Text

Amends 105 & 94 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively, Revising TSs 3/4.4.8.3.1,3/4.1.2.3 & 3/4.5.3 to Implement Recommendations of GL 90-06
	ML20044H132
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	06/01/1993
From:	Quay T; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20044H133	List: ML20044H132;
References
	GL-90-06, GL-90-6, NUDOCS 9306070455
	Download: ML20044H132 (26)
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE. CALIFORNIA l

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM. CALIFORNIA DOCKET NO. 50-3 G SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT NO. 2 6!iLNDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N

Amendment No.105 License No. NPF-10 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated December 20, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),. and the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and.the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is'in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9306070455 930601 ADOCK0500g1 DR

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Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-

-l fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and..

j paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 is hereby j

amended to read as follows:

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(2)

Technical Snecifications 3

i The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the.

"l Environmental Protection Plan contained in-Appendix B, as revised l

through Amendment No.105., are hereby incorporated in.the license. Southern California Edison Company shall. operate the l

facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the j

Environmental Protection Plan.

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3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and l

must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the~date of

~ issuance.

I FOR.THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0lWISSION l

bw S M Theodore R. Quay,' Director

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l Project Directorate V i

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V-Office. of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical l

Specifications Date of Issuance:

June 1, 1993-i

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ATTACHMENT-T0 LICENSE AMENDMENT l

AMENDMENT NO.105TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10 DOCKET NO. 50-361 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas l

of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain j

document completeness.

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REMOVE INSERT i

3/4 1-8 3/4~1-8 i

3/4.4-32 3/4 4-32 i

l 3/4 4-32a 3/4 4-32a l

3/4 5-7 3/4 5-7 B 3/4 4-9 B 3/4 4-9 I

B 3/4 4-9a.

B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATH 5 - OPERATING LIM: TING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.2.2 The following boron injection flow paths to the RCS via the charging pumps (s) shall be OPERABLE:

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At least one of the following combinations:

a.

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One boric acid makeup tank, with the tank contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, its associated gravity feed valve, and boric atid makeup pump.

2)

Two beric acid makeup tanks, with the combined contents e the tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, their associated sity feed valves, and boric acid makeup pumps, 3)

Twc boric acid makeup tanks, each with contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, at least one gravity feed valve, and at least one boric acid makeup pump, and b.

The flo-path f rom the refueling water storage tank.

APPLICABILITs:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With fewer than the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor C olant System OPERABLE, restore the required boron injection flow paths to the Reacter Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDE) and boratec to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3.0% delta k/k at 200"F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the required flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLAN:E REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 Tne above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

Intentionally deleted.

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

At least once per refueling interval during shutdown by verifying c.

that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a SIA5 test signal.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 3/4 1-7 AMENDMENT NO. 73

REACTIVITY CO M SYSTEMS

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CHARGING PUMP - SWTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2 3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specifica-tion 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an GPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.*

l ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or capable of being pcwered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

See Specification 3.4.8.3.1 for the limit on the number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps OPERABLE in Modes 5 and 6.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8 AMENDMENT NO.105

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

_ PRESSURIZER - HEATUP/C00LDOWN

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LIMITING Cf;9"! TION FOR OPERATION 3.4.8.2 The pressurizer shall be limited to:

A maximum heatup of 200'F in any one hour period, a.

b.

A maximum cooldown of 200'F in any one hour period.

t APPLICABILITY: At all times.

5 ACTION:

With the pressurizar temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressuriger; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least NOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce the pressurizer pressure.to less than 500 psig within the following 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.8.2.1 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown.

4.4.8.2.2 The spray water temperature differential shall be determined for use, l

in Table 5.7-1 for each cycle of main spray when ':4ss than 4 reactor coolant pumps are operating and for each cycle of auxiliary spray operation.

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SAN ONOFRE - iWIT 2 3/4 4-31 AMEN 0 MENT NO. 44 l

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i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM j

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

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RCS TEMPERATURE < 312*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.8.3.1 No more than two high-pressure safety injection pumps shall be i

j OPERABLE and at least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve (PSV9349) with:

1) A lift setting of 406 i 10 psig*, and

2) Relief Valve isolation valves 2HV9337, 2HV9339, 2HV9377, and 2HV9378 open or, l

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b. The Reactor Coolant System depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 5.6 square inches.

I APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any one RCS cold leg is less than or equal to the enable temperatures specified in Table 3.4-3; MODE 5; and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel d the RCS is not vented.

ACTION:

a. With the SDCS Relief Valve inoperable, reduce T,Than or equal to to less than 200*F, depressurize and vent the RCS through a greater 5.6 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

b. With one or both SDCS Relief Valve isolation valves in a single SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair (valve pair 2HV9337 and 2HV9339 or valve pair 2HV9377 and 2HV9378) closed, open the closed valve (s) or power-lock open the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or reduce T,,than or equal to 5.6 inch vent within to less than 200*F, depressurize and vent the RCS through a greater the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

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c. With more than two high-pressure safety injection pumps OPERABLE, secure the third high-pressure safety injection pump by racking out its motor circuit breaker or locking close its discharge valve within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

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For valve temperatures less than or equal to 130*F.

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l SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-32 AMENDMENT N0. 44h 105 l

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l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION:

(Continued)

d. In the event either the SDCS Relief Valve or an RCS vent is used to l

mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be pre-pared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initi-l ating the transient, the effect of the SDCS Relief Valve or RCS vent on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

g SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.4.8.3.1.1 The SDCS Relief Valve shall be demonstrated OPERATE by:

a. Verifying at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when the SDCS Relief Valve is l

being used for overpressure protection that SDCS Relief Valve isola-tion valves 2HV9337, 2HV9339, ?HV9377, and 2HV9378 are open.

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b. Verifying relief valve setpoint at least once per 30 months when l

tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

i 4.4.8.3.1.2 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the third high-pressure safety injection pump shall be demonstrated to be secured by verifying that its motor circuit breaker is not racked-in or its discharge-valve is locked closed. The l

requirement to rack out the third HPSI pump breaker is satisfied with the pump breaker racked out to its disconnected or test position.

4.4.8.3.1.3 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair (valve pair 2HV9337 and 2HV9339, or valve pair 2HV9377 and 2HV9378) that is used for overpressure protection due to the other SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair being IN0PERABLE shall be verified to be in the power-lock open condition until the INOPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is returned to OPERABLE status or the RCS is depressurized and vented. The power-lock open requirement is satisfied either with the AC breakers open for valve pair 2HV9337 and 2HV9339 or the inverter input and output breakers open for valve pair 2HV9377 and 2HV937P wH chever valve pair is OPERABLE.

4.4.8.3.1.4 The RCS vent shall be verified to be open at least once per j

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

when the vent is being used for overpressure protection.

Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-32a AMENDMENT NO.105 I

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l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T LESS THAN 350*F j

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be l

OPERABLE:

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One OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and b.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatical-ly transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation l

Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4**.

ACTION:

a.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at.least"one-ECCS subsys-tem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in COLD. SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the-Reactor Coolant System,;a Special Report shall be-prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within i

90 days describing.the. circumstances'of the actuation and.the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. 'The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety; injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value ex-l ceeds 0.70.

q SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.5.3 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

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With pressurizer pressure less than 400 psia.

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- See Specification 3.4.8.3.1 for the limit on the number of OPERABLE High l

Pressure Safety Injection Pumps OPERABLE in Mode 4.

-SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 AMENDMENT NO.- 105 l

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r EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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r 7,. 5. 4 The refueling water storage tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum borated water volume of 362,800 gallons above the ECCS suction connection.

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Between 2350 and 2800 ppe of boron, and l

c.

A solution temperature between 40'F and 100*F.

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,;2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Witt the refueling water storage tark inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 5. 4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 7 days by:

a.

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40*F or greater than 100'F.

l SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 3/4 5-8 AMENDMENT NO.61

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

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l PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

The OPERABILITY of the Shutdown Cooling System relief valve or a RCS vent opening of greater than 5.6 square inches ensures that the RCS will-be l

protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G l

to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal l

to that specified in Table 3.4-3.

