
They leave ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
32 1 that on for a little while and it causas another code 2 safety to lift.
3 Unfortunately, we 1ose a lot of data at this 4 point.
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
What happened?
6 NR. MARTIN:
The computer crashes.
It is a 7 Prodac 250. You can see the dotted l'ine there.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Twenty minutes.
9 ER. HARTIN:
The only information we have 10 during that perioi is really the information we have 11 from the strip chart, the one non-safety related strip 12 chart from that pressure transmitter located on the A 13 hot leg.
That is really what you see on the dotted line 14 there.
So the resctor coolant pump starts during the 15 period when we haven't got any really good data.
16 Subsequently after the reactor coolant pump 17 has been restarted, if there was any residual bubble 18 lef t, and we don't really believe there was much of one 19 lef t because they had operated the safety injection 20 system and they had pumped it up pretty well.
Also, the 21 thermocouple readings up in the upper head told us that 22 at maximum it couldn't be much greater than 300 cubic 23 feet at that time anyway.
The reactor coolant pump 24 starting would have caused good circulation in the upper 25 h e s d.
Any bubble that had been there would now have ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
33 1 collapsed and be gone.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Collapsed for what i
3 reason?
4 HR. MARTINS Because of the cool water you are 5 now injecting.
The water in the head was running 480 or 6 490 and your temperature of your water in your cold leg 7 of your "A"
was running much less than that.
In fact, I 8 think I have a graph of that later on.
9 COHNISSIONER GILINSKYs You are essentially to cooling the bubble?
11 HR. HARTIN:
Ex ac tly.
There are actually flow 12 holes that inject cool water up into this area even 13 through a normal operation.
So once the reactor coolant 14 pumps start the turbulance and all then these injections l
15 should cause cooling of that bubble if it is still there l
18 and collapse it.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Because the increase 18 of pressure by itself wouldn't do it.
19 MR. MARTIN:
Understood.
20 Subsequently after the computer comes back up 21 you will notice that there is again a wide difference 22 between the primary system and the steam generator.
We 23 have had another safety valve lift.
This time it is 24 probably seeing pure water and it doesn't recede well.
25 We know the lines are full.
If the lines a re f ull and l
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY, NC,
. CED VIRGINIA AVEe S.We WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
34 1 you have got this kind of leak that this delta P implies 2 is going into the steam generator it has got to be going 3 some place.
4 We say it probably went out the safety valve.
5 The licensee probably wouldn't have been able to see it 6 though b'ecause he is steaming off the "A" steam 7 generator and the plume side by side and you wouldn't 8 know where it is coming f rom.
The valves are right side 9 by side.
So we wouldn't expect the operators to note 10 this.
11 So you go through the period of the leaking 12 saf eties.
Subsequently at about a little before 12:30 13 it seems to seep, the valve seems to seep.
Subsequent 14 to that they establish a long-term cool-down.
They go 15 onto RHR about 7 a.m.
the next morning and they are in 18 the cold shutdown at about 7 p.m. th e next evening.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 Tim, somewhere along the 18 line I got the impression that the safety relief valves 19 on the secondary side have lif ted only for a fev 20 minutes.
Now this indicates that they had lifted ---
21 MR. MARTIN:
The original numbers, about two 22 minutes, was the operator's recollection from 23 overhearing the noise.
They are not very quiet.
24 Actually the majority of water that we found leaving the 25 system is during these periods of leaking.
I l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
35 1
For instance, in period eight, we believe that 2 the safety is leaking about a hundred gallons per minute 3 during that period of time.
That is about a 50-minute 4 period so that is a significant amount of water.
5 Our total number of water loss from the system 6 runs around 18,300 gallons.
That is around 117,000 7 pounds.
8 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
What did you say the leak 9 rate was during period eight?
10 MR. HARTINa About 100 gallons per minute.
I 11 think that is an underestimate.
It is a little higher.
12 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
How about when they first 13 opened?
14 NR. HARTIN:
Between 10:19 and 10:28 that 15 would have been only steam leaking out which vould be 16 equivalent to about 20 gallons of water.
Basically what 17 you have got there, you have got about 20 gallons of 18 water leaking in.
You really just displacing volumes.
19 You are moving the same amount of volume in steam as you 20 are replacing with water.
f 21 The systen at this point, our calculations of 22 inventory show thAt the steam lines would not yet be 23 full.
So they are filling at this point and steam is 24 being vented.
The equivalent of about 20 pounds of 25 water would have been vented from the safeties during ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
36 1 this period of time.
2 Now a little bit later I have got some graphs 3 of leak rates.
In fact, I think it is the next one.
4 May we have the next slide, please.
5 This slide represents our calculations of 6 leakage rate flow, if you will, through the steam 7 generator.
Our maximum rate computer was about 760 8 gallons per minute.
You can see that there was a period 9 where it went negative.
That was during the period the 10 power operated relief valve got stuck.
You can see in 11 general that it ran 200 or 300 for a considerable length 12 of period out there.
13 We also did a tank balance.
By the way, the 14 data generated by the plant is for operations.
It is 15 really not for post-event analysis.
The tank 16 information we had was minimal.
Safety injection flows 17 vere minimal.
You know, if somebody remembered to write 18 them down we had them but that is the only way we got 19 them.
The charging flows the same way.
Temperatures, 20 there is a lot of information that it was difficult to 21 come up with and in many cases had to be implied.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Tim, during the early 23 part of the accident I was told the leak rate was 24 something around 75 I guess it was gallons per minute.
25 Do you remember that?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2346
37 1
NH. HAYNESt Yes.
)
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I don't see any of 3 t his ---
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
We passed through it 5 seve' al times, Joe.
r 6
CHAIRNAN PALLADINO:
What is that?
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
We pass through 75 very 8 rapidly.
9 (Laughter.)
10 3R. HAYNES:
As I recall, Nr. Chairman, around 11 11 a.m. or shortly thereaf ter we reported 75 gallons per 12 minute and that was based upon what the plant was 13 experiencing as their charging flow at that time of 75
~
14 gallons per minute.
So it was an inferred type reading.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes.
It looks like it 16 was certainly higher than that at that particular time.
17 HR. HAYNES:
Yes, it does.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s As a matter of fact, 19 except for that one dip, it was always higher.
20 MR. HAYNESs Right.
21 HR. HARTIN:
We of course have had two months 22 to come up with these numbers.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes, I appreciate that.
24 I was thinking that one of the things you try to 25 estimate during the course of an accident is how bad it t
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
38 1 is.
I was wondering how you felt about having an 2 estimate of 75 and trying seekinc orerall that it was 3 auch more rapid ?
Is there anything we can do to improve 4 our estimating as a result of'what we learned at this 5 accident?
4 8
NR. HAYNES:
I am sure there is.
Like I say, 7 it was an inferred reading of what they got from the 8 charging flow and safety injection flow and how much is 9 throttled.
I can well imagine it is very difficult for 10 the operators.
As Tim said, the plant is really 11 designed for operator as opposed for post-event or 12 accident analysis.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It seems to me the 1,4 point is they reported an inferred reading on the basis 15 of the charging flow and that is probably the best you 18 can do rather than report it as the leak rate.
17 HR. HAYNES:
That is right.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes.
I was just trying 19 to find out if the next time we get something like that 20 that we have to worry that it is considerably higher.
21 Maybe that is something we can look at later.
22 HR. MARTIN:
Hay we have the next slide, 23 please.
24 This next slide represents our attempt 25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYa I think there is an ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2346
.~.
t
39 1 important point there.
Often in these occasions we have 2 had things reported without it be made clear just what 3 the basis for the particular report is.
I think by 4 conveying that as well it gives it a little bit of a 5 context and it is easier to place it in your mind and 6 fix the importance of it.
7 MR. HAYNES:
That is a sof t number and you go 8 get a harder number.
9 COHNISSIONER GILINSKYa Yes.
10 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
Well, I remember having 11 discussions later.
I said, well, I heard 75 gpm, and he 12 said, oh, it was up much higher than that.
I was tryino 13 to get a feel for how we get information during the 14 course of an accident.
I agree.
15 MR. MARTINa This next slide represents the 16 task force's attempt to quantify the thermal transient 17 that the reactor vessel may have seen.
After the 18 reactor coolant pumps were tripped the "A" loop very 19 quickly established a natural circulation.
We estimate 20 it to be about 8,000 gallons per minute.
21 Using only the "A" loop's temperature trace 22 you come up with a cool-down rate of about 100 degrees 23 per hour, 116, or something like that.
So the majority 24 o f the reactor vessel would have seen that type of 25 temperature transient.
That was really the maximum ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
40 1 during the early part of the event.
Subsequently it is 2 certainly much lower than that.
l l
0 Until the "B" main steam isolation valve was 4 shut and the feedwater flow to the "B" steam generator 5 was isolated, it, too, saw about 8,000 gallons per l
6 minute natural circulation flow.
Subsequent to securing 7 feeding and subsequent to shutting the main steam 8 isolation valve the "B" steam generator basically heated 9 up to whatever TH was and we stagnated natural 10 circulation and then the "B" loop when through some type 11 of transient.
You see here what the RTD on the cold leg 12 showed us happened in the "B" loop.
13 Again, I want to remind you this sticks only 14 like an inch into the pipe.
It is 27 and a half inches 15 in diameter and it is almost right on top of the i
16 injection point of this water coming from the RWST.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But you are dropping 18 from something like 535 or 540 down to a minimum there 19 of about 270 over a period of, what, 30 minutes.
