ML20043G266

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs Re New Containment Isolation Valves in RHR keep-full Sys
ML20043G266
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/12/1990
From:
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML20043G250 List:
References
NUDOCS 9006200109
Download: ML20043G266 (10)
v • d • e


Text

. . _ .

l ATTACHMENT I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REGARLHNG ~~

i I

NEW C HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) KEEP-FULL SYSTEM JPTS-9t>001 1

(

.I l

l-i I-L ,

l l

NewYork Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333

.$$[D Nh , '

P

TABLE 3.7-1 -

(Sh.12 of 15) .

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES -

CONTAINGAENT PENETRATION VALVE ISOLATION CLOSE TIME MORRAAL RERAARKS PENETRATION FUNCTION NURABER SIGNAL (SEC) (5) STATUS (7) 210A RHR to 10MOV-16A R N/A Oooed Pump minimum 90w.

(con't) Suppression Pool 10MOV-21A G.R N/A Closed Heat exchanger drain.

10MOV-167A R N/A Oooed Heat exchanger vent.

10RHN-95A Reverse Flow N/A Open RHR Keep-Ftd min. Bow l RCIC 13MOV-27 K.R 5 Oooed Pump minimum Sow.

Core Spray 14MOV-5A R N/A Open Pump minimum Row.

Test to Suppression 14MOV-26A G.R 45 Closed Thronle valve for Pool flow 1est.

-l 14 CSP M Reverse Flow N/A Open Core Spray KeepFull min. flow.

I 2108 RHR to 10MOV448 G.R 70 Gosed Thronle volve for flow i Suppression testand suppression Pool pool cooling. Note 2.

10MOV-168 R N/A Closed Pump eninrnum flow.

10MOV-21B G.R N/A Oooed Heat exchangerdrairt l 10MOV-1678 R N/A Oooed Heat exchanger vent.

  • 10RHR@58 Reverse Flow N/A Open RHR KeeW mirt flow l Core Spray 14 CSP-628 Reverse Flow N/A Open Core Spray KeeW j Test to mitt fbr.

Suppression

( Pool Amendment No.

20cc

. - - .. _ . ___---_--____________L_

l. JAFNPP -

TABLE 4.7-2 -

EXCEPTION TO TYPE C TESTS -

l CONTAINMENT PENETRATION val #E LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST PERFOfMBED j PENETRATION FUNCTION NUR$BER 2028 Vacuum Breaker- 27AOV-101A These vehes wE be tossed in the reverse direcelort Reactor BuBding 27AOV-101B to Suppression t

Chamber l

1 205 Pressure Suppression 2FAOV-117 These vehes wW be tested in the reverse diredfort Chamber Purge Ex- 27MOV-117  ;

houst (Air or Nitrogen) I 210A RHR to Suppression 10MOV-16A WW not be teseed as lines are weber sealed by - - _ _ _'_- chamber weser.

Pool, RCIC, Core 10MOV-21A Vahe 10MOV-34A is seased during the Type C test of Penserselon X-211 A.

SprayTest to 10MOV44A Suppression Pool 10MOV-167A 13MOV-27 14MOV-5A i

14MOV-26A 10RHR-95A j 14 CSP 42A 210B RHR to Suppression 10MOV-teB Wel not be teseed as lines are weser sealed by suppreselon chamber weser. [

Pool HPCI, Core 10MOV-21B Valve 10MOV-348 is tested during the Type C test of Penetrahon X 2118.  !

, SprayTest to 10MOV348 l Suppressson Poo! 10MOV-1678 >

14MOV-5B 14MOV-268 23MOV-25 10RHR-958 14 CSP-628 i 211A RHR to Suppression 10MOV-38A This valve wel be tested in the reverse direction.  !

Spray Header Amendment No. 40,130,134,1 '

i i

i ATTACHMENT ll 1

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECH 68 REGARDING '

NEW CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 5 IN THE RESIDUAL  :

HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) KEEP-FULL SYBTEM [

i JPTS9H01  !

t t

i 1

t k

l New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 L-l l

m__- - , -__ _,-% - -

ew..., # #- , .- ,__ .y,,,__,,..,. .,__,, ....,__m_ ,,__ , . , _ . _ , , ,,, , , , _ . ,_,_ _ . ,

.r .

