ML20043D258

Evaluation of Unisolable Piping from RCS W/Potential for Leakage Induced Thermal Stresses in Response to NRC Bulletin 88-008 SONGS 2 & 3

ML20043D258
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	09/30/1988
From:	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML13304A487	List: ML13304A486 ML20043D258
References
IEB-88-008, IEB-88-8, NUDOCS 9006070302
Download: ML20043D258 (101)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:- - a. i EVALUATION OF UNISOLABLE PIPING FROM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WITH POTENTIAL FOR LEAKAGE INDUCED THERMAL STRESSES i IN RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 88-08 SONGS 2&3 l i SEPTEMBER 1988 i i ) M80/86 '/ Date Prepared by: v Reviewed by: [. Ufe_ Date /o//3/BB Approved by: / Date /4 M 7 !9006070302 900604 PDR ADOCK 05000361 .( Q PDC

r, J i TABLE OF CONTENYS PAGE l 1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1_

2.0 INTRODUCTION

6 t 3.0 DISCUSSION 8 4.0 METHODOLOGY 15 I 5.0 EVALUATION 19

6.0 CONCLUSION

S 58 7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 61

8.0 REFERENCES

68 APPENDIX A - CALCULATIONS A-1 APPENDIX B - ATTACitMENTS B-1 .t i 7 h (i)

r 1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletin No. 88-08 requested a review of unisolable sections of piping connected to the reactor coolant system (RCS) which may be subjected to temperature stratification or l temperature Oscillations induced by leaking valves. The review documented in this report included all high pressure lines connected to the RCS. This included lines tupplied by the Reactor Coolant Chemical and the Volume Control System and the High Pressure i Safety Injection System. The evaluations for the lines which have the potential for thermal stresses associated with valve leakage were divided into three ( categories. t The first category contains the four 12" Cold Leg Safety Injection (SI) lines which contain check valves near the hot RCS cold leg piping top entry connection similar to the Farley-2 configuration. It was concluded that the potential for cyclic thermal stresses, of the nature l which caused failure at Farley-2 is very low. This conclusion is l' supported by the fact that the SONGS 2 and 3 system design would require leakage through three closed isolation valves in series to each of the SI headers compared to the single isolation valve at Farlet-2. l r V

Based on a review of the operating procedures and operating history, these lines have not been subjected to cold water leakage from the charging pumps to the unisolable portion of the SI lines downstream of I the check valve. This is because of operational limits which maintain these headers upstream of these valves at pressures well under RCS pressure during plant operation. ) An additional evaluation was done to determine the temperatures at the SONGS SI check valves compared to the Farley-2 ECCS check valve. l Maximum temperature at the SONGS check valves was calculated to be 185'F verws the 475'F calculated (and measured) for the Farley-2 ECCS check valve. This increased distance would prevent the large temperature cycles of 200*F or more found at farley-2, if it is postulated that highly improbable leakage could occur, i The second category includes one 16" Hot Leg Safety Injection (SI) line to RCS loop 2 and one 2" Hot Leg Safety Injection (SI) line to RCS loop I which contain check valves so far from the hot RCS hot leg piping connection that the valves are at or near ambient temperature. These o lines d'<i, - on the 12" SI lines in that they are bottom entry connections to sne RCS loop piping. It was concluded that the potential for cyclic thermal stresses is also very low for these two lines. This conclusion alsa considers the SONGS 2 and 3 system design which has i three closed isolation valves in series in the leakage path to these ~ headers. t 2- ,_.-+.. --,---,.-vr +w,. ,r e.

l i Sased on a review of operating procedures and operating history, the 2" Hot Leg SI line to RCS loop 1 for each Untt has not been subjected to cold water leakage from the charging pumps to the unisolable portion of j L the line downstream of the check valve. However, the 16" Hot Leg SI i line o RCS loop 2 has been subjected to pressure greater than the desired operational limit of 1000 pst and may have therefore been i subjected to cold water leakage from the charging pumps. An additional evaluation considering a maximum plausible leakage past the three isolation valves was performed for the 16" SI line. It was concluded that this line would not be subjected to any significant ] thermal stresses because of the extremely low flow velocity in the 16" header conne: tion near the RCS loop piping. Based on a review of operating procedures and operating history, these lines do not appear to have been subjected to thermal cycling due to high pressure cold water injection. for jtsLth of the above categories of itnes which contain all high pressure injection lines into the RCS loop, cold and hot leg piping, it is possible to control pressures in the headers to pressures less than the RCS pressure with the existing system designs. As a practice, this has been done precluding the need for NDE to determine if fatigue damage has occurred or the need to perform additional fatigue stress analyses to account for thermal stresses associated with leaking valves..

l i Enhancement of procedures to require corrective actions to preclude these six headers f rom operating at RCS pressure for a significant time 1 is recommended. 1 A further review of the P&ID's was done to consider design changes that would insure that the concerns identified in NRC8 88-08 can never occur without consideration of procedural controls. Recommendations included a change to the system to direct leakage flow through the first single l valve in the leak path of all six of the above lines to the charging pump suction piping at a pressure below the RCS operating pressure. The third category evaluated was the connection of the pressurizer auxiliary spray and the auxiliary spray bypass lines to the unisolable portion of the pressurizer spray line. This evaluation resulted in identification of a configuration where a single isolation valve could allow leakage flow to a check valve very near the hot pressurizer spray line connection. It was concluded that this configuration is similar to the Farley-2 ECCS line and has potential for significant thermal cyclic stresses to have occurred or to occur in the future. It is recommended that NDE be performed to verify the condition of the piping at the check valve and the connection of the 2" line to the 4' line just downstream ? l of the check valve. Alternatively, replacement of the short piping I spool between the check valve and the tee is recommended. If this is l done, only NDE of the tee will be required. 4 I I-

7.. i Based on a review of operating procedures, no system operational methods were found to solve this potential problem. t.ong-term recommendations are identified to prevent the potential for future cyclic thermal stresses including the relocation of the check valve and the optional addition of a thermal sleeve at the 2"- to 4"-pipe connection. Alternative recommendations include installation of temperature sensors to monitor the.viping section near the check valve similar to the approach used at Farley. l In summary, it is concluded that the SONGS 2 and 3 system design and operational procedures have prevented 4-.1 will prevent occurrence of the thermal stress problem encountered at the Farley-2 plant for all high pressure lines connected to the RCS primary loop piping. However, the pressurizer auxiliary spray line could have significant thermal cyclic stresses at or near the last check valve at the connection to the pressurizer spray line due to leakage through a single isolation valve. Further actions are necessary to insure that possible excessive thermal stresses will not occur in this piping section which could result in the NRC Bulletin 88-08 concerns of cracking in unisolable RCS piping. -S-

i

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This report presents the results of an evaluation of the potential for 4 unacceptable thermal stresses in unisolable piping attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) on San Onofre. Units 2 and 3 Nuclear Generating Stations. The evaluation was performed in response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Bulletin No. 88-08 issued June 22, 1988. The bulletin includes a description of a piping failure on the Farley-2 plant t associated with large thermal cycling in the vicinity of a check valve l in an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) line close-to the RCS. L 2.1 Backaround h l In December cf 1987, a through-wall crack causing leakage occurred at Farley-2 in an ECCS pipe connected to the RCS. It is postulated that the crack occurred as a result of high-cycle thermal failure that was caused by relatively cold water leaking through a normally closed globe valve isolating high pressure charging pump discharge piping from the RCS. The leakage flow then caused a swing disk check valve on the 6" ECCS line to open and close in a cycIle manner. The resulting flow conditions caused large fluctuating radial thermal gradients in the piping L just beyond the check valve in the non-isolable 6" ECCS piping l l attached to the RCS (Reference 1). l 1.

As a result of this failure and a similar failure at Tthange (Reference 2), the NRC has requested that a review of systams connectoi to the RCS be performed to determine whether unisolable sections of piping connected to the RCS can be subjected to excessive stresses from temperature stratification or temperature t oscillations that could be induced by leaking valves, J l I i t f. L ;

i 3.0 DISCUSSION The nature of the cause of the Farley-2 ECCS piping failure is described in some detail in NRC Information Notice 88-01 (Ref. 1) and NRC Bulletin 88-08 (Ref. 2). The cause was postulated to be cyclic thermal stresses resulting from cold water suppl 16d through a normally closed valve causing a check valve in the ECCS ploe to partially open and close in a cyclic manner (chatter) admttting cold water to the unisolable portion of the piping between the Reactor Coolant Loop Cold leg piping nozzle and the ECCS pipe check valve. Further information regarding the failure at Farley-2 was obtained by contacting Alabama Power Company. The purpose of this investigation was to determine how the San Onofre Units (SONGS) 2 and 3 piping systems compare with Farley with respect to the postulated failure mechanism. As part of this effort, details of the Farley piping systems and the failure were clarifted. Figure 3.1 shows the dimensions of the Farley-2 ECCS line which failed. These dimensions were used in calculations to I compare temperatures in similar lines on SONGS 2 and 3. The line sizes and isolation valve description for the Farley-2 Boron l-Injection System which is the source of cold water leading to failure of i the ECCS line is shown in Figure 3.2. The single 1" Kerotest Y-pattern globe valve used to isolate the Farley-2 BIT bypass line is similar to l the 2" Kerotest Y-pattern valves used in various applications for --

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i 1solationpurpose$n50AGS2and3. SONGS, however, does not hr.ve o chemical injection into the high pressure side of the charging pumps. Chemical injection on SONGS 2 and 3 is through the suction stdt of the charging pumps. ) Review with an Alabama Power engineer knowledgable with the problem provided additional insight (References 7,8). Facts and commentary obtained included: The failure occurred on a single ECCS line on Farley-2 whn:h started operation in 1981. Farley-1, which started operation in 1979, has not had a failure. ) 2. The mechanism of a cyclic opening and closing of a citeck valve does not appear to be common to all lines subject to pressure from a common source leaking valve. A combination of check valve friction, opening force requirements, line length, relative elevation, leak rate, etc., probably results in only one check valve cycling in a system with a common pressure' source. 3. The point in time that the closed isolation valve leaking started and/or the check valve started cycling is not known because the Farley BIT bypass valve is not subject to in-service leak testing and it is not isolable. 9 y- ..,ws m

i 4. The check valve cycle i. tod a s determinitd to be 30 seconds to 2 minutes based on temp ratiste data. It it estimated that the accumulated number of cycles is between 1 million to 5 million over a 2-to-5-year period. Temperature cycling as high as 200*F was . measured on the t3ttom of the pipe just beyond the check valve. 5. The cracks in the weld zones were attributed to fatigus failure based on metallographic examination. Thermal stresses rather than j mechanical vibration stresses are believed to be the cause because the crack initiated at machining marks in the weld counterbore area on the pipe ID, and no significant vibration of the line was measured by accelerometers installed to assist in identifying the problem. i 6. The temporary solution of bleeding off leakage downstream of the BIT bypass isolation valve has been effective in eliminating check valve cycling and large temperature differences from top to bottom in the wall of the unisolable piping just beyond the check valve. l l Figure 3.3 shows the pipe temperatures recorded on one of the Farley ECCS lines with and without leakage flow. l l 7. Westinghouse performed a study for Alabama Power to rank the 1 susceptible lines on the Westinghouse design Farley plant. They rank them from highest to lowest as: r ! l

1. Cold Leg Injection Lines (3), one which failed. 2. Hot Leg Injection Lines (3) 3. Alternate Auxillary Pressurizer Spray Line G anked much lower because pressure differential is only 7 pst vs 300 pst and i heated water is supplied from the Regenerative Heat Exchanger) This additional information was useful in the evaluation of the SONGS 2 and 3 piping systems which could be susceptible to thermal cyclic stresses due to valve leakage. Some differences and i similarities in system design and piping system layout were noted for the Combustion.Enyineering (CE) design SONGS 2 and 3 Units compared to the West nghouse design Farley 1 and 2 Units. These differences and simi arities are discussed in Section 5 of this report. l ... m u

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-. -.... - -. -. ~ l t l i 1 WITH WITHOUT LEAKAGE LEAKAGE _ TOPOP>I>I 440F 498F 80TTOM OF PIPE Itsr 400F WITH WITHOUT LIAKAGE LEAKAct _ TOP OP PlPE lith 200F = 15-30,. 80TTOM,0F PIPt ittr tisP R TD s y (.. j q q,....s"sw uo r v ( o . - PAttt0 WELO t wsuso ron i. I'- RCS COLO LEO 8 P U ) 1 1 1 l FARLEY-2 TEMPERATURE DATA L l FIGURE 3.3. _ _.

t 4.0 MtiH0001.0GY 4.1 General Considerations This evaluation addressed two concerns responsive to the Action 1 request in NRC Bulletin 88-08. These concerns are:

1) temperature stratification, and, 2) temperature oscillations, that could be incurred by leaking valves which could cause high thermal stresses in unisolable sections of piping connected to i

[ the RCS. 1 The following conditions were determined to be prerequisites for these postulated concerns to occur:

1..