20 MR. HARTIN:
That is true.
But remember this 21 is back in the loop.
This is a considerable distance in 22 the loop.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes, I understand 24 tha t.
But you didn't talk about the significance then 25 of that later pump.
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
41 1
HR. HARTIN:
That is a true statement.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEa Now what your data 1
3 seems to imply then is that you have something like a 4 260 degree drop in half an hour.
5 HR. HARTIN:
In the loop right by that RDT.
6 COHNISSIONER AHEARNEa Right.
Then you have 7 to talk about how much of a drop, how rapid a drop do 8 you have as you go back further.
I agree.
But it is 9 correct that your data has a -260 degree drop in half an 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
11 HR. MARTIN This is what the data would 12 suggest.
That is correct, and that is only on the "B"
13 side.
14 What we did then was we looked at what was 15 happening in the "B"
loop.
We had a break in the loop.
16 There is going to be flow to the loop.
It is going to 17 come from the hot leg and it is going to come from the 18 cold leg.
Using a very simplified assumption that the 19 water is going to be mixed real well before it goes by 20 this RTD, we were able to match the tempera ture 21 transient seen by the RDT by assuming a reverse flow in 22 the cold loop of approximately 400 gallons per minute.
23 With that assumption and the known safety injection flow 24 and the known charging flow you can see how the dark 25 black line lays very closely on top of the transient ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) $$4-2345
42 1 that you actually experienced in the loop.
2 Now if that really occurred that way, what 3 that suggests is that it is like 400 gallons per minute 4 coming out of the reactor vessel toward the break 5 sweeping the safety injection and changing flow toward 6 the break and therefore the reactor vessel would never 7 see the transient that you are seeing in the "B" loop.
8 Now what are the problem with that?
- Well, 9 first of all, the break flow at max was calculated to be 10 sbout 400 gpm at this point already.
So 400 gpm plus 11 the safety injection flow, which is about 200 gps, plus 12 the charging flow certainly can 't be flowing back that 13 w a y.
14 Well, the next place you draw back is well, l
15 maybe there is not complete mixing.
If there is not 16 complete mixing you could get the same transient by 17 doing some mixed mean.
But the bottom line is we can 't 18 tell you.
I cannot tell you today that that vessel 19 righ t below the "B"
loop didn't see a significant 20 thermal transient greater than the average that ther 21 e xperienced.
We try it a:d the instrumentation just 22 does not provide us the information to give you that 23 answer.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE.
That is then the 25 interpretation.
I noticed the language in your report ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
43 1 seemed to be carefully chosen that suggested that the 2 flow to tha-f aultad loop ma y not have ---
3 ER. MARTIN:
We are confident that there was 4 flow toward the faultad loop but certainly not of this 5 magnitude.
I can't today tell you that it didn't 6 ha'ppen, that there wasn't a significant, this 7 200-and-some-odd degree drop that you pointed out.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let's see, where does 9 this leave us?
10 CONMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Let me go back to a 11 point I raised earlier before you came here, Vic.
I 12 guess I am disturbed tha t there is no conclusions or 13 recommendations out of this.
I recognize, Tim, that 14 your charter was not to have conclusions and 15 recommendations, but you have had this group of people, 16 very knowledgeable people, spend all this time digging 17 through this and I guess I feel on several of these 18 points that you come across that it short of cries out 19 f or a "therefore," therefore more work or therefore this 20 is our conclusion or theref ore the plant management 21 ought to do this or therefore NRC ought to do this.
22 This is one area that seems to need a "therefore."
23 MR. DIRCKS:
The "therefore's" are coming.
24 CONHISSIONER AHEARNE:
But I would have felt 25 that this report ought to have had ---
l l
l-ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
44 1
ER. DIRCKSs But you make a choice.
Do you 2 want the report fairly quickly and with the facts laid 3 on the table or do you want the "theref ore's" and get it 4 three or four months later.
5 COHNISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is there another 6 report in the works?
7 HR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
What we are going to do is 8 take this report and get it back to the program offices 9 to come up with a ---
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE4 But, Bill, these people 11 did do this report.
This group now has spent all this 12 time digging through this.
I guess I would liked to, 13 and in f act I know I would have liked to, and in fact 14 given that the Chairman's letter said that it would have 15 conclusions and recommendations ---
16 HR. DIRCKS:
I think you are going to get 17 recommendations.
I think the report lays out a very 18 exhaustive and comprehensive statement of what happened 19 there.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is there some reason 21 w hy the writers of the report couldn 't put down their 22 recommendations?
23 MR. DIRCKSs Well, I think we have had 24 experience with trying to assemble facts and coming up 25 with a series of recommendations that become then a ALDERSoN REPCRTING COMPANY,INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-234S
6 45 l
1 driving force for agency actions that when we go back 2 and take a look at a year later we say, well, really 3 were we pressed by time to come up with that 4 recommedation or pressed by some other reasons?
I think 5 it is better to say what are the immediate actions that 6 we have to take as a result of this?
The answer I get 7 is no.
8 Then if there are no immediate actions let's 9 go back and do an exhaustive analysis of the facts and 10 then come in with a statement of recommendations that 11 h a v e a ---
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are you going to let 13 these authors at least whisper to this longer-range 14 group?
15 NB. DIRCKS:
Many of the authors are actually 16 now going back to review the statement from the 17 longer-tera, and I hate to use the term, action plan 18 connotation.
19 (Laughter.)
20 CHAIBMAN PALLADINO:
Tim, are there any 21 analyses that you think might be made to give us a 22 better handle on what happened to ---
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Careful, that sounds 24 like a recommendation.
l 25 (Laughtar.)
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
46 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am sympathetic with i
2 your point of view so I am trying to be careful.
But 3 are there some analyses that we could make tha t would 4 give us a better handle on whAt might have happened in 5 the reactor vessel, the reactor vessel temperature?
8 MR. MARTINa I believe there is certainly 7 capability in the agency or with the contractors to do a 8 computer modeling of it and do a lot more than we were 9 able to.
We have the facts to feed into that model.
We 10 know approximately what the safety injection and the 11 charging flows were and we have the temperature 12 inf ormation.
13 If I might, I am going to turn to Gary Holahan 14 who can probably answer tha t better.
15 Gary.
18 HR. HOLAHAN:
I am Gary Holahan from NRR.
17 What you see here are basically hand calculations from 18 the data available from the plant.
Certainly more 19 detailed calculations could be do with any of a number 20 of computer codes that are available.
A basic 21 one-dimensional calculation could be done with a code 22 like RELAP or a comparable code that Westinghouse' would 23 have, or an even more complicated sophisticated 24 calculation could be done with the TRACK code from one 25 of our contractors.
ALDERSoN REPORTING CGMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINtA AVE. S.W, WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2346
47 1
COMMISSIONER AREARNE:
What kind of confidence 2 do you have in those codes?
3 MR. HOLAHAN:
You always have to be somewhat 4 skeptical, but in this case you have got the data.
If 5 the code can match the data without too much fine-tuning 6 of the code then I think you could live with the answers.
7 MR. DIRCKSs Let me make one point though on 8 tite recommendations.
The restart review for Ginna is 9 now ongoing.
So you are going to pick up the actual 10 content here in the restart review.
Many of the members 11 who worked on this report are participating in the 12 restart review.
So that is one vehicle in which you get 13 recommendations or recommended actions to be taken in 14 regard to this particular reactor.
15 What I was talking about before is 16 recommendations cutting across action that may have a 17 generic meaning for many reactors.
That is what I was 18 talking about before.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Bill, will some further 20 attempt be made to evaluate what we think the rate of 21 temperature drop for various parts of the vessel have 22 been?
23 MR. DIRCKS:
That I am sure is going to be 24 part of the analysis during this restart review.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That is what I was ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
48 1 getting at because the implication that part of the 2 vessel got something like a 260 degree drop in a half 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> seems extreme and may not bear any resemblance to 4 what actually took place.
5 NR. DIRCKSs Anything in here is not going to 6 he overlooked and particularly in the restart review.
7 HR. DENTON:
I think that particular area is 8 one in which the steering group did press the task force 9 to make as definitive statement as they could and it is 10 one that we are going to have to follow up on very 11 closely.
They have pushed as hard as they could within 12 the time f rames they have had to get answers and we vill 13 pick it up from there and see what aise we can do to 14 better establish what did happen to the vessel.
I think 15 it is a key issue to be resolved before restart and we 16 will do that.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is that being done in NRR7 18 MR. DENTONs Yes.
l 19 MR. DIRCKS Witi a good deal of contribution 20 from Region I.
21 MR. DENTON:
Of course, Mr. Holahan who just 22 spoke is in the Division of Licensing and will be l
23 heavily involved in that proceeding.
t 24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do you want to proceed.
l 25 MR. MARTINa The next slide, please.
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
ng 1
This particular slide which I am going to use 2 to talk about the radiological information, you are 3 looking to the northwest.
The lake is to the right and 4 at the top and you are actually looking right at the 5 plume.
6 CHAIRHAN PALLADINOs Right at the what?
7 MR. HARTIN:
Right at the plume.
The wind 8 during the majority of this event, during the time when 9 the releases occurred actually came right across the 10 plant towards you.
11 The tower which you see behind the plant is 12 the primary meteorological tower.
There is a back-up 13 meteorological tower off the picture to the left.
