ML20045E930
| ML20045E930 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1993 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045E888 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9307060209 | |
| Download: ML20045E930 (25) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT A Beaver Valley Power' Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 MARKED UP PAGES i
The following is a list of the affected pages:
Affected Pages:
3/4 9-14 B 3/4 9-3 B 3/4 9-4 l
r T
i i
9307060209 930628 PDR ADOCK 05000334
'l P
i
.o
- DPR-66 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.14 Fuel is to be stored in the spent fuel storage pool with:
a.
The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool maintained greater than or equal to 1050 ppm when moving fuel in tne spent fuel pool; and b.
Fuel assembly storage in Region 1 restricted to fuel with an enrichment less than or equal to 5.C w/o U235; and l
c.
Fuel assembly storage in Region 2 restricted to fuel which has been qualified in accordance with Table sriticality analysi;.
3.9-lj55d e
d.
Fuel assembly storage in Region a restricted to fuel whien has been qualified in accordance with Table
- 3. 9-A.
APPLICABILITY:
During storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool.
ACTION:
a.
Suspend all actions involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined a
fuel assembly has been placed in the incorrect Region until such time as the correct storage location is determined.
Move the assembly to its correct location before resumption of any other fuel movement.
b.
Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined the pool boron concentration is less than 1050 ppa, until such time as the boron concentration is increased to 1050 ppa or greater.
c.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.14.1 Prior to placing fuel or moving fuel in the spent fuel,)} N
- pool, verify through fuel receipt records for new fuel,Cby burnup analysis and comparison with Table 3.9-1 4y a
criticel.;7 t
7 or analysis that fuel assemblies to be placed into orl moved in the spent fuel pool are within the above enrichment imits.
gg yg 4.9.14.2 Verify the spent fuel pool boron concentration is 2 1050 ppm:
a.
Within 8
hours prior to and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool, and b.
At least once per 31 days.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-14 Amendment No.
i PROPOSED
c.
OPR-66 i
TABLE 3.9-4 BEAVER VALLEY FUEL ASSEMBLY MINIMUM BURNUP VS. INITIAL U235 ENRICHMENT FOR STORAGE IN REGION 3 SPENT FUEL RACKS Initial U235 Assembly Discharge Enrichment Burnuo (MUD /MTU) 2 348 0
2.5 I,6 0 f t
3.0 6,980 3.5 II,68A 4.0 It,A39 4.5
.2 0, C 7A 5.0 ACooO A
NOTE:
The data in the above table may be either interpreted linearly or may be calculated by the conservative equation below.
This equation provides a linear fit to the -decign burnup limits, bes7 onaj sir y
b g burnup, MWD /MTU = - 4 90 M- (6 % f + / 2,90 0 W E % - A7, YO O ir Where E = Enrichment (E 5 5%)
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-15et.
Amendment No.
PROPOSED
DPR-66 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.10 AND 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99%
of the assumed 10% iodine gap
)
activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the l
accident analysis.
l 3/4.9.12 and 3/4.9.13 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the storage pool ventilation system ensure that 1
all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere.
The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
The spent fuel pool area ventilation system is non-safety related and only recirculates air through the fuel building.
The SLCRS portion of the ventilation system is safety-related and maintains a negative pressure in the fuel building.
The SLCRS flow is normally exhausted to the atmosphere without filtering, however, the flow is diverted through the main filter banks by manual actuation or on a high radiation signal.
3/4.9.14 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL The requirements for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensure that:
(1) the spent fuel pool will remain subcritical during fuel storage; and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained in the water volume in the spent fuel pool to provide negative reactivity for postulated accident conditions under the guidelines of ANSI 16.1-1975.
The value of 0.95 or less for keff which includes all uncertainties at the 95/95 probability / confidence level is the acceptance criteria for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool.
The Action Statement applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensures that:
(1) the spent fuel pool is protected from distortion in_ the fuel storage pattern that could result in a critical array-during the movement of fuel; and (2) th (this includes a (e boron concentration; is. maintained at 2 1050 ppm 50 ppm I
conservative r allowance for uncertainties) during all actions involving movement of fuel in the s ent fuel /$ool._
a Goo He +ot matt D The Surveillance Requirements applicable to fuel st'orage in the spent fuel pool ensure that:
(1) the fuel assemblies satisfy the analyzed U-235 enrichment limits or an analysis has been performed and it was determined that Kaff is 5 0.95; and (2) the boron concentration meets the 1050 ppm limit.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-3 Amendment No.
PROPOSED
DPR-66 Regions 1
and 2 with Region 2 PEFUELING OPERATIONS further subdivided and identified as Regions 2 and BASES g
l FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL (Continued) pool The reracked spent fueld consists of -swe-discrete regions.
