ML20043G684

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Proposed Tech Specs Revising Electrical Power Sys - Shutdown & Ac & Dc Distribution - Shutdown
ML20043G684
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 06/14/1990
From:
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20043G682 List:
References
NUDOCS 9006210003
Download: ML20043G684 (20)


Text

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ATTACHMENT A-1 Revise the = Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 Technical

- Specifications as follows:--

Remove Paaes Insert Paces 3/4 8-5 3/4 8-5 -1 3/4 8-7 -3/4 8-7 1

3/4 8-10 3/4 8 -)

B3/4 8-1 B3/4 8-1 B3/4 8-2 B3/4 8-2 l

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.; ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN- i I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

, 3.8.1.2 As a minimum,'the following A.C. electrical' power sources L shall be OPERABLE:

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a. One circuit between the-offsite transmission network and the onsite Class-1E distribution' system, and '

b.- One diesel generator:with:  !

1. Day and engine-mounted fuel tanks containing a minimum of c 900 gallons-of fuel, s

2.. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of 17,500 gallons of fuel, and i

3. A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: Modes 5 and 6, AND During movement of irradiated fuel with no' fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel, and During movement of loads over irradiated fuel f with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum ' required A.C. electrical power 4 sources OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE-ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of- irradiated fuel, and movement of loads-over irradiated fuel until the minimum

= required- A.C. electrical power sources- are restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2 The above' required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the Surveillance i Requirements of 4.8.1.1.1 and 4.8.1.1.2 except for requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.6.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-5 (Proposed Wording)

?.

. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .

A.C.' DISTRIBUTION'- SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.8.2.2- As a ^ minimum, one of the following trains of A.C. Busses l shall be OPERABLE and energized in the specified manner: I a.- Train "A" A.C. Emergency Busses consisting of:

1. 4160-Volt Emergency Bus #1AE, i
2. 480-Volt Emergency Bus #8N,
3. 120-Volt A.C. ~ Vital Bus #I energized from its-associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus #1-1, and
4. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Bus #III energized from its associated inverter-connected to D.C. Bus #1-3.
b. Train "B" A.C. Emergency Busses consisting of: i
1. 4160-Volt Emergency Bus #1DF,
2. 480-Volt Emergency Bus #9P,
3. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Bus #II energized from its-associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus #1-2, and .
4. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Bus #IV energized from- its (

associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus #1-4. .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, AND During movement of-irradiated fuel with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel, and During movement of loads over irradiated fuel  ;

with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel.

i ACTION:

With the above required train of A.C. Emergency Busses not fully energized in 'the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes,. movement of irradiated- fuel and movement of loads over irradiated fuel. Initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical busses in the specified manner as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 The specifiedL busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once-por 7 days by verifying correct breaker j alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-7 (Proposed Wording) ,

l l

y ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS D.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN i

. .l LIMITING-CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.4 As a minimum, one of the following trains of D.C.. electrical equipment and busses shall be OPERABLE and energized in the specified manner:

a. Train "A" (orange) consisting of the following:

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1. 125-volt D.C. Busses No. 1-1 & 1-3, and ,
2. 125-volt D.C. Battery Banks 1-1 & 1-3 and Chargers 1-1 l

& 1-3. i l

b. Train "B" (purple) consisting of the following l l
1. 125-volt D.C. Busses No.-1-2 & 1-4, and i 2, 125-volt D.C. Battery Banks 1-2 & 1-4 and Chargers 1 ]

& 1-4. l l

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' APPLICABILITY: Modes 5 and 6, AND l

During movement of irradiated fuel l with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel', and  ;

1 During movement of loads over irradiated fuel l with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel. l ACTION:

>With the above required train of D.C. electrical equipment and busses ,

not fully- OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operation inwclving CORE  ;

ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and- movement of loads over irradiated fuel. Initiate corrective action to restore the required train of D.C. electrical equipment and busses to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.8.2.4.1 The above' required 125-volt D.C. bus train shall be determined OPERABLE and energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

4.8.2.4.2 The- above required 125-volt battery bank and chargers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 1

-4.8.2.3.2. l 1

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-10 l (Proposed Wording)

- .~ . - .. .. . . - . - . .--

i 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEME BASES i 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2 A.O. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE PqHER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS I 1

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during opecation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply thrs safety related equipment required for 1). the safe shutdewn of the facility and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy tne requirements of General Design criterion-17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation ,

commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the  !

power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of r the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one >

L redundant set of onsive A.C. .and D.C. power sources and associated.

L distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident.

with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

L The ACTION requirements specified in Modes 5 and 6 address the l condition where sufficient power is unavailable to recover from postuleted events (i.e. fuel handling accident). Implementation of the ACTION requirements shall not preclude completion of actions to '

establish a safe conservative plant condition. Completion of the requirements will prevent the occurrence of postulated events for which  ;

mitigating actions sould be required.

The OPERABILITY of the r.sinimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and . associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or- refueling condition for extended time periods, 2) ,

sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for L monitoring and maintaining the unit status, and 3) sufficient power is available for systems (i.e. Supplemental Leak Collsction and Release

. System) necessary to recover from postulated events in these MODES, e.g. a fuel handling accident.

The Surveillance Requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY-of I the station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory L Guide 1.129, " Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Mair.tenance , Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-1 (Proposed Wording)

LECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.

BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery. capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 3.8-1 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the designsted pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and .015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than .020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than .010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific

. gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

-Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 3.8-1 la permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7 day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than .020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease- in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than .040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

Note

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B3/4 8-2 (Proposed Wording) w nw ,

ATTACHMF,NT A-2 Revise the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Technical l Specifications as follows:

Remove Pages Insert Pgggg 3/4 8-6 3/4 8-6 3/4 8-8 3/4 8-8 3/4 8-12 3/4 8-12 B3/4 U-1 B3/4 8+"1 a

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN LIMITinc enuntTioW rot opraATIoW

3. 8.1. 2 L. As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: .
a. .

One circuit onsite Class IEbetween thesystem, distribution offsite transmission and network and the

b. One diesel generator with:

1.

Day tank containing a minimum of 350 gallons of fuel, 2.

A fuel storage system containing a minimum of 53,225 gallons of fuel,

3. A fuel transfer pump, r_ W

[ APPL]CABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. -

ACTION: '

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity _ changes until the minimum required A.C. electrical power urces are restored to OPERABLE status. _

k _RE9 LACE W)TN  !

_ T N SE RT "A" tuavttttawer nroutarterNTs 4,8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be

. demonstrated OPERABLE by the performaate of each of the Surveillance

. Requirements of 4.8.1.1.1 and 4.8.1.1.2 er. cept for requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.6.

e BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 8 6 '

N y s,A % M,y )

Attachment to " Electrical Power Systeam - Shutdown

  • Insert "A" APPLICABILLIX Modes 5 and 6, AND During movement of irradiated fuel with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel, and During movement of loads over irradiated fuel with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changas, movement of irradiated fuel, and movement of loads over irradiated fuel until the minimum required A.C. electrical power sources are restored to OPERABLE status, i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 (Proposed Wording)

\

k ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS J A.C. DI5TR!tuTION - $NUTDC= l

.. l LIMIT 1hc enkn17thW Foe h>rtAT10W 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical busses shall be i i

OPERA 8LE and energized from sources of power other than a diesel generator '

but aligned to an OPERABLE diesel generator.

1 4160 volt Emergency Bus  !

1 - 480 vo). eme, 'ncy tus 2 - 120 vt ' t A J Vital tusses

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APPLICAl!LITY: Mt.O s 5 and 6.

ACTION:

l With less than the above eneplement of A.C. busses OPERABLE and energized,  !

establish CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. {  !

\ l tuevrftiamer arnuraturWT1 4.8.2.2 The specified A.C. busses shall be determined OPERABLE and I energized from A.C. sources other than the diesel generators at least  !

once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker al.ignment and indicated '

power availability.

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R E P L f4 3 w t T H

.r tasliRT "B" l

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 8 8 (Pr. posed W eed

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  • Attach = ant to CA.C. Distribution - Shutdown 2 {

INSERT "B"  ;

3.8.2.2 As a. minimum, one of the following trains of A.C. Busses shall be OPERABLE and energized in the specified manner:

a. Train "A" A.C. Emergency Busses consisting of:
1. 4160-Volt Emergency Bus $2AE,  ;
2. 480-Volt Emergency Bus #2N,  !
3. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Bus #I energized from its  ;

associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus (2-1, and ,

4. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Bus $III energized from its '

associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus #2-3.