The Shutdown Cooling System relief valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization l

when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the j

i secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 100*F

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above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) inadvertent safety injection actuation with two HPSI pumps injecting into a water-solid RCS with full I

l charging capacity and letdown isolated -

The design basis of the LTOP assumes unrestricted flow from two HPSI pumps and three Charging pumps (full charging capacity) without letdown.

l Because there are three HPSI pumps and three charging pumps,:the limitation on the number of HPSI pumps to be maintained OPERABLE during the specified MODES ensures that a mass addition to the RCS that exceeds the design basis

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assumptions of the LTOP will not occur. This limitation on the number of HPSI i

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pumps that can provide makeup and injection to the_RCS implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06.

The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time (A0T) for a single channel SDCS Rel4f Val /e isolation valve (s) increases the availability of the LTOP system to-mitigate low temperature overpressure transients especially during MODES 5 and l

6 when the potential for these transients are highest (RCS temperatures between 80*F and 190*F and the RCS is water-solid). The 24-hour A0T implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06.

One SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is capable of mitigating an LTOP event that is bounded by the limiting SDCS pressure transients. When one or both SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in one isolation valve pair becomes IN0PERABLE, the other OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is placed in a power-lock open condition to preclude a single failure which might cause undesired mechanical motion of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in a single isolation valve pair and result in loss of system function. This power-lock open condition of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is consistent with'the guidance provided in Branch Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB), " Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves."

1 3/4.4.9 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with J

Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has-been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-9 AMENDMENT NO. ffr,105

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RfACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES l

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY (Continued)

Components of the reactor coolant system were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition and Addenda through Summer 1975.

3/4.4.10 REACTOR COOLANT GAS VENT SYSTEM Reactor coolant system gas vents are provided to exhaust noncondensibla gases from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling following a non-design bases accident. The OPERABILITY of at least one reactor coolant system vent path from the reactor vessel head and the t

pressurizer steam space ensu>es the capability exists to perform this function.

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The design redundancy of the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System are consistent with the requirements of Item II.b.1 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

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l SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-9a AMENDMENT N0.105 l

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i

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3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS): safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core throut,h each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety fnjection tanks.

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This initial surge of water into the core provides'the initial cooling i

mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and-pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank. injection in the accident analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971 which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever pemissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occuring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

i If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystes through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystes provides long ters core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-1

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l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

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With the RCS temperature'below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is

- i acceptable without single failure-consideration on the basis-of the stable-i reactivity condition of,the reactor. andLthe limited core cooling-requirements.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure'that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses.are met ~and that subsystem OPERABILITY is. maintained.

Surveillance requirements for flow balance. testing provide assurance that' proper ECCS flows ~

j will be maintained'in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow-resistance. and: pressure drop in the piping' system to each injection point is-necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump 1 flow from_ exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2). provide.the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and' (3) provide an acceptable level;of total:

ECCS flow 'to all injection points equal to or above.that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

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3 /4. 5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS en'sures that a sufficient.

supply of borated water is available:for. injection by the ECCS in the-event of a LOCA.

The limits on RWST minimum volume and' boron concentration ensure that i

)) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation

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cooling flow to the core; and 2) the reactor will remain subtritical in the cold condition following mixing of the' RWST.and the RCS water-volumes ~ with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. The limit on maximum boron concentration ^1sito ensure that boron does.not'precipi-tate in the core following LOCA. The limit on RWST solution temperature is to ensure that the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses' remain' valid.

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SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 AMENDMENT NO.-&h 105 a

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UNITED STATES

;1 1 E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 g '.v 4 /

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY-

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SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC ~ COMPANY-THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE. CALIFORNIA l

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM. CALIFORNIA-i DOCKET NO. 50-362 SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT llQ.,_1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE l

Amendment No. 94 l

License No. NPF-15 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has. found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated December 20, 1991, i

complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy i

Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; l

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the i

provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission 4

C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical.to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2.

Act 3 gly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-fi t... is as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment. and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 is hereby:

amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised l

through Amendment No.-94

, are hereby incorporated in the.

license.

Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

l 3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from'the date of issuance.