The pressure of the leakage source must be greater than that of the RCS. 2 .The water temperature of the leakage source must be significantly colder than that of the RCS. Water supplied at temperatures within 100'F of the RCS is not judged to create a thermal stress problem. 3. The source of cold, high pressure water must be large enough I to permit many cycles of cold water injection to occur for any significant fatigue damage to occur. -

4 4. The scurce of water must be normally isolated from the RCS by a closed valve. 5. There muet ce a check valve operable in the direction of t riow for temperature oscillations to occur. 6. The occurrence of temperature stratification requires specific geometric considerations, primarily a long length of horizontal pipe subject to high temperatures. 4.2 Procedure The initial evaluation consisted of review of the P&lD for the SONGS 2 and 3 Reactor Coolant System to determine which lines are connected to the RCS. Those lines for the Reactor Coolant System, the Safety Injection Sy* M, and the Reactor Coolant Chemical and Volume Control System.' d are connected to the RCS from a higher pressure, low temperature water source were considered for further evaluation. i The' potential for high pressure water leakage into unisolable portions of the pressurizer spray line was identified from the Reactor Coolant System and the Reactor Coolant Chemical and Volume Control System P&ID's. This potential leakage was also evaluated. , 1

Other lines were removed from consideration because they do not have the potential to create the thermal stresses of concern based on the prerequisites established in the general considerations evaluation 4.1. A simplified flow diagram was developed as shown in Figure 4.1. which condenses the P&ID information.into a diagram including potential high pressure leak paths to the RCS piping. Some of these lines are excluded in the detailed evaluation because they are operating at pressures lower than the RCS or are normally flowing lines to the RCS. Qualitative evaluations were then performed using the simplifted flow diagram as a guide. Isometric drawings of the piping were reviewed to determine if the geometric considerations and the operational aspects, including leaking normally closed valves, could create the conditions for either thermal strat;fication or temperature oscillations. Where a potential for the thermal conditions of concern was l identified, calculations were performed to quantify temperature gradients or to determine an estimated number of cycles which 1 might occur. These calculations were performed to envelope the expected conditions. No finite element heat transfer or 3 transtant analyses were performed because they were not needed to define the conditions to a level needed for this evaluation. 1

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- -.~.- - - -. 5.0 EVAL.UATION 5.1 Discussion Review of the overall problem of leaking valves on the potential for creating the cracking mechanism in piping leads to the conclusion that the only significant cause of pipe material damage is fatigue associated with alternating metal temperatures through many cycles. The result of a small leak flowing through i a line without changes in velocity (or rate) is not judged to be a problem for a piping system with the exception of possible line bowing in a long hot section of piping with cold water leakage and resulting stratification over a long length. This type of stratification problem can result in changes in the overall piping system thermal expansion stress pattern and in pipe support loads being considerably different than calculated by ignoring the bowing effect due to stratification (References 9, 10). This problem is not significant with respect to high cycle fatigue failure in piping associated with a large quantity of t cyclic stresses. The problem of concern is associated with the phenomena of flow rate changes caused by a check valve downstream of the leak opening and closing a large number of cycles. This phenomena can be qualitatively evaluated by an unde, standing of the mechanisms involved. !'

+ i j Check valves of various types are used including swing disk, tilt disk, and spring loaded disk. In general however, all check { valves open when a positive pressure differential exists across the valve. Typical pressures required to open check valves are generally between 2 and 10 psi and each valve of the same type may have a unique cracking pressure due to friction in the disk hinge i pin or disk guide, spring pressure variances, etc. j i 4 The pressure which opens the valve comes from the water supplied through the leaking upstream isolation valve (s). The combination of the check valve minimum cracking pressure and the check valve disk positional instability when partially open creates a mechanism that allows a small pressure buildup with the check valve closed, and then a small opening of the check valve to allow flow to relleve the pressure buildup. The check valve remains open for a short period until flow stops, and the valve counterweight, disk weight, or the spring force closes the check valve. This phenomena is sometimes called chattering and can lead 1 to the cyclic injection of a potentially significant volume of j cold water (enough to drop the pipe wall temperature significantly ) sn a short time if the check valve is in a normaily hot piping section). This cyclic nature of check valve opening.and closing along with high temperature gradients are the most significant factors creating the fatigue stresses over many cycies needed to cause piping material cracking as observed on Farley-2 and on Tihange as described in References 1, 2 and 3)..j c ,.. -.. -. ~..,

~.. f As part of the evaluation for SONGS 2 and 3, the phenomena investigated included all lines from high pressure sources (greater than the RCS operating pressure). The effects of a check valve in three relative locations were considered. The location of check valves included: 1. Check valves in cold piping located far enough from hot piping so that no thermal cycling occurs at the check valve l itself but might occur at the point of injection into hot RCS piping (Figare 5.1A). 2. Check valves in warm piping near the hot RCS piping (Figure 5.18). 3. Check valves in hot piping very near hot RCS piping. This is sistlar to the Farley design (Figure 5.1C). l l ! o

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5.2 P&ID Review The unisolable lines connected to the RCS shown in Figure 4.1 are summarized in Table 5.1. This table includes the containment penetration number, the unisol3ble piping line numbers, and the RCS connection description for each of the possible leak paths. Table 5.2 identiftes the normally closed valves which are in the t various leak paths. This table shows that the Safety Injection lines which are connected to the RCS hot leg and cold leg primary loop piping are isolated from high pressure cold water by three normally closed valves in series between the high pressure source and the last check valve. This differs from farley where a single normally closed isolation valve in the BIT system isolates the high pressure source from the RCS loop piping. t It is noted, however, that leakage into the pressurizer spray line can occur through either (or both) of two normally closed single isolation valve (s), Tables 5.3 and 5.4 describe the normally closed valves and the last check valves (closest to the RCS). The manufacturer, size, and type are included in these tables. These tables allow comparisons vith other plants and also vithin the SONGS 2 and 3 systems. Leakage data for a certain type of valve may be ) representative for similar valves, as an example, l

0'r w 'w The following evaluations are organized in sections which have i unisolable lines with common features. The sections include: (5.3) Four 12" safety injection and shutdown cooling lines j connected to the RCS cold leg piping with top entry nozzle. e connections; (5.4) one 16" shutdown cooling Ilne and one 2" safety injection line connected to the RCS hot leg piping with bottom _ entry nozzle connections; and (5.5) the 2" auxiliary pressurizer spray line connected to the 4" pressurizer spray line, b These seven lines are the only lines meeting the prerequisites requiring further assessment. 4 l e I l 7 ? 1 H L' L 1

~ TABLE 5.1 UNISOLABLE LINES CONNECTED TO THE RCS Containment Penetration Line(s) RCS Connection Comment 71-1201-072-3" Hot Leg, Loop 2 Safety Injection 1201-072-10" 1201-002-42" fenction 1201-016-16" 67 1201-147-3" Hot Leg, Loop 2 Safety. Injection 1201-018-2" 1201-001-42" function 3 1204-(,43-12" Cold Leg. Loop 1A Safety Injection 1201-007-30" function 5 1204-044-12" Cold Leg, Loop 18 Safety Injection 1201-009-30" function 39 1204-045-12" Cold-Leg Loop 2A Safety Injection 1201-008-30" function 41 1204-046-12" Cold Leg Loop 2B Safety Injection 1201-010-30" function- '8 1201-060-2" Pressurizer Spray Line Note 1 1201-012-4" ' 68 ^ 1201-060-2" Pressurizer Spray Line Note ?. 1201-012-4" h Note 1: ' Source is the Regenerative Heat Exchanger outlet at 470'F through a- = single normally closed motor-operated valve. Note 2: Source is cold water at a pressure of 2500 psi:through one normally closed manual remote containment isolation valve. I,

TABLE 5.2 1 1 NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE LINEUPS FOR POSSIBLE LEAKAGE PATHS Last Check 1st-Valve 2nd Valve 3rd Valve valve line Rg3 HV.9434 ---- MU 156 --+- 018-2" --*- Hot leg - MV 005 i i 043-12" Cold Leg HV 9323 --+- MU 027 HV 9327 + MV 029 044-12" + Cold Leg MU 065 045-12" --* Cold Leg 1 -+- HV 9330 -+- MU 031 1 - HV 9332 - HU 033 046-12" --*- Cold Leg 1 - - HU 154 - HV 9420 ---*- HU 156 + 016-16" -+- Hot Leg MU 130 - 1 MV 019 ---- 062-2" --*- PZR Spray Line HV'9201 f ' m

_. _ _... ~ l i TABLE 5.3 NORMALLY CLOSED VALVES IN LEAK PATHS Valve No. Manufacturer DesertDtion 1208-MU-065 Kerotest 2" Series 1500#, Y-Type Globe (Note 1) 1208-MU-005 Karotest 2" Series 1500#, Y-Type Globe .1208-MU-154' Kerotest -2" Series 1500#, Y-Type Globe 1208-MU-130 Kerotest 2" Series 1500#, Y-Type Globe 1204-HV-9323 Target Rock 2" Globe, Y-Pattern, Motor Operated j 1204-HV-9326 Target Rock 2" Globe, Y-Pattern, Motor Operated 1204-HV-9329 Target-Rock 2" Globe, Y-Pattern, Motor Operated -1204-HV-9332 Target Rock 2" Globe, Y-Pattern, Motor Operated 1204-HV-9420 Target Rock 3" Globe, Y-Pattern, Motor Operated- .1204-HV-9434-Target Rock. 3" Globe, Y-Pattern, Motor Operated s. e s s F ' Note 1:. Farley-2 BIT Leaking Valve was Kerotest 1" Y-Type Globe. Q so i

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l .i '1 i -TABLE 5.4-LAST CHECK VALVE IN LEAK PATHS Valve No. Manufacturer Description 1204-MU-027 Anchor / Darling 12" 1500#_ Tilt 01sk-4:" . 1204-MU-029 Anchor / Darling 12" 1500# Tilt Disk. 1204-W-031 Anchor / Darling 12" 1500# Tilt Disk = ' 1204-W-033 Anchor / Darling 12" 1500# Tilt Disk 1204-MU-152-Anchor / Darling 3" 1500# Tilt Disk 1204-W-157 Anchor / Darling 3" 1500# Tilt D1sk i V 4 1201-W-019 Kerotest 2" Series'1513. Y-Type (Spring Disk) o . ) -- i I -l I - ,7 ~ - 4 P\\ ' ', 3g 3 -h,\\)I -

w ( I. lC, 5.3 Lines Connected to the RCS Cold Leo Pinine There are four 12" Safety Injection (SI) lines connected to the ,,pm L RCS cold leg primary loop piping. These lines are connected to the RCS through top entry nozzles.- Check valves are located with respect to the RCS for the four lines, 1204-043, 044, 045, and 046, as shown on Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, respectively.- These 7 lines are isolated from the 2500 psi charging pumps by three closed valves in series as shown on Figure 4.1 and Table 5.2. ) o i Therefore leakage if it is-to occur, requires all.three normally closed valves in each of the leak paths to leak. This is a significant difference from the piping arrangement on Farley where-L a single valve leak allowed the charging pump to pressurize the 1 ECCS/RHR lines. The geometry of the SONGS 2 and 3-piping between the last check valve and the RCS connection is similar to Farley because they are s> both top entry lines. However, the SONGS piping is less susceptible to the phenomenon of large temperature fluctuations at l o the check valve because of the increased distance from the hot RCS cold leg piping. These lines are characterized as shown in o Figure 5.1B with length-to-diameter (L/D) ratios ranging from 8.4 g to 9.7. Calculations (Appendix A) show that the temperatures just N L downstream of the check valves are considerably lower than those b measured at Farley as shown in Table 5.5. The calculated i temperatures for Farley are approximately the same as the measured { L H', (L..