14 Some important things.
If you will notice the 15 large building closest to the lake.
In the northeast 16 corner you will see a little pipe sticking up.
That 17 happens to be the air ejector exhaust.
That was where 18 the first releases came f rom.
19 Subsequently if you look in to the large 20 square building which is a little further to the south, 21 You are looking inside the facade which goes around it.
22 Readinc from west to east across the north facade, you 23 have the auxiliary turbine exhaust which very early in 24 the event had some releases, the "A" steam generator 25 PORY, and then almost in the eastern side of that facade ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
50 1 the "B"
steam generator cod e safety that released the 2 majority of activity.
3 Now in the south fa,ce of that facade you will 4 notice that it drops straight down and runs into another 5 building.
There is actually a space between that 6 building and the facade that you can crawl under and it 7 hae gens to be right here where the auxiliary building 8 ventilation suction is located.
9 Now that is important because in the wake that 10 occurs f rom this plume that actually tumbles over the 11 edge of tne building, this ventilation system picks it 12 u p and low and behold we do get radiation particulate 13 and iodine alarms from the monitors which are located on 14 the exhaust from the auxiliary building ventilation 15 system.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO Did I follow that 17 correctly?
I thought you were saying they were picking 18 up radioactivity from the outside?
19 MR. MARTINS They are actually sucking it back 20 into the building.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That is a new invention.
22 (Laughter.)
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Not necessarily 24 desirable.
25 MR. MARTIN:
Coming on out from the plant you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
51 1 see the grove of trees.
Just behind the grove of trees 2 ve have our maximum verified on-site reading of about 3 three MR par hour, and it was,,right up against the fence.
4 Then in the middle of the field that seems to 5 be circled by that road you see the white spot.
That 6 white spot happens to be the location of the two TLD 's 7 which showed significant readings, the licensee reading 8 which gave 21.7 M-rad integrated dose and the New York 9 State TLD which read 9.4 millirad.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 Where is that?
11 MR. MARTIN:
This is the white spot in the 12 middle of the field which you see circled by the road.
13 Now I am also waiting for this answer so let me turn to 14 Mr. Nehemis c.
15 Would you tell me why those two read 16 dif ferently ?
17 MR. NEHEMIAS:
Principally simply that the l
18 state dosimeter was higher.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
How much higher?
20 MB. NEHEMIASa About eight feet for the state 21 and about four and a half feet for the licensee.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE.
And the three and a 23 half foot difference is the reason?
24 MR. NEHEMIAS Yes.
25 MR. MARTIN:
I have been waiting for that ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AEL S.We WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 @$ 554 2345
52 1 answer.
2 NR. HAYNES:
There is snow on the ground.
3 MR. MARTINS Yes, t,he re is a lo t of sno w on 4 the ground here.
5 COHNISSIONER AHEARNEa Four feet?
6 (Laughter.)
7 MR. MARTINa I think one of the points we 8 should make here is this was a very cold day, high 9 humidity day, there was snow and almost all the activity 10 that was condensable or was entrainable by moisture feel 11 right out on the plant and the plant property on site.
12 This circular drive is still on site.
All these 13 readings are on site.
14 Now there was one significant reading off site 15 just off the lower left-hand side of the picture.
At 16 the intersection of Lake Road and Ontario Road at about 17 mid-day there was a reading of 1.2 M-rad per hour, but 18 that was the only off-site dose of significance that was l
19 m ea sured..
20 To give you some feel for the releases.
Our I
21 computation indicates about 90 curies of nobel gases 22 were released, about 0.4 curies dose equivalent of 23 Iodine 131 and 1.3 curies of particulate, including 24 cobalt, molybdenum, barium and cesium.
There was also 25 about 25 curies of tritium most of it in the form of ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
i 53 1
1 water.
2 I just want to point out that the nobel gases 3 and the Iodine 131 releases do not exceed design 4 analysis numbers.
Particularly I want to focus in on 5 the iodine since it has the largest effect.
6 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
What was your iodine 7 reading?
8 HR. HARTIN:
It was 0.4 curies dose equivalent 9 iodine.
If you just add it up, you know, the total of 10 the iodines, it came to around five curies.
I do want 11 to point out though that this plant was running only a 12 few percent of its tech spec limit of iodine in the 13 primary system.
Therefore, there wasn 't that much ready 14 for release.
15 A review of the chemistry data before versus 16 around 12:50 that afternoon when another sample was l
17 taken, there appears to have been no iodine spike which 18 is assumed in the analysis.
19 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
There is something you 20 said that I guess I don't understand.
You said the 21 total of how much iodine?
22 HR. HARTIN:
Total of about five curies.
23 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
Now what was the I
24 f our-tenths?
25 MR. MARTIN:
The four-tenths is the dose l
l t
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (S78) 554-2345
54 1 equivalent Iodine 131.
In other words, if you were 2 looking for what is the equivalent amount of Iodine 131 3 which would cause the same ef,fect to a human, then it 4 comes out 0.4 curies.
5 HR. HAINES:
And I believe the technical 6 specification is in dose equivalent.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is in what?
8 HB. HAYNES:
Is in dose equivalent for Iodine 9 131, the longer half life.
10 HR. M ARTIN :
Actually the way it works out is 11 it is dose equivalent for the activity in the primary 12 system and you really end up with dose equivalency 13 because of the way the tech spec is worded.
14 Now one thing that we did note here was that 15 there was water released from the safeties versus steam 16 which is assumed.
Because there was water released you 17 do not get the partitioning of the iodine into much 18 smaller releases per cc of matter.
Also, you get 19 particulate that you would not normally expect in a 20 design analysis.
It was of interest to us and that is 21 w ha t we found.
i 22 Basically it was forced on the plant because 23 of the configuration of the piping and the fact that 1
24 they did allow the piping to flood and fill.
25 There is one other point to make on this i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, G'MEm
55 1 picture.
You will notice the ' building in the middle off 2 site to the lef t.
That is the licensee's evacuation 3 center.
It also was in the plume and the licensee did 4 evacuate people in to the plume to this location.
He did 5 not have an alternate evacuation site nor does NRC s
6 require one.
7 I wonder if I can have the next slide, please.
8 I wanted to show you this slide to give you 9 some feel for where the water came f rom tha t ruptured to the PRT rupture disk.
During containment isolation the 11 valve on the right-hand side, FC-371, that gets a "T"
? solation 12 signal goes shut if it is
~Ttainment i
s 13 valve.
The valves inside
. tat to the lef t do not get a 14 signal.
I 15 The valve, 427, which is coming from the 16 reactor coolant system, that valve goes shut when the 17 pressurizer level goes out the bottom.
Basically this 18 is a level control system, if you will.
So when the 19 initial transient caused the pressurizer level to drop, 20 the valve. 427 vent shut.
21 Ghen it goes shut the selected orifice valve, l
22 the 200 A, 200B and 202, whichever one is selected, would l
l 23 also go shut.
So while the pressurizer level is l
24 off-scale low these valves would all remain shut.
25 Further, on containment isolation you kill the l
l ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INA 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
56 1 instrument air inside containment and therefore the 2 valves assume their f ail position.
So the orifice 3 isolation valves all f ail closed so they would stay 4 closed and 427 would subsequently drif t open.
5 When the containment isolation was reset you 6 don't open the valves immediately.
All that does is 7 allow you now to take manual control of the valves.
8 One of the valves that was opened af ter 9 containment reset was instrument air, opening instrument 10 air then pressurized the system.
You would expect 427 11 to go shut because the pressurizer level was still 12 off-scale low and you would expect the orifice valves to 13 assume whatever position was commanded for 427.
14 When the pressurized came back on scale on 15 opening the PORV 427 would stroke open.
When it strokes 16 open the reactor coolant system pressure comes in 17 through the orifice valve.
Since there is no flow the 18 orifices don 't follow your pressure any and this line 19 starts to pressurize.
Relief valve 203 then opened and 20 you can watch the pressure trace and the level trace on t
l 21 the PRT and it very quickly starts to fill.
22 Now pressure didn 't go up that much as a 23 result of filling because apparently there was some 24 leakage in the vent valve that goes back to the vent 25 header.
The vent header is a gaseous waste treatment l
l ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, l
cmtano An 0.tL mmmactu @a mmw;um am
57 o
1 system.
But subsequently when the PRT went solid, was 2 full of water, then th e pressure, basically as seen 3 reactor coolant system pressure ruptured this loop.
4 This was the major contributor to the inventory increase 5 in the PRT.
6 May I have the next slide, please.
7 This is a slide of the steam generator at 8 Ginna.
There are a couple of points I want to point out 9 to you.
10 Coming down the right-hand side you will see a 11 downcomer flow resistance plate.
That flow resistance 12 pis te was put in the generator to control recirculation 13 in the generator and actually can be moved up and down 14 and can shut off the loop circulation flow.
15 In 1975 the licennee made a modification to 18 the steam generator at the recommendation of 17 Westinghouse and cut the orifice plate out, just flame 18 cut it out.
We have looked at the procedure.
The one 19 thing the procedure doesn't have although it has tools 20 in and tools out type inventory, it didn't have make 21 sure you have got all the ring out in your hands.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Was that a modification 23 which was unique to Ginna?
24 MR. MARTIN:
No, sir, I do not believe it is.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Was it a modification ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INA 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
58 1 requested of Sales?
