ML20042C153

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Amend 74 to License DPR-65,authorizing Cycle 5 Operation & Amending App a Tech Specs
ML20042C153
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 03/05/1982
From: Clark R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20042C154 List:
References
TAC-47355, TAC-47389, TAC-47473, NUDOCS 8203300275
Download: ML20042C153 (13)


Text

-

'. c iai UNITED STATES 8

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

g g

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

\\o...*/

l

  • 1 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-336 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT N0. 2 l

l AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 7 4 License No. DPR-65

. ~..

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The applications for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) dated December 17, 1981 and January 14, 1982 as supplemented, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 QFR Chapter I;

~

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the applications, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Cornission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 0.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

8203300275 820305 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P

PDR

.,,_~

n-.

,,n i

i 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment'to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 7 4, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical-Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY, COMMISSION S

2 obert A. Clark,-Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: MAR 5 1992 m

f W

e

. _.. ~.

v t

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 7 4-FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0.':DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications

-with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area'o'f change.

i he corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Paoes e

3/4 1-1 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-6 3/4 1-28 3/4 4-4

~'

B 3/4 1-1 e

e 4

e 9

9 e

G e

F e

e

).'

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CON' TROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T

> 200 F avg LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be ?_2.90% ak/k.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the. SHUTDOWN MARGIN < 2.90% ak/k, within 15 minutes initiate and f

I continue boration at 3,40 gpm of boric acid solution at or greater than the required refueling water storage tank (RWST) concentration (ppm) until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is rest'6 Ped. ~

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be 2. 2.90% ak/k:

l a.

Immediately upon detection of an inoperable CEA.

If the inoperable CEA is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN, required by Specification 3.1.1.1, shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovabis or untrippable CEA.

b.

When in MODES 1 or 2, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

c.

Prior to initial operation above 55 RATED THERhAL POWER after each refueling, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

, See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

'7, py,779 7 y..

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1 l Amendment No.

1

7.

m

<=_ _ m m, -

m e

, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continued) 7 d.

When in MODES 3 or 4, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consider-ation of the following factors:

1.

Reactor coolant sy. stem boron concentration, 2.

CEA position.

3.

Reactor coolant temperature, 4.

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal erergy generation, 5.

Xenon concentration, and 6.

Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compsred to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1.0% ak/k at least once per 31 Effective Ful1 Power Days.

This compa.-ison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1 1.1.1.d, above.

The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond-to the actual core conditions prior to excegding A, fuel, burnup of 60 Effective Full Power Days after each refueling.

f e

t i

l 1

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4.1-2

w.

_ rag REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.l'.l. 4 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

-4 a.

Less positive than 0.5 x 10 Ak/k/*F whenever THERMAL POWER is < 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, b.

Less positive than 0.4 x 10-4 ak/k/*F whenever THERMAL' POWER.

l 1s > 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

-4 c.

Less negative 'than -2.4 x 10 Ak/k/*F at RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2*#

ACTION:

With the moderator temperature coefficient outside any one of the above limits, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.4.1 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits by con-firmatory measurements. MTC measured values shall be extrapolated and/or compensated to permit direct comparison with the predicted values.

  1. See Special Test Exemption 3.10.2.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2

-3/4 1-5 Amendment No. 28,p),7 4

~= _.-.

.z~

_ a s = _ v.-a m m y I.

l h

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS f

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1 4.1.1.4.2 The MTC shall be determined at the following frequencies and THERMAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

a.

Prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each refueling.

b.

At any THERMAL POWER, within 14 E'0D a'fter each fuel loading at equilibrium boron concentration.

-~

4 e

MILLSTO'NE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-6 Amendment No.#,7 4 9

..m.

,_,7

_~

1 2

REACTIV1(Y CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN CEA INSERTION LIMIT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4

3.1.3.5 All shutdown CEAs shall be withdrawn to at least 176. steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2*.

ACTION:

t With a' maximum of one shutdown CEA with' drawn, except for surveillance.

j testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, to less than 176 steps, either:

t a.

. Withdraw the CEA to at least 176 steps within one hour, or

.i 7

b.

Declare the CEA inoperable and apply Sp,e,qification 3.1.3.1.

P SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

+

4 4.1.3.5 Each shutdown CEA shall be determined to be withdrawn to at i

least 176 steps:

a.

Prior to withdrawal of any CEAs in regulating groups during an j

approach to reactor criticality, and b.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

l j

[

6 1

See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

l 3

Change rio. 3 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/41-27; September 19, 1975

[

[,

I

i I

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS REGULATING'CEA INSERTION LIMITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.3.6 The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the withdrawal sequence and to the insertion limits shown on Figure 3.T-2.

