ML20044B597

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Discusses Recovery from Disasters Affecting Offsite Emergency Preparedness,Specifically Hurricane Andrew.Most Restart Situations Do Not Involve Circumstances in Which Adequacy of Offsite Emergency Preparedness in Question
ML20044B597
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1993
From: Murley T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Davis A, Ebneter S, Martin T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20044B583 List:
References
FOIA-93-125 NUDOCS 9301140270
Download: ML20044B597 (2)


Text

1" f,,. g h

  • e N 5

umw./.PA 7.<

/

UNITED STATES 7%

h C b*

! g( (,},

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/g WAsMNG TON, D. C. 20555 G

%Uf January 8,'1993

, /, $ (

Martin, Regional Administrator, Region I MEMORANDUM FOR:

Tim,.2 : T Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III James L. Milhoan, Regional Administrator, Region IV John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V FROM:

Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor.tplation

SUBJECT:

REC 0VERY FROM DISASTERS AFFECTING 0FFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Hurricane Andrew caused damage in the area around the Turkey Point nuclear ^

power plant to an extent that raised questions about the continued adequacy of offsite radiological emergency preparedness.

In deciding about the continued operation or restart of a plant under such circumstances, one NRC concern is whether the state of emergency preparedness continues to give reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergenc~y.

The NRC bases its decision on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) findings an'd determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and can be implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's emergency plans are adequate and can be implemented.

Upon reviewing the lessons learned during the restart of Turkey Point after Hurricane Andrew, the NRC staff is refining its internal procedures and practices to ensure proper consideration of offsite emergency preparedness in consultation with FEMA.

Our procedures will ensure that any questions about offsite emergency preparedness are referred to NRR/DRSS, which is responsible for coordinating with FEMA.on emergency preparedness matters for nuclear reactors.

Circumstances which are likely to call into question the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness include events or disasters that disrupt the offsite infrastructure (e.g., roads, buildings, crenunications, and transportation resources) and affect the capabilities of offsite response organizations in the plume Emergency Planning Zone (plume EPZ).

Examples of events that could cause such devastating consequences are hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, major fires, large scale explosions, riots, and insur-rections.

Such events may unacceptably reduce the a;fequacy of offsite -

emergency preparedness if their consequences within the plume EPZ signifi-cantly affect the essential elements of emergency planning in 10 CFR 50.47 (b).

One license condition under 10 CFR 50.54(q) is that operating reactor licensees are required to maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the NRC's emergency planning regulations.

Therefore, licensees also bear a 7, / :

f l

y u ! ;j < <y,

~

l I

y Jaman 8,1993 Regional Administrators significant responsibility to maintain an awareness of the status of offsite emergency preparedness.

To address the lessons learned from the Turkey Point restart after Hurricane Andrew, the NRC and FEMA staffs are also planning to revise the NRC/ FEMA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to address FEMA and NRC actions after a disaster such as Hurricane Andrew, affecting the 10-mile EPZ and associated

'i offsite emergency preparedness. The MOV revisions will clarify FEMA's responsibility to respond to a disaster by assessing offsite emergency preparedness and the NRC's responsibility for considering'such an assessment in the decisions it makes after a disaster regarding the restart or continued operation of an affected operating power reactor.

The MOU revisions will also describe FEMA and NRC commitments to inform each other of related plans, schedules, and actions.

Most restart situations do not involve circumstances in which the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness is called into question.

Accordingly, special FEMA reviews and determinations are not necessary or appropriate for most restart decisions.

Nevertheless, the NRR/DRSS staff is available to advise and assist both headquarters and regional staffs in ensuring that the NRC staff considers offsite emergency preparedness issues and consults with FEMA when it is appropriate.

W Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:

J. Taylor J. Sniezek E. Jordan

!