2 MR. WIGGONS:
It is not a generic modification.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They took that whole ring 4 out?
5 MR. MARTIN:
Yes, sir.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Except for ---
7 MR. MARTIN:
Well, you are getting to the 8 punch line.
9 (Laughter.)
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They were supposed to 11 take the whole ring out.
12 MR. MARTIN:
The other part of the steam 13 generator I would like to point out to you is the 14 wrapper plate inside the shell comes down I think it is 15 about 17 inches above the tube sheet and then you can 16 see the tubes inside.
The tubes that are going to be of 17 interest to us are going to be the peripheral tubes, the 18 ones located on the outside and in fact those on the hot l
l 19 leg.
So you see the primary coolant inlet.
That is i
20 where the hot leg tubes come up there.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Tim, let me ask a 22 question.
This is a generic action that was taken?
23 MR. MARTIN:
That is my understanding.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But the procedures that 25 Westinghouse put on didn 't specifically address taking l
ALLERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, Mi) N.
59 1 out the ---
2 HR. REYNOLDS:
The procedure included a 3 provision f or putting in a protective system to prevent 4 dropping things into the steam generator.
That was in 5 the procedure.
The procedure did not call for 6 reassembly of all of the parts of the ring to make sure 7 you had 100 percent of all of the volume of the ring 8 when you took it out.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
To you knowledge, has 10 any other licensee run into the problem of parts of that 11 left inside the steam generator?
12 3R. REYNOLDSs Westinghouse has indicated 13 there is no indication of similar peripheral tube 14 problems on any other steam generators.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I wasn't asking whether 16 there was any similar tube problems.-
I was asking 17 whether you had any indication of any other licensee 18 having f ound any pieces that had been lef t behind af ter 19 that modification?
20 ER. REYNOLDS:
Not to my knowledge?
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How many steam generators i
l 22 were there in which this modification was made or how 23 many plants ?
i l
24 HR. REYNOLDS :
I believe all the 44 series l
25 were similsrly modified.
Now I can't say for sure.
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
60 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What, half a dozen, or 2 more or less?
3 MR. MARTIN:
I don',t think we can answer that, 4 Mr. Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I was just wondering if 6 anything paculiar was happening to those plants.
7 MR. MARTIN:
Could we have the next slide, 8 please.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Maybe I am asking the 10 question too soon.
Was one of the pieces or one or more 11 of the pieces that was found in there, did it come from 12 this ring or was it presumed to come from this ring?
13 MR. MARTIN:
We believe it is and I have a 14 picture here very shortly to show you.
15 MR. HAYNES:
Mr. Chairman, you question about 16 whether anything peculiar was happening at the other 17 plants ---
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
On this modification.
19 MR. HAYNES:
Yes.
I believe Sam did try to 20 add ress tha t because the information he got from 21 Westinghouse is that none of the other plants that had 22 undergone the modification had shown indications with 23 peripheral tube problems like Ginna has experienced.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, did Ginna have any 25 precursor symptoms before ---
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, MNN
@$i
i 61 1
ER. MARTINS Yes.
2 MR. HAYNES:
Oh, yes.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
--- someone addressed 4 that something like that was happenino?
5 HR. MARTIN:
Yes.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s So if it was not 7 happening at the other plants you might have a higher 8 assurance that there is no similar problem.
9 HR. MARTINa Yes.
10 On this slide, what we have here is a picture 11 of the tube sheet f or just the hot side.
The circled 12 areas are those that have plugged tubes.
The ones with 13 "x's" have sleeves in them.
The ones in the center part 14 of the semicircle are basically sludge related problems, 15 chemical problems.
They can either be in the sludge 16 area above the tube sheet or in the crevice area below 17 i t.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Some of these are dark 19 circles.
Wha t does that mean?
l 20 MB. HARTIN:
The dark circles mean it is 21 simply plugged.
The circles with an "x" th rough it 22 means it is sleeved.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The dark circle with an 24 " x".
25 NR. MARTIN:
That means it is sleeved.
i l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
62 1
CHAI3 MAN PALLADIN0s And the plain circle?
2 MR. MARTIN 4 The plain circle means just 3 plugged.
4 CHAIBMAN PALLADINO:
Means what?
5 MR. MARTIN:
Plugged.
It has a plug that 6 prevents flow through it.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s That is if it is solid.
8 What if it is just an open circle?
9 MR. MARIINs
.If it is just an open circle that 10 is a flow hole.
It basically is a place where flow can 11 go through.
12 The ones in the center ---
13 COMMISSIONER B0BERTS:
What are we looking at 14 here ?
This isn't a tube sheet 15 MR. MARTINS I am looking right d own at the 16 tube sheet.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBERTSa This is the tube sheet.
18 MR. MARTINS This is the tube sheet and it is 19 showing what are the different tubes.
Basically at the 20 intersection of each line there is a tube there.
For 21 those that we chose to put black marks, tha t is a 22 plugged tube at that location.
For those that have 23 black marks with an "x" through it, that means it is 24 sleeved.
Those that have simply little circles, these 25 are flow holes.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (HD 564-2345
63 1
Mr. Haynes has brought something to my 2 attention.
If you look around the periphery of the 3 semicircle you see the pattern of little open circles.
4 Those represent tubes.
You notice those little dots.
5 Those are the flow holes we are talking about.
6 Sam, is that righ t?
7 HR. REYNOLDS:
The dots around the cutside are 8 the outer boundary of the flow holes in the tube support 9 plate.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEa That is the dots.
11 There are dots and circles.
~
12 MR. REYNOLDSs The dots on here indicate the 13 extent of the flow holes.
They have flow holes inboard 14 of that but not outboard of that.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And the circles also ---
16 MR. REYNOLDSa Ch, these circles are just the 17 tube holes.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So then you legend down 19 in the middle isn't' correct.
l 20 MR. REYNOLDS:
That really should be a dot.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Okay.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
What do you mean by a 23 wedge area ?
24 NR. MARTIN:
The tubes are supported at six l
25 locations I believe coming up through the steam ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WA3HINGToN, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
64 1 generator.
Basically they are perforated plates the 2 tubes pass through and those plates have to be supported 3 from the wrapper.
At the wedge areas is where you 4 actually have supports.
5 Now there are 12 wedge areas around the 6 wrapper.
Each tube, sheet has six support points.
The 7 lowest tube support is supporting each even number wedge 8 area, the next one at each odd, et cetera.
So the wedge 9 area is simply for location purposes.
10 It just so happens that the problem we 11 experienced this time was in the No. 4 wedge area.
It 12 is a locational aid, if you will, at this point.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I almost followed you and 14 then I got lost about one-third of the way through.
15 (Laughter.)
16 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
Could you start over.
17 MB. MARTIN:
The tubes are suppor,ted by tube 18 support plates and there are about s'1x of them.
19 Can I go back to that previous slida.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are they complete plates?
21 NR. MARIIN:
Yes.
22 If you will notice the tube support plates 23 aarching up the bundle.
Now each one of these tube 24 support plates is hung from the wrapper and they are 25 hung by vedges.
Each tube support plate has six wedge ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
65 1 positions and they alternate.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0a What do you mean hung by 3 wedges.
4 MR. MARTIN 4 So there are 12 locations total 5 around a vrapper.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0a What do you mean hung by 7 vedges?
8 NR. MARTINa They actually are wedged into 9 place.
There are three little wedges that are knocked 10 in and af ter the wedges are put in place then the 11 support plate is welded to the wedge and the wedge is 12 then welded to the wrapper.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO I see, and there are how 14 many wedges around?
15 MR. MARTINa For a support plate there are six 16 support points and a total'of 12 vedge locations becase 17 they alternate as you go up the bundle.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So going around the 19 periphery you use one, two, three, four?
20 MR. MARTIN:
That is correct.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO4 So now when you talk 22 about wedge area No. 4 it is on a particular peripheral 23 position ?
24 MR. MARTIN:
Yes, sir.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
66 1
COMMISSIONE8 ROBERTS:
Well, is there any 2 significance to the fact that the plugged holes at least 3 in the periphery are almost always in a wedge area?
4 MR. MARIIN:
The majority of them seem to be.
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Does that tell us 6 anything?
7 MR. MARTIN:
The licensee originally 8 attributed the f ailures he was experiencing to a 9 stiffness in that area.
I am not sure he still does 10 today.
I have not seen his latest analysis nor have we 11 completed ours.
But you are correct.
It does seem in 12 the majority of cases on the periphery to locate in 13 *.hese ar eas.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
What is the basis for 15 your earlier statement, and I am not disputing it,' but i
16 how do you know that it was a sludge problem on these i
17 middle tubes.
18 MR. MARTIN:
Let me turn to my expert.
1 19 Sam.
20 MR. REYNOLDS:
That is the typical sludge l
21 location.
They have sludge.
The characteristics that 22 they had at phosphate water treatment were similar to 23 the standard sludge phospha te water treatment problems.
l 24 Eddy Current was the one that told them that they had 25 indications to tubes, sir.
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
67 1
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Okay.
2 MR. REYNOLDS:
We didn't go into that in great 3 detail in the NUREG because 1,t is well documented in 4 other NRC documents.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Now your previous 6 point, Sam, that you had mentioned that there were no 7 other plants that had experienced anything similar.~ You 8 sean they had not experienced tube degradation out in 9 the far perimeter?
Is that your point?