b. Train "B" A.C. Emergency Busses consisting oft i
1. 4160-Volt Emergency Bus $2DF, l
2. 480-Volt Emergency Bus #2P,
3. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Bus #II energized from its t associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus #2-2, and
4. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Bus #IV energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus #2-4.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6, AND During movement of irradiated fuel ,

with no fuel assemblies in the reactor ve91, and During movement of loads over irradiated fuel with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the above required train of A.C. Emergency Busses not fully ,

energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations ,

involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement of loads over irradiated fuel. Initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical busses in the

, specified manner as soon as possible.

h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS L 4.8.2.2 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses. I l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 (Proposed Wording) )

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i

D.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN REPLMW MTH  !

n n )

LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION 3.8.2.4 _,

be energizedAs and a OPERABLE:

minimum, the following D.C. electrical equipment and bus shall i

2 125 volt D.C. bus systems, and 2

125-volt battery bank and chargers / rectifiers associated with the l f above O.C. bus systems.

APPLICASILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION: '

Withblish lessCONTAINMENT than the above complement of D.C. equipment and bus system 0PERABLE, .

INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, suevtItiANet asoutersetNTs 4.8.2.4.1 The above required 125-volt D.C. bus3 l shall be detemined OPERABLE and energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breeker .

alignment and indicated power availability.

4.8.2.4.2 The above required 125-volt battery bank and chargers / rectifiers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.3.2. ,

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  • e%O v a nMstf \

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1-BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT.2 3/4 8-12 (Propend L0e rding )

a nttachment to CDic. Distribution - Shutdown" l i

INSERT "C" 3.8.2.4 As a minimum, one of the following trains of D.C. electrical  !

equipment and busses shall be OPERABLE and energized in the specified .

mannert i

a. Train "A" (orange) consisting of the following:
1. 125-volt D.C. Busses No. 2-1 & 2-3, and -
2. 125-volt D.C. Battery Banks 2-1 & 2-3 and Charger 2-1*  ;

& Rectifier 2-3*. >

b. Train "B" (purple) consisting of the followingt .
1. 125-volt D.C. Busses No. 2-2 & 2-4, and
2. 125-volt D.C. Battacy Banks 2-2 & 2-4 and Charger 2-2*

& Rectifier 2-4*.  !

APPLICABILITY: Modes 5 and 6, AND During movement of irradiated fuel with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel, and During movement of loads over irradiated fuel with no fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel. i ACTION:

With the above required train of D.C. electrical equipment and busses l' not fully OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operation involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement of loads ever irradiated fuel. Initiate corrective 4 action to restore the required train of D.C. electrical equipment and busses to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 (Proposed Wording)

3/4.6 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS Ratti i .

3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER O!STRIBUTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility and 2) the mitigation and control of accident

, conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfythe i

requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix 'A" to 10 CFR 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the i

power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are comis- 1 tent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based i upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. Power sources I

and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coin-  ;

cident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

  • IM The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and 0.C. power sources and OE" associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that i
1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for I

' extended time periods one 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability ##

is available for moniloring and maintaining the unit status,and (;-- Aob'MSMT 0 l

l i

The surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the l diesel generators are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9, Reyision 2, " Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power ,

t Supplies," December 1979; 1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1 August 1977; and 1.137, " Fuel-011 Systems for Standby Diesel Generators,"

Revision 1, October 1979, Appendix A to Generic Letter 8415 and Generic Letter 83 26, " Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for Diesel Fuel Impurity

)

Level Tests."

The Surveillance Requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the

' Station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129,

" Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for i Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage 3 Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations." l Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery teminal voltage on float charge, c6nnection i resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 8-1 (fr.potN %th l

r

, Ittachment to 03/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES #

Insert "D"

3) Sufficient power is available for systems (i.e. Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System) necessary to recover from postulated events in these MODES, e.g. a fuel handling accident.

Insert "E" The ACTION requirements specified in Modes 5 and 6 address the condition where sufficient power is unavailable to recover from postulated events (i.e. fuel handling accident). Implementation of '

the ACTION requirements shall not preclude completion of actions to l establish a safe conservative plant condition. Completion of the requirements will prevent the oceurrence of postulated events for which mitigating actions would be required.

f l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 l (Proposed Wording)

i

. ... t g ATTACHMENT B Beaver Valley Power Station, Units No. 1 and 2 i Proposed Technical Specification Changes No. 179 and 42  ;

REVISION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.8.2.2, 3.8.2.4 AND 3.8.1.2 A.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN, D.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN, '

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN, AND BASES A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specifications  !