Region 1 l
is configured to store fuel with mcxinur enrichment cf 5.0 :/ c.
l The most reactive of the Westinghouse 17 X 17 STD/ Vantage 5H and OFA fuel assemblies yielded a maximum Ke f of 0.940 including all biases l
and uncertainties.
The enrich =ent limitatione for.ctorcqc cf fuel in ncgior
^f_
-cpent fuel opc! ic baced-en ;/ nominal region average enrichment Fwith) or - 0.05 w/o(6f 5.0 w/o ndividual fuel assembly tolerance of
+
Region 2 racks are designed to store fuel with burnup consistent with 3
its initial enrichment.
A table of enrichment and corresponding l
required burnup is provided in the j[echnical g'ecification.
A p
conservative value of the required burnup is given by the following linear equation:
i Minimum burnup for unrestricted storage in Region 2 in MWD /MTU 12100 E%
- 20500, where E
is the initial
=
enrichment in w/o.
y,. SAM he maximum reactivity in Region 2 is 0.945Alf all cells are loaded with fuel with minimum allowable burnup.
This includes all biases and uncertainties and appropriate allowance for uncertainty in Q etion calculations.
%'torage cells in Region 2
which face the pool wall are capable of imaintaining the Keff below 0.95 with fuel which does not meet the foregoing burnup restriction.
A separate calculation to establish I
the admissibility of storing low burnup fuel in a Region 2 peripheral cell will be required on a case-by-case basis.
The calculation to demonstrate subcriticality for the proposed storage of low burnup fuel will be performed using the same analytical models and compute j
eodes which were used in the high density rack design.
g
/
3/4.9.15 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS
- /84 #
JCnstet /
The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency habitability system ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.
The ambient air temperature is controlled to prevent exceeding the allowable equipment qualification temperature for the equipment and i
instrumentation in the control room.
The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based en limiting the whole body radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less, or its equivalent.
This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 c:
Appendix "A",
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-4 Amendment No.
PROPOSED 1
DDR-66
~
Regions 1
and 2 with Region 2 REFUELING OPERATIONS further subdivided and Repons 2 ad h enMed as BASES
\\
3/4.9.14 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL (Continued) 16.1-1975.
The value of 0.95 or less for keff which includes all; uncertainties at the 95/95 probability / confidence level is the acceptance criteria for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool.
l The Action Statement applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensures that:
(1) the spent fuel pool is protected from distortion in the fuel storage pattern that could result in a critical array during the movement of fuel; and (2) the boron concentration is maintained at 2: 1050 ppm (this includes a X50 ppm I
conservative allowance for uncertaintiesQ during all actions involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool. g g 4
g The reracked spent fuel pool consists of
-t-we-discrete regicnc.
Region 1 is configured to store fuel with a maximur enrichscnt of 5.0 w/.c.
The most reactive of the Westinghous 17 X 17 STD/ Vantage 5H and OFA fuel assemblies yielded a maximum Keff o 0.940 including all l biases and uncertainties.
Phc cnrichment limitatienc for ctcr:ge cf fuel ir Ecgicn 1 cf the cpent fucl pccl in hcccd on gnominal region average enrichment +witn V dividual fuel assembly tolerance of
+
or - 0.05 w/o (of 5.0 w/o)
J Region 2 racks are designed to store fuel with burnup consistent with its initial enrichment.
A table of enrichment and corresponding required burnup is provided in the fechnical Jfpecification.
A conservative value of the required burnup is given by the following linear equation:
l Minimum burnup for unrestricted storage in Region 2 in 12100 E%
MWD /MTU
- 20500, where E
is the initial
=
enrichment in w/o.
f (M.w Rgm3 iso. M
]
The maximum reactivity in Region 2 is 0.945+1f all cells are loaded with fuel with minimum allowable burnup.
This includes all biases
- and uncertainties and appropriate allowance for uncertainty in j
pletion calculations.
j IStorage cells in Region 2
which face the pool wall are capable of maintaining the Keff below 0.95 with fuel which does not meet the foregoing burnup restriction.
A separate calculation to establish the admissibility of storing low burnup fuel in a Region 2 peripheral 1
cell will be required on a case-by-case basis.
The calculation to demonstrate subcriticality for the proposed storage of low burnup fuel will be performed using the same analytical models and computer tcodes which were used in the high density rack design.
REPLACE MTH l
Twt ed d.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-4 Amendment No.
(fmed wd)
i INSERT 1 i
Storage cells in Region 2, which face the pool wall, are in an area l
of high neutron Icakage and are capable of maintaining the Keff below 0.95 with fuel that does not meet the foregoing burnup restriction.