Regulating CEAs are conside' red to be fully withdrawn in accordance with figure 3.1-2

  • when withdrawn to at least 176 steps.

With CEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Inscrtion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits restricted to:

a.

1 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval, b.

1 5 Effective Fu1T Power Days per 30 Effective Full Power Day interval, and

~

c.

1 14' Effective Full Power Days per calendar year.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

a.

With the regulating CEA groups insdrted beyond the Transient Insertion Limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within two hours either:

1.

Restore the regulating CEA groups to within the limits, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allo'wed by the CEA group position using

~

the above figures.

b.

With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval, except during operation pursuant to the provisions of ACTION items c. and d.

of_ Specification 3.1.3.1, operation may proceed provided either:

1.

The Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits of Figure 3.1-2 are not exceeded, or 2.

Any subsequent increase in THERMAL POWER is restricted to 1 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER per hour.

  • See Special Test Exc'eption 3.10.2 and 3.10.5.

With Keff >_l.0.

MILLSTONE - UN.IT 2 3/4 1-28 Amendment No. 7 4

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

i AP,PLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated. block valve (s) and remove power from the block valve (s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b.

With one or more block valve (s) inoperable, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> either restore the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve (s) and remove power from the blo'dR'vaTve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

Once per 31 days by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, excluding valve operation, and b.

Once per 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

4.4.3.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete, cycle of full travel.

This demonstration is not required if a PORV block valve is closed.and power removed to meet Specification 3.4'.3 a or b.

o r

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-3 Amendment ~No. #E, /74 68

- n =-a v :

w--

=.a w

w

.., c.a a ;;c- - umg;t:.

"wwm:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER n

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a steam bubble and with at least 130 kw of pressurizer heater capacity capable of being supplied by emergency power.

The pressurizer level shall be within 5% of its l

programmed value during periods of normal operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

A.

With the pressurizer inoperable due to an inoperable emergency power-supply to the pressurizer heaters either restore the inoperable emergency power supply within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

B.

With the pressurizer otherwise inopeFable,"E ~ in at least H0T STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in H0T SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIR'EMENTS 4.4.4 The pressurizer water level shall be determined to be within 5% of its programmed value at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

o

  • During transient operations (startup, power level changes, trips, etc.) the pressurizer level may be outside the + 5% band for peripds not to exceed one hour.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-4 Amendment No. @@, ?4 d

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS s

BASES 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity. transients associated with postulated accident conditions a're controllable within accep' table limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently

~

subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel. depletion, RCS boron concentration, and_R,CS T The m:st

~

avg.

restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T at no load operating avg

~~

temperature, and is associated with a post'ulated i~teain~line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.

In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 2.90%Ak/k is initially required to control l

the reactivity transient.

Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is based upon this limiting condition and is con-sistent with FSAR accident analysis assumptions.

For earlier periods during the fuel cycle, this value is conservative.

With T i 200 F, avg the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accident are minimal and a 2% Ak/k shutdown margin provides adequate protection.

3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTION AND ADDITION A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be

.s gradual during boron concentration changes in the Reactor Coolant System.

A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant Tystem volume of 10,060 + 700/-0 cubic feet in r.pproximately 30 minutes.

The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration changes will be within the capability for operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle.

The surveillance requirements for mgasurement,f the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provices assurance that the co-efficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

AILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-1 AmendmentNo.JE,/,J5,ff,74

=

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES i

3 /4.1.1. 5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY Tne MTC is expected to be slightly negative at operating conditions.

However, at the beginning of the fuel cycle, the MTC mdy be slightly positive at operating conditions and since it will become more positive at lower temperatures, this specification is provided to restrict reactor operation when T is significantly below the normal operat' ~q temperature.

3yg 3 /4.1. 2 BORATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation.

The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric Acid pumps, 5) associa.ted heat tracing _ systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE

' diesel generators.

~~"~~~

~

With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an. assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be ccmpleted without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN AARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F. ~The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 4550 gallons of 6.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 47,300 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The requirements for a minimum contained volume of 370,006 gallons of borated water in the refueling water storage tank ensures the capa-bility for bcrating the RCS to the desired level.

The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4.

Therefore, the larger volume of borated water is specified here too.

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restric-tions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event t,he single injection system becomes inoperable.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2

. B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 38