i r i data as reported in Reference 2. These temperatures are calculated assuming no flow across the check valve. Table 5.5 - r shows that the temperatures on the SONGS unisolable piping at the check ~ valve-are much lower, averaging 300'F less. If the check valve were to open and close on these lines, cold water injection can be expected to mix with warm water with significantly less severe stress cycling in the pipe wall compared to Farley. However, the problem of thermal' cyclic fatigue stress, although less severe, is still possible for these lines if cold water i leakage from pressures greater than the RCS pressure is allowed to occur upstream of the check valve. i i Y h

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1 glg" i f f ) h ( / 0 l MuoBS Q/204 - 0% -/2 ") 4 ~i V s T- ~ O ~ 9 .1 Y ( .J-(20/-O/O-50") LOOP 28, coi.D LEG FIGJRE 5.5 SIS LINE NO.~046 LAST CHECK VALVE TO RCS l

'i v.; 1 TABLE 5.5 CALCULATED PIPE TEMPERATURE AT CHECK VALVE FOR SI/SC 12" LINES Distance to . SONGS 2&3 Cold leg Temperature Line No. L/Do Ratio 'F-Comment i204-043 9.4 160 ) 1204-044 '9.7 150 L 1204-045 8.4 185 1204-046 8.5 170 i 'Farley-2 i 1 Falled ECCS/RHR 5.5' 475 Calculated 495 Top Measured 490 Bottom Measured M -l n l 1

t l I 5.3.1: Operation Assessment These four cold leg Safety Injection-(SI) lines are . instrumented with pressure transmitters, indicators, and 7 switches tied to a control room alarm. The cold leg-SI headers are normally pressurized to Safety Injection Tank (SIT) pressure of 600 psig. The expected cause for o pressure to increase above 600 1.sig in the line upstream of a the check valve is backflow from t'io RCS through a leaking i 12" check valve itself. This is more probable than leakage' from the charging pumps through the taree isolation valves-in series,.all of which must leak, Cu. rent procedures for= the operation of this system were reviewed. Alarm Response Procedures (ARP) (References 11, 12) indicate an alarm is' given in the control-room when the header pressure exceeds 1,000 psig. Operating procedures require recirculation of H the SI header water to maintain boron concentration when the alarm is given. A' portion of the P&ID showlng,the 600 psig SIT,-header pressure indicator, pressure switch, 'l and remotely operable valves directing water to the Rea'. tor R Coolant Drain Tank is shown in Figure 5.6 for Line 044. This is typical for.all four SI 12" lines. Based on a review of plant operating history for each Unit, it is concluded that none of these lines has been pressurtzed to greater than RCS pressure, except deliberately for a brief period during periodic SI check valve testing.

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40113An6_ FIGURE 5.6.

1 L, 5.3.2-Summary I u These four cold leg-SI lines have geometric similarity of piping near.the RCS loop connection compared to the ECCS/RHR line which failed at Farley-2.

However,

i significant differences exist.

These incluc'e: (1) the leakage path must be through 3 normally closed valves in series rather than a single normally closed valve used at' Farley; (2) the check valve relative distance from the=RCS i cold leg line (L/D ratio) is greater; and (3) the estimated-1 temperatures at the check valves are lower than at Farley. Significantly lower thermal cycIlc stress would be expected- -j if the check valve should be subjected to cold water-pressure higher than the RCS pressure causing check valve-chattering. 1 Procedural controls-limit the header pressure to less than-the RCS pressure. A review of operational history of both Units-confirms that the headers have not been-pressurized to RCS pressure during normal-plant operation. No piping i system changes are necessary to prevent-check valve chattering and associated cold water injection into the I unisolable piping attached to the RCS cold leg loops. y, t. 5.4 Lines Connec'ted to the RCS Hot Lea Pipine There are two Safety Injection (SI) lines connected =to the RCS hot -leg primary loop piping. These lines are connected to the RCS through bottom entry nozzles. These lines are a'16" line which serves Shutdown Cooling and Safety Injection functions, and a 2" Safety Injection (SI) line. -The 16" line and other lines downstream of the check valve are shown in isometric format on Figure 5.7. The last check valve from the high pressure source'1s MU156 on a 3" line, 1204-167-3". The check valve location is characterized as shown on Figure-5.1A. The check valve relative distance L/D ratto is approximately 50 (63' of 16" and 18" pipe) which is so far from the~RCS hot leg line that the pipe temperature on both sides of the check valve will~be at ambient temperature. Therefore, leakage cannot result in temperature cycling'at the check valve. The 2" SI line is shown on Figure 5.8. The last check valve from the high pressure source is MU152 on:a 3" line 1201-147-3". The check valve location is also characterized as shown on Figure 5.1A. The check valve relative distance L/D ratio is 23 (conservatively assuming all 3" pipe). Calculations ~(Appendix A) show that this is far enough from the RCS hot leg line that the pipe temperatures on both sides of the check valve will be at approximately ambient temperature. Therefore, leakage cannot result in temperature cycling at the check valve. 7

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l_ ';L g'. l'

a-l-. i I ,Mcs teot-ocv-12 ") Loop t, Nor Lea f. (24. Solo" l R l ,i t i q t h i

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~ .o .{ qfhu h l . (1201- 018 S ) L "i (/ god -/65-3" ,\\- l Ifl!YZ I \\ / ,y Mulso 2 1 p l o l201 - /47 - S ") t' a~ o ,1 i FIGURE 5.8 LINE N05, 1201-147-3" & 1201-018-2" LAST CHECK VALVE TO RCS sI'. Both of these lines are isolated from the 2500 psi charging pumps by._three closed valves in series as shown on Figure 4.1 and Table p 5.2. Therefore leakage, if it is to occur, requires all three normally closed valves in each leak' path to leak. This is again a i significant difference from the piping arrangement at Farley. Although no thermal cycling will occur in the region of the check l valve for each of these lines, another phenomena can be postulated for these bottom entry lines. Thir is shown'on Figure 5.9 and 1s-characterized as a water column or piston effect with a cyclic movement of water associated with. check valve opening and closing. For bottom entry lines, mixing of hot and cold water by.

convective heat transfer is considerably less significant than that in top entry lines.

The effect of axial cyclic movement of water on the vertical line near the SCS connection can create i y cycile stresses in the pipe wall-if sufficient flow'of cold water ~ occurs during the time the check valve is open. However, the i t

volume of water that is expected to flow at each valve opening i

period is anticipated to be small. The effect of this phenomena for the 16" pipe connection 1s-judged to be insignificant. The potential leak is through two 2" Kerotest and one 3" motor-operated Target Rock Y-pattern valves in series. Leakage can be confidently predicted to be small. A calculation (Appendix A) assuming a worst case equivalent measured

,. t

-) flow during local leak rate testing (LLRT) of a 2" Kerotest Y-pattern valve gave leakage rates corresponding to 0.069 gpm at -l the 265 psi pressure difference between the charging pumps and the J RCS piping. This leakage flow corresponds to an equivalent velocity of 0.0002 FPS for a 16" pipe assuming continuous flow .throgh the check valve. However, we must now postulate a realistic ratio of opening time and closing time to determine the time dependent flow rate. Figure 5.8 shows the relationships between uniform upstream flow, flow when the valve is.open, times, and the pipe area. Based on judgement, the opening time is y L conservatively assumed to be 20% of the opening plus closing time (a small percentage is conservative). Using this ratto. the p calculated flow velocity in the 16" vertical pipe is.approximately 0.001_ FPS (0.5 in/ min) when the check valve-is open, which is tessentially stagnant (normal pipe line flows are typically 6 to 20 FPS). This very conservative value for potential cold water' motion in l l the 16" line is judged to be inconsequential from a pipe thermal l l> cyclic stress standpoint. Both conduction and convective heat l_ transfer-will prevent cycite temperature differences in the line for this very slow movement of water. Therefore, even if leakage .did occur through the upstream isolation valves, no significant thermal stresses will be created in this 16" line near the RCS connection... - a

. - ~ [ ..~ t i RCS l 4 d x = -=V o ( t) ' COLD WATER LINE d j t OL* N d Qo ^P - l t QL = Leak rate through rpstream N/C valve d '= cold water piston effect displacement near RCS x V = Velocity of water movement near RCS + o Qo = Flow rate when check valve is open A = Pipe area near RCS p l to = Time when check valve is closed per cycle l to. = Tim when check valve is open per cycle Qo i o O E L D t C o

time, t+

l Qo = Qg (to + te) ; Vo = } 1:. to Ap FIGURE 5.9 TIME DEPENDENT FLUID FLOW

A _g, ed i The.effect of cyclicLaxial (piston) motion-in the bottom entry 2" line can be similarly calculated. All of the previous assumptions -are valid. However, the much smaller area of:the 2"-line gives a corresponding larger calculated flow velocity. The leakage flow g (from the same LLRT correlation) corresponds to an equivalent' . velocity.of 0.01 FPS for a 2" pipe. Using the 20% ratio of valve closed time to total valve cycle time gives a calculated. velocity ~ of 0.05 FPS (36 in/ min) when the check valve is open.- This very conservative value for potential cold water motion in the 2" line is large enough that the potential for cyclic thermal-pipe stresses exists in the line near the-RCS Hot Leg. Review of the nozzle geometry as shown on Figure 5.8 shows that a reinforced section extends l'-2" from the hot leg pipe. This reduces overall stresses in the nozzle. Potential thermal cyclic stresses at the 2" pipe to nozzle connection are. judged to.be possible and would need further evaluation if.the leakage rate through the-three isolation valves is similar to that postulated In this evaluation. It is noted, however, that small-piping,1s less susceptible to high thermal stresses because the relative pipe metaiLvolume to water volume is significantly greater than for large piping. Therefore, metal conduction in the pipe wall-15 more significant than in large pipe which reduces the effect of fluid to metal heat transfer created stresses. Also, because the fluid motion is distributed over the total pipe area over a length ' s t 4

n; of pipe with a nominal thermal gradient, thermal stresses'would be significantly lower than the localized high cyclic stresses which occurred in the Farley-2 ECCS line. .In-service non-destructive examination (NDE) of this line was performed on SONGS Unit 2 by dye-penetrant testing (PT). The pipe to nozzle weld was inspected in November 1984_and the, check valve to pipe and pipe to 45' elbow was inspected in April of 1986. No-Indications were found. It is noted, however, that PT examination would only_ find through-wall cracks for cracks initiated on the pipe.ID which would be expected for thermal cyclic stress associated with the postulated phenomena discussed in this section. 5.4.1 Ooeration Assessment Pressure transmitters with control room readouts are installed upstream of the last check valve on each of the two lines. This instrumentation is similar to that used on the 12" Cold Leg SI lines. Figure-5.10 showscthe P&ID portion showing this instrumentation for both lines. Control room alarms were also provided for both lines; however, the alarm was removed several years ago from the 16" Hot Leg SI header because of chronic alarms. The chronic alarms were probably caused by a small amount of leakage from the charging pumps into a very small volume of.

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5 n ~, 3 l pipe (approximately one gallon) between the last' isolation' l valve and the RCS loop. check valve. The-alarm function for header pressure greater than 1,000 psig remains for the 2" Nat leg SI line to RCS Loop 1. The Safety Injection System .) 1 Operating Instructions (Reference 13) specifies corrective actions to depressurize the RCS Hot Leg injection headers upon high pressure annunciation. l Y The Hot Leg SI headers are depressurized to the Reactor Coolant Orain Tank by opering valve HV-9437 for Loop 1 or valve HV-9433 for. Loop 2, which are shown on Figure 5.10. i Based on a review of plant operating history for each unit, q lt is concluded that the 2" Hot Leg SI header has not been ) pressurized.to greater than:RCS pressure, except-l deliberately for a brief period during periodic checkivalve testing. Leakage, if it did occur, into the 16" Hot Leg SI I header would not cau3e thermal stresses as shown in the preceding section. l lH -5.4.2 Summary The:e two lines have check valves located remote enough from the hot RCS piping that temperature cycling at a check valve will not occur. Like the four 12" SI lines, leakage L can only occur through 3 normally closeo valves in series.