3.8.2.2., 3.8.2.4, and 3.8.1.2 A.C. Distribution - Shutdown, D.C.

Distribution - Shutdown and Electrical Power System - Shutdown for Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2. This change would modify the existing Technical Specifications 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4, '

along with Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.2, to more closely resemble the wording contained in the Standard Technical ,

specifications (STS). The Applicability Statements for L.C.O.'s ,

3.8.1.2, 3.8.2.2, and 3.8.2.4 would be modified to include the -

period when all fuel is removed from the reactor vessel, and when movement of irradiated fuel or movement of loads over irradiated ,

fuel is occurring. The Action statement for L.C.O. 3.8.1.2 would be modified to include a limitation on moving irradiated fuel and movement of loads over irradiated fuel.

The addition of the requirement that an operable 120 volt A.C. >

Vital Bus must be energized from an inverter connected to a D.C.-

Bus, and the change to the Action Statements to immediately suspend all operations involving core alterations, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel, and movement of loads over irradiated fuel are the major changes contained in this proposed amendment.

The Bases Section for Technical Specifications 3.8.2.2, 3.8.2.4 1 and 3.8.1.2 would be modified to reflect the proposed changes.  ;

B. BACKGROUND '

The Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 each have two separate 4160 volt )

emergency busses which are supplied from the normal 4160 volt l

busses. In the event of a loss of the normal power, two i independent diesel generators will automatically supply all essential components contained on the 4160 volt emergency busses. Each 4160 volt emergency bus feeds one 480 volt l emergency bus. The 480 volt emergency busses in turn power four Class 1E vital bus uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems.

Each vital bus UPS system has three separate sources of power l

available. The normal power source is from a 480 volt motor control center (Mcc) via a rectifier unit which feeds 125 volt D.C. to a 120 volt A.C. inverter. Alternate power sources are from a 480 volt MCC through a 120 volt regulator or directly from the 125 volt batteries through the inverter. The 125 volt 0.C.

Distribution System consists of four independent busses with i regard to power sources and corresponding distribution equipment, ,

l 1

'Prcpo3;d T;chnic31 Specific 3ticn Chang 30 No. 179 Cnd 42 Page 2 1

Each 120 volt D.C. Bus is supplied from battery chargers or i rectifier / chargers (as applicable) which simultaneously supply a )

float charge to each battery associated with each specific D.C.

bus. At Unit 2, a spare mobile battery charger 2-7 is available ,

to provide charging current to the Class 1E batteries in the )

event that a Class 1E battery charger fails. This spare charger and its associated connecting receptacles are qualified for class 1E use.

C. JUSTIFICATION The proposed amendment includes operability requirements for the A.C. Vital Bus inverters by requiring that the Vital Busses be powered from inverters connected to D.C. Busses. This operability requirement for the inverters is consistent with STS i wording and was previously approved by Amendnents No. 153 and 30 >

(TAC Nos. 75963 and 75992) for L.C.O. 3.8.2.1 A.C. Distribution -  :

Operating. The revision to the Applicability Statements, for  !

L.C.O.'s 3.8.1.2, 3.8.2.2, and 3.8.2.4, will ensure that power is available to systems (i.e. Supplemental Leak Collection and ,

Release System) necessary to recover from a fuel handling accident. The revised Action Statements, for L.C.O.'s 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4, are consistent with STS wording, with the exception ,

of the requirement to depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The Cold overpressure Protection L.C.O. 3.4.9.3 ,

provides this action if the power operated relief valves become inoperable. Therefore, this action is redundant and not necessary. The proposed Action Statements, for L.C.O.'s 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4, are consistent with the Technical Specifications  !

i. that were approved for Wolf Creek Unit 1 and Diablo Canyon Unit
  • The addition of the limitations on movement of irradiated II.

fuel, and loads over irradiated fuel, to the Action Statement for L.C.O. 3.8.1.2, are consistent with the STS and the proposed Action Statements for L.C.O.'s 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4.

