ML20042B101
| ML20042B101 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Indian Point, Turkey Point, Quad Cities, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1969 |
| From: | Clint Jones, Oller R, Thornburg H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042B096 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-69-01, 50-237-69-1, 50-247-69-01, 50-247-69-1, 50-249-69-01, 50-249-69-1, 50-250-69-01, 50-250-69-1, 50-251-69-01, 50-251-69-1, 50-254-69-01, 50-254-69-1, 50-265-69-01, 50-265-69-1, NUDOCS 8203240569 | |
| Download: ML20042B101 (22) | |
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGION III DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE Report of Inspection CO Report Nos. 237/69-1 l
249/69-1 254/69-1 265/69-1
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250/69-1 l
251/69-1 l
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden 2 - Const. Permit No. CPPR-18 (B)
Dresden 3 - Const. Permit No. CPPR-22 (A)
Quad Cities 1 - Const. Permit No. CPPR-23 (A)
Quad Cities 2 - Const. Permit No. CPPR-24 (A)
Consolidated Edison Company - Indian Point 2 Const. Permit No. CPPR-21 (A)
Florida Power & Light Company Turkey Point 3 - Const..crmit No. CPPR-27 (A)
Turkey Point 4 - Const. Permit No. CPPR-28 (A)
I Date of Inspection:
January 7-9, 1969 Date of Previous Inspection at Dravo Corpora c.
'Septembez 6 and 7, 1967 C
Inspected By:
C E J es Reactor Inspector January 24, 1969 er Metallurgical Engineer January 24, 1969 (Khi41 Reviewed By:
H D.
ornburg Sr. Reactor Inspector January 26, 1969 Proprietary Information:
None i
SUMMARY
An in-depth audit of Dravo's fabrication and quality control activities re-garding work on piping systems for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Indian Point 2 and Turkey Point 3 and 4 showed their fabrication, welding and quality control procedures were well documented and in conformance with codes, standards, purchaser specifications and good practices.
Welding procedures, welders and nondestructive testing personnel were qualified. Quality control management are knowledgeable on current codes and standards and have authority to stop work which is out of conformance.
The chief inspector reports directly to the chief engineer who is the quality control manager.
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e Summary (continued)
Record traceability is acceptable, but difficult to follow since different records are kept in various departments. X-ray films indicated good radiographic techniques.
Review of MTR's revealed some nonconformities and deficiencies which were satisfactorily corrected or explained by Dravo.
The method of receiving and dispensement of material is margins 1 in 1
that the Inspection Department functions only if discrepancies'are noted by the Receiving Department.
In addition, no provisions.have been made for physical segregation of nonconforming material.
It appears that Dravo's shop space is inadequate for the quantity of work in process. Many assemblies' of small diameter piping were stored outside J
and were covered with snow.
Investigation of special problems reported found at the sites by the purchasers revealed that some were valid incidents and showed periods 4
of laxity of inspection by Dravo and the purchaser's shop quality control, while others were groundless, being based on incomplete informr. tion.
' Dravo has taken adequate corrective action on the ser.ious problems of:
l 1.
MIG wire protrusions on the ID of turbine buildin'g piping and i
fissures in emergency core cooling pipe section (both on Indian Point 2).
2.
The indented 12" stainless raiser pipes (Dresden 2).
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The excess weld reinforcement on waste disposal piping welds l
(Turkey Point 3 and 4).
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i The activities of purchasers' quality control shop inspectors were found I
to range from poor to good.
s DETAILS s
I I.
Scope of Inspection On January 7-9,' 1969, an announced vendor visit was made to Dravo Corporation ~, Marietta, Ohio, by Messrs. C. Jones, Reactor Inspector, and R. E Oller, Metallurgical Engineer, both of Region III, Division I
of Compliance. The purpose of the visit was to audit Dravo's fabrication and quality control activities regarding work on piping systems for the s
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t Details (continued) following projects as specified in a memo, O'Reilly to Grier, subject:
" Vendor Inspection - Dravo Corporation," dated 11-10-68:
1.