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s e rather than a single normally closed valve as at Farley. Leakage,.lf it were to occur at any plausible rate will not create: significant thermal cycling in the 16" header because of very low fluid velocity. If leakage occurred, .some potential thermal cycling and associated pipe' stresses could occur in the 2" line at the nozzle connection to the RCS hot leg; however, operational' controls have= precluded such leakage. Nondestructive surface exams done as part of the normal NDE process have not resulted in any indications for this Hot Leg SI line on SONGS 2 as shown by the NDE resultsLin Appendix B. Nol piping system changes are necessary to prevent check m valve chattering and associated cold water injection.into the unisolable piping attached to the RCS Hot Leg. loops. . Procedural controls are-in place for the 2" SI line'to: I limit the header pressure in these-lines to less.than RCS pressure, similar to procedures available for.the.1," Cold 2 . Leg Safety Injection lines, to' eliminate the potential for cold water leakage into the unisolable piping attached to the RCS. I m a

• j j

j 5.5-Lines Connected to the Pressurizer Soray Line - The 2" Pressurizer Auxillary Spray line ts-connected to the unisolable portion of the Pressurizer (PZR) Spray.line. Thi s __line - y is 1201-060-2" which connects to the P2R Spray-line, 1201-012-4"'. Line 1201-060 contains a check valve, MU019, which is downstream from both the Regenerative Heat Exchanger and the Charging Pumps. - Isolation from Charging Pump high pressure cold water is provided by a single normally closed containment isolation valve, MU130, 1 l outside' containment at penetration 68. Figure 5.11 shows the piping in isometric form from the Regenerative H, and from tho' normally closed containment isolation valve to the pressurizer.. Figure 5.12 shows the physical location of the last auxiliary spray line check valve upstream of the Pressurizer Spray.line, l Figure 4.1 and Table 5.2 show that leakage through elther of two closed valves which are in parallel can provide high pressure water'to the spray line. One potential leak path is,through the

normal auxiliary spray line, 1208-ML-011-2", which is' isolated by motor operated valve, HV9201.

This line normally provides water from the Regenerative H at a temperature of approximately. x 470*F. During normal operation this line is isolated and stagnant water in the line between the H and valve HV 9201 will be at-x ambient temperature of approximately 100'F. 1

• /.s N

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e. f f } 72;7 PMSSUM/ZEA ( n GPMAY MI5EA F t I10/-0/2* $% =d - x ~s-y i It 0 1 0 6 0 - 2 "-, N! ri i f*RMO7FM ,I cHK, VALVE, O' fluo /9 l I i g /[% 7D \\ 4 coto trG = 4 PV C100A FMOM: l I. REGEN NX THRU NV-920/ 2, Vc/CHAMGING FUMFS THMU NN coNTAINNENT /$0LA7/0N VALVE,MU/SO L l-L I. l. FIGURE 5,12 PRESSURIZER SPRAY LINE CHECK VALVE CONFIGURATION L l

i 4 The other potential leak path is through the normally closed remote manual containment isolation valve, MU130. This line is exposed to cola water at the Charging Pump operating pressure of 2500 psi. Leakage through this single valve would allow high pressure cold water to reach check valve MU019 which is only 5 inches f rom the pressurizer spray line which operates under a low flow condition of 550*F water from the RCS Cold Leg as part of the normal pressurizer spray line function. This condition is similar to the Farley-2 ECCS line which failed. The check valve is close to a hot, unisolable line with only a single isolation valve between it and the high pressure Charging Pumps. Coincidentally the leaking 1 solation valve at Farley-2 and the potential leaking vilve, MU130, are both Kerotest Y-pattern glove valves, of l' size i l and 2" size respectively as shown in Table 5.3. l l-Since there are two potential leak paths into the pressurizer spray line, each case is evaluated for potential thermal cycling. 5.5.1 Leakane Throuch HV9201 Leakage through motor operated valve HV9201 will allow hot -l water from the Regenerative H, d W h M N pressure of 2500 psi to reach the last check valve, MU019. l The evaluation of this case need only consider the potential that HV9201 starts leaking during normal i l l -s2-l 1;

I e j i t operation. The water between the normally flowing Regenerative Hx discharge line, 1208-009-2", and the check l valve on line 1201-060-2" is stagnant water at ambient temperature (assumed to be approximately 100*F). Review of Figure 5.11 snows that the total length of 2-inch piping from the Regenerative H, discharge line to MU019 is i approximately 38 feet. This is equivalent to a total volume c of 4.4 gallons of water. Therefore, after the first 4.4 gallons of leakage has occurred, the leakage into the j hot pressurtzer spray line will be hot water from the i Regenerative H,. Therefore after a few cycles of check l valve opening and closing, the pipe will be warmed by any [ significant leakage flow and there will be no significant number of. thermal cycles occurring. Also, the energy transfer possible from this small amount of water is l t insignificant '.oth respect to that needed to cause fatigue 1 l damage to the Alping, i L 5.5.2 Leakane Throuah MU130' 1 leakage through the containment isolation valve, MU130, will allow cold water at the Charging Pump pressure of 2500 l psi to reach the last check valve, %019, adjacent to the hot pressurizer spray line. Since the check valve is so L close to the hot Itne, the potential for thermal cycling is , l b

~ great if the check valve opens and closes (chatters). The check valve is a 2" Kerotest Y-pattern spring loaded disk type. These valves normally require a 3-10 psi pressure differential to open. This type c valve would allow flow in in annular pattern when it opens the small amount needed to allow the leakage flow to pass. This is postulated to be less severe than the flow pattern from a swing or tilt disk which allows flow in a local zone at the bottom of the pipe. However, because of the close proximity of the MUO19 check valve to the hot pressurtzer spray line, 1201-012-4", significant thermal cycling might occur if MU019 chatters. Because the single closed valve, MU130 serves as a containment isolation valve, leak rate testing (LLRT) is performed on this valve. Test data sinct startup of Units 2 and 3 has been reviewed. Maximum measured leakage (Appendix B) corrected for the pressure difference (265 pst in operation versus the 68 pst LLRT pressure) gives a leakage flow of 0.069 GPM (prior to valve servicing). This flow is believed to be low enough so that conduction heat transfer between the 4" pressurizer spray line and the 2" line with the check valve will warm the water upstream of the check valve to limit thermal cycling if the check valve opens and closes. The evaluation of check valve opening time versus closing time in Section 5.4 as presented in a i Figure 5.9 is valid. This evaluation shows that cold water velocity for this leak rate will be 0.05 FPS (36 in/ min) in the 2-inch line if valve chattering occurs with a 20% opening time per cycle. Detailed calculations would be necessary to accurately predict thermal stresses for this potential condition. Also, because valve WJ130 leakage ] I rates could increase, the potential for thermal cytilng and ] l the associated thermal fatigue stress in the juncture at the check valve and tee connection of line 1201-060-2" and 1201-012-4" cannot be discounted, j Review of the potential for stratification in the tone of 4 leakage flow cold water injection shows that this is not I possible. Cold water injection through the check valve j occurs at a short distance (5 inches) from a vertical run f of the het pressurizer spray line as shown on Figure 5.11. Sufficient mixing will occur in the 9 feet of vertical run so that stratification cannot occur in the downstream long l t (27') hortrontal section of the pressurizer spray line. 5.5.3 operational Assessment u l The flow path from the Regenerative H through motor x operated valve, 2HV9201, to the pressurizer spray line functions as an auxiliary spray line to facilitate depressurization of the RCS during natural cir:ulation < ~

j ~ plant cool-downs. Hot water from the H, replaces the 550*F water from the RCS cold leg at the normal pressurizer spray flow of 5 to 10 GPM. This flow path has been considered as part of the operational modes of the plant j i and_the associated piping stress analyses. The leakage flow condition would not significantly impact the fatigue life of the system since pot 0ntial Cold water flow injection is insignificant because of the limited volume of cold water available. The Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray 8ypass flow path from the charging pumps through the containment isolation valve to the pressurizer spray line is provided for a station blackout condition with a loss of power to the motor operated valve 2HV9201. Therefore, MU130 would only be opened to provide pressurizer spray line flow to allow controlled depressurization of the reactor, if required during station blackout. This system has not been used during the Unit 2 or Unit 3 plant operating history. However, valve MU130 serves as a containment isolation valve and therefore is under the Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) program. Data since plant startup has shown that this valve has failed LLRT requirements at least once on both Unit 2 and 3 during their life (Appendix B). Maximum leak rates correspond ta 0.07 GPM nrior to valve servicing to reestablish the LLRT acceptance level leak rate., w ,e,-,- ,w y,- n s, ,wn-

5.5.4 Summary The potential for thermal cycling caused by high pressure cold water leakage from the Charging Pumps through a single isolation valve Mul30, causing chattering of a check valve was postulated. Because of the proximity of the check valve, MU019, to the hot pressurizer spray line, the configuration is similar to the configuration at Farley-2 which resulted in fatigue of the piping in an unisolable portion of the RCS. The isolation valve is also the same manufacture and type. However, the SONGS valve is under the LLRT program and is periodically tested and serviced. This is not tree for the leaking valve on the Boron Injection system at Farley. Although no leak rate data is available for this single valve at Farley, the temporary modification to limit pressure upstream of the check valve on the ECCS line resulted in an integrated leak rate, including this valve, measured at I to 2 GPM (Reference 8). I

6.0 CONCLUSION

S i L Conclusions are derived based on the detailed evaluation of the SONGS piping system arrangements, the review of the SONGS operating history with cognizant engineers, the information obtained about the failure at the Farley-2 plant on the calculations performed for temperatures and flow rates provided in Appendix A, and on site data provided in Appendix 8. 1 For unisolable piping connected to the RCS hot and cold leg primary [ i coolant system piping, the following conclusions were reached: 1. To date, the three isolation valves in series have provided an effective barrier in preventing the SI headsrs from being j pressurized by the charging pumps to a pressure greater than the RCS pressure, precluding inadvertent cold water leakage through the last check valve into the RCS on each of these six lines. 1 l 2. The SONGS piping configuration of the four cold leg safety injection 12" lines is less susceptible than Farley to high thermal cycile stresses if high pressure cold water should pressurize the lines causing check valve chattering because the SONGS check valves are further away from the RCS piping than at Farley... -.

l l I 3. The 2" SI line nozzle connection to the RCS hot leg loop piping l-would be susceptible to thermal cyclic stresses due to cold water cyclic axial flow if the line were subjected to significant high pressure cold water leakage with check valve chattering. 4. Operational procedures currently in place to prevent pressures from exceeding 1000 pst in the SI headers, in the event of backflow from the RCS through leakage v, dough the last check valves, have been effective in preventing cold water injection from the charging pumps into the unisolable RCS piping, except for the 16" hot leg injection header to RC Loop 2. Leakage from the charging pumps to the RCS through this header would not result in significant thermal stresses. 5. No unaccounted-for thermal stresses due to high pressure cold water injection have occurred in these six lines to date, precluding the need for fatigue analysis to account for the potential concerns addressed in NRCB 88-08. For piping connected to the unisolable portion of the pressurizer spray line, the following conclusions were reached: 6. The limited supply of cold water in the auxiliary spray line supplied by the Regenerative H precludes the occurrence of ( x sufficient thermal cycles to have adverse effects on the connection to the RCS. i +.

i j 7. The single containment isolation valve, MU130, for the auxiliary spray bypass line may have allowed cold water leakage into the hot pressurizer spray line based on LLRT results for SONGS 2 and 3. 8. The last check valve, MUO19, on the pressurizer auxiliary spray line is so close to the hot spray line that the mechentse which caused pipe cracking at Farley could occur in the tone of the 2" line to 4" Ilne connection. 9. It is concluded that the tee downstream of check valve MU019 may have been subjected to unaccounted-for thermal stresses from temperature oscillations induced by leakage of upstress isolation valve, MU130. Because of the low leakage rates found li: LLRT to date and the differences in the check valve design, thermal stresses should be lower than those which occurred that caused failure of the Farley-2 ECCS line. k F 9 k 60- -w. ,m .,w -m-, ~