Attachment il SAFETY EVALUATION Page 1 of 6

1. DESCR6PTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications revises Tables 3.71 (* Primary Containtnent Isolation Valves
  • on page 206c, Reference 1) and 4.7 2

(' Exception to Type C Tests' on page 213, Reference 1). These changes reflect the two Containment isolation Valves (CIVs) in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Core Spray keep full systems.

A RHR Keep Full System The two Containment isolation Valves (CIVs) denoted as 10RHR 95A and 10RHR 958 are added to Tables 3.71 and 4.7 2, listed under the Containment Penetration heading X 210A and X 210B respectively (Attachment 1).

B. Core Spray Keep Full System The two CIVs denoted as 14 CSP 62A and 14 CSP-62B are added to Tables 3.71 and 4.7 2, listed under the Corp.ainment Penetration heading X 210A and X 210B respectively (Attachment 1).

II. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The purpose of these changes is to revise the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications (Reference 2) to reflect the RHR and Core Spray keep-full systems.

A. RHR Keep Full System The change to the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications reflects the two CIVs in the RHR system with a " keep-full" subsystem. The RHR keep full system maintains the discharge piping in a water solid condition, thereby increasing the overall system reliability of the RHR subsystem loops by reducing the potential for water hammer.

B. Core Spray Keep Full System The amendment to the RtzPatrick Technical Specifications reflects the as built configuration of the core spray keep full subsystem. The Core Spray keep full system maintains both Core Spray discharge lines full of water to reduce the potential for water hammer in the piping during core spray operation.

, Attaohment ll SAFETY EVALUATION Page 2 of 6 til. IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES A. RHR Keep Full System The original design requirement for CIVs as specified in the as licensed FitzPatrick FSAR Section 7:3.4.3 (Reference 3)is:

  • Process lines that penetrate the primary containment but do not communicate directly with the reactor vessel, the primary containment tree space, or the environs, have at least one Group C isolation valve located outside the primary containment which may close either by process action
i. (reverse flow) or by remote manual opera'Jon.*

l The RHR keep full minimum flow line perwtrates primary containment through penetrations X 210A and B. Neither line communicates directly with the containment free space, reactor vessel, or the environs. Unre that communicate directly with water in the torus (as is the case with the rdnimum '% onnections) requires that each line contain one CIV. Check valve 10RHR 95A iss y + anotration X 210A and check valve 10RHR 95B isolates ,

penetration X 210B.

NUREG-0737 ltem II.E.4.2 (Reference 4) requires licensees to review operating plants for i containment isolation dependability. A comprehensive review of the containment isolation ,

design of the FitzPatrick plant and a comparison of the design to the NUREG acceptance criteria has been completed. According to the response to NUREG 0737 Item II.E.4.2 (Reference 5), the RHR and Core Spray systems have been classified as essential systems because their operation is required for accident mitigation. The CIVs Installed to both RHR and Core Spray keep full systems will not affect the requirements outlined in this document.

The integrity of the RHR System, as a pressure boundary, will not be degraded by the addition of the keep full pumps and piping since the design temperature and pressure of the RHR Keep Full System is equal to the design temperature and pressure of the RHR System.

The integrity of the new RHR keep-full system will be verified by hydrostatic in service leak test in accordance with ANSI B31.1 (1967) (Reference 6). The heat generated by the RHR keep-full pump motors and the heat transferred through the RHR keep full system insulated piping is not significant and will not affect environmental qualification parameters in the east and west crescent zones. The addition of this system was evaluated to comply with Appendix R and Fire Protection using EDP 30,

  • Review Procedure for Ensuring Long Term Appendix R and Fire Protection Compilance" (Reference 7). These modifications will not invalidate any assumptions in the FitzPatrick Appendix R Fire Protection Analysis. The RHR keep full system will not adversely affect any of the modes of operation of the RHR System as defined in FSAR Section 4.8.

The keep full system minimum flow penetration lines are submerged below the torus water level, in accordance with Section 7.3.4.3 of the original FSAR the check valves are acceptable for use as CIVs on these lines. These CIVs are exempt from Type C leak rate

! testing, because the piping inside containment is sealed with fluid from a seal system (torus I

water). Therefore, these CIVs are added to the list of Exception to Type C Tests, Table 4.7 2.

