ML20045C178
| ML20045C178 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1993 |
| From: | Burdick T, Jacqwan Walker NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045C176 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-OL-93-01, 50-346-OL-93-1, NUDOCS 9306220160 | |
| Download: ML20045C178 (3) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-346/0L-93-01 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company 1
300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Examination Administered At:
Davis-Besse Training Center i
5503 N. State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449 Examination Conducted: May 24 - 27, 1993 Examiners:
Eugene Benjamin, PNL Jim Nickolaus, PNL Chief Craniner:
,1 Aj f 6[/o/93 ohh R. Walker Date Approved By:
/
((#
/////9) m Th6ma's Mr Burdick, Chief Da~te Operator Licensing Section 2 Examination Summary Examination Administered the week of May 24 - 27. 1993 (Report No. 50-346/0L-93/01(DRS))
Five previously licensed Reactor Operators were given Senior Reactor Operator examinations.
In addition three Senior Reactor Operators were given-requalification retake examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPM) portion
- only, Results: All individuals taking the initial examination passed all sections of their respective examination. Two Senior Reactor Operators passed their-requalification examination, one Senior Reactor Operator failed the requalification examination.
The following is a summary of the strengths and weaknesses noted during'the performance of this examination.
9306220160 930614 PDR ADOCK 05000346 V
PDR c
Examination Summary 2
Strenaths:
Communications were formal and positive with ample feedback and crew input to ensure the crews were kept apprised of all events / situations.
(For details see Section 3)
All crews kept personnel outside of the control room apprised of all events. (For details see Section 3)
All crews made good use of procedures including, alarm response, abnormal operating, general operating, etc. (For details see Section 3)
Feaknesses: No major weaknesses were noted.
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Examiners
- + John R. Walker, Chief Examiner, NRC, Region III Eugene Benjamin, PNL Jim Nickolaus, PNL 2.
Persons Contacted Facility
+ Lou Storz, Plant Manager
+ John K. Wood, Plant Operations Manager
- +Mel Stewart, Manager Nuclear Training
- +Ted Berger, Supervisor, Simulator
- + John Bialorucki, Qualification Instructor
+ George A. Bradley, Licensing Representative
- + Dave Eshelman, Operations Supervisor
+ George Honma, Compliance Supervisor-Licensing
- + Dennis Jones, Lead-Operations Training
+Ted Myers, Technical Services Director
- + Randy Patrick, Lead-0perations Requalification
- + Rick Simpkins, Supervisor, Nuclear Operations Training 1
- +Nathan L. Wahl, Simulator Instructor U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
+Keith Walton, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the Training Staff exit meeting on May 27, 1992.
+ Denotes those present at the Management exit meeting on May 27, 1993.
3.
Initial License Trainina Proaram Observations Overall, the initial training program appeared to be effective in preparing individuals for the examination process.
The following information is provided for evaluation by the licensee via -
~
their SAT based training program. No response is required.
a.
Written Examination No strengths or weaknesses were observed in this category during this examination.
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b.
Job Performance Measures (JPMs)
No strengths or weaknesses were observed in this category during this examination.
c.
Administrative Strenaths/ Weaknesses:
No strengths or weaknesses were observed in this category during this examination.
d.
Dynamic Simulator Scenarios Strenaths:
o Communications were formal and positive with ample feedback and crew input to ensure the crews were kept appraised of all events / situations, o
All crews kept personnel outside of the control room appraised of all events.
o All crews made good use of procedures including, Alarm response, Abnormal Operating, General Operating, etc.)
Weaknesses:
e No major weaknesses were observed.
4.
Trainino. Operations. Security. Rad Protection Strenaths:
e During the simulator portion of the examination, the facility provided all examiners with radios to communicate with each other and the booth. This greatly aided the administration of this portion and the JPM portion of the examination.
e During the administration of the simulator portion of the examination, the booth operators gave the examiners a ten second warning prior to initiating any event.
This enabled the examiners to maintain control of the scenarios as necessary.
e Pre-examination review of the written examination aided in ensuring the examinations conducted were plant specific and challenging.
In addition the cooperation given during the preparation week was excellent.
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Weaknesses:
During the preparation for and administration of this examination there were three instances of violation of the security agreement.
Three instructors / lecturers who had signed the security agreement either taught classes or evaluated one or more of the requalification candidates.
One individual taught a class on 120 vdc switch gear. After completing the class he realized that one individual in this class was a requalification candidate. During the staff meeting that afternoon the instructor informed his immediate management and the j
training staff present of the event.
j The next morning a second instructor evaluated a requalification a
crew which contained a requalification candidate. This instructor was present et the staff meeting on the previous day and failed to realize the need to either have a different person perform the I
evaluation or have the candidate leave the simulator.
That afternoon a third individual, a representative from operations, taught a class on upcoming procedures changes. This individual was not present during the previous staff meeting.
The first two individuals had no specialized knowledge of the examination at the time the instruction took place. The Chief Examinor reviewed the material taught and determined that no I
examination comprise existed. The third individual did have
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specialized knowledge of the examination. Again, the Chief I
Examiner reviewed the material taught and determined that no examination comprise existed.
There was no appropriate corrective action implemented following the first compromise to prevent the next two from occurring. Upon discovering the three compromise events the Training Supervisor brought this to the attention of the Chief Examiner.
Each individual was interviewed and written statements were taken from them. The first two individuals had been asked to sign the security agreement earlier than was actually needed to ensure examination security.
Immediate corrective action implemented was to start an immediate review of the program and ensure that the instructors involved did not evaluate the requalification candidates that were present during the instruction.
Further corrective action is under evaluation.
Included is a change to the security agreement to ensure that all personnel signing on understand what they are signing and the security agreement will include a list of the candidates for the examination.
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This issue is not being viewed as an examination compromise, but as inadequate quality control over the examination process. A 30 day written response to this event is requested to identify all corrective actions taken or proposed to prevent a reoccurence of this type of event.
During validation of JPM 91B, " Loss of Decay Heat Pump," it was noted that procedure DB-0P-02527, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal,"
was inadequate to ensure recovery from a loss of one decay heat removal pump. The attachments used for venting and starting the other decay heat pump failed to open the discharge valve into the reactor coolant system. These valves DH-1B and DH-1A are now normally closed if the specific train with which it is associated is not running. The valve status, to normally closed, was changed just prior to the last refueling outage. The abnormal procedure was not revised to reflect this change in operation philosophy.
This item was turned over to the Resident Inspector for further action.
5.
Simulator Observations No Simulator discrepancies were identified.
6.
Exit Meetina A preliminary exit meeting with the facility training department was 3
held at Davis-Besse on May, 27, 1993, and a final exit meeting with Davis-Besse plant management was held at Davis-Besse on May, 27, 1993.
Those attending the meetings are listed in Section 2 of this report.
The following items were discussed during the exit meeting Strengths and weaknesses noted in this report.
The general observations relating to the plant noted in Section 4.
Violation of the examination security agreement and the request for a written response to the event.
i Procedure DP-0P-02527, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, being inadequate.
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t ENCLOSURE 3-SIMULATION FACILITV' REPORT
. Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Docket No.
50-346 Qperatina Tests Administered On: May, 24 - 27, 1993 The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the May,1993, requalification and ' initial examinations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are.not, without further verificatica and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or. approval of the simulation fac1'lity other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to those observations.
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
1 ] I 11 DESCRIPTION None I
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