10 MR. 3EYNOLDS:
They did not experience tube 11 degradation problems of say a cancerous growth mode like 12 this on peripheral tubes.
I can't say that they didn't 13 have any peripheral tube problems that may have been 14 denting or some other mechanism.
I can 't make that 15 sta tement because I just don't know.
I 16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So you are not sure if 1
l 17 you had a similar chart of other plants that you might 1
18 get this pattern on the outside ?
19 MR. REYNOLDS:
What I am saying is I certainly 20 cannot say categorically that if you looked at other 21 series 44 steam generators that you would not find an 22 occasional peripheral tube plugged, but you would not 23 find a pattern of tube pluqqing l
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
A large number of them.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Why wouldn't you find l
l ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, GD Wl2ANIA AR O.Wm W5MNGTE1 FOBL RMVD81 ED3 FEM
68 1 them?
2 NR. REYNOLDS:
Excuse me?
3 CHAIRNAN PALLADINO:
Why wouldn't you find 4 them in other steam generators?
5 NR. REYNOLDS: :They have not been found by any 6 kind of testing in any other plants and there is no ---
7 NR. MARTIN:
They haven't experienced the same 8 set of problems.
9 CONNISSIONER ROBERTS:
Because it happened in to this one doesn't mean that 11 CHAIRNAN PALLADINO:
But he made it sound like 12 it was so obvious that it wouldn't happen.
13 CONEISSIONER AHEARNE:
What I was trying to 14 follow was the line that if they made this change 15 generically did other plants perhaps have this stuff 16 drop in, and I think his counter was if it had then you 17 would have expected to see the peripheral tubes or a 18 larger number and they haven't seen them.
19 3R. MARTIN:
This particular drawing shows the 20 situation prior to the event.
The problems that had 21 been experienced in the No. 4 vedge area had been 22 basically progressing inward toward the center of the 23 figure.
24 Sam, can you tell me the approximate time the 25 first one appeared in the No. 2 vedge a rea, the first ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
cG %MYRD2 OfL EkCL NT@Rk [0.R F55R38 f'~thU
69 1 problem?
2 MR. REYNOLDSs 7/77.
3 MR. MARTIN:
7/77.
The original modification 4 was made in '75 on the orifice plate.
If the part that 5 was found truly came from there it could have been 6 sitting in there from that time.
7 The next slide, please.
8 No, hold that slide.
9 This slide shows a picture of the largest 10 piece that was removed from the "B"
11 Although you can't see it real well in this photograph, 12 the piece has markings on it, parallel grooves that are 13 spaced at approximately the spacing you would find on 14 tubes and they are basically indented just as if it had 15 been sitting and bounding against the tubes like that.
16 The drilled hole corresponds to approximately 17 the kind of and size hole you would expect to find in 18 the orifice plate.
The material is magnetic.
19 Is that true?
20 3R. REYNOLDS:
It has the appearances of 21 carbon steel.
22 MR. MARTIN:
We have not performed a chemical 23 analysis of it.
24 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
How thick was the 25 orifice pla te, half inch ?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC,
_ CD) VIRGINIA ANL S.W, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 q@ 554-2345
70 1
MR. REYNOLDS:
Yes.
2 MR. MARTINa Everything seems to point to this 3 being a part of that plate.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEa You say you haven't 5 done a metallurical examination.
Has the licensee or
~
8 Westinghouse?
7 MR. REYNOLDSs They are in the process of 8 analyzing it, yes, to the best of my knowledge.
9 MR. MARTIN:
It also has the appearance of 10 being flame cut.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Wait.
Excuse me.
12 Do we know whether they are or not?
13 HR. WIGGINS:
They are.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs Thank you.
15 MR. MARTIN:
The thing also has the appearance 18 of being flame cut as the procedure called for in 1975.
17 MR. HAYNES:
It has got the thickness.
It has 18 got the curvature.
It has got the small hole, the 19 orifice hole.
' +
is made of the same material.
It is 20 very similar.
21 ER. MARTIN:
The next slide.
22 This particular picture shows a tube and not 23 the ruptured tube, although obviously this one is 24 rup tured, that was f ound in the genera tor.
You see 25 several rotations of it showing the structural damage ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (20_2) 554-2345
71 1 that has occurred.
This particular tube was one of the 2 tubes that had been previously plugged.
3 Sam, do you remembe,r why this one was 4 originally plugged?
5 MR. REYNOLDS:
I will have to -look on the list.
6 MR. MARTIN:
Basically you can see the 7 structural mechanical damage that occurred to this 8 particular tube.
9 The next slide, please.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTSi Excuse me.
What do you 11 mean " White dot points outward"?
I am confused.
What 12 is the terminology at the bottom of the slide?
13 MR. MARTIN:
The white dot, Sam.
14 HR. REYNOLDS4 They cut a hole in the shell 15 and the wrapper and reached in and put a paint marker at 16 tha t point.
They could only get outboard so they called 17 this zero degrees and then these are the degrees based 18 o n th at outboard direction.
19 MR. MARTIN:
Sam, do you want to comment on l
20 some of the markings on those tubes?
21 MR. REYNOLDS:
They are rather classic l
22 fretting wear marks on tubes, like this one, for 23 example.
You can see all the flat marks on there.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What are all those edges 25 down at the bottom?
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 8 554 2346
72 1
HR. REYNOLDS:
That is where the tube was 2 detached at the bottom from the rest of the tube.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That is where it was 4 broken.
5 HR. REYNOLDS:
Yes, detached it.
6
- 58. MARIIN:
Let me point out this was not the 7 ruptured tube because this one, as I understand it, had 8 been previously plugged and Saa vill find out what they 9 said.
10 MR. WIGGINSa There is an indication above the 11 tube sheet.
It was an indication of inner surface metal 12 loss.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They plug them at both 14 ends?
15 MR. NARTIN:
They plug both ends.
Of course, 16 it then no longer has the primary side pressure on the 17 inside to help support it.
Whatever the mechanism was 18 tha t ultimately caused'it to fail it wasn't as 19 defendable as it was before.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Were there in a position l
21 to be struck by the other pieces of metal?
22 MR. MARTIN:
The metal was found at a location 23 which was displaced azimuthally from this but draqqing 24 the lights through it could have moved the large pieces.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
In other words, they are ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
73 1 in a position though ---
2 MR. MARTINS It is certainly below the wrapper 3 and in a place where it could,,have been ---
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It could have been beat 5 up by the ---
6 MR. HARTINs It could have been.
7 HR. REYNOLDS:
That is a peripheral outer tube.
8 NR. MARTIN:
That is an outer tube?
9 HR. WIGGINS:
That is an outer tube.
10 CHAIRMAN P ALLADINO:
Was the one that broke an 11 outer tube?
12 HR. MARTIN:
No.
Would you go back to the 13 previous slide, please.
The one before that.
14 The arrow points toward the ruptured tube.
15 Sam 's comaent about a cancer, basically the problem 16 developed initially on the outside and kind of worked 17 its way in.
There is precautionary plugging and other 18 things that were done.
19 CH AIRM AN PALLADINO:
Are you saying that it 20 might have been beat up by the extraneous piecec of 21 metal?
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE Or could it have been 23 beat up by a broken tube?
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes.
25 Go ahead.
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, l
74 o
1 MR. MARTINS Again, Sam loves this.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I mean initiated by a 3 broken tube.
4 MR. MARTIN:
Sam, what is your opinion?
5 MR. REYNOLDSs The wear marks on the tube that 6 you see are in my opinion tube-to-tube fretting wear 7 marks.
The damage at the bottom of the tube could 8 possibly have been associated with the loose foreign 9 object.
10
~0MMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, by tube to tube, 11 do you sean one tube rubbing against or banging it?
12 HR. REYNOLDS:
Yes.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE4 But that would have 14 meant that one of the tubes would have had to have been 15 broken off at the bottom.
16 MR. REYNOLDS:
Yes, sir.
There were tubes 17 that were broken off completely between the first tube 18 support plate and the tube sheet.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS But they were plugged?
20 MR. REYNOLDS:
There were previously plugged 21 tubes that were subsequently broken off-(
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But I think it is an 23 important observation if true.
I am not saying that you 24 have proven that.
I understand this particular tube had 25 been checked at the previous inspection and was found to ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
75 1 be within our tolerance limits.
2 HR. MARTINS Using the standards they had it 3 indicated about 20 percent and they had a 40 percent i
4 criteria.
5 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO So what I am saying is 6 had this been a corrosion problem or if I were to 7 conclude that it was a corrosion problem, then it cast 8 doubt about our ability to inspect and the frequency of 9 inspection giving us any assurance that the tubes were 10 all right.
If, however, it was a result of something 11 bea ting outside tubes that in turn beat this one, I 12 don 't get comfort f rom it, but at least it gives me some 13 feeling that we still can rely on inspection for the 14 more normal corrosion process.
15
~COMV.ISSIONER AHEARNE:
Agreed.
16 Could you take a minute and perhaps talk 17 through wha t, from your group and perhaps Sam the 18 expert, what was the progression that led to the rupture.
19 MR. REYNOLDS:
I can only give an opinion.
20 MR. MARTIN:
That is what he is asking for.
21 MR. REYNOLDS:
There is a group that is 22 working on this.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I understand.
I am 24 just asking what your opinion is.