. - - _ ~ 't. 0 RECOMMENDATIONS Short-tetin and long-tem recommendations are provided to prevent high l pressure cold water leakage into the RCS unisolable piping. Implerentation of any long-term reconnendation required should be completed by the end of the next refueling outage to comply with the requirements of NRC Sulletin 88-08. ) 7.1 Lines Connected to the RCS Cold Leo and Hot Lea Pioina Short Term 1. Maintain current procedures to limit pressure in the six-SI/SC headers to less than the RCS pressure to prevent cold l water injection through the last check valves. Lona Tem-1. Reconnect the high pressure alarm from PT9422 for the 16" SI header for RCS Hot Leg 2. t 2. Enhance the plant alarm response procedures for the SI l headers to provide additional assurance that corrective l actions will be required to preclude header pressure from operating at RCS pressure for a significant time (8 hours). l l \\

1 3. In the event long-term recommendation 2 is not practical to 1mplement, modify the piping system to prevent leakage j through the single closed isolation valve, MUO65, from pressurizing the six headers to a pressure greater than the RCS pressure. Two options are provided: ) a. Add a relief line for leakage flow just downstream of I MUO65 as shown in Figure 7.1. This creates a path I i back to the charging pump suction line for leakage l 1 through MUO65 which is the first closed valve in the 1 leak path to all six SI lines connected to the RCS loop piping. A local pressure gauge is recommended to allow periodic monitoring of leakage into this bypass L i line. ) i b. Provide a spectacle flange near or in place of MUO65 to prevent leakage flow during normal ontration. { Manual flange reorientation would be required during SI header check valve testing done during the refueling outage. l' l .r ,,,._.r.,

.. x ~ s,c M e x. ,7 ....,.43:. ....... g,. ) y lp,u i &**.hL .O y wrt I. ~ .g i+.. r,. . 1e_-.. .,.H -l4 (e x _ -l@ @'~ -lO .g '86 s..j { g-g4.m,-.. ~ ~ v 9 -@ ss p m

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e v 4,.H-!. ."<aara -,. uu. a.s -1 ".1 I - ).'.m} t ;

ge'-

o' c em .., usu.as t m- ~ e_w. q %l i g je =a, m,_ [w'4._,, ora. 1_ Antamit to PSV M 1 .....&.&.........@~ +e ?<<%'LL ~ VALV& aa -l

• e _

p ya-

awIue, e s e y ~

x_, e=..1 =3 4 cl

• s.

a g-.. dio i lp* 1,, @ M{% g I_v$ ,p se h-[ h Hf, _,,T g I D v 4 i.~$e'. W ) f.e"9[ I' W@_. m,,%, 7 4 a g-9 A ^ u l' J,,,,,, ,a t-n g I f I j ~ i -l M I daino y h-! y @g*"~g@ v }! - g 3 g { czhkEDGUED ^ ,l 1 u I .t FIGURE 7.1 RELIEF LINE FOR ISOLATION VALVE t.EAKAGE \\

+ l i 7.2 Line Connected to the Pressurizer $nraw Line Lone Tore 1. Perform NDE using an appropriate volumetric inspection I method such as ultrasonic testing (UT) in the vicinity of i the 2" auxiliary spray line to the 4' PZR spray line connection. Alternatively, surf ace inspection of the inside i surfaces is acceptable if the line is cut to gain access. Inspection should include the two welds and base metal in the region shown on Figure 7.2. This inspection is required to determine if any internal cracking has occurred A t to cold water injection through past leakage through uPre MU130. Alternatively, the spool containing welds NH and MJ crA be replaced, eliminating the need for NDE in th h area. ? Replacement of the 4x4x2 reducing tee is recomended if i defects are found or in place of NDE if this is cost etfective. l l 2. Modify the piping system to prevent high cyclic stresses due to postulated check valve chattering. Modifications recomended include: a. Relocate check valve MU019 upstream to a portion of the 2' line which is nominally at ambient temperature., y

l i ( %r i v CHEC K VALVE yp MUO 19.. i BASE ME TA L > -J l u g ( / T 0 \\ )i 12 OI ML- 06 0- 2" Q __ % / ( / i 1. MH MJ L l C V .4"x 4"x 2" RED. TEE /2 O /- ML - O / 2-4',' l FIGURE 7.2 P7,R SPRAY LINE NDE RECOW4 ENDED S .r_,. e.-, .,.,_..._,...----....m. .-m.-e -m.-----------------

b. Provide a thermal sleeve at the intersection of the i pressurizer auxiliary spray line and the pressurizer spray line as shown in Figure 7.3. This modification is not required but would enhance thermal stress reductions. 3. Alternatively, temperature sensors and monitoring equipme nt can be installed on the 2" line just downstream of check 4 valve MU019. This approach has been effective on Farley to determine if temperature cycling occurs due to check valve i chattering. h .t ;

I' o n\\W " \\k i \\ New snu woru rmant steeve l 12 "t. G. l /\\l [NhtelINff8eet\\%'xxs ne (s.n T WHf//M V////// O W qxNM t m e ss s e s \\ .st,- s m\\ smss 1 i / 30 ( e' s s T \\ \\ T \\T '\\ \\\\\\ \\ \\ \\ T T \\\\\\T \\T ( A//////{ Y ////////A\\ \\ \\ a ~ D ft/5T/M6 2 'swo /40 ~~+- i (70 nme onsrim rare),, \\ )': /r~' 5N PER Senationo h\\ p - ,s t $lt$$?uave t YW" 20 ^' l

• rts "'

( i \\w_- FIGURE 7.3 THERMAL SLEEVE DESIGN FOR TEE CONNECTION l

.. ~ _. _. _ - _. _ - _ _ -. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ i 1

8.0 REFERENCES

l 1. NRC Information Notice No. 88-01: Safety Injection Pipe Failure. 2. NRC Sulletin No. 88-06: Thermal Stresses in Siping Connected to Reactor Coolant Systems. 3. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08 Supplement 1: Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Coc' ant Systems. 4. ISEG Action Request, 88-ISEG-012, dated June 6, 1988; to: J. T. Reilly, from D. A. Herbst. 5. ISEG Action Request, 88-ISEG-097, dated July 27, 1988 to: J. J. Wambold, from D. A. Herbst. 6. ASME PVP conference, June 1988 " Fatigue Degradation of Nozzles and Ptplag in a PWR Reactor Coolant System. 7. Memorandum dated August 2, 1988, G. Esswein to A. Sistos; Farley ECCS Failure. 8. Memorandum dated August 3, 1988, G. Esswein to A. Sistos; Farley ECS Failure. 9. Interim Report for P1ps 8ending Phenomenon of the Pressurizer Surge Line, SONGS 3, 8echtel Western Power Corporation, July 1988.. -e --e -,,,,--.,.,,s , - --..,, - - -a e-e+,e ,-,, - - ~, - - v- - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

.~

8.0 REFERENCES

(CONT'D) 10. An Investigation of Piping Bending Phenomenon of Feedwater Line 393-10"-EG, Bechtel Western Power Company, March 1988. 11. Operating Instruction, 5023-5-2.9 E SF 57A Alarm Response Procedure, Rev. 5. i 12. Operating Instruction. S023-5-2.10 E SF 578 Alarm Response Procedure, Rev. 4. i 13. Operating Instruction, 5023-3-2.7 Safety Injection System Operation, Rev. 8. t 14. SONGS 2/3 System Descriptions l. 1. 50-5023-360 Reactor Coolant System 2. 50-5023-390 Chemical and Volume Control System 3. 50-5023-740 Safety Injection, Containment Spray, and Shutdown Cooling Systems 15. Ooerator Surveillance Test, 5023-3-3.31.1 Rev. 2 TCN 2-10. RCS Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Rate Measurement. ~ l _ .. ~

t t 8.1 Drawines 40111A-13 Reactor Coolant System System No. 1201 401118-10 t 40112A-15 Safety Injection System, System No. 1204 40112C-6 401120-4 40113A-6 401138-6 40123A-8 Reactor Coolant Chemical and Volume Control System, 401248-12 System No. 1208 i i k l 1 8006q t

• ga.

.+ -a --..---.-n+,.-.ws.-,s 4 A-=. m,* ~ _ - - 4 8 APPEN0!X A i CALCULATIONS I i ? (. I I l B l l. r a f 4 l i A-1 l l

'k ^ ENGINEEQlNG DEMOTMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET ?^'! V : ' ' ^ ~ ~ ~ - E I -f E _. it *'*'s,,..._ .v.s.e s. ~ ....., A n ,m en. f/6/F P I e m.,_ HEAR %nme Mocet s e m R ou ro Hor %.% r m u r a s 1. FOR Top En re v Po ernc T.e I I- [ y; I -2 yg h t W.us. 30 t h \\ i <> 3 s j \\ 'd' xo---- --75 h INSULATION L 8 MlX/Nd - i l 4O Pipe ar Source 7 Ear, T,,ro 40e p u e M f Flo w 'l Ts 4 } \\ i .H. FO R E s ~:M EnrRY hpius ( ? ,- MIXING l Flow P Ts l' / ' ' ' I* Pipe Arsovece Time, Ts, ro l O p x. o -...Iv Ts (WorH MINIM &M 0F b tucHE5) } IDp l $ TAGNANT Fl O \\ Q g 'f,, ) f i i -p ,g-1 i '\\ -.......,.., ;.. i

} ENOINEERIND DEPARTMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET l Mf' ' U 'l ? # SOE ? ".' *,*u.,,...... eves.cs ....., S b 4 w, .... l L' /i l e...._ 1 3 TEADY Srpri i nigog &pHMei D;T2!.?uriCil I. Nisraccotos1 TREAT THE SP!/OP1N /C /W IN T/thTE 20D VV/TH CNE inD ara i/>'ED TENT'EWA TllRE 1 s i c", /) 5 $y/n PTION: I. Hear Teim:rie :. 1arouien rue instit.arioti 2, THe re.m;ci'Ar ia's Dirrerince Acros: ras pipe watt / :, NM//4/dL E

3..TN5 tit.A7/ou It, k!% s.?EN:ITY fiOArdlh5S t

t f 0 CNOUC 7/Vlr/ES A CE A f A ' N$MINA L TEM A or 300 Y S. A u. P1omr,i.: stom/m.Thd

5. Anwsis hveom Faou Petr u nce

, Fo2 A N IM Rtu TEL Y LON(r 200. / l7(x) G l Ts' H (

.x i

t4 Px */n A -9u%A 1) T(x) - 7~,,, c _e Ts-T:,o FOR A PIPE F/LLED W/THN 0, COUERED BY avsut:ATDV.' 2 A=A PIPE c20s: recryoN C' 0,0 (N O p k = k y = ccupourt ruunw.ccNoacnvnor Pn& e P = PE Punt TE 2 A T /t/.Sulp noN OD (ff) l. Vc = CVERAU HEAT 77dANTTER c'OEFftCIENr(8TU//p. (/.' Of) l -........,..,i..>

$ ## gysmas,g '"88' ENOINEEQlND DEPAQTMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET 30// C 7.I t/r ?? 2M2

y,,,,..

f ..... Se M ? h rh f em., __ $0NIN6 FCR Ne{$ 2) May = h ;' AM 0 ' Nsiee{ Ag,,1 2 Ap wuses ; k,= 40 btu /he *F-f4 g k,gt =

9. 8 STN/le *F.Il (30433 93m*F; esr. Ah g7 T*NEN) 3)

Ka ff = . + 0 A u,o + 9.8 A,,,,. g 7eg, _,,, g, s Ap f~og THE INsutAr!0N me wr rcsoo.:ce ibeerEe; /, "1 Asrueria 4 2 L & UO Wl f~ Q t f s) P = 17 D, a 'If(Df i g, ? op r THE ovettu vur Tmsrs merr:civir; 5 ../ v s) # = C + D o in ( D o / 0,') Ay, o i I he 2k t WHe te, h - Fiiu Cormaenr ro A1.2 2.0 Bru/ha-l+ ? 'F (eer. A t ) e D, - Iti:uuriou 0. D."- D, t 2f ((9) 'O Dp hpe 0. D'.' (fD /2 ki = insvarion ruteen comerwrr. 0.4 erajg.g,y;g 033870ll,g.ff.op (2ed 3 ) = l 0N* f + 12 x 2 x 0.03bD. In(D*/or) C =- \\ -............,i..