FOR THE-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION S

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Theodore R. Quay, Director l

Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of_ Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

June 1, 1993 i

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ATTACHMENT TD LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO. 94 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15 DOCKET NO. 50-362 l

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified _

below and inserting.the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal-lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain -

document completeness.

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REMOVE INSERT 3/4 1-8 3/4'l-8 l

3/4 4-33 3/4 4-33 3/4 4-34 3/4 4-34 e

3/4 5-7 3/4 5-7 B 3/4 4-10 8 3/4 4-10 B 3/4 4-10a l

I l

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

t 1

FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 The following boron injection flowpaths to the RCS via the charging pump (s) shall be OPERABLE-At least one of the following combinations-I a.

1)

One boric acid makeup tank, with the tank contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, its associated gravity feed valve, and boric acid makeup pump.

2)

Two boric acid makeup tanks, with the combined contents of the l

tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, their associated gravity l

feed valves, and boric acid makeup pumps, 3)

Two boric acid makeup tanks, each with contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, at least one gravity feed valve, and at least one boric acid makeup pump, and b.

The flow path from the refueling water storage tank.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With fewer than the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor i

Coolant System OPERABLE, restore the required boron injection flow paths to the i

Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT i

STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3.0% delta k/k at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the required flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN wfthin the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.1.2.2 The above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPEkABLE:

a.

Intentionally deleted.

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is'in its correct position.

At least once per refueling interval during shutdown by verifying that c.

each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct i

position on a SIAS test signal.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3/4 1-7 AMENDMENT NO. 61 I

-n.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 1

CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- )

3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or _one high pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specifica-tion 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE ~ and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.*

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection-pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving' CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

[

i i

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements 'other than those required by-i Specification 4.0.5.

i 5

See Specification 3.4.8.3.1 for the limit on the number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps OPERABLE-in Modes 5 and 6.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 3/4 1-8 AMENDMENT N0. 94

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i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS RCS TEMPERATURE < 302*F l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.4.8.3.1 No more than two high-pressure safety injection pumps shall be OPERABLE and at least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

l a.

The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve (PSV9349) with:

1)

A lift setting of 406 i 10 psig*, and 2)

Relief valve isolation valves 3HV9337, 3HV9339, 3HV9377, and i

3HV9378 open or, l

l b.

The Reactor Coolant System depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 5.6 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any one RCS cold leg is less than or equal to the enable temperatures specified in Table 3.4-3; MODE 5; and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel and the RCS is not vented.

ACTION:

With the SDCS Relief Valve inoperable, reduce T,y, to less than a.

200*F, depressurize and vent the RCS through a greater than or equal to 5.6 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

b.

With one or both SDCS Relief Valve isolation valves in a single SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair (valve pair 3HV9337 and 3HV9339 or valve pair 3HV9377 and 3HV9378) closed, open the closed valve (s) or power-lock open the other SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , reduce T,,,ter than or equal to 5.6 inch vent within to less than 200*F, depressurize and vent the RCS through a grea the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

t c.

With more than two high-pressure safety injection pumps OPERABLE, secure the third high-pressure safety injection pump by racking out its motor curcuit breaker or locking close its discharge valve within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

The lift setting pressure applicable to valve temperatures of less than or equal to 130*F.

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-33 AMENDMENT NO. -6 94

4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION:

(Continued) d.

In the event either the SDCS Relief Vallye or an RCS vent is used to l

mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the. Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the SDCS Relief Valve or RCS vent on the transient and any correcticve action necessary to prevent recurrence.

e.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

l SURVElllANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.4.8.3.1.1 The SDCS Relief Valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Verifying at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when the SDCS Relief Valve is being used for overpreswre protection that SDCS Relief Valve isolation valves 3HV9337, 3HV9339, 3HV9377, and 3HV9378 are open.

b.

Verifying relief valve setpoint at least once per 30 months when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.8.3.1.2 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the third high-pressure safety injection pump shall be demonstrated to be secured by verifying that its motor circuit breaker is not racked-in or its discharge valve is locked closed.

The requirement to rack out the third HPSI pump breaker is satisfied with the pump breaker racked out to its disconnected or test position.