. Attachment ll SAFETY EVALUATION Page 3 of 6 B. Core Spray Keep Full System i The Core Spray keep full check valves most the same original design requirement (specified in the original RtzPetrick FSAR Section 7.3.4.3,) as the RHR keep-full check valves. The Core Spray keepfull system minimum flow lines penetrate primary containment through penetrations X 210A and B. Neither line communicates directly witn the containment free space, reactor vessel, or the environs. Unos that communicate directly with water in the I torus (as is the case with the minimum flow connections) are required to contain one CIV.

Check valve 14 CSP 62A isolates penetration X 210A and check valve 14 CSP-62B isolates penetration X 2108.  !

The keep full pumps and piping will not degrade the integrity of the Core Spray system as a I pressure boundary, since the design temperature and pressure of the Core Spray keep. full )

system is equal to the design temperature and pressure of the Core Spray system. The Core Spray keep full system will not adversely affect any modes of operation of the Core Spray system as defined in the FSAR Section 6,4.3.

The keep full system minimum flow penetration lines are submerged below the torus water f level. In accordance with Section 7.3.4.3 of the original FSAR the check valves are acceptable for use as CIVs on these lines. These CIVs are exempt from Type C leak rate testing, because the piping inside containment is sealed with fluid from a seal system (torus ,

water). Therefore, these CIVs are added to the list of Type C Tests, Table 4.7 2.

I l

___a_4-

. Attaohment il SAFETY EVALUATION Page 4 of 6 IV. EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the James A. RtzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in aooordanca with this proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration, s,s defined in 10 CFR .

50.g2, since the proposed changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident or consequence previously evaluated.

The RHR keep full system maintains the discharge piping full of water, thereby increasing the overall reliability and reducing the potential for water hammer.

The RHR system is designed to mitigate the consequences of analyzed accidents and is normally in the standby mode. This system can not initiate i accidents and the proposed changes have no effect on the probability of occurrence of previously evaluated accidents.

The Core Spray keep full system maintains both Core Spray discharge lines full of water, preventing water hammer in the piping during system startup. The i Core Spray system is designed to protect the core by spraying water over the l- fuel assemblies to remove decay heat following the postulated design basis LOCA. This system can not initiate accidents and the proposed changes have no effect on the probability of occurrence of previously evaluated accidents.

The applicable criteria, equipment quality standards, and design considerations -

have been satisfied for both RHR and Core Spray keep-full systems. -

2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated because the keep full systems will not cause either the RHR or the Core Spray systems to fall as a result of inadvertent actuations or the failure to operate on demand.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for l Technical Specifications. The RHR and Core Spray keep full systems will not adversely affect any of the modes of operation of the RHR System (as defined in the FSAR Section 4.8) and the Core Spray System (as defined in FSAR Section 6.4.3). The proposed changes to both the RHR and Core Spray keep-full systems were evaluated using EDP 30, " Review Procedure for Ensuring Long Term Appendix R and Fire Protection Compliance *. These modifications will not invalidate any assumptions in the FitzPatrick Appendix R Fire Protection ,

Analysis, s

9 Attachment ll 1

SarErv EvauaTion Page 5 of 6 V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES l

Implementation of the proposed changes will not impact the ALARA or Fire Protection l Programs at the RtzPatrick plant, nor will the changes impact the environment.

VI. CONCLUSION These changes, as proposed, do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in '

10 CFR 50.50. That is, they:

a. will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis l report;
b. will not increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type from any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; c, will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical l specification; and
d. Involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.

l I

l l

l l

[

.> Attachment ll SAFETY EVALUATION Page 6 of 6 vil. sinuoGRAPHY

1. James A. RtzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications, Volume 1 A ; Table i: 4.7.2
2. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Vol. 2 Sec. 4.8 Residual Heat Removal System and Vol. 3 Sec. 7.3 Table 7.31 (Sh.12 of 18).
3. James A. RtzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant FSAR (Original), Vol. 3 Sec. 7.3.4.3 (Supplement 13).

l 4. NUREG 0737 Item II.E.4.2

  • Containment isolation Dependability".
5. Power Authority of the State of New York, James A. RtzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Response to NUREG 0737 item II.E.4.2
  • Containment Isolation Dependability".
6. ANSI B31.1 Code for Pressure Piping (1967).
7.
  • Review Frocedure for Ensuring Long Term Appendix R and Fire Protection Compliance" (EDP 30).
8. 10CFR50, Appendix J
  • Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors *,
9. 10CFR50, Appendix A 'Ucensing of Production and Utilization Facilities *.

l L

l l

t l

l

_.-  !

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20043G266&oldid=2562370"