.n_. EN@lNEEQlNO DEPAQTMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET DiMi e1 i.- _, 7,?-or ....., A : s 6 rI:sls 8,,,..., En.%mr, rue esamous nesoro n : owr no m) n x A ee ; / 3) M. y = . 'o A u, o r 9. 8 A,,,,,, . 40 Ay, o + 9. 9 A,7,,e Ap Ag,o r A,,,,, +)' P = X ( Dc + 2 h ) w irs o < h in km p 12 I I wirn D, in in em 0, "' ' i + D '",l**/Dd a50 + t.2f D. In(Dk,,) y, -X U wum Ap n in' ), T(x) - T, + T - T,) e N e P,/%UA%4 i THE foll O WING CA L Ct/L A r/cNS AN D TAfif5 ARE THf SOLU TIONS TO THf:E E QU AT/Otis F0R vA 2iQu: St EE PIPE 3 0 P (N rdRE57~. l l l

==........., (..)

T: 87'"' ENOINEE2 NO DEPAQTMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET _ s'ru65 d3 n -it-Of ...., L Saa ..,. d x / u ?ASE $ 2 INC$ ::- :at /60 P've, Sforn/ns Streu InwtA ma - TYPE CHC, 3 "dh'(k i Pq opet rigs o r 2 ' S.'.'. a 9..=e, A,, - 2.241n ' 0, - O + t t y p i Asurt.= 2.19 !!! " 8.375in og - /.575 /N j 3)' l(* y = . 40 (2.24)+ 9.8[?.I9) =

5. 05 Bru/),g. op. (j

2. 2+ + 2.19 4)'

P = f (2. 375 + 2 (3.o& = 2.19 f6 i I 6 ') //c, = I O. 50 + 1.24 (8.375) In (/ 8. 375 ') O. 50 + 1.2G(t.375XI. 26) 1 rrrs. I/c = 0,0 748 STu/hp. fl *F 1 E ~X Y 0 074E" E9/,o5,4 43 i 5 I)i T(x) = 7,~ +(T, - 7,~ ) e j L l+4 l T,~ +(Ts -T,% x G j.022 'Qt (T - Q) 6 - /. 0ll X

• F 3

Assumej. T,* 100 *F (Ancieur in aursiom7) 7* e G/l 'F (Nor tes,RCS QPE2AritK') Ti= 553 F(mo s) S X(/L) 77x); F X/C, Ex) - L, #F )( Tx)'F X/0, 0 6 l/ 0 5ll .10 47/ I .2 517 1.0 417 40 40+ 2 .5 408

2. 5 308

.79 305 + 1 I.0 2 BG

5. 0 18G l.S8 lyI

?

2. 0 IGS to 68 L.31 I4l il 4.0 10 9 20 9

5.96 /08 20 L 5.9 lol 30 I ........., i.. i I j t

• ~*" b w i f.....

i ENGINEEQlNO DEPARTMENT f C ALCU LATION SHEET D'l 4 IA 'll 'I-#9!

'.*,1.,,......

iv.aet a... $1 ..,, _ i Of !!i,,,,.., Cast E i k INCH SCHO l20 ftGE, 3/mtr.les:.reti ^ il ) Zn:t/U.'iott - T YPE CHC,

4. 5 7 HICK P w u nt3 Y 4 'ica leo Pipe, A,. /p.35m D, = 15. 5 h u

Asrm. 358in' 3)' iQg =. 40 (10. 33) + 9.B(5 58) Dp = 4.50in /033+ 558 3.70 Bru/Ar *.= - R +)' P E ( 4.50 + 2(4. 5)) - 3. 53 fl 12 6)' l/c = I ,I 0.50 + /.2 6 (13. 5) In G?) b.50 +1.24 05.5XI I$, 0.0$2l 8 i u.Q!*r +.s O'052l* 3'53/3.70s1591 o 9 ,v.(r -r) e m s ~ =7;+(r.&g = 7, + (y.. T, ) e. ' of V g b5:wnt G = /WG G= 553 F(ECSeMh ) 3 X(h) l 7tx).*F % r ; &)-To,*." i I 0 553 0 ^ 453 .38 +5I I.0 3SI ,75 374

2. 0 274 I.5 266 4.0 Ibb

3. 0 IGo W.0 60

5. 0 I I(.

13 l6

7. 5 105 20 3

-........., i., i

l .-. " 7 " i 7 '-"" 1 ENGINEEQiNS DEPARTMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET $$//4$ IlI //IIf dd*O8 [**'**,,,,,,,,, , y,,, c, .... 4 2 f:d-me.... z/zshs..... CA t$ $ !//fU ., G, $ ) $/ f7, $!.;qinItL$ $ll!l

n :uu riew - ~~ns :-C>

3'. 5 " THicn I?t o.4.: r Es : = l ; '- : M C s t?E, ho. 21.15dt' JD S425ir y A:rm.15.33/d'i Do - /3.425 /u a)' k'y. 'O(2!.I5)' c.?D!. n) 4.03 21.15 -!! ?$ b P ' E4. +0!N ' 4)' P= _R_ ' (6.625 + 2[!. 5)) = 5.57 12. s)' Q = I I S,5 + /.2 G (13.425) In f / *T 625 ) 0.5 +(1.t Giu2s%7?l), 6.'0 7 7s \\ 6.625/ l)i }) = T' + ( g-7,- ) e -x j o.0 7% K 3. 5.03x34 3 g \\ -x J o.2 a 7 Th -r,,) e. ss s x "F 4 dri - T,) e A sswe 7, - iCo'G i] - 553 'F (Ra :cidled X (fl) 777) *F i %p ' 777)-D,'r \\ O 553 0 953 . 2.6 494 C.S 334 .55 437 f.0 337 I. I 35l 20 23I

2. 2 239

4. 0 13 9

4. 4-14 3

8. 0 4'E G. G II3 12.0 13 II. 0 1 01 20.0 l

l l 1 1 l l. esao m.....,,, (.)

~.... - i 1 . a g.. / 7.... ENDINEEQlNO DEPARTMENT x C ALCU LATION SHEET b fly:-s 2 N tie' 2 2E 0a ..... S 1 Oa ..._Jh546,,,,,.,, c AsE B~ l2 inca

c-c ifo pw,,

5S,n;,n :leel .[n:ula fsn - ryc; cyc, 3, 5 " rwicx Papano n 12 "::->ico ::pe, A, 80.5 in '

b = 12.75 ia

p $* " I I' 7 5 " 3)' Key..M(80$) r 9.3(+7. I), 3. 8 7 !O. 5 r 47. I Ae - t27.s w 4)' P =- fI2.75 +2[3.5)) Q7 R h

6. a =

i C.5t /.2 G (/9. 75.)In (/7 7 5) O.5+(/.2G Yt9.1$f43X). o.o e /1.75 /)i I f/) = le f(T -T& q-y Jo.os7e x 3.17/ Y /1.27x 117. c S I44 -X) 0.132 + .3f4g = /, +($ - 7; )C Tg~ [E-7.~)e Assums 7Q -l00 *Fj f =. 553 'f (Rcs cceo ced )( (19) 77x), *F X/p, m) g;, ';- [ 0 553 0 453 . S3 474 0.5 37+ I. I' 40+ I.0 504-E'I 3 ll 2.0 2_ t l l A.2 /98 A.0 ') 8 f.5 /2/

g. 0 21

12. 8 10 4 12.

+ kl.2. /00 20 0 l' e F y[ es... e.,.....,,,, n e.,) l? s

~ _ _~ saan } s ] op ENQaNEEQiNO DEPA '(MENT C ALCU LATIOtw SHEET m /63 ,3 >KN - ?i-21 i ...., f- ? m.,. n~ :,i e...,. ~ c D3E $ ]6 lNCH, ScND /60 ME, .irtwirss Treeu Jt/.it/t A rior) - T Y P C H C.,

3. 5 " TMick Paomries of :2 ": - ico noe; Aa,, n 12 9. o i + 0 - i s, o o ja 7

Agreu - 72 I at D,. 23,00 ja y)' %y . +0(i29.0 e :.e( c.i). 3.77 b P

• E Ol I i"'

~ .I29.0 f 72.1 4)' P

• g (/6.00+ 2/3.5)) = 4.02

,,0&908h. l I 6He= ^ R o.5 + /.24 ( 2 3.o) In('2 u\\, o.5 +(/.24 Yn.ol. 343) }. j E ~~' u.o ) l)' IQ() : If+ -7 \\ & 3.77' 20 ~ [b./033 _x . 32.z.X &+(Ti-Q,)e =% + (T - T, e = 5 Aswmr 'i,~ = /00'F; l} = 555'F (ecs roso ies) I X (fD Ex), 'F X/D, Wx)- G, 'F 'o 553 0 4 53 V .f7 465

0. 5 bb5 1.33 395 l.o 295 i

2 67 292

2. 0 192.

~ S.33 IBI

4. 0

&l i O. 7 IIS 8,0 lS L /6 103 /2 3 F 27 00 20 0 1 L l l L -.........., i.. e l

l lp o' /7sasats tasst ENGINEEnlNG DEPA ATMENT .C ALCU LATION SHEET N II I!l'c*u"6ation ne - owesect: en vision p 's o ne. esass ov - oteta E 2 c u st. s v _. _,,_eate m Ficune A. I ~ 'l!MPERA rutE DROP FOR 5 74/utiss STsn AF/u6

1. ear le is Fiu.EO Wi TH WA TER A

htNSall); ( / l / f / / / / / // //(s // * [b q //

1. ' E

/ l / / / / / MW j/ 4,_ / 5-2 5cHO 160,3 "INSul. = / A r e- 't SCtIDl20, 4h,INsul. d. {g) ( y 1 g4- 'q & ~scao ICO, 3 h"tNwL. x[3-12'scao MD, 3 4 in5VL. IS"scno 160, 3 h "Insul. [ K P-W - T.et25 E 9,_ -.-.r l l l { l l I l 1 l '~I I l l I 2 3 + 4 7 6 9 10 12 13 I4 m M Elp;pg o g p p { ese ee se,-. nevi.,u te.)

i 1 1 10 L

nw 2h N Ecs-Ei -08 I" " A " 17

$< $m,. ej2ilEl .5E L A*HYC De U A u t C % (NO ) X, s 2Cb ~(5g3*f). TEh1Ps& 70 p 1 (Tc, ') x, p(1'.5") s y ". 4 y,, .io': u t'.3r". ser 4, = ,l (c%cc Vaw,)x Eo% i?"4o,.ig'Q,ypl (Tcd y. So"3o' g,,gg.,g,gg TC, TC i t RTDA RTD's ? rs% so AO' 6' o 9 .t _m 1

n. n

' t,r (W **, >X ( i r 1 i 'o ~17 2'$ (spou soacw,ypeyy 1' - LR EL L .g 3-- f 7'y (#cc cod t.sa) 2 q o a Ts F l. U n lisius Fisune A. I L ( i fT l

Calc,

. mre r, k .h

l. eca n'on f.