4.4.8.3.1.3 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair (valve pair 3HV9337 and 3HV9339, or valve pair 3HV9377 and 3HV9378) that is used for overpressure protection due to the other SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair being INOPERABLE shall be verified to be in the power-lock open condition until the INOPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is returned to OPERABLE status or the RCS is depressurized and vented. The power-lock open requirement is satisfied either with the AC breakers open for valve pair 3HV9337 and 3HV9339 or the inverter input and output breakers open for valve pair 3HV9377 and 3HV9378, whichever valve pair is OPERABLE.

4.4.8.3.1.4 The RCS vent shall be verified to be open at least once per l

32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months

when the vent is being used for overpressure protection.

Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-34 AMENDMENT NO.94

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,y LESS THAN'350*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised'of the following shall be' OPERABLE:

One' OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and a.

i b.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling i

water tank on a Safety-Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction. to the containment sump.on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4**.

l ACTION:

a.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN' l

within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

l l

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System,.a Special Report shall be prepared and-submitted to the' Commission pursuant to' Specification 6.9.2 within'-

90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation.and the l

total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The currentLyalue of the usage factor for each affected safety' injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value' exceeds 0.70.

I SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.3 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

i i

I

With pressurizer pressure less than 400 psia.

- See Specification 3.4.8.3.1 for the limit on the number of OPERABLE High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps

. SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 3/4 5-7 AMENDMENT NO. 94 l

4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank 'shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum borated water volume of 362,800fgallons above the ECCS suction connection,.

b.

Batween 2350 and 2800 ppm of boron, and c.

A solution temperature between 40*F and 100*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

i With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 7 days by:

a.

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the horon concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40*F or greater than 100'F.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 3/4 5-8 AMENDMENT NO. 50

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E SAN QMDFRE - UNIT 3 5 3/4 4-9

^

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

The OPERABILITY of the Shutdown Cooling System relief valve or an RCS vent opening of greater than 5.6 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to that specified in Table 3.4-3.

The Shutdown Cooling System relief valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 100*F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) inadvertent safety injection actuation with two HPSI pumps injecting into a water-solid RCS with full charging capacity and letdown isolated.

The design basis of the LTOP assumes unrestricted flow from two HPSI pumps and three Charging pumps (full charging capacity) without letdown.

Because there are three HPSI pumps and three charging pumps, the limitation on the number of HPSI pumps to be maintained OPERABLE during the specified MODES ensures that a mass addition to the RCS that exceeds the design basis assumptions of the LTOP will not occur.

This limitation on the number of HPSI pumps that can provide makeup and injection to the RCS implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06.

The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time (A0T) for a single channel SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) increases the availability of the LTOP system to mitigate low temperature overpressure transients especially during MODES 5 and 6 when the potential for these transients are highest (RCS temperatures between 80*F and 190*F and the RCS is water-solid). The 24-hour A0T implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06.

One SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is capable of mitigating an LTOP event that is bounded by the limiting SDCS pressure transients. When one or both SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in one isolation valve pair becomes INOPERABLE, the other OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is placed in a power-lock open condition to preclude a single failure which might cause undesired mechanical motion of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in a single isolation valve pair and result in loss of system function. This power-lock open condition of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is consistent with the guidance provided in Branch Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB), " Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves."

3/4.4.9 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part S0.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

l SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-10 AMENDMENT NO. -7h 94

i

~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY (Continued) j Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access-to permit, inservice inspections in accordance with Section.XI of the ASME-Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,1974 Edition and Addenda through Summer 1975.

j

.3/4-4.10 REACTOR COULANT GAS VENT SYSIEM' Reactor coolant system _ gas vents are provided to' exhaust noncondensible -

j gases from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling following a non-design bases accident. - The OPERABILITY of at least.

one reactor coolant system vent path from the reactor vessel head and 'the pressurizer steam space ensures the capability exists to perform.this function.

~

The design redundancy of the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while i

ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, or control system does not l

prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of.the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System are consistent with-the requirements of Item II.b.1 of l

NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action. Plan Requirements," November 1980.

i i

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i

-SAN ON0FRE UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-10a AMENDMENT NO. 94 -

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