25 MR. REYNOLDS:
I certainly don't think there ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D.C._20024 EQ G93-8009
76 1 is any question that a large foreign object on a 2 periphery of the tube would cause tube damage, would 3 cause changing of the shape o;f the tube which could 4 possibly cause collapsing of the tube once the tube is 5 no longer round and has a pressure on the outside of it 6 which then can change a lot of things, the natural 7 frequency of the tube.
8 There is no direct evidence that we can see of 9 going from the first damage on the outside of the tube 10 through to the final rupture.
The final rupture is 11 apparently due to f ailure by another tube and not by the 12 foL::ign object beranse it has fretting wear marks on it 13 that are longer than nine inches and that are of the 14 geometry that you could only get by two orbiting tubes 15 touching each otner on the surface giving you the score 16 marks that are horizontal to the tube.
17 So that is all I can say.
18 MR. MARTIN:
You might be able to see this on 19 the next slide.
20 Can we have slide 12, please.
21 Sam, do you want to point out points on there.
22 MR. REYNOLDS:
This is the tube that did 23 rupture.
It is worn to the point of an almost knife 24 edge.
.You could cut your finger on this portion of the 25 rup ture righ t here.
We originally reported that ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 661Nfa8EE C5fMk1MD31KUii@A 88 fMB3880 EXE __
77 1 visually there was less than five percent wall thickness 2 and there are some spots where it is considerably less 3 than that.
6' 4
The total length of the rupture is similar to 5 the length of the indication that was previously 6 reported on the Eddy Current examination as a 20 percent i
7 def ect.
This obviously is flats on the tube.
The 8 characteristic of the f ailure are similar to the 9 characteristics that you have when you had mixed span 10 collision of tubes, for example, in a surface condenser, 11 in that it is somewhat symmetric and runs out.
The 12 rupture stops at roughly 50 percent of the wall 13 thickness of the tube.
14 There are indications on this tube of fresh 15 f retting wear marks and fretting marks that are not 16 f resh that have an oxidized appearance.
So this tube 17 was being worked on in another location actually before 18 this location when all the way through the tube.
19 COMMISSIONES AHEABNE:
Tim, do you know the 20 perimeter at the break?
21 MR. HARTIN :
It is about what, seven-eighths?
22 HR. REYN01DS:
The opening here is about 23 three-quarters of an inch and the diameter is 1.05.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs Do you know the 25 perimeter of the me tal that is left in the break?
'Jh a t ALDERSoN REPoRTIN3 COMPANY. INC,
_CED VIRGINIA ANlg 6W Q{DE%fG@A @&M_8MM____
y
78 1 I was wonder is that when a rupture occurs sometimes it 2 isn 't just a' complete rupture.
What first happens is 3 you begin to get enough stres,s that you actually get 4 some metal flow.
5 MR. REIN 0LDS:
Oh, sure, it balloons.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEa It stretches, 7 ballooning, and then it breaks.
8 MR. REYNOLDSs It increased from seven-eighths 9 of an inch to 1.15 inches measured across here.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What I was wondering is 11 you mentioned how thin the material is at that break 12 point.
It wasn't clear to me that that thinning was due 13 to wear or whether it was due to the ballooning and the 14 stretch.
15 MR. REYNOLDS:
In my opinion, it was due 16 mostly to wear.
Certainly when you have got excessive 17 deformation of the tube in ballooning that some thinning 18 resulted from that, too.
19 MR. MARTINa That is my last slide.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Before you get through 21 with that slide.
Where is that tube being examined?
22 MR. REYNOLDS:
That particular tube is being 23 examined at Westinghouse Research Labs.
At least it was 24 there three weeks ago.
It is being obviously 25 metallurgically examined which means it is being cut up ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
CES VK121NIA A3% 0.W WQ]XIC'3 TON, D.C. 20024 W 554-2343 y
79 1 into pieces and the pieces are being examined.
2 MR. MARTINS I have some concluding remarks 3 relative to the operators and the licensee management.
4 I think that this event demonstrated that they 5 understood their plant, that they understood their 6 procedures and that they understood the philosophy of 7 coping with a steam generator tube rupture event.
8 They paid particular attention to assuring 9 that the core was adequately cooled.
When they ran up 10 against problems in their procedures which didn't see to 11 fit the situation they did not just leap in and change 12 things.
They assessed the situation.
They made a 13 determination of what was the best course of action.
14 They did leave their procedures.
They did devia te f rom 15 their procedures when they weren't appropriate and they 16 re-entered the procedures later on when it was.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Now I gathered from 18 somewhere in your report though, I thought I ran across 19 where the operators did not think they did deviate fro 20 the procedures.
21 MR. MARTINS That was their statement.
I 22 disagree with them.
I think they reacted prudently.-
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs In other words, they 24 believe they didn't deviate and you believe they did but 25 they were correct in devia ting?
I ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
80 1
MR. MARTINS That is correct.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s Is that because the 3 procedures can be interpreted a couple of different ways?
4 MR. MARTIN:
I think that their interpretation 5 is that in all cases we will act prudently, that the 6 procedures simply are a guideline.
If I have to jump 7 from this procedure to that procedure to that procedure 8 to get around a hurdle in a procedure, that is following 9 sy procedures.
Another interpretation of the same to thing.
I think they acted prudently and that is what I 11 was looking for.
12 RR. HAYNES:
The procedure itself didn't cover 13 all of the situations what were facing the operator.
14 When it didn't cover that situation then they stoped and 15 thought and said well ---
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I was just puzzled by 17 the way that the report seemed to read.
It was as 18 though the operators did very well.
When necessary ther 19 deviated from their procedures and that deviation that l
20 ther took was appropriat'.
On the other hand, the s
l 21 operators were saying no, we did not deviate from the 22 procedures.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It is important for us to 24 begin to understand what we mean by the words "following 25 procedures."
1 l
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345 I.
81 1
MR. MARTIN:
I think their response was 2 partially defensive.
There had been a lot of publicity 3 relative to NRC's original assessment of their 4 performance with charges that they had not followed t
5 procedures.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN04 But you sort of give then 7 a little justification in saying what they said because 8 you said the procedures aren't all inclusive and you 9 have to select which procedures to use at what time.
10 Maybe we have to look a little closer at procedures and 11 what we mean by the words, but that is the least of my 12 worries.
13 (Laughter.)
14 COHNISSIONER AHEARNE:
The impression I had is l
15 they were saying look, you guys, there was a newspaper te flap about we were wrong, and also we know the tendency l
17 perhaps of you guys to jump down our throats if we do 18 something wrong.
We followed procedures.
19 MR. MARTIN:
That may have been the response.
20 I think that there was some apprehension when our task 21 f orce arrived.
We were not investigators.
We were a 22 task force.
23 (Laughter.)
24 MB. MARTIN 4 There are two other comments I 25 would like to make.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMFANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
82 1
The licensee did provide adequate notification 2 to both ioral, state and federal officials.
3 Finally, our emergency notification system 4 wasn't of the quality and reliability that we would like 5 to have during an emergency.
6
, CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s Which notification?
7 MR. MARTIN:
'.'his is the emergency 8 notification systen, our hot line.
We lost it severe.1 9 times.
It clicked off on us.
The volume and quality of 10 the signal vasn't what we have have expected or hoped 11 for.
But even given those detriments, it still is a 12 damned goed system and we did get a lot of information 13 over it but it could be better.
14 That is all I have.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINOs Can I ask you, do you 10 draw a conclusion yet on what led to the failure of this 17 particular tube?
l l
18 MR. MARTIN:
I support Sam's opinion, but that 19 is an opinion based upon -- I am an electrical 20 engineer.
So that puts it in perspective.
21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. MARTIN:
I trust Sam.
l 23 MR. HAYNES:
The licensee and Westinghouse are 24 continuing to try to get assurance, that they really 25 have got a definitive reason of why did the tube fail, ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
g3 1 for example, at the tube sheet'.
2 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO:
Do they lean toward Sam's 3 sporoach?
4 MR. M ARIIN :
Do you want' to give your approach?
5 MR. REYNOLDSa I have no information as of 6 this moment of exactly what their latest thinking is.
7 It is hard to conclude snything other than what I said.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
When migh t we have a 9 f eel.ng f or wha t Westinghouse and the licensee think?
10 5R. DENTON:
I might mention we have some 11 samples of the tubes being analyzed at Brookhaven.
We 12 have retained a number of materials experts and I would 13 imagine within the next south, sometime before restart s
s 14 we will have a definitive view on it.
I don't think the 15 staff has a definitive position yet on what the cause 16 w as.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s Any other questions?
18 Tom?
19 3R. R EYN O L DS :
(Nodding negatively.)
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0s John?
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:. Well, we thank you very 23 auch.
That was an interesting presentation.
24 COMMISSIONER AREARNE:
We certainly thank Tim 25 and all th e people who worked very hard in putting the ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
84 1 information together in a short period of time.
2 CH AIRM AN P ALL ADIN0s All right.
Thank you very 3 auch.
4 We vill stand adjourned.
5 (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the meeting 6 concluded.)
e e e 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGlNIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D$C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
k t
W?u REGULL9.1tr comSICN
. This is :c car-if7 that the. attached proceedings bef re the COMMISSION MEETING in the sattar ef:. PUBLIC MEETING - DISCUSSION OF REPORT ON TASK FORCE ON EVALUATION OF GINNA EVENT Casa of Proceedisg:
Aoril 14, 1982 l
Occkat llunther i
F1' ace of Proceedi3g:
Washington, D. C.