A separate calculation to establish the admissibility l
of storing low burnup fuel in these cells, designated Region 3, has been performed and a table of enrichment and corresponding required burnup is provided in the technical specification.
This calculation l
was performed using the same analytical models and computer codes which were used in the high density rack design.
A conservative value of the required burnup is given by the following linear
'I equation:
Minimum burnup for fugl storage in Region 3 in MWD /MTU = - 480 *(E%)
+ 12,900
- E% - 27,400, where E is the initial enrichment in weight percent.
i l
l
)
4 l
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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 (Proposed Wording) l
. ~.
i
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REFUELING OPERATIONS I
BASES 3/4.9.15 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency habitability system ensures that the control room will remain habitable for cperations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.
The ambient air temperature is controlled to prevent exceeding the allowable equipment qualification temperature for the equipment and instrumentation in the control room.
The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the whole body radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less, or its equivalent.
This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of Appendix "A",
l i
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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-5 Amendment No.
(
sO WoNm m
4.
-+
m m
ATTACHMENT B Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
~
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 SPENT FUEL POOL RERACK SUPPLEMENT A.
DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST i
This supplement incorporates some changes to our original submittal to address those recommendations identified in an NRC i
request for additional information (RAI) letter dated January 25, 1993.
We responded by letter dated February 23, 1993 and agreed to the following modifications:
l i
1.
Modify Specification 3.9.14, Surveillance Requirement 4.9.14.1 and Bases 3/4.9.14 to incorporate separate qualification requirements for storage of fuel assemblies that do not meet the requirements of Table 3.9-1 in Region 2 peripheral cells.
2.
Revise the proposed change to Bases 3/4.9.14, " Fuel Storage Spent Fuel Storage Pool,"
to clarify the boron concentration uncertainty, and to reposition "of 5 w/o" to follow " nominal region average enrichment."
The applicable typed replacement pages provided in our original submittal have been marked-up to identify the new changes proposed here.
In addition, there are two sets of marked-up page B
3/4 9-4.
The first marked-up page B 3/4 9-4 is from our original submittal and the second marked-up page B 3/4 9-4 has been typed to include the wording that was shifted from the previous page by Amendment No. 170 which was recently issued.
To I
include all the information, Bases Section 3/4.9.15 was shifted to a
new page B
3/4 9-5.
Therefore, the typed pages in Attachment C
only include Bases pages B 3/4 9-4 and B 3/4 9-5, whereas our original submittal included changes to Bases pages B 3/4 9-3 and B 3/4 9-4.
B.
BACKGROUND Our original submittal was provided by letter dated November 2, 1992 and requested technical specification modifications to allow i
an increase in the spent fuel pool storage capacity to 1627 storage locations.
In the NRC RAI, the NRC stated _they did not i
agree with our proposal to allow a
separate calculation to establish the admissibility of storing low burnup fuel in a Region 2
peripheral cell on a case-by-case basis.
This affected i
our proposed changes to Specification 3.9.14.c, Surveillance Requirement 4.9.14.1 and Bases 3/4.9.14.
The NRC suggested these calculations be done now to determine the minimum burnup requirements for fuel that can be stored in peripheral cells based on the remaining interior cells containing fuel with the minimum allowed burnup for Region 2,
and felt that a separate I
ATTACHMENT B, continued Pr6 posed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 Page 2 initial enrichment versus burnup table should be included in the technical specification for these peripheral cells.
We have defined a
new Region 3
as the peripheral cells requiring a separate qualification for spent fuel storage.
The rerack vendor performed the calculations and developed a
table Eto qualify storage of fuel assemblies in Region 2
peripheral cells (Region 3) that do not otherwise meet the requirements of Table 3.9-1.
Therefore, Table 3.9-2 is'being incorporated here and referenced in Specification 3.9.14.d, Surveillance Requirement 4.9.14.1 and Bases 3/4.9.14 to provide the alternate qualification requirements for spent fuel storage in Region 2 peripheral cells.
The NRC also recommended that we reword Bases 3/4.9.14 with respect to the spent fuel pool boron concentration uncertainty.
The proposed change stated that the 1050 ppm boron concentration includes a 650 ppm uncertainty whereas it is actually composed of 400 ppm for the accident analysis, 50 ppm for uncertainty.and 600 ppm for margin.
Therefore, this revision includes modified wording to address the above concern.
The NRC further recommended that we also reword Bases 3/4.9.14 by changing the position in the sentence where "of 5.0 w/o" is added.
Moving "of 5.0 w/o" to follow " nominal region average enrichment" is an editorial change and is consistent with the intent of the sentence.
C.
JUSTIFICATION Our original request would have allowed performance of a
criticality analysis for acceptance of fuel storage in peripheral l
cells that do not meet the requirements of Table 3.9-1.
