ML20045A858
| ML20045A858 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1993 |
| From: | Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045A852 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-93-13, 50-374-93-13, NUDOCS 9306150095 | |
| Download: ML20045A858 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1993013
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Report No.
50-373/93013(DRP); 50-374/93013(DRP)
Docket Nos.
50-373; 50-374
License Nos. NPF-II; NPF-18
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place Suite 300
Downers Grove, IL 60515
Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois
Inspection Conducted: April 27 through May 31, 1993
Inspectors:
D. Hills
C. Phillips
J. Roman. Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
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Approved By:
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g/j2/73
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L~. Hag ~ue, Chief
Date
Reactor / Projects Section 1C
Inspection Summary
inspection from April 27 throuah May 31. 1993 (Reports No. 50-373/93013
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Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced safety inspection was conducted by
the resident inspectors and an Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
inspector. The inspection included followup on previously identified items
and licensee event reports; review of operational safety, monthly maintenance,
and surveillance activities; and temporary instruction 2515/119.
Results: One violation was identified involving a fuel bundle mispositioning
(paragraph 4.a(2)).
One unresolved item was identified involving
qualification requirements of the Operations Manager (paragraph 4.a(1)).
Plant Operations
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Although personnel errors had trended considerably downward since the latest
refuel outage, problems still existed with regard to fuel handling.
Operators
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received training on the Boiling Water Reactor's Owner's Group recommendations
as .to reactor water level instrumentation errors during rapid
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depressurization. However, a corresponding draft emergency operating support
procedure was not implemented due to licensee concerns regarding this
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guidance.
Maintenance / Surveillance
No concerns were identified in this area during the inspection period.
9306150095 930603
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ADOCK 05000373
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
W. Murphy, Site Vice President
- G. Spedl, Station Manager
J. Gieseker, Site Engineering and Construction Manager
- J. Schmeltz, Operations Manager
C. Sargent, Support Services Director
M. Reed, Technical Services Superintendent
J. Lockwood, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- M. Santic, Maintenance Superintendent
R. Crawford, Work Planning Assistant Superintendent
- S. Koenig, Regulatory Performance Administrator
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- M. Depuydt, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
- J. Arnould, Regulatory Assurance
- J. Atchley, Senior Operations Supervisor
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- D. Carlson, Regulatory Assurance
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on June 1, 1993.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
employees during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on PreviouslY Identified Items (92701 and 92702)
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(Closed) Open Item (373/92021-04(DRP)): Determine cause of reactor
recirculation (RR) pump 1B failure to shift to slow speed. The
manufacturer could not identify any binding or wear problems in pump
breaker 3B and attributed the problem to hardening of grease in the
operating mechanism. The licensee adjusted surveillance frequency to
inspect RR pump breakers, safety related breakers, and selected other
breakers every other refueling outage to verify no evidence of grease
hardening was present.
Breakers with evidence of grease hardening would
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be cleaned and relubricated per LaSalle Electrical Procedure (LEP)-GM-
172. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Licensee Event Reports Followuo (92700)
The following licensee event reports were reviewed to ensure that
reportability requirements were met, and that corrective actions, both
immediate and to prevent recurrence, were accomplished or planned in
accordance with the technical specifications:
(Closed) LER 373/91010-01 Spurious Auto Start of Control Room
Ventilation Emergency Make-up Train Due to High Radiation Spike
(Closed) LER 373/92007-01 Spurious Auto Start of Control Room
Ventilation Emergency Make-up Train Due to High Radiation Spike
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(Closed) LER 374/92007-01 Spurious Auto Start of Control Room
Ventilation Emergency Make-up Train Due to High Radiation Spike
(Closed) LER 373/93010-00 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump
Automatically Tripped Due to Trainee's Unfamiliarity of Specific
Equipment
In addition, recent deviation reports (DVRs) were reviewed in order to
monitor conditions related to plant or personnel performance and to
detect potential development of trends. Appropriate generation and
disposition of DVRs, in accordance with the Quality Assurance Manual,
were also reviewed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707 and 71710)
The inspectors reviewed the facility for conformance with the license
and regulatory requirements,
a.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors observed control room
activities for proper control room staffing; coordination of plant
activities; adherence to procedures or technical specifications;
operator cognizance of plant parameters and alarms; electrical
power configuration; and the frequency of plant and control room
visits by station managers.
Various logs and surveillance records
were reviewed for accuracy and completeness.
Significant observations were:
(1)
The inspectors noted that the LaSalle Operations Manager did
not hold a current senior reactor operator license nor was
there an intent for that individual to obtain one.
LaSalle
technical specification (TS) 6.1.D required qualifications
of the station management and operating staff meet minimum
acceptable levels as described in ANSI N18.1, " Selection and
Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel," dated March 8,
1971. ANSI N18.1, section 4.2.2 stated, "at the time of
initial core loading or appointment to the active position,
the Operations Manager shall hold a Senior Reactor
Operator's License." Section 3.1 also stated, "use of
personnel to fill a position for which they are not
completely qualified is permissible on temporary basis but
shall not be used as a means of reducing the level of
minimum qualifications." The manager of the operating
organization was previously the Assistant Superintendent of
Operations (AS0).
LaSalle TS 6.1.C.8 required the ASO to
hold an SR0 license. Due to the reorganization, the
Production Superintendent position was deleted and the
Operations Manager position was created to which the
operating organization reported. To address the TS ASO
requirement, an Operating Engineer was given the title of
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ASO. This is considered an unresolved item (50-373/93013-01
(DRP)) pending more detailed review of position duties to
determine whether TS intent was met.