77e)*F L A'cN !- .528y476 yl', TC, 1 (MECKVALVF l.3 W $50 TC 5.00 Op 200Y W.I I/5 .~ Farley 2 ECCS Configuration CAn.cuunav5 MWbnD TEnf P. l. non I. rRon NK l (sauerdSE*0E t i a.. n"

I i-.., a-ENGINEERINS DEPARTMENT /7....,. C ALCU LATION SHEET ~ a,jgs- ?i: n, t 1 - EE-02 1 6. 6. c..... L E -a..,.,b In....,- EAKA6s lf E3 * /ELoctTiES THE Ac7t#L LEPXA A E 2/ TES THRouGH NCEMALLY CLOSED VA t VE.5 ARG or IN TECES T To CETE.CMINE FLOWRATES ANO VELoctTIES IN Pinus .nnnEcrEO 70 YHE SEACTOR 000lMT TYSTEM (RCS). l h?k 2ATES 'W iCVE h1U'l30 ALE AVAllA8LE FEOM SON 6.3 2, ? Ano Sw6 3 h s !Epe b E 7Esrs ( L LRTT Tais yetva l $ " Y-PP~rErn SLOSE yAivE MANt/Fh07/EED BY NE20fSi~ l5 A 1 (TME LEAKING /PLVE A f f*P2 ley-E Wh3 h ! " Y-PA77E2W (5 LO8E VP?VEj ALSO ffFNVFAtTJRED "{ iGROTEST (,* E ? ~\\)1 l YALVE MlI~/30 lEt')ES ?) THE SINS.6 /SQLAT/0N BAEE/EE-i DURIN6 PLANT OPERATION BETWEEN THE NI6M P2ES59t? [ Cepesinn kes er 2sco psl Ana raE PaeuweEr DzAY IiNE C?E2ATIN6 AT RCS DGES5u2E OF 2235 ?34 $1NCE 7? tis VALVE IS T YPICA L F02. OTWER NCEMALLY CLOSED VALVES (SEE TA RE 5.3.) BETWEErl cr/A R AltM PUMP F2ES: It:2ES At/D RC5 C 2EE suns, LLRT l DATA 'A t/ EE bt:ED 70 A PPi20xitY) ATE Pos 3ia cE L' LEA K 2?"E$ WH /CH CAN BE VSED FOR THE E VA LtJA TION OF flu /D VEL 0ct T/ES HJ l - PiPiti6 corinecrec To THE RC S. li =..=>......,(..i L

L' ENGINEERINO DEPARTMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET TO//C l/8 /'/ T (7" N !!T,*,",,,,,,..,_ ....., S1 Sud"..,. W3l?e _L L R 7 oers DA TA FOR SON 63 2 m 3 15 A VAIL A B LE FROM Pisur SrAtruP. 1. 7~8s UNir2 r on1 serveen slip /to ANo ioltit7 (Amew B ) SHOW5 THAr THE t/02 Sr L E A t R A TE Pride 70 \\/ALv& SERVic1H6 ?ll2 I17 w / TH A LL PSto2 TES TS SHOWlN6 OCCu22ED 7'l ES SENr/ ALLY uO . inn i =lleN T L E A kh 6c~. SIS LEMtA65 RATE was

• Foe A A P = 71. 3 P5 L (re:r VALuE)

{ r 61 = 0.284 in 5 in 0 II5uta. (measuerob. . 2 4 m '/,,

2. +118 '/mia

= a. THe uiyir3 e nroey serween 2/23/11 mo slii/ra snow.s rnar e l rn.s woe:r t eAn enre peion ro vstvs seevxisis occuaaeo oni l lis/r7 wirn peroa pun.us:causar resr.s n o r o ti e R-l QNE /Yh 6tvirH o E L.2 5 5. 7~ MIS LEAKh6E AATE Wh 5

• Fog A D P = 6 8.1 P 5 i-(TTST VALUED r

( Q =

0. 2 91 it) iN 0.036 M N (MEF:JREDj 2 91 3

ja f,;,, 7,08 ik /mia = .036 l l l l-l ess.. ser e new i.e (e.)

d 6 N -- ENOINEEDING DEPAATMENT C ALCU LATION SHEET 'I / 2/E ///$[F II'N

'.*A.,..... -

ev aev4 r....- a ' M..,. 9 /3 /P 4 = CAi c uia rev ,=~e o n & //l$lt/6 k00hf IEWG DA TA THE FLON 2ATES CAtl BE CA ttut ATED V0e. y Tets GPEEA7touA t. P2E::u2E Ot FFEREN Tlh L, d& Caserrim ; o m,y K o,p,= 0. 03si3 16 / p V n 3 s uon, p = 8 34 %) y, Assame. 1 P g = 2 500 p L (chnyypy hnmpmsuu) e Pg,

2.3 5 y s L (RCS opezAr>y yavuuse, cetatu)

Nwa,' b }} = 2 500-Z235

• 265 psi j

j t L FOR cidce !low a &> is peoroeroonse. ro lA P (Actos 3 VALVELEAk ea rn > Ca tca srin c, Ftow roc e woesr wensaaca i.ne neouem t/wir 3, Mu t30, c f

f. 08 iH '/nla 3 wes ;

&w= 8.08 INNin 8.08 EU 15.9 IN'/mia = a Pr sg.1 t [n 6 PN), THE WORST Mi ASHEE D Lt AC. IS j (J (IL/p b, /5 9'.036/3 pm

• k,,(IN'/mid) x i

1 8.34 () (lb/p/) 0.()b9 6PM (4.146PH) l Q = matY l

-... -......, i. 3 ew w

• t-+-w 1

~ smaat I or -) gust,s. ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT ~ C ALCU LATION SHEET OfM* I/1 t) !: : 3 - Ed -02'

= '.

ae,.,_ /> ! b >.k E' ea,, ? b k I e Caictitsreo 'ipe veiociries f0R VE2 TICAL P I P'!!6 COLD WA TER WILL m0VE IN AU AXtAL D I2CC TION L INE A 'PISTod. FOR A e6/VEN LEAkh6E BATE THE VElocti'l o r COLD v/ATER tu ANY PIPE SIEE CAN BE DETERMINEb A3 } Y l0 CITY, Yp= g[ E A 12 inHe V = N ATi2 V ELoctT Fger / Min. _(FW) V)HE25} f & = LEAN 2hTE, IN / MIN A = PIPE INSIDE A REA = by,9, iM '* f. YS/N6 THE /f)p vitwit M E AS& FEED LLRI~ /283utM FWMU $0 FOR VA 210t/.S 5IEE Pt "E 5, . VELOCITIES A 2E CAlcutATED: G,,, = l5. 9 ja%in j = 0 0@6PM (4.14 6 PH.)

wuru, he Sier ScHo Au,,,ia' Vp., FPM V, FPS p

2" Ib o 2.24 0.59 0.010 4" l20 10.33 0, / 3 0,oot 6" I60 2I.IS 0.065 0.001 I2" 14 0 80.5 0.016 0.0002 I6 " l60 l29. 0 0.0 IO o.0002 --........,i.,

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EN@lNEE RING DEP A51TM ENT C ALCU LATION SHEET '3/4 $ //3 //E.8 Et-of =..,,,,,,,,,._ .,.cy, --..... Z ' d.... 9h h3......- 1 w YOLUME Of \\NA7ER IN Au xit iA e r Sp2A Y linic Fnom FM,URE $* ll THE l.EN6 TH Of 2 flPiN6 FRotn 'THE AN, OMt% uott,QOg-06-f TO CHEM VALVE, M U$l 9 ON UNE' l201- 040- 2 ' In ff FEET, THE WATEol WLinu r PEE roor IN 2 SCHO 140 PIPE IS A PPROX, O. 97 lb/R. A nnrun uw nu + A rEn Ar 1. E lbs/pl, rw TOTAL YQLuine roe THE3 8 S 'r /5 l EE I V = 3 a (+ < a 9 7 iW(t - 4A9 ~ Min. 3 ' y / 3 Its/p/ 4 [ 1 L L

p r ENOINECRINS DEPART MENT C ALCU LATION SHEET J s j L

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l Rereecnces L-1 hI. l-lEA7 7husmission, W.II. Inc ADMs, McGRaw N'iu. PG 17.9 TAate 7. 2, 3 ** Eciriou } A z. Powen Asur Tauer i De.sisu, R r Porrn; Roano Rea

P6I48, 2 " Eoirion h 3.

?iPlHG NANDaoon, S. CRocnen, 6 1 c O g.s w H it t. pg 2 -ts, Fierx Eoirios t T-l l 8 t e 4 see. " " ' " ~ ~ ..<-i..,

t APPENDIX 8 L ATTACHMENTS 1.- Memorandum dated August 2, 1988, G. Esswein to A. Sistos; Farley ECCS Failure L 2. Memort.ndum dated August 3, 1988, G.- Esswein to A. Sistos; Farley ECCS l'- 'Fallure 3. Unit 2 History of LLRT's for 52 1208 MU130 4. Unit 3 History of LLRT's for S31208 MU130 5. -NDE PT Exam Records for Welds on Lines 1201-028-2" and 1201-147-3"- B-1 w

V A rro cnmestr i August 2, 1988 A. D. SISTOS

SUBJECT:

Farley ECCS Failure Paferences: 1. 141 econ, 8/2/88, with Robert Fuscich, Alabama Power, 205-250-1856 2. NRC Bulletif 88-08 3. NRC Info. Notice 88-01 Se Reference 1 Telcon provided the following infomation on the Farley Unit 2 ECCS pipe failure. 1. The failure occurred on a single lir.s on Unit 2, no failures have occurred on the other ECCS lines on Unit 2 or on Unit 1.- Unit 2 started up in 1981, Unit i started up in 1979. S e failure appears unique to the line. 2. The ECCS (SIS) lines are dual function. %ey are also ustA for RHR. RID data on this line indicated as acon as RHR was turned off, the R!D's on the line began cycling of ~200 F in 2-3 minute long cycles. Nacich feels.that the leaking valve allowed a pressure buildup which then overcema the friction. namimi to open the check valve. 3. De normally locked closed bypass valve to the BIT (the leaking valve) is a 1" Farotest Y Pattern Globe Valve. Se pressure differential

• across the valve is '325 psi.

-4. Accolertnoter data irdicated no significant vibration. Se c acMz, ' <a ctc-ulate! to be thermal cycling fatigue d p. 5. Ma cracking was initiated on the ID of the pipirg in the weld counterbore areas and at tooling marks. 6. The 6" line is schd. 160, the check valve is a swing disk. 7.. The 9.i W of the lina (added dimensions) is shown in the attached figure. The 2" tie in from. the BIT system is borizontal line 6" frem the valve to pipe weld. 8. Alabama Power conmitted land has installed RID's on these lines. Se-tenparature sensors appeal to give a very good indication of the probleth if it occurs. 9. Alabama Power had previously installed penetrations for use during outages (for eddy current testing?) thuse are used for the data cables.

3 n m ~ 10.- They are- - usirs;r a data logger to a PC in the Contro'. Poom and have a Intus pry. the.t complies / manipulates data fran their mWs. 11.- 'Ihe installation is tanporary (instrumentation) but may be made permanent. = $)a f L wtut ,DE ESSWEIN G L GEsswein:05C' e E = = F r-0 t ,, T B-i h E M )'

.o t - 1TMHM ENT August 3, 1988

A.'D. SISTOS SUBJECr:

Farley ECCS Failure

Reference:

1. Telecon, 8/3/88 with Robert Fuscich, Alabama Power (followup to 8/2 Telecon) 2. Memo dated 8/2/88, G. Esswein to A. D. Sistos "Farley ECCS Failure" Additional information on the Farley 2 ECCS failure was obtained per Tsference 1. This information is sumarizad below: 1. The tagorary fix for Ferley 2, to prevent cyclic cold water injection into the ECCS line, was open a path from the BIT cutlet back to the BIT surge tank. This flow' path allows leakage of the BIT discharge side back to the surge tank. Isakage into the BIT surge tank has been measured at about 1 gpn but this includes a number of possible leak paths, not just the leaking 1" kerotest BIT bypass N/C valve. 2. No specific.information exists on the sW 1" Ferotest valve with respect to W1 leakage seat h==, etc. The reason is that the problan was not uncovered until going to power and the valve is non isolable. The use of line freeze plugging uma ccr.sidered but not used to remove the valve. 3. During the next cutages the 1" bypass line for Units 1 and 2'will be cut'and-capped eliminating the BIT bypass function cospletely. This is the final fix planned. 4. Westinghouse performed a study to rank susceptible lines. They ranked them as: 1. 3 cold leg injection lines ic.m whids failed) 2. 3 hot leg injection lines 3. Alteru.te auxiliary pressurizar spray line. (thia was ranxad madt lower because of the 1erar AP (7 psi vs 300 psi) and because heated we.ter is supplied from the rmjenerative heat exchanger. l 1

e 5. RIV's have been installed to date on: 1. % e 1 cold leg injection line which failed on Unit 2 2. The 3 cold leg injection lines on Unit 1 3. %e 3 hot leg injection lines on Unit 1 2e rjoal is to have the Unit 2 RID's installed on all 6 injection lines by 3/89. RID's are installed at the top and bottom of the line before and after the check valve at the RCS boundary. 6. Se RID s show no tenparature cycling when the tagawy fix is implananted.- 2 1s is the acceptance criteria. may have found tenparature data tAich-is somewhat different than expected during plant operation (but apparently acceptable). 7. Regarding ISI, an enhanced tJr method using 60 shear waves vs the normal 45 shear wavtp technique was used on the 6 injection lines for Unit 1. Only the welds were inspected. However since NRC Eulletin 88-08 requests high stress base metal examination, Alabama Power may also perform this added NDE. 8. Bechtel and Westinghouse have been contracted to identify high stress areas for possible NIE of base metal. 9. De need for augmented NDE may not be needed. Se goal will be to treet this as a one time problem with the use of RID monitoring as a method to . eliminate augmented NDE over the plant lifetime. detth p GENE ISSWEIN GEsswein:06C L k _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ " - - - - - ' - ^ - - - - - - - ~ - ~ - - - - - - - - - ^ - - - -

uP me.. I 1 11/00' Wii 2 CIETST OF LLRT*s -

PES ~- SE5CSIPTION VALVE BisWER TEST Stat TEST P1' 11 P2 - T2 901. or le TIE -IEASWEB E00m. '.ECNBE0 Pts Teu Cint itel 0