Commonwealth Edison Company - Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2.
2.
Consolidated Edison Company - Indian Point 2.
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Florida Power and Light Company - Turkey Point 3 and 4.
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An in-depth inspection by audit of Dravo's quality performance on these projects and the inspection activities of the respective i
purchasers w a s made.
The inspection activities covered compliance to specifications and applicable codes, fabrication procedures, welder and welding pro-cedure qualifications, material certifications, heat treatment, non-destructive testing final inspection, and material receiving and control.
In addition, deficiencies in material and, workmanship in piping delivered to the above specified reactor sites were investigated.
-Discussion of the individual projects was held with Dravo and the respective purchaser's representatives on separate days to avoid con-flicts of interest. Although each project documentation covering specifications, drawings, fabrication and inspection procedures was specifically written for the project, a major part of the documentation was common to all projects. Accord.'ngly, this audit of Dravo was based on a conposite review of all projects plus analysis of problems related j
to specific projects.
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The following personnel were contacted during the course of the i
inspection:
Dravo Corporation l
G. Schwab - Plant Manager j
W. Molvie - Chief Engineer L. Stiles - Assistant Chief Engineer J. Moore - Chief Inspector General Electric Company (GE) i R. L. Payne - Quality Control Representative - Pittsburgh I
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Details (continued) following projects as specified in a memo, O'Reilly to Grier, subject:
" Vendor Incpection - Dravo Corporation," dated 11-10-68:
1.
Commonwealth Edison Company - Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2.
2.
Consolidated Edison Company - Indian Point 2.
3.
Florida Power cnd Light Company - Turkey Point 3 and 4.
An in-depth inspection by audit of Dravo's quality performance on these projects and the inspection activities of the respective purchasers w a s made.
The inspection activities covered compliance to specifications and applicable codes, fabrication procedures, welder and welding pro-cedure qualifications, material certifications, heat treatment, non-destructive testing final inspection, and material receiving and control.
In addition, deficier.cies in material and workmanship in piping delivered to the above speciried reactor sites were investigated.
Discussion of the individual projects was held with Dravo and the respective purchaser's representatives on separate days to avoid con-flicts of interest. Although each project documentation covering l
specifications, drawings, fabrication and inspection procedures was l
specifically written for the project, a major part of the documentation was common to all projects. Accordingly, this audit of Dravo was based on a composite review of all projects plus analysis of problems related to specific projects.
The following personnel were contacted during the course of the inspection:
Dravo Corporation G. Schwab - Plant Manager W. Molvie - Chief Engineer L. Stiles - Assistant Chief Engineer J. Moore - Chief Inspector General Electric Company (GE)
R. L. Payne - Quality Control Representative - Fittsburgh 4
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United Engineers & Constructors (UE&C)
S. Hawe - Quality Control Representative - Pittsburgh R. J. Vurpillat - Quality Control Engineer - Philadelphia Bechtel Corporation A. Lord - Quality Control Resident Inspector H. M. Frissell - Quality Control Representative - Pittsburgh II.
Results of Inspection A.
Dravo Management Organization The overall organization of ti;e Dravo Pipe Fabricaticn Shop i
and the specific quality control organization was discussed and are l
shown on attached Exhibits I and II.
Of particular interest to the CO inspector was the authority of Mr. Molvie as Chief Engineer and Quality Control Manager to control the quality of the work and stop work on any nonconforming item.
Mr. Molvie is on the same level of authority as the Shop Superintendent and reports directly to Mr. G. Schwab, Plant Manager (Exhibit I).
The heads of the Engineering, Welding, and Inspection Departments report independently to Mr. Molvie through Mr. Stiles, Assistant Chief Engineer j
(Exhibit II).
l B.
Fabricating Processes 1.