(2)
On May 13, 1993, the licensee identified that an incorrect
fuel bundle had been moved in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool on
May 11, 1993, contrary to the nuclear component transfer
checklist.
Licensee fuel handlers were moving the bundles
in preparation for LaSalle Limited Procedure (LLP)-93-043,
" Sampling of Deposits on the Surface of Spent Fud1 in the
Fuel Pool." The fuel handler moved the incorrect bundle and
the supervisor overseeing the fuel transfer mistakenly
verified that the correct bundle was being moved.
In each
of the last three refuel outages, fuel elements were
mispositioned in the fuel pool. All were due to inattention
to detail.
The safety significance of this event was
minimal as the bundle was moved from one approved location
to another.
LaSalle Fuel Procedure (LFP)-100-2, " Administrative Control
of Transfer of fuel or Special Nuclear Material Between or
Within the Spent fuel Pool (s) or Vaults", step F.3., stated
"As the steps on the Nuclear-Component Transfer List are
completed, they will be VERIFIED, initialed and dated by the
Fuel Handling Supervisor." Failure to verify that the
correct fuel bundle was moved in accordance with LFP-100-2
is considered a violation of technical specification 6.2. A.a
(50-374/93013-02 (DRP)).
b.
On a routine basis, the inspectors toured accessible areas of 'the
facility to assess worker adherence to radiation controls and the
site security plan, housekeeping or cleanliness, and control of
field activities in progress.
c.
Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Walkdown
The inspectors verified the status of selected accessible portions
of the Unit I residual heat removal (RHR) (low pressure coolant
injection) system.
Consideration was given to the plant mode,
applicable technical specifications, limiting conditions for
operation action requirements, and other applicable requirements.
Observations were made of hangers and supports; housekeeping;
breaker positions and conditions; potential ignition sources;
major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.; interior
conditions of electrical breakers and control-panels; and
instrumentation installation, calibration, and function. The
inspectors evaluated significant process parameters to ensure
consistency with expected values, operability of support systems,
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control of vendor manuals, and agreement of local and remote
indicated breaker positions.
In addition, the licensee system
engineer was interviewed to determine his knowledge of the system
and if he was aware of problems in similar. systems at other
utilities.
Significant observations were:
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The breaker for valve IE12-F024A was found mislabeled. At motor
control center 135Y-2, breaker 85 was identified as the Unit 1 RHR
containment spray valve, when in fact it was the 1A RHR test
return valve. The system engineer was informed of the labeling
problem.
d.
Management Meeting
On May 27, 1993, Mr. A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, NRC
Region III, and members of his staff met with Mr. W. Murphy,
LaSalle County Station, Vice President, and members of his staff
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at the NRC Region III office. Topics of discussion were current
operating performance, training, and selected engineering topics.
One violation and no deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related and
important to safety systems and components listed below were observed or
reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
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approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards,
and did not conflict with technical specifications.
The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
WR L21005
Calibrate The Local Power Range Monitor Points On The
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Process Computer
WR L22179
High Pressure Core Spray Water Leg Pump Replacement
WR L21193
Refurbish Actuator For FW145
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance testing required by technical specifications, the safety
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analysis report, maintenance activities, or modification activities were
observed or reviewed.
Areas of consideration while performing
observations were procedcre adherence, calibration of test equipment,
identification of test deficiencies, and personnel qualification. Areas-
of consideration while reviewing surveillance records were completeness,
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proper authorization and review signatures, test results properly
dispositioned, and independent verification documented.
The following
activities were observed or reviewed:
LaSalle Instrument Surveillance (LIS)-NR-303B Unit 1 Average Power
Range Monitor Channels B, D, and F Rod Block and Scram Weekly functional
Test
LIS-NR-209 Unit 2 Average Power Range Monitor Gain
LIS-NR-207 Unit 2 APRM/ Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Flow Converter to Total
Core Flow Adjustment
LIS-NR-105 Unit 1 Rod Block Monitor Calibration
LIS-NR-403 Unit 2 Average Power Range Monitor Rod Block and Scram
Functional Test
LIS-NB-404A Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1 Emergency Core
Cooling System Division 1 Initiation and Level 2 Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling System Initiation Instrument Channels
A & C Monthly Functional Test
LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS)-RH-Q1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
and RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Inservice Test for Operating
Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
LaSalle Limited Procedure (LLP)-93-043 Sampling of Deposits on the
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Surface of Spent Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/119. " Water Level Instrumentation Errors
Durino and After Depressurization Transients (Generic letter 92-04)"
The inspectors completed the questionnaire included in the TI, providing
the requested information to appropriate NRC technical personnel for
further evaluation.
The operators received training on the Boiling
Water Reactor Owner's Group recommendations with respect to potential
for errors in reactor water level instrumentation after rapid
depressurization. The operators also received training on a draft
emergency operating support procedure that incorporated the guidance.
However, due to certain concerns the licensee had regarding the
guidance, the procedure was not officially implemented and operators
would not be expected to necessarily follow the guidance exactly as
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written.
The inspectors also provided information regarding the
notching phenomena exhibited during the shutdown for the latest Unit 1
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refuel outage and compensatory actions being taken by the licensee.
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8.
Report Review (90713)
During the inspection, the inspector reviewed selected licensee reports
and determined that the information was technically adequate, and that
it satisfied the reporting requirements of the license, technical
specifications, and 10 CFR as appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
Unresolved items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or
deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
discussed in Paragraph 4.a(1).
10.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
1) during the' inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection
period on June 1, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and results
of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection
report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate
that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be
considered proprietary in nature.
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