ML20045B996

Proposed Tech Specs Pages E1-4 Re Core Alterations & E2-2 Re CRD Scram Accumulators

ML20045B996
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	06/10/1993
From:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20045B945	List: ML20045B944 ML20045B996
References
NLS-92-280, TAC-M85162, TAC-M85163, TAC-M85736, TAC-M85737, NUDOCS 9306210368
Download: ML20045B996 (4)

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ENCLOSURE 1

'P BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 I' NRC DOCKETS 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-71 AND DPR-62 REVISION TO REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT CORE ALTERATIONS (NRC TAC NOS. 85162 AND 85163)

NLS-92-280 CORRECTED PAGE E1-4 s

E1-1 9306210368 930610 f PDR- ADOCK 05000324 p PDR 9{

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Surveillance requirement 4.9.3 has also been revised according to the logic outlined above for the

. Specification applicability. Accordingly, it is appropriate to delete the reference to " CORE ALTERATIONS" and incorporate " loading of fuel assemblies into the core." This will make the language of the surveillance requirements congruent with the applicable language of the LCO.

Other references to " CORE ALTERATIONS" within the Technical Specifications have been reviewed for potential contradiction with the existing CORE ALTERATIONS definition. These Sections are as .-

follows:

3.1.1 Shutdown Margin 4.1.1 Shutdown Margin 4.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies B3/4.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies 4.1.3.2 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times 4.1.3.6 Control Rod Drive Coupling 3.1.5 Standby Liquid Control System T3.3.1 1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation T3.3.2-1 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.6.5.1 Secondary Containment Integrity '

3.6.5.2 Secondary Containment Automatic isolation Dampers 3.6.6.1 Standy Gas Treatment System 3.7.2 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System B3/4.7.2 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System 3.8.1.2 Electrical Power Systems - Shutdown 3.8.2.2 A.C. Distribution - Shutdown Of Both Units 3.8.2.4.2 D. C. Distribution - Shutdown 3.9.1 Reactor Mode Switch 4.9.1.1 Reactor Mode Switch 4.9.1.2 Reactor Mode Switch 3.9.2 Refueling Operations - Instrumentation 4.9.2 Refueling Operations - Instrumentation 3.9.5 Communications 4.9.5 Communications 6.2.2 Facility Staff T6.2.2-1 Minimum Facility Shift Crew Composition CP&L's review of the above specifications determined that none of the above specifications contradict the current CORE ALTERATIONS definition and, therefore, do not require revision.

E1-4 Revision 1

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ENCLOSURE 2  :

DRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS l' AND 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-71 & DPR-62 REVISION TO REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT -

CONTROL ROD AND CRD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS -

(NRC TAC NOS. 85736 AND 85737)

NLS-93-007 CORRECTED PAGE E2-2 9

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• t, from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 to OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 does not increase the corisequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Exemption of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, ACTION b from the requirements of Specification 3.0.4 allows entering OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 from OPERATIONAL ,

CONDITION 2 with one or more inoperable control rods. Withdrawn inoperable control rods do not affect power any differently than movable and operable withdrawn control rods.

Changing from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 to OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 occurs prior to power ascension and is not impacted by the presence of control rods that are inopnrable.

Therefore, changing from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 to OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1

. does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. l

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety as defined in the basis of any operating license technical specification.

Exemption of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, ACTION b from the requirements of Specification 3.0.4 allows entering OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 from OPERATIONAL '

CONDITION 2 with one or more inoperable control rods. Operation in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 is currently permitted when no more than eight control rods are inoperable.

The proposed change only allows moving from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 to CPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within the restrictions previously evaluated; therefore, this addition does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any operating license technical specification.

Procosed Chance No. 2:

The proposed change revises Technical Specification Section 3.1.3.5, Control Rod Scram Accumulators, to address operation with more than one inoperable accumulator. The current -

specification does not address operating with more than one inoperable scram accumulator, thus requiring entry into Specification 3.0.3. Provisions for operating with one inoperable scram accumulator are also being revised to be more consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1433. In addition, the BASES section of Specification 3.1.3.1 is being revised to include the BASES for the revised specification.

Basis for Procosed Chanae No. 2:

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an actident previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Control rod scram accumulators contribute to the mitigation of accidents and anticipated l operational occurrences and the operability of scram accumulators is not a precursor to any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, multiple inoperable control rod scram accumulators do not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

E2 2 Revision 1 l

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