ML20049H968
| ML20049H968 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1981 |
| From: | Kountanis B EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Bender P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17194A572 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-0250, CON-FIN-A-250 EGG-1183-4211, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8203090800 | |
| Download: ML20049H968 (9) | |
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EGtG NRC TAC No.
42737 and 42738 Report No.
EGG 1183-4211 Contract Program or Project
Title:
Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control System Support i
Subject of this Document:
Technical Evaluation of the Licensee's Response to I&E Bulletin 80-06 Concerning ESF Reset Controls for the Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 Type of Document:
Informal Report Author (sh
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B. Kountants Date of Document:
iday 1981 Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Of fice or Division:
P. Bender /R. Wilson, ICSB This document was prepared primartly for preliminary or internal use.
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has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be considered final.
EG1G Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations San Ra non. CA 94583 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington. 0.C.
Under 00E Contract No.8&R 201904031 NRC FIN No.
A0250 INTERIM REPORT 8,2 o p o 9 0 8 0 0
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p Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO I&E BULLETIN 80-06 CONCERNING ESF RESET CONTROLS FOR THE 6RESDEN STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 (OOCKET NOS.50 237 AND 50 2d9) by B. Kountanis Approved for Publication
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'd. R. Hadosevic Department Manager This document is UNCLASSIFIE0 a s i er:
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Nicn IWi. tirodericK Department Manager l
Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory under U S Department of Er ergy Conteact No. DE. ACOB-76 NVO 1183 y
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f INTRODUCTION On March 13, 1980, the USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (l&E), issued 1&E Bulletin 80-06, entitled " Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)
Reset Controls," to all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses, l&E Bulletin 80-06 requested that the following actions be taken by the licensees:
(1)
Review the drawings for all systems serving safetye related functions at the schematic / elementary diagram level to detemine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.
(2)
Verify thtt the actual installed iristrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals.
Provide a schedule for the per-formance of the testing in your response to this bulletin.
(3)
If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your f acility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.
(4)
Report in writing within 90 days the results of your review, include a list of all devices which respond as discussed in item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action.
This technical evaluation addresses the licensee's response to 1&E Bulletin 80-06 and the licensee's proposed system modification, design change, and/or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.
In evaluating the licensee's response to the four Action item requirements of the bulletin, the following NRC staff guidance is also used:
Upon the reset of ESF signals, all safety-related equipment shall remain in its emergency mode.
Mul ti pl e reset sequencing shall not cause the affected equipment to deviate from its emergency mode.
Justification should be provided for any exceptions.
EVALUATIO!4 AtiD C0tiCLUS10!is In a letter dated June 10,1980 [Ref.1), Commonwealth Edison, the licensee for Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3, replied to I&E Bulletin 83-06.
In a telephone conference call on March 2, 1981 [Ref. 2], the licensee provided clarification of their original response which was con-firmed by a letter dated March 20,1981 [Ref. 3].
A subsequent telephone conversation on April 8,1981 [Ref. 4] provided additional information.
In response to Action Item 1 of I&E Bulletin 80-06, the licensee reported [Ref. 1] that they have completed the review of all applicable schematic and logic diagrams.
The ESF systems that were considered by the licensee in this review are as follows:
(1) Core Spray (2) Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)
(3) Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW)
(4) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
(5) Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
(6)
Isolation Condenser (7) Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries (8) Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT)
(9) Primary Containment Isolation System (Groups I through IV)
(10) Reactor Protection System (RPS)
(11) Atmosphere Containment Atmosphere Dilution / Containment Air Monitoring System (ACAD/ CAM)
The licensee states that as a result of this review, no equipment diverts from its emergency rnode when the actuation signals are reset. How-ever, there are seven cases where manual resets at the system level for nives and equipment may return the equipment to its normal operating natus.
We conclude that this review by the licensee satisfies the re-quirement set forth in Action Item 1 of I&E Bulletin 80-06.
In response to Action item 3 of I&E Bulletin 80-06, the licensee dots not currently plan to make modifications on five of the seven cases at Dresden Sta: ton, Units 2 and 3.
The licensee has offered the following justifications for five of the systems identified:
(1)
HPCI System Valves Valves 2301-64, -65, -29, and -30 close on HPCI system initiation.
Since the valves have a two-position, maintained-contact switch, the valves will re-open when reset.
However, the reset switch controls the valves only and is not the same switch used to reset the initiating signal.
iherefore, the valve reset switch would be used for the express purpose of re-opening the valves (return to normal).
Valve 2301-28 opens on HPCI system initiation and closes on reset. -
(2)
HPCI Aunitary Gil Fu::n The HPCI auxiliary oil pump will not deplete the de power source.