That portion has been replaced in this revision with the flexibility to qualify fuel assemblies for storage in Region 2 peripheral cells in accordance with Table 3.9-2.
The required calculations have been performed to provide the enrichment -versus burnup values for this new table to ensure the effective multiplication factor for fuel stored in the cells remains below the reference value including uncertainties and allowances.
The Bases revisions are editorial changes to clarify the boron concentration uncertainty and the region average enrichment in accordance with the NRC recommendations and do not adversely affect the intent of the Bases description.
Additional changes have also been incorporated which consolidate the first two paragraphs on Page B 3/4 9-4 and modify the last two paragraphs to include discussion of the Region 2 peripheral cells (Region 3).
d B-2 1
-m.-
't ATTACHMENT B, continued
~
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 Page 3 D.
SAFETY ANALYSIS This supplement modifies our proposed changes to Specification 3.9.14.c, Surveillance Requirement 4.9.14.1 and Bases 3/4.9.14 in response to NRC recommendations to incorporate alternate qualification requirements for storing spent fuel in the Region 3 cells when they do not meet the requirements of Table 3.9-1.
The vendor has performed the required calculations and developed enrichment versus burnup data for a new Table 3.9-2 that provides the limitations necessary for storing fuel in Region 3.
Modifications to the licensing report are provided in Attachment D.
The results of the calculations performed with the KENO-Sa code for the peripheral
- cells, using a
conservative 30 centimeter water reflector, show that these cells can safely accommodate fuel with an initial enrichment of 5.0 w/o which have a burnup of 25,000 MWD /MTU.
The KENO-Sa calculations were made with the peripheral cells containing fuel enriched to 2.348 weight percent (w/o)
(equivalent to 5.0 w/o enriched fuel with a burnup of 25,000 MWD /MTU) and the remainder of the rack filled with the maximum permissible enrichment for Region 2
fuel (1.694 w/o
- enriched, which is equivalent to 5.0 w/o enriched fuel with a burnup of 40,000 MWD /MTU).
For this condition, the calculated reactivity was 0.9119 i
0.0010 (with a
95%/95%
probability / confidence
- level, bias corrected),
and with uncertainties and the temperature correction to 4*C added, the maximum K
is 0.946.
Therefore, as a result of the neutron eff leakage from fuel in the peripheral cells, these cells can safely accommodate fuel with an initial enrichment of 5.0 w/o which have a burnup of 25,000 MWD /MTU.
The KENO-Sa code was the principal method of analysis along the l
periphery of the storage
- racks, assuming a
30 cm water reflector.
The CASMO-3 code (with the restart option) was used to define the equivalent enrichment for fuel with an initial enrichment of 5
w/o burned to 25,000 MWD /MTU evaluated in the storage rack cell configuration at a reference temperature of I
4'C.
Once the reactivity for 5.0 w/o enriched fuel at 25,000 MWD /MTU had been established, CASMO burnup and restart calculations at other enrichments were made and interpolated for the same reactivity.
This data is tabulated in Table 3.9-2 and defines the acceptable initial enrichment versus burnup limits for storing fuel in the Region 3 cells.
The maximum effective multiplication factor for fuel corresponding to the limits defined in Table 3.9-2 is less than the reference multiplication l
factor of 0.946 including uncertainties and allowances.
Fuel assemblies that satisfy the criteria provided in Table 3.9-2 may be safely stored in the Region 3 cells with assurance that the effective multiplication factor will be maintained within the regulatory limit of 0.95.
Therefore, this proposed change is safe and will not reduce the safety of the plant.
B-3 l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ __ ___- __ a
ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement i l
Page 4 The proposed Bases have also been revised to clarify the spent fuel pool boron concentration uncertainty and the allowable region average enrichment.
Those changes are provided in accordance with the NRC recommendations and do not affect the j
rest of the original changes.
Additional changes also consolidate the first two paragraphs on l
Page B
3/4 9-4 and modify the last two paragraphs to incorporate a
description of Region 3
including the linear equation for l
qualification of fuel for storage in this region.
Applicable calculations were performed using the same methodology used in the high density rack design to ensure no criticality concerns i
exist for fuel storage in Region 3.
Therefore, the margins of safety are not significantly reduced by the proposed rerack.
E.
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION
}
The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
l The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment i
to an operating license for a
facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a testing i
facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if
(
operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1)
Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2)
Ctaate the possibility of a new or different kind of
[
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or j
(3)
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The following evaluation is provided for the no signi(; cant
{
4 hazards consideration standards.
1.
Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously l
evaluated?