Material Procurement l
t Dravo's receiving process was discussed in detail as they had no documented procedure. The process is as follows:
When purchased material is received at Dravo, the Receiving l
Department gets copies of all purchase orders (PO's) which l
show what the material is, who it is from, and if any specific inspection is required.
Receiving checks such items as lineal feet or number of pieces, and material type and size. They then fill out a portion of the P0's which tallies the number of items, date, and how delivered. This information is then put on a Ditto Master Copy of the PO which goes to the Production l
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Department.
If special inspection is required on the PO, the Receiving Department notifies the Inspectioa Department which inspects it and completes a Discrepancy Report when necessary, which goes to the Engineering Department for resolution.
An item of significance to the CO inspectors was Dravo's g
practice of not physically segregating nonconforming 1
material. This lack of segregation was considered poor practice by the CO inspectors, aa it could allow inadvertent use of such material.
Dravo was questioned closely on this matter, and they assured tne inspectors that the Production Department can not use material until it is released by the Receiving Department.
It was Dravo's opinion that this method of release would preclude the possibility of nonconforming material being used.
l Dravo was then advised that the CO inspectors still considered the system inadequate but they were not telling Dravo how to change their system.
2.
Fabrication Procedures a.
Description Dravo compiles written general fabrication procedures (noted as 1000 sheets) for each project.
These pro-cedures have ingredients common to all projects and in addition, incorporate the requirements of purchaser's specification including applicable codes.
The con-tents of the 1000 Sheet Procedure for Turkey Point 3 l
and 4 are shown below as typical for other projects:
l.0 General Site Description 2.0 Scope of Piping Systems 3.0 Codee and Specifications l
4.0 Materials 5.0 Welding 6.0 Dimensional Requirements l
7.0 Bending l
8.0 Testing 9.0 Radiography 10.0 Wall Thickness Tests 11.0 Magnetic Particle and Dye Penetrant Tests 12.0 Hydrostatic Testing
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4 6-Details'(continued) i' 13.0 Heat. Treatment 14.0 Stainless Steel Cleaning 15.0 Carbon Steel Cleaning 16.0 Lube 011 Piping Cleaning 17.0 Protection for Shipment 18.0 Marking b.
Review i
The separate. procedures for each of the projects listed in the scope of this report were reviewed by the CO inspectors and appeared to meet ASA B31.1 code require-ments and represent good practice.
In general, the procedures for all projects were similar except as modified by the purchaser's specification. The pur-chasers in this instance were:
I General Electric - Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2-United Engineers & Constructors - Indian Point 2 Bechtel - Turkey Point 3'and 4 2
An in-depth audit of Dravo's performance on each project was made and is discussed in later portions of this report.
3.
Welding Procedures Qualification
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Welding procedures applicable to the systems of a specific project are listed in Dravo's fabricacion procedures including qualification test records (1000 sheets), and are common to other projects. Fifteen procedures covering the piping systems for Indian Point 2 were reviewed by the CO inspectors. All procedures and qualification test j
records were in accordance with Section IX, ASME Code.
i' Those applicable to austenitic stainless steel contained the required 350 F maximum interpass temperature limits.
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Welder Qualification and Performance Welder qualifications were reviewed in conjunction with the special problems reported for Indian Point 2 auxiliary coolant and turbine extraction piping.
a.
Film Review Dravo was asked to pull at random radiograph films and welder qualification sheets on the following systems for Indian Point 2:
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Details (continued)
(1) Weld Sketch 1431, Weld A, reported by CO Region I to have four films made by four different techniques.
(2) Main Steam 28" OD x.912" wall Sketch E-2366-315, Weld A, six films Sketch E-2366-322, Weld A, six films Sketch E-2366-322, Weld B, six films Sketch E-2366-322, Weld D, six films (3)
Boiler Feed 20" OD Sketch E-2366-7, Weld B, five films Sketch E-2366-14, Weld D, five films (4)
Safety Injection System, 6" schedule 10 Sketch E-2366-1861, Weld D, four films Sketch E-2366-1861, Weld E, four films i
3" schedule 10 Sketch E-2366-2160, Weld C, two films All of the above films showed good technique, sensitivity and contrast.