.RJre held as hereis appears, anc tha't. this is the =rt;1:al :: scscet; tharsof fcr the file of the Cc-*ssicc.
Mary C.
Simons Offtcial Reportar (77ced)
ArriM Offici21 Espcrter ( Sif=2 Cure)
'wgw g-gew
--m--w ywe-,er--------T
aww-----9-,--
.g-
>v---
y.------w-
,-w
I n
8 a
,_.-,-x i
11 l'
1 1
r O
l 1
10
(
.p g_JI a
e p
oj j
u
,t T
g ip' j
e I_
v 8
l2 2 -
A 4 a.
!Y'}
"O N
- t**g-5 i
i i
.> e e
=
a
--e--
I.
i s-
?
I d.
d.
M u
a
._a
[
4
.~
==
h
=
u e
1 2
u o
o 3
M*
j-9 O
,j
- &s j
1"-m Sh 1
O iX ec 464
,1 i
1 G::
Do
~)
a
=
o
.. c or i
am 4
2: w a
n g
Il==l
_.__I i
l 4
C ]
II fg Hi
g-------
O O -}
r9 l2:
..i OO
- I a
1 (
yi
>-------W e 1:
t
.8 I
I 1
g' J
L.
g l
+T
~
-a 91 I
h l r*9 1
0 00 j
I:
>-------l-.0.3 % j 4%,i i l t
- i I 3
, }=
,, # r se LJ
. tlW L
W 6-
__.J l
r-- != +--~e
.l O
i 4
M,
[.
}-
,-*0
~
1 0
i ii 3,!
4-+l-
--=
-M ll
=
E se!
of a
E l3 8
aG" E
E o a a
e Ej I I
Ge E A A A 8
e Se e
Y C
{
4
$lf i
E-a,, x a
NG h
Q' 1E t
V E
en e
l 4
r o
s, E E
af*
4 e*
w o
U E
-4.
m l
j?M> J
~*
.X I
Ild L
-4 X
'[?
i l
-+
il r!!
il lii l
Q f
f a -@.: f--
z
,~z/T
)
j-z i.
)
xi u
e
e e
~FF7 T~T7 s
e e
s e
i e
a e
a a
e e
i s
s s
a s
a e
e e
s s
a i
a s
a e
a i
e e
e a
y u
u
(
i 99 6
- e. io t mese ssss 1
n.usw c a.e t, re w
a =>
,_,,a
_.T.
l
%/
~
D em-sr. a um
.co
- - -- E ss. aims
~
~
n.s.
=.
- =
A A
A I
1 E
A E
1 A
1 E
i I
A B
.i S
9 2
1 R
G G
2 E
0 0
1 S
I O
E I
I O
I saa os so is ao n in n so es so ss so oo os to is ao n so n eo es so as sioo es no is se as ao a eo es se es sa ss es so is se as se as ao es se se iam aM an nas PEA g
Tase Phases 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
90 a r...
. o s/o e n.
. o aea r o
SLIDE 3 Reactor coolant system and steam generator pressure response as a function of time, January 25,1982
1 e
g l
l 2
4 Z
8e
_ 2E i
3 i
i U
~
n 3
Ce
~1 e
E=
0 8
5 5
e ae w
3 o
E E
%2 e
~~ R o
E 3
C E:
8 Ji S
T LLJ Q
w J
(,n R
I i
I S,
f f
- 4 h
{
o (wd6pgoljyggggg
o 600 e
i i i i
, i a
i e
i i
e i
i i
i i i e
i i i e
i i i e
i i
. i i
soo 660 B S/G Temperature sto 500 4eo A Loop Measured 40 g-~~e 440 430 man g B Loop Measured I
l*
Temperature 9
j 3s0 P
360
{
340 i
320 Calculated 300 Mimed Mean Temperature 200
~
b Qpm Estemated Reverse Flow
=
Data 240 220 200 t
i i f
8 8
8
.40 45 to SS 30 00 On to IS 20 25 30 36 40 45 to DS 8100 de to 15 20 2S 30 35 40 46 to 56 32 00 n
a a
e a
e a
i i
e a
e a
a e
Ls e
e a
e a
e a
a a
n 9 00 OS 10 SS 20 25 30 35
^"
NOON A Coks leg Temp G 8 Cold Leg Temp. o Calculated Values e SLIDE 5 Reactor coolant loop cold-leg temperature compared with calculated values, January 25,1982 i
l i
l
L nq s. :. w :+ y y h u n& ml W '
- i,.
,y g f " '[a
.e
'Q W -;.54 7 ne
- ..:+,Y;--f: ?;%~-..e.m. s, W.fi
, 'p'a.
m
- %i,1
. q =oc. :, $.,g.
(... 4 m.9 ag
- 3. 4.
..n, y., g, c
. c w..;;
. p'
.f.* *
-.'*',T-T 2,*'. $,Y t -*. x.
=.:.
- .* *:, w. t i.f.r k,=*T'
& Y.
s,'
- , s.r. 3$d.74 g.
s,;.
e 5,. n*:.'>; y, n..re rr._
~
h.
5,.
^
^ ' i. k'; 6;, [.'.; k $*p,* I2',1 i'
.i?.
i m v{.
r A
'?,p_ ;; '..
r ;r,
j l'
1 1>.
a
-~
-i
' ' ~,... : x..
\\
}.,a[ '.4 a
r "'- e th a si f ff,'&,p
- f;
- ,'.'L,',:'*?'
s.. 'A -
. ?? ?.' * ' * * ' 4 y _ h
,s i t
~?
- r
..... - $.f *' *
..- u ' -
t,
- 2,
-:5.('
.s W
';h Y~5'f -
^
1
'5
$Y
^
.?.
$ ;< y.
, V,M i n%f:! c - 8. T **
TW'. ".No
'_ fMkYj ~
s
. ;m~p,h / ((?'f
.a ) --q, :ng*4,? -
L
+:r
..>.:.i.*.'~.
h
,:'*F'.,,,f
~
..'. 3 y
. ~ - ~ ' '
.. W.h.z../ 17 9
- a. -
u.
w:.:s.Wi.
mM n,
t %.,. % : W.~:r, et
. +:w 3..
a
,5X --
7 n:.w.ac
.a.G 4 4 *.,s s
43 p
.~ y.. s nazpt g.
h a
i
~
.k p,wr. tiw.;,h.,
g N,,y}D '
- Di-Q
- u -s ~
D
. e '.
a.
m.m.".cp,gx wee ce.~
F
.g a
,w h-m.'. 2 *....
=
u s 3
'f Y
h-I:
I w
~.
Wi '%w g
V
$.?. r 'df ' ?$z g,.)
Z
- Q % r.3 i
f, r
.'$: W h.
- '[ g,g,.
j
,i
.~ Ae'"A b'L.gp**'? 7M.,.c n.
- 9. &.9y',* c
^WJ.
,.fI,i,*.I,j h_ q g.
. Wh E:'
s.
I1k~.
j 7
,yj
{ *T h"h ke*
..n.
,7 s
b y..
rk kto e
r - <w h ll> W N.
h v!.h#a$
..hs. xmw
. m..d.' <zcl w r.
w e
u a
w Ni 3 E '.-.
h' [g,.,.Y k
%w.a y ij
- f. f a
(;l$.;.z.'.lp *b J'** W s
- s..
e*
0
'v y
'1(\\
w];;'Q::&. s "s.,$.k. :n Y g,
- 2'.
N
'\\
?,
e W
G&
- ~ * *r A %
h' I'
kr
- t
,.p,
. e'2 w
- d. &'h8 PG'}dtt") w?
9'-
b gR -Q D. f gg
{
e '-..e,y -
2J W
c6
.:-... : :y M s c*? ::
1, ; {.<
,n. y,,....,
e.t..
~
a, -
l p.a.r.e.
t
- v. 2 es.u.,;w m- -
w 1.,I-
.~
r g
,.e
~
%~m?;;M 3
.1
[l/yJ.A -S.2 ;*}', i
.;f 2
4':':;i-
,a.
h.T.??KT)f ~
- . q 5[ d
,s
- . W l'
- )
s.gy *-.'
\\ 'i.
r-Jw,M
-!..i ya. -
-EC-
^
'c
.MY:]
9:
4 $ u.) N'.
TA.
-fVi&,.
(MYf3 i
'i --;
l
!.1%. * ~1 C*
&~ng
'..- n,.y ~
+,. : "E-;; p.,w~s
.x l
j V,....
e n.
s.===. y <
M g
1..g
. s - %.
t.
., f
,. v r....
4,
.n ;-r 3,
y m.e, 9f
~.
s
.CL j
.n..
11
(
\\.
t g
4
---w-.
r
--y, w,--
e--.--
-, = - -,,. -. -, - - -., -
..m..-.