8 This proposed change revises portions of our original submittal dated November 2,
1992 based on the NRC recommended changes issued ny letter dated January 25, 1993.
The NRC stated that they di d not agree with our proposed changes to Specification 3.
.14.c, Surveillance i
Requirement 4.9.14.1 and Bases 3/4.9.14 that would have i
allowed a
separate calculation to establish the I
admissibility of storing low burnup fuel in a Region 2 f
B-4
r 1
.,~
ATTACHMENT B, continued
~
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 Page 5 peripheral cell on a
case-by-case basis.
The NRC feels
)
i these calculations should be done now to develop a separate initial enrichment versus burnup table that would be i
included in the technical specifications for the peripheral cells.
i J
The vendor has performed the required calculations and developed enrichment versus burnup data for a new Table 3.9-2 that provides the limitations necessary for storing l
n fuel in the Region 2 peripheral cells, to be called Region 3.
The results of the calculations performed with the EENO-Sa code for Region 3,
using a
conservative 30
(;entimeter water reflector, show that those cells can safely accommodate fuel with an initial enrichment of 5.0 w/o which have a
burnup of 25,000 MWD /MTU.
The KENO-Sa calculations were made with the Region 3 cells containing fuel enriched to 2.348 w/o (equivalent to 5.0 w/o enriched fuel with a burnup of 25,000 MWD /MTU) and the remainder of the rack filled with the maximum permissible enrichment for Region 2 fuel (1.694 w/o
- enriched, which is equivalent to'5.0 w/o-enriched fuel with a
burnup of 40,000 MWD /MTU).
For this condition, the calculated reactivity was 0.9119 i 0.0010 (with a
95%/95%
probability / confidence
- level, bias corrected),
and with uncertainties and the temperature correction to 4*C
- added, the maximum K
is 0.946.
eff Therefore, as a
result of the neutron leakage from fuel in the Region 3 cells, these cells can safely accommodate fuel with an initial enrichment of 5.0 which have a burnup of 25,000 MWD /MTU.
The KENO-Sa code was the principal method of analysis along the periphery of the storage
- racks, assuming a
30 cm water reflector.
The CASMO-3 code (with the restart option) was used to define the equivalent enrichment for fuel with an initial enrichment of 5 w/o burned to 25,000 MWD /MTU evaluated in the storage rack cell configuration at a
reference temperature of 4*C.
Once the reactivity for 5.0 w/o enriched fuel at 25,000 MWD /MTU had been established, CASMO burnup and restart calculations at other enrichments were made and interpolated for the same reactivity.
This data is tabulated in Table 3.9-2 and defines the acceptable initial enrichment versus burnup limits for storing fuel in the Region 2 peripheral cells.
The maximum effective multiplication factor for fuel corresponding to the limits defined in Table 3.9-2 is less than the reference multiplication factor of 0.946 including uncertainties and allowances.
Fuel assemblies that satisfy the criteria provided in Table 3.9-2 may be safely stored in the Region 3
cells with assurance that the effective multiplication factor will be maintained within the regulatory lirit of 0.95.
Therefore, this proposed revision is safe a;4 will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of A,
accident previously evaluated.
B-5
ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 Page 6 The NRC also recommended that we reword Bases 3/4.9.14 concerning our proposed change describing the spent fuel pool boron concentration uncertainty.
The proposed change stated that the 1050 ppm boron concentration includes a 650 ppm uncertainty whereas it is actually composed of 400 ppm for the accident analysis, 50 ppm for uncertainty and 600 ppm for margin.
As a result, this portion of the Bases has been revised to clarify the uncertainty discussion.
This revision provides an editorial clarification which does not change the intent of the Bases discussion, therefore, this revision will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The NRC further recommended that we also reword Bases 3/4.9.14 by changing the position in the sentence where "of 5.0 w/o" is added.
Moving "of S.O w/o" to follow " nominal region average enrichment" is an editorial change and is consistent with the intent of the sentence, therefore, this revision will not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Additional changes also consclidate the first two paragraphs on page B
3/4 9-4 and modify the last two paragraphs to incorporate a
description of Region 3 including the linear equation for qualification of fuel for storage in this region.
Applicable calculations were performed using the same methodology used in the high density rack design to ensure no criticality concerns exist for fuel storage in Region 3.
Therefore, this proposed revision is safe and wl;1 not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed revisions do not affect the other portions of the original change requict.
Table 3.9-2 was developed to provide an alternate means of qualifying fuel assemblies for storage in the Region 3
cells.
The methodology used to develop Table 3.9-2 was similar to that used for Table 3.9-1 and previously derived for a number of comparable plants.
Tables 3.9-1 and 3.9-2 ensure the required guidance and limitations are available to provide for the safe storage of fuel in both Region 2 and Region 3 of the spent fuel pool.