C00E COBE DATE pstg.-det.pe19 dog ' le slautes' LEAKAGE' LEAKAGE LEAKAGE LEAIUIEE le . F ;- F ft3 or le (accm) (sams) (seca) (ecom) (secm): e 60- Atal SPRAY SYPASS $2120180ft29. ( A-A- 8/19/00 0.00 0.0 0.00 :. 0.0 0.036 0.000 999999 999999 999999 0 273 st-Alst SPRAr SvPA55 52120W0:330 0 8/19/00 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.c 0.204 0.000 999999 599999 999999 999999 1000272 1 1 00- Alst $ PRAY STPA55 - $21201109120 A-A- 11/ 4/00 50.40 L70.0 50.N 70.0 0.036 31.000 ' 40- ARE SPRAY STPASS ' 5212019W129 A-A-'~ III 5/00 50.10 70.0 59.90 70.0 0.204 15.000 450 20 450 450 1986-i SS ~ AtSt SPRAT STPA55 52120Well30 0-0-~ 157 - 2. 157 157 FSF - 3/ 9/02 50.00.09.5 57.00 39.5 - 0.036 5.250 14 2 14 14 6574 SS-AtSt SPRAY STPA55 52120WW130 0-0- 3/ 9/02 50.00 00.0 50.00 80.0 - 0.204 ' 15.000 7 5 7 7 656F SS-Alst SPRAY STPASS 5212018W829 A-A- 11/30/03 61.00 07.0 50.00 07.0

0.ON 4.533 32, 2

32 7 52467'- i 60- AREI SPRAY SYPA55 52120W00130 0-0- II/30/P! 00.00 71.9 50.00' F1.0 0.204 15.000 7-5' F F-52467' j et--. seat wtAv B PASS - $23201 sept 29 A-A- 11/27/04 60.00 65.0 50.40 65.0 0.036 15.700 7 0 7 7 '27720 ~ 60- Alst SPRAY BYPASS 521205W130-0- 0-II/27/04 61.00 64.2 GG.00 64.2 0.204 15.0P3 7 5 7 7 27F20 ' 80- AINI SPRAY STPA55 321201808129 'A-A. 4/15/06 30.00 61.7 57.00 61.7 0.03E 6.273 35 2 35 F 9054 EG-ARE SPRAY STPA55 'al200 Wl30 0-0- 4/15/06 80.00 56.5 59.50 66.6 - 0.204 19.000 -15 4 15-15: 9062 - 60- Alst SPRAY STPA55 5212018091 0 A-A- ~9/12/07 50.00 56.1 57.00 50.1 0.036 1.557 144 '- 7 144 15 9632 ~ SG-AIM SPRAF OVPA55 1521200Ntil3v 0-0- 9/12/07 60.00 J71.3 57.00 F1.3 0.204 0.115' 14226 EFF 14226 - 134 - 9761 50- Atat SPRAT SYPA55 321200Ntfl30 0-0-' 10/ 0/07 50.00 F1.2 50.00 '78.9 0.204 15.000 0 5 5 5 06F3 .' l 'I . h 'f b A ,N i X l ' j m a 1 -4 'l W l 4 .l i '1 ~ 5 _g, 3 ..s.. kgm-[y r...., m. r-., - ,,,,ey,..

) 1 Fz .p no.' 1- ~ II#80 ' Meli 3 MISTORT OF LLS1*r PEN ' GESCRIPTION VALVE Stel0ER - TEST Sts TEST. - P1 il P2 T2101. er a 11 ele ~ BEAS4fBE0 EGRER REC 000E0 PEG Teens Clest TWW y g CODE CODE BATE; pslg dog pelg' dog to slautes LEAKAEE - .LEARAEE~ LEARAEE, -LEAKAEE 10. - F F ft3 er le (sces). (scom). (scca) (seca) -.(scas). 72.9 50.00 72.0 0.039 36.403 325 6 325 0 190 I $8-. Ata SPEAT STPA55 5312011W129 A-A- 2/23/02 60.00 ~ T2.8 60.00 72.0 9.291-80.000 '8 6 6 6 _4705 ' Alst SPRAY STPA15 5312018I013e 5-0- - 2/23/02 50.00 196 355 51 355 6 68 Alst SPRAT STPA55 531291808129 A-A- 12/ 5/02 60.00 74.0 SB.00 80.9 . 0.e39 S.219 . '444 50 4* 6 - 355 5054 80- AIK SPRAY STPASS 5312019EB130 0-B- 12/ 5/02 60.00 72.1 50.80 72.5 8.291 1.332 50- AtSt SPRAf BTPASS 5312011W129-A- A. - 2/10/84 50.00 75.8 57.00 75.0 8.039 0.757 300 17 ase s 300 - 64518 SS-AISI SPRAT BYPASS 5312910W130 - B-0- 2/10/84 60.00 72.3 5F.00 72.4 0.291'- 5.241 30s IF 308 300 64518-60- Aest SPRAF STPA55

531231sul29 A-

-A' 10/12/85 68.00 66.2 57.00 E6.2 0.039 0.039 EteF 296 600F 306 -13101 40- Alst $ PRAY STP.J5 53120510130 0- '0-' 10/12/05 80.00 86.7 5F.00 46.7 9.291-8.149 6440' 305 6448 8047 18762 58-Aest SRIAT STPAS$ $3120Sul30 ' 5-0- 10/16/85 60.00 76.5 57.00- 76.5- - 9.291 8.263 6330 305 6330 00071 '3006F. ~68-Alst SPRAY STPASS 5312618Wl29 A-A- . 10/24/95 60.00 64.5 57.00. 64.5 0.039 S.34F 008 32 000 000

54635 f.tet ieRAY STPASS

$3120S Wl30 8-S- 10/24/95 64.M 76.1 57.00 '76.2 ~ 8.291 7.051 230 ~ 11 238 230 54185 ES-Mfit SPRAlf STPA55 ^$312050f130 B-B- t/ 8/87 60.00 08.1 57.00 40.1 0.291 0.836 46399 2206 85399 Ett - 15209 ES-Alst SRtAY STPA55 5312911W129 A-A- t/13/07 60.00 39.1 57.00 99.1 0.039 : 8.0BF 2447 116 2447 7447 16424 60- Alst SpitAY BTPA55 531291108129 A-A- I/30/SF 60.00 57.5 57.00 57.5 0.039 8.309 781 37 781' 76! 18724 58-Alst SPRAY STPASS 531209W130 8-' S-t/30/07 80.00 56.9 57.00 57.9 0.291-5.047 338 16 338 330 - 11201 88 ~ Alst $PRAF BYPASS 531201815129 A-A- 5/16/00 58.00 58.2 57.00 50.3 0.039 3.017 80 4 90 80 4567 88-Atst $PitAV STPA55 131200808139 0 5/16/80 61.00 06.1 50.00 E0.1 C.291 4.57F 369 18 369 80 4632- -1 -t b I. ,s,, F t -e y F s S " ' "" " ~ ' ' ~ ~' ^" ~ ~ ~ ~

{. .j . A rrAcoeurs Res 190/-CCV-42") L OOP /> Nor L EG g_ EL. 3 0-/ 0 " i 7 i s l j 4// r/ic, (62-059-010) y Is l // // ? /f 4 ') (o2-o39-i4) l { 4/ts/26 s (02-occ, - ou,x i (/fo/- O/B-2 " ~\\ g /_ a \\_ s y Cito*-tu -B"k) \\_ l V, n t s mfit- / w K .y uviso _s o_ YJt201-147 - 5 ") iL e " FIGURE b*I L IN G NOS. H0/-/47-5 " / /20/- O/8-2 " /4S7 CHECK VAL VE TO RCS t' FT NDE Wac Locarious. S O N 6 S _2 q. hg, ('- I; s t

neceme ths/sg A rrAcuuuser 5,,,, 3 80ansesteomfamatmaaman ~ Powen sysvaus oaoup = ' ' PIBLO cofesTRucTeoM Plant / Unit - MS U6'f 1 PT No. d'O Comp /5ystem M4' A" Pere./ Procedure No. 5033-155 OW Zone d3 9 p,,, y, o Contract No. F#'/ Mot ST. No, '

1. 4 Rev. v4 LIQUID PENETRANT EXAMINATION Brand Name M

Batch No. Dwell Time CLEANER: A'"" n " ' ' N0* # M"43 EON PENETRANT: h '" 5# #5

• "8 #O

/* *

• REMOVER:

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1. • 3
2. $'*68 5

/' * *> DEVELOPER:

1. """N' #
2. "," N 6T W

'2 *'" Instructions: Completely describe ALL Indicatiors. If in the "as welded" condition so state, if no indications were found so state. EXAAstNATION WELO/ AREA DESCRIPTION /REAAARK8 ACCSIT R8 JECT N*C19'0/0 ft&"u tt.At'L' D,15,,/. ea:fms.6 }( y ' ~ ' M 63 9 ~ 0/ 3-VR vit 12./l/p. u w',,e.j+f,,,e X 12*6.59 6/Y flih' /g tugy; u y,g,eg,,g X ~y 8 2 - AS 9-4/ 6 yng-rs e t ycJ pg. 2, y/.,94g,, g y~y,p, \\ A N N N N N N Component Temperature M*E Photoeraph:. None Y Attached 2/# Sketch: None Y Attached AM h( LEVEL DATE N' 6*N EXAMINER axAMINERdb!b kb O Mud 6 LgyEL 3 ~ I DATE &~ /F 8( Raviewan MEFW Lavat 'TE-DATs u(-1 Authorised Nusiest inspector * #' - DATE 1/&/# r y Page I of i e4 noui., man

E 2 0. gl .'g AnxuMwr5 cour I lant/ Unit' S o o <::_ e K Data Sheet No. 4V /L ? Comp /Sys temm oi cze =/ - 1,.*w, Precedure No. Som zu-m Zone AM Rev/ Change No. o LIQUID PENETRANT EXAMINATION Brand Name ,T,y,p.e Batch No. Dwell Time CLEANER: hwdta, s;u.w h e. n su % ss 5a:a i PENETRANT: Nat a [l u v SEL 'HF l3 94 Ho 3'1 Le N. REH0VER: M Ar. u h u s Ruc. urhe 11 eq 'to CC s,,,l, Mafas/Luv M -w#h P.QA E9 W IV w,,', DEVELOPER: Instructions: Completely describe ALL Indications. If in the "as-welded" condition - so state. If no indications were found - so state. EXAMINATION WELD / AREA DESCRIPTION / REMARKS ACCEPT REJECT d2-d W ofa JUO % bur loa.r V W/n 62 006-O// A)a Ldn eviw Y N/A / / / / 7 o / / l / s / / i / Photograph: None v Attached N/f Temperature 7f, p. Sketch: None 7 Attached *'// - EXAMINER d._. I /-,,2* LEVEL 5 DATE N-/9-ky N STbS EXAMINER 8 U A #9 LEVEL 1 OATE //-4 9V

cuses o.n o. eta m im REVIEWER 9,.0 I E 2 LEVELTrr DATE#1 1.3y AUTHORIZED INSPECTOR, % A, -

DATE \\ a --(-e g Page 1 of / L s..}}