The system design provides for an auxiliary oil pump trip when the HPCI turbine shaft-driven oil pump comes up to rated pressure or when the HPCI initiating signals clear.
(3)
ADS System The ADS system initiates when four conditions are simultaneously satisfied--reactor low-low water level -
high drywell pressure, two-minute timer, and suf fi-cient LPCI or core spray pump discharge pressure. The low-low level signal automatically resets when the i
condition clears and will also reset the two-minute timer if it has not timed out.
The high drywell i
pressure signal must be manually reset if it has j
cleared and will reset the two minute timer if it has not timed out.
The two-minute timer can be reset at any time and will cause the valves to reclose, but if the low-low level and high drywell pressure signals are still present, it will restart and the valves will open in twc minutes. Once the timer has timed out and the valves are opened, resetting either or both of the low-low level and/or high drywell pressure signals will not close the volves.
(4)
RPS System The RPS system's function is to shut down the reactor by initiating a control rod scram for various off-normal conditions.
Once a scram has been initiated, the operator changes the MODE switch to " shutdown,"
thus locking in the scram so it cannot be reset for 10 seconds to allow all control rod drives to fully insert (maximum Technical Specification travel time of 7 seconds).
Once the initiating signal (s) clear and the 10 second timer times out, the scram can be reset.
l No movement of the control rods takes place until the operator initiates normal condition rod ' withdrawal.
The scram discharge volume vent and drain valves re-open after the scram is reset to allow the dis-charge volume to drain.
(5)
ACAD/ CAM Valves The ACAD/ CAM valves are installed, but will not re-spend to an ESF actuating reset signal.
The valves are out-of-service in the closed position.
Prior to placing the valves in service, their operation will be reviewed against ISE Bulletin 80-06 requirements. e
We have reviewed the justifications submitted by the licensee to insure that sufficient information is provided as a basis for NRC to pre-pare a Safety Evaluation Report, in response to Action Item 3 of !&E Bulletin 80-06, the licensee will modify the two systems shown below at the next scheduled outage.
(1)
Isolation Condenser valves 1301-1,
-2, and 4'
The isolation condenser valves 1301-1, -2, and -4 con-trol switches will be changed from a two-position, maintained-contact switch to a three-position, return to normal switch. This will eliminate the maintained-contact open signal from the circuitry which will prevent the valves from re-opening following reset of the Group V isolation signal.
(2)
PCIS Group 1 Valves The control switches have been changed from a two-position, maintained-contact switch to a three-return to normal switch.
This eliminates
- position, the maintained-contact open signal from the circuitry, which will prevent the valves from re-opening follow-ing reset of the isolation signal.
(No reset problems were discovered for Group 11, Ill, and IV systems.)
These modifications will ensure that equipment will remain in the emergency mode position upon ESF reset.
In response to item 2 of I&E Bulletin 80-06, the licensee has indicated [Ref.1] that surveillance tests, which are performed at least at each refueling, provide detailed verification of system logic and operation from the process sensors to the actuating devices. These tests have demon-strated proper system performance as well as conformance of the electrical schematics to the as-built condition.
Additional testing [Ref. 3) of the identified above will be done after installation and will modifications specifically demonstrate that equipment will not reposition from its emer-We conclude that the li-gency condition with initiating signals reset.
censee has complied with Action item 2 of !&E Bulletin 80-06 by scheduling and performing these tests.
We conclude that in the licensee's response to Action items 1, 2, and 3, they have complied with Action item 4 of I&E Bulletin 80-06.
FINDINGS Based on our review of the documents and information provided for controls Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3, we conclude that the ESF reset meet the requirements cf Action items 1, 2, and 4 of 1&E Bulletin 80-06.
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In response to Action Item 3 of I&E Bulletin 80-06, the licensee has modified two systems and has offered the justifications given in the
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previous section of this report for five systems in lieu of any system modifications or other corrective actions.
REFERENCES 1.
' Commonwealth Edison letter (O. L. Peoples) to NRC -(J. G. Keppler),
"Respcnse to l&E Bulletin 80-06," dated June 10, 1980.
2.-
Telephone conference call, NRC (P. Bender); Commonwealth Edison (R.
Janecek); EGaG, San Ramon (B. Kountanis.
D.
Hackett', and D.
Laudenbach), March 2, 1981, 3.
Commonwealth Edison letter (R. Janecek) to NRC (T.
A.
Ippolito),
" Response to NRC Infomal Questions Concerning 18E Bulletin 80-06,"
dated March 20, 1981.
4.
Telephone conversation, Comonwealth Edison.(R.; Janecek) to EG&G, San Ramon (B.-Kountanis), April 8, 1981.
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