These revisions are based on NRC review of our original submittal and will improve the technical specification requirements in accordance with NRC policy while maintaining the intent of the changes.
Therefore, these changes do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
B-6
e ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 Page 7 r
3.
Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
i Incorporating Table 3.9-2 provides an alternate means of qualifying fuel assemblies for storage in Region 2
peripheral cells.
The maximum effective multiplication factor for these cells is maintained less than the reference effective multiplication factor including uncertainties and-allowances.
This change does not affect the margin of safety since these changes adequately control storage of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool and do not affect any other system or component that might degrade the safety of the plant.
The editorial changes to the Bases are in accordance with the NRC recommendations and are provided to improve the clarity of the Bases discussion.
Therefore, the changes will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
F.
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that the activities associated with this license amendment requent satisfies the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c)
- and, accordingly, a
no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.
I I
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e B-7
ATTACHMENT C Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Suppleraent 1 TYPED PAGES l
Applicable Typed Pages
]
5 6
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.
i
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FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 POCKET NO. 50-334 t
i Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, i
with the enclosed pages as indicated.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating I
the areas of change.
f I
Remove Insert 3/4 9-14 3/4 9-14
's 3/4 9-15a
{
B 3/4 9-4 B 3/4 9-4 B 3/4 9-5 e
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f t-I s
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1 f
-i i
(Proposed Wording) t t
~.... _,
=.
I DPR-66 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL STORAGE' POOL i
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.14 Fuel is to be stored in the spent fuel storage pool with:
a.
The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool maintained i
greater than or equal to 1050 ppm when moving fuel in the spent fuel pool; and i
e b.
Fuel assembly storage in Region 1 restricted to fuel with an-enrichment less than or equal to 5.0 w/o U-235; and l-4 c.
Fuel assembly storage in Region 2 restricted to fuel which j
has been qualified in accordance with Table 3.9-1; and l
d.
Fuel assembly storage in Region 3 restricted to fuel which has been qualified in accordance with Table 3.9-2.
APPLICABILITX:
During storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool.
ACTION:
a.
Suspend all actions involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined a
fuel assembly has'been placed in the incorrect Region until such time as the correct storage location is determined.
Move the assembly to its correct location before resumption of any other fuel-movement.
b.
Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in'the spent fuel pool if it is determined' the pool boron concentration is less than 1050 ppm, until such time as the boron concentration is increased to.1050 ppm or greater.
c.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not i
applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.14.1 Prior to placing fuel or moving fuel in the spent fuel
- pool, verify through fuel receipt records for new fuel, or by burnup I
analysis and comparison with Table 3.9-1 or Table 3.9-2 for spent I
- fuel, that fuel assemblies to be placed into or moved in the spent l
fuel pool are within the above enrichment /burnup limits.
3 4.9.14.2 Verify the spent fuel pool boron concentration is >
1050 ppm:
i a.
Within 8
hours prior to and at least once.per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool, and b.
At least once per 31 days.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-14 Amendment No.
(Proposed Wording)
1 DPR-66 l
TABLE 3.9-2 i
BEAVER VALLEY FUEL ASSEMBLY MINIMUM BURNUP VS. INITIAL U-235 ENRICHMENT FOR STORAGE IN REGION 3 SPENT FUEL RACKS.
l Initial U-235 Assembly Discharge Enrichment Burnuo (MWD /MTU) 4 2.348 0
I 2.5 1,605 i
3.0 6,980 3.5 11,682 4.0 16,239 4.5 20,672 l
i 5.0 25,000 i
NOTE:
The data in the above table may be either interpreted linearly or may be calculated by the conservative equation
-i below.
This equation provides a best fit to the analysis burnup limits.
Minimum burnup, MWD /MTU = - 480 * (E%)2 + 12,900
- E - 27,400 f
Where E = Enrichment (E 5 5%)
i 4
t l
BEAVER VALLEY -' UNIT 1
-3/4 9-15a Amendment No.
l (Proposed Wording) j i
.~
~
I i
DPR-66 l
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.14 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL (Continued) i 16.1-1975.
The value of 0.95 or less for K f which includes all l
uncertainties at the 95/95 probability / conf! bence level is the acceptance criteria for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool.
The Action Statement applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensures that:
(1) the spent fuel pool is protected from distortion in the fuel storage pattern that could result in a l
critical array during the movement of fuel; and (2) the boron concentration is maintained at 2
1050 ppm (this includes a 50 ppm conservative allowance for uncertainties and 600 ppm for margin) during all actions involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool.
The reracked spent fuel pool consists of discrete Regions 1 and 2 I
with Region 2
further subdivided and identified as Regions 2 and 3.