The L.C.O.'s 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4 were modified to specifically state which plant equipment is required. This change is consistent with the wording contained in L.C.O.'s 3.8.2.1 and l 3.8.2.3 for Operational Modes 1 thru 4. Specifically, stating the required plant equipment is more conservative than generally stating the number and type of components required. An asterisk was added to L.C.O. 3.8.2.4 for Unit 2 only. This asterisk denotes that spare charger 2-7 may be substituted for any one charger or rectifiar. Spare charger 2-7 is a fully qualified Class 1E charger. L.C.O. 3.8.2.3 D.C. Distribution-Operating allows the use of this spare charger if one of the chargers or rectifiers are inoperable. Therefore, allowing the use of the spare charger 2-7 in modes 5 and 6 would be appropriate.

1

Prcpored Tcchnic21 Specification ChongO3 No. 179 cnd 42 ,

Page 3 ,

l D. SAFETY ANALYSIS  ;

This proposed amendment is imposing additional operability requirements to the 120-volt A.C. Vital Bus by specifically requiring that the vital busses be powered from inverters with a ,

D.C. . backup. This operability requirement is consistent with the current NRC definition of an operable A.C. Vital Bus. This

  • operability requirement will ensure that the minimum required .

A.C. power sources and associated distribution systems will be i operable during plant shutdown and refueling. The revision to ,

the Applicability Statements, for L.C.O.'s 3.8.1.2, 3.8.2.2, and 3.8.2.4, will ensure that power is available to systems (i.e. ,

Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System) necessary to {

recover from a fuel handling accident. The change to the >

required Action Statements for L.C.O. 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4 are ,

consistent with STS, with the exception of requiring >

depressurizing and venting of the RCS within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This i requirement for depressurizing and venting the RCS is covered by ,

LCO 3.4.9.3 Overpressure Protection System. Therefore, this requirement was not included to eliminate redundant requirements. The addition of the limitation on movement of irradiated fuel and loads over irradiated fuel, to the Action -

Statement for L.C.O. 3.8.1.2, will ensure the suspension of activities which could potentially initate Mode 5 and 6 postulated events. Allowing the use of spare charger 2-7, which  ;

is qualified for Class 1E use, will provide additional assurance that the D.C. electrical distribution system will be available in Modes 5 and 6 to assure adequate reactor coolant inventory, and t sufficient instrumentation and control capability for monitoring and maintaining the plant status. Therefore, this change is considered safe based on the fact that the proposed amendment is imposing additional operability requirements, modifying the existing Action Statements to be consistent with the STS, and providing additional- assurance that the D.C. electrical .,

distribution system will be available in Modes 5 and 6.  !

E. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

The Commission asy make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed i amendment would not:

l-(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

t

.oc Prcpored T0chnic31 Specificaticn Chong;3 No. 179 cnd 42 Page 4 (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of ,

accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The following evaluation is provided for the no significant hazards consideration standards.

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously  :

evaluated?

The availability and reliability of the A.C. Distribution System and the D.C. Distribution System will not be  !

significantly affected by this change. These A.C.

electrical distribution systems will still be availt.ble to recover from postulated events in Modes 5 and 6 and when f handling irradiated fuel. The D.C. electrical distribution i system will still be available in Modes 5 and 6 to assure adequate reactor coolant inver. tory and sufficient instrumentation and control capability for faonitoring and maintaining the plant status. "there fore , the proposed change docs not involve a sign!.ficant inerease in the probability or consequences of. an accidant previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

There would be no change to system configurations, plant equipment or annlysis as a result of this proposed amendment. The change to the required Actions will ensure the suspension of activities which could potentially initiate Mode 5 and 6 postulated events.

1 Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the  ;

possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed amendment will help maintain the reliability of the A.C. Distribution System by requiring that the A.C.

Vital Busses be powered from inverters and connected to D.C.

Busses as a backup source. The change in the required Actions will ensure the suspension of activities which could potentially initiate Mode 5 and 6 postulated events.

Therefere, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

, - ,. . . . . . _ . _ .,.m.,- m ... -

.m.

ac Prep CCd TCchnic31 Specificatien Ch2ng33 ND. 179 Cnd 42 i Page 5 F. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that the activities associated with this license amendment request .

satisfies the no significant hazards consideration standards of  !

10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified. 3 i

G. ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION ]

The proposed changes have been evaluated and it has been  !

determined that the changes do not involve (i) a significant I hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or j significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be i released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual l or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the I proposed changes meet the eligibility criterion for categorical  ;

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9) . 'Therefore, pursuant  ;

to 10 CFR 51.22 (b), an environmental assessment of the proposed  !

changes is not required.

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