D i
PRT4- - -
203 i
a FC ll!l 8
WW
.)g T
2OOA l
/
1 O
FC Eg 371
)
p 204A ocis Q
\\
369][g lIl
)(
i 703 l
j 2008 FO I
RCS -> )(
l 427 c
E g
Regenerative Q
.E FC ll!l
'E Heat
%(
f y
Exchanger y
202 n
g From
.E I jl RHR
- E l Loop
.E i
SLIDE 7 Diagram of letdown line isolation and relief valves
/' "s PWR STEAM GENERATOR A
/-
Steam Dutietto Turtune-Generator
-Manway Upper Shell Feedwater inlet -*-
31 /
1 y
f g
Downcomer Flow Resistance Plate Antivibration Bars Q
{
I' s
y
\\
Lower Shell
[
M i
1 I!
/
Tube Supports
'h Wrappsr Tube Bundle First Tube c
I Support Plate Secondary-Side q
j l
3 Inspection y
Handhv.e ll1 Tubesheet Partition Manway
/
k
.i Primary Co ant
- q N'
Pnmary Coolant N Primary Channel Head SLIDE 8 wes inghouse Model 44 steam generator
i a
4 O
N ON-@N
@M-m%gg*?NO4-T T " @M M M M M N N T
NNNL l
' 9 i ! l1 l l
fI l
I l
I i
- e ~lowW~!cew ~;oW,:s;9 e e io *,miM.M m.~ N.cw ~, _.., =,
e :e,,~i
' l: 'j
. g.t.;:
l '
8 ', i 6
ll, 6l. i i'
Il! 3
!l' llI g
y}
i 1.*
l1 ;;I:l
' ! ! !' 4!
}
l-lM@o i
Z
,i l
l } ;' j ;' l '
. 0, p'
. ii:
i l
i i;
3 i
. li ll 3i. .
I !,I
- C N
a I.
E
' i
, l' l ', '
llt,l. il l
j
- j O
j ij
. i U
lla l !!iE.
i pc.,o. e%9.'. d'I g II. ' MT il
'l I
~
~ __
M
~
. w eA'_
. %- ; oc m
4
),
m g
,UJ -
i
- i A
- I I
s
. h_. a',e,,
- g}l
- $
o
..-,-.g
% i: N c
e -
,..ei
...m 4. { 3 +.,,,
e-
+
.L
- N e
+-+
O G
D
==-km w,N h4 m;%)-.
f
' z 2
- _9
>=-
.eo n
.,. y h
~
~
2
,f _ _ _ 3..
-m c...
I g
- 6. L.-+:
p i
g 4
=
./
<g
=
1 f..
..,. l e
e
. 1 h
.O
. >i 2W i
N N
2 8
M N
F
- 1.-
r-. g..
4-l l
=Q N
q p
N E
I! i iwf jll N
.J O
N 4
g
/
2.Y :
i
._i i_*-
- l G
N x,,
i
.D JC
]
@-- M ~
5
_'5;
.- - g 'I e
g I.
x= 1 I
M e.
I l,
I
,C 1
A A
I y
Q g
x q
e D
+
\\
i
.x F9 J
\\f h.
!.~Z N
e A
_y.
. g y &.,
s c
J2 i
%.1 ',
- =r l
A g;
I \\
w.
ess e
I
.x eg g r
TW M
g
_rr'
.(
cg e
I I.X
+8 l
- C OI r
(11' e
1
- 'I
_ _A gg 3J Y.-
p e
O 1
=- '
.Y ir 12:
. :2 a, 0.C 1
x
' Ei 0
c e
1*
i
.b i. b.,d I-O g
Q
,,. ee.o
,o,,
c
- r. r
. y f
. N
$ em E
g g
y
.1* i 3!
g 4 WOO h
j
=
'T
.I
.' 4 s
m i
I.
t/
3
' I f
. T!lt._
ill i
g esi e
i
- 11. ' /.
- I :..='
- j g
d g
1
- II
/.
i.
- T
';'a i I : ! l..
g g
g t
1 1.;
e i
' I i g
ist 4
F
-Y t
rr x
g p.
C g
g3 i
r I
iT:
p l
m e
1 T:
l O
O
\\
r h
N" i.I_
l
~ l: i h*\\
I.,
t I : i i
j p
J
<, \\
- 3. -
i '
j
.,g a
g
\\
.f i j 1
I E
J og i
=1
i i ! I i
l
-C
,.a e
g i
.m.
i<
- f a
a g
x
".r.-
) i i
D Q
3 1
-I w 4 -
-. i -
! l.
I ~ i g
N
\\
" T*f i 1 -
9 m
\\
v ii:
a
\\
i i I 1
i
!i
~
I' P=
N f ?
g
^'....
4f l
c2
^ -
i F
N
.e m
P x
X
, i i i f'
J P
x
' I i 2
\\ ' W. '... i E
o 1
3 x
Q 8
5 a
i N *x. b, u".
i :g.
s J
~
1 i z o
x 4
s e
w
- 9 __.
.* 3
' %g :8 n e
~
c e.
U Cl VeSN to 4
I s
.llt
. s.
~
""" gg' te
" *Q. 4 Parallel Grooves with M,
Tube Bundle Spacing
$9 M
gf, Oxyfuel Cut Surface-am n Wktf
- n.
~~
Drilled Hole y
"~
k fjj!l;lj'[FijiY[l :7j'jiP?l@Fy'If!'i"Ty'i'ITlTPgPiTj7T1y';Tri.. g..
.. - +...
SLIDE 10 Large foreign object removed from hot leg of B steam l
generator (% in. thick) l l
l i
e 5, -
- I
+4
.g
- t, t g:fty C.:,
t, (F pr f. %. :n 3d P..
s#
p.,y j
?
T
- ' *', i I
f I ^ ':%
N'
., ?.A q.
y:
i' 5!. -'-..,
y.
7.4.
?.:
i
~
x,.
d
- g., * ^
F 0
-]
L g.
i u-I l b -"
in.
,7' r
9 T'
i i
} t t
1
- 19 i
- f m
4 7 7j 4 ~j j
' t'
.L i
i L
t -s
.i yd j-h
- j.J. 4 J
i t
r 1
l 3 9~.
Y c '.s 1.as
.a.r
$y N. r.F 4
4 i
P 2 >
,. 5-
] %r' T'
b ?
l i
j
'5 "F
5 '(
1 p
?
c 1-
. P
.: r e 1
v
)
i
..g lI i
5 Fe '
Mi i
eg F 3..
M r<
n r
a NF
- I' I
)
1 y
)F
- f. ---
1 l
i N
F.;
c f
r
' [
. 4 g
.i i
- }.
b i
I i
l
-i r
r
. ).
d
-f...
& Y j.
s.
r r,..
,1-2 k
k L
1)
}
2, -
2
~ l f
'k 7
g L'
L,l j
L. '
a i ;1.s.:. <
s, i.
r r
W 1.
k,
-t j
[
l
,, l' t'
\\c, JI s
1 1
.(
[
a i
l j
-f i
f 1
t v.
E tY',.
I
)
j w %x F
'j j
I
)
/)i 1
j
,,f E.
t r
v l
U.'.. :[621 a
l h
"i h
t
. i 4}g !,?p 1
K-i 4
i t
I j
j
-2.3 JG ho).
1-g.
a I'g e k,,
'T
.{ j N
N a
I 3
T.}. l ;nJp )
.J
- -s' y
r i
h h l
N L
$..q;'
n g g'
[
97.
f-
'.4 Q
r3 q
.g s
p.~
\\
x.~
n p s.,
@..]
I M..w.
f@n.
l f
3..
- t.,
% #4 T-d A,
Yj l
1.
4 Fe
- y.e c
,~4 E.$
kWk8 f.7 N
h*7 h
D.:dE g[
@f-g y
'M k
u,
- n 4
SLIDE il Radial views of tube R44C55 showing first 9 in. above tubesheet. Tube detached from remainder of tube in tubesheet. White dot points outward.
W t
".:::i:
W I 5::=
9 b, _
\\
TRANSMITTAL TO:
4/7 ocument Control Des,
.r-5 66 ygN," ~ %(,_
..J g/
016 Phillips k.A C
3 g
e*"
r d"7L.
,4
- 5=
d 67 d0 ADVANCED COPY TO:
/7:The Public Document 2coi[ 4rr[$# D 2
=:
9 sysa Mi DATE:
M f4 s.
PS File s
s From: SECY OPS Branch N
e
- s=
=8 1.e")
C<!E=:
(
Attached.arel copies of a Cc H ssion meeting
=g transcript /s/ and related meeting documen't/h/.
They 1-d-j are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession C
3 List and olacement in the Public Document Room.
No b
h.
other dis'tribution is requested or required.
Existing Ed DCS identification numbers are_ listed o_n the individual y
d documents wherever known. -
- =
1
.:;=
j-Meeting
Title:
3MC.
h 0;[
b CM h
EQ M K %2 o M t
-g 6 pen /
y
. M N3 DATE:
/
, Closed DOS COPIES:
d-g Copies (1 of each Checked)
- fs rrEF. DESCRIPTION:
Advanced J.If May Q
j To PDR:
- Original be Duplicatedi:
I-l$
- 1. If N
- Doctrnent Dup
- copy * {
=?d lu)lQ.ctTL<.Lx4L (Stea) # aAlah h
=_'
x-
)
\\
G
~
y s
e
~.5, y
- 3=
e
- l
.2 di:
3d di:
7.1f, 2.'
@ii:
Ilii C
2-)
W m_.:
- 5:l
<=
- 5.~I W=:
.. p' b
3 z,
q.i C':
,Q$
..G :
4.
_::i
~
54l r" -
25'
=fR S'
5.
4:=
~
<=
~p h
p P
.]'-1
- Verify if in DCS, and g<=
change to "PDR
-?.
(PDR is advanced one of each docu:nent, two available."
.. 5 of each SECE paper.)
E' g
l
.