Region 1
is configured to store fuel with a nominal region average enrichment of 5.0 weight percent (w/o) with individual fuel assembly tolerance of
+
or 0.05 w/o U-235.
The most reactive of the Westinghouse 17 X 17 STD/ Vantage SH and OFA fuel assemblies yielded a maximum Keff of 0.940 including all biases and uncertainties.
I Region 2 racks are designed to store fuel with burnup consistent with its initial enrichment.
A table of enrichment and corresponding required burnup is provided in the technical specification.
A conservative value of the required burnup is given by the following linear equation:
Minimum burnup for unrestricted storage in Region 2 in 12100 E%
- 20500, where E
is the initial MWD /MTU
=
enrichment in w/o.
Storage cells in Region 2, which face the pool wall, are in an area l
of high neutron leakage and are capable of maintaining the Keff below 0.95 with fuel that does not meet the foregoing burnup restriction.
A separate calculation to establish the admissibility of storing low burnup fuel in these cells, designated Region 3, has been performed and a table of enrichment and corresponding required burnup is provided in the technical specification.
This calculation was performed using the same analytical models and computer codes which were used in the high density rack design.
A conservative value of the required burnup is given by the following linear
^
equation.
Minimumburnupforfue}storageinRegion3in MWD /MTU = - 480 * (E%)
+ 12,900
- E - 27,400, where E is the initial enrichment in weight percent.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-4 Amendment No.
(Proposed Wording)
I
l
- E DPR-66 i
REFUEL 1NG OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.14 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL (Continued) l The maximum reactivity in Region 2 is 0.945 and in Region 3 is 0.946 l
if all cells are loaded with fuel with minimum allowable burnup.
This includes all biases and uncertainties and appropriate allowance for uncertainty in depletion calculations.
3/4.9.15 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency habitability system ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.
The ambient air temperature is controlled to prevent exceeding the allowable equipment qualification temperature for the equipment and instrumentation in the control room.
The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on i
limiting the whole body radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less, or its equivalent.
This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of Appendix "A",
f l
J l
l l
1 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-5 Amendment No.
(proposed Wording)
I
e :-
ATTACHMENT D Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 202, Supplement 1 i
MODIFICATION TO'RERACK LICENSING REPORT Modified Pages:
4-14 4-14a 4-14b
{
4-21 4-27 i
'l I
f t
I em.
I I
l J
For Region 2 Unrestricted Storage Minimum Burnup in MWD /MTU
=
- 20,500
+
12,100*E (for initial enrichments (E) up to 5 w/o U-235)
I At a
burnup of 40,000 MWD /MTU, the sensitivity to burnup is calculated to be 0.0064 Ak per 1000 MWD /MTU.
During long-term
- storage, the K.
values of the Region 2
fuel rack will decrease continuously as indicated in Section 4.4.4.
t An independent AMPX-KENO calculation was used to provide additional t
confidence in the reference Region 2 criticality analyses.
Fuel of 1.694 wt% initial enrichment (equivalent to the reference rack design for burned fuel) was analyzed by AMPX-KENO and by the CASMO-3 model used for the Region 2 rack analysis.
For this case, the CASMO-3 K.
(0.9112) was slightly lower than the bias-corrected KENO-Sa value (0.9148 1
0.0014) obtained in the AMPX-KENO calculations.
The KENO-Sa result confirm the reference CASMO calculation within the l
expected uncertainties and allowances.
Recognizing that the peripheral cells (cells facing the pool wall) are subject to neutron
- leakage, the threshold burnup for the fuel assemblics which can be stored in these cells is slightly lower.
The licensee may store the few prematurely discharged bundles, which do not meet the burnup criterion of Figure 4.2.1, in the peripheral cells in an arrangement which is qualified to meet the governing K
criterion.
In the criticality evaluation of this eff configuration, the licensee has used the same computer codes which have been used in this licensing application.
4-14 1
I e
The boundary cells facing the pool walls are an area of high neutron leakage and may be used to store fuel assemblies that have not achieved a
burnup adequate for unrestricted storage in Region 2.
Calculations with KENO-Sa for the boundary cells, using a 30 cm water reflector, show that these cells can safely accommodate fuel of 5.0 weight percent (w/o) initial enrichment burned to 25,000 MWD /MTU.
The KENO-Sa calculations were made with the boundary cells containing fuel of 2.348 w/o enrichment (equivalent to fuel of 5 w/o enrichment at 25,000 MWD /MTU burnup) and the remainder of the rack filled with maximum permissible Region 2 fuel (1.694 w/o enrichment equivalent to 5
w/o fuel at 40,000 MWD /MTU burnup).
For this condition the calculated reactivity was 0.9119 i 0.0010 (95%/95%, bias corrected),
and with uncertainties and the temperature correction to 4*C,added, the maximum K
is 0.946.
Thus, because of neutron leakage from eff the edge of the racks, the boundary cells can safely accommodate fuel with an initial enrichment of 5 w/o burned to 25,000 MWD /MTU.
The limiting burnup data for Region 3 has been fitted to an equation of the following form:
For St orage in Peripheral Cells (Region W
~ ~
Minimum Burnup in MWD /MTU =
2
- 27,400 + 12,900
- E - 480
- E (for initial enrichments up to 5 w/o U-235) l i
i KENO-5a was the principal method of analysis along the periphery of the storage racks, assuming a 30 cm water reflector.
CASMO-3 (using the restart option) was used to define the equivalent enrichment for fuel with an initial enrichment of 5 w/o burned to 25,000 MWD /MTU, evaluated in the storage rack cell configuration by CASMO-3 at a reference temperature of 4*C.
Once the reactivity of fuel with an 4-14a
.s,"
i f
Initial enrichment of 5 w/o at 25,000 MWD /MTU had been established, CASMO burnup and restart calculations at other enrichments were made t
and interpolated for the same reactivity.
This data, shown in Figure 4.2.1 and tabulated in Table 1,
defines the acceptable j
enrichment-burnup limits for fuel in Region 3, the peripheral' cells' of Region 2.
The maximum K for fuel corresponding to the limits eff defined in Figure 4.2.1 is 0.946, including uncertainties.and allowances.
Therefore, fuel assemblies within the acceptable domain of Figure 4.2.1 may be safely stored in the peripheral cells'with assurance that the K
of the storage racks will be less than the cgg regulatory limit of 0.95.
Table 1 Enrichment - Burnup Limits for Peripheral Cells i
s Initial Minimum Acceptable Enrichment Burnup. MWD /MTU*
i 2.348 0
(
243) 2.50 1,605
( 1,850) i 3.00 6,980
( 6,980) 3.50 11,682 (11,870) 4.00 16,239 (16,520)
{
4.50 20,672 (20,930) i 5.00 25,000 (25,100) l 1
- Parenthetical values are calculated for the linear equation.
h 4-14b 1
=
e ;*
Table 4.2.1 PJMMARY OF CRITICALITY SAFE"1Y ANALYSES Region 1 Region 2 Periphery Initial Enrichment and 0
FigurG Figure i
limiting burnup Unburned 4.2.1*
4.2.1*
Temperature for analysis 4*C 4*C 4*C Temperature Correction 0.0012 (KENO-Sa 20*C to 4*C)
Reference K.
0.9315 0.9112 0.9018' (CASMO)
(CASMO)
(KENO-Sa)***
Calculational bias, Ak 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101 Uncertainties Bias 1 0.0024 i 0.0024 i 0.0021 B-10 loading i 0.0022 1 0.0033 1 0.0033 Boral width i 0.0009 i 0.0006 1 0.0006 Inner box dimension 0.0016 i 0.0008 0.0008 Water gap thickness i 0.0076 NA NA SS thickness i 0.0009 i 0.0003 0.0003 Fuel enrichment 0.0016 i 0.0016 i 0.0016 Fuel density i 0.0018 i 0.0023 i 0.0023 Eccentric position Negative Negative Negative Statistical combin.
i 0.0089 0.0051 i 0.0049 of uncertainties **
Effect of Axial Burnup NA
+ 0.0143
+ 0.0143 Distribution Allowance of Uncertainty NA
+ 0.0141
+ 0.0141 in Depletion Calculations Total 0.9315 0.9396 0.9415 i 0.0089 i 0.0051 1 0.0049 Maximum Reactivity (K )
0.940 0.945 0.946 m
Analyses for fuel of 5%
Initial Enrichment listed.
See Table 4.4.1 for other enrichments, all providing the same maximum reactivity.
Square root of sum of squares.
- CASMO is used for criticality analysis of an infinite fuel i
array.
KENO-Sa was used for the peripheral cell criticality analysis since these cells are subject to higher neutron leakage.
4-21 b
e t
1 45000 l
t 40000 35000 7
ACCEPTABLE BURNUP DObAIN 3<e, 30000 y
a e/
E
,#/'
25000 p
h gO /
g "*"
ey 9,,,y sy[ /g G
15000 10000 Y
f
/
6 UNACCEPTqBLE 5g@9 y/
BURNUP DOMAIN
&,,p/
5000
/
/
/
/
0 l
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 INITIAL FUEL ENRICHMENT, PERCENT U-235 FIGURE 4.2.1 ACCEPTABLE BURNUP DOMAIN FOR REGIONS 2 and 3 4-27
.