It wae found that the films on Sketch 1431, Weld A, of concern to Region I in above Item 1 represented a weld between an elbow and a flange in a 3" schedule 40 pipe. These films were made by double wall technique using an x-ray machine.
Differences of density in the four films was due to the inability to place the films in direct contact with the pipe surface due to the curvature of the elbow.1/ The penetrometers were accu-rately placed and the sensitivity was good.
b.
Welder Certification I
i Ten welder qualifications related to the above films were reviewed and found to be in accordance with Section IX, ASFE Code.
c.
Weld Problems Discussion of the problem of MIG wire protrusion in the
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ID of. pipe welds at Indian Point 2 and the excess weld reinforce.ent on waste disposal piping at Turkey Point 3 I
revealed the information noted below:
1/ CO Report No. 247/68-6, Section II-E.
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(1) MIG Wire Problem (a)
Description Indian Point 2, the piping in question, con-sisted of auxiliary coolant and turbine extrac-tion carbon steel piping. Although radiography was not mandatory for the welds, UE6C Specifica-tion 248-18 required good workmanship verified by a visual inspection as required by Paragraph 635 of ASA B31.1-1955 Piping Code.
In discus-I sions, Mr. Molvie indicated that initially UE&C did not require radiography for the auxiliary coolant piping. Af ter Dravo had shipped two assemblies to the reactor site, UE&C changed their specification to require I
radiography. The welds in these assemblies were field radiographed at Dravo's request.
MIG wire protrusions and lack of penetratien was found. As a result, visual and/or radio-graph inspection was made of all welds in the turbine building piping shipped to the reactor site during the period of June to December 1967.
It should be noted that the problem was not brought to Dravo's attention until April '1968, after most of the piping had been erected.
This also indicates to the inspectcrs a l
deficiency in or lack of site receiving in-l spection by UE&C.
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Cause of MIG Wire Problem Questioning of Messrs. Molvie and Stiles as to how this could have occurred revealed that Dravo's Inspection Department had not inspected e
the welds in the cenpleted piping because no radiography or other nondestructive testing was specified.
Inspection was left up to the individual welders.
It was also noted that
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when Dravo inspected the welds at the site j
they were unable to find welder identification l
stamps on a significant number of the welds.
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Details (continued)
In the total number of welds inspected, Dravo was unable to correlate with any consistency good and bad welds made by specific welders.
(c) Preventive and Corrective Action by Dravo Molvie stated that there was a laxity in their quality control program and they were delinquent in not inspecting the piping in question. Since June 1968, Dravo has assigned a welding engineer from the Production Department to inspect 100%
of all welds in piping assemblies before the assemblies are shipped. This will be in addition to the new routine of the Inspection Department's final inspection before release. As an additional precaution all system pipe welds which are j
specified for 10% and 20% spot radiography will i
be 100% radiographed.
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The corrective measures for the Indian Point 2 piping in question were outlined in a UE&C memorandum dated October 9, 1968, to their reactor site construction manager. The essence of this directive is as follows:
The defects rejectable under agreed on standards of good workmanship are:
MIG wire protrusions Cracks Lack of root penetration l
Lack of penetration into backing rings The procedures outlined for inspection and repair were:
(d)
UE&C Recommendations Visually inspect all fabricated assemblies, whether in storage or erected, and perform i
the following repair.
Remove MIG wire by grinding.
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Remove and repair other rejectable defects, if the assembly is required to maintain the erection schedule.
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Details (continued)
Return to Dravo if the assembly is not re-quired to maintain the erection schedule.
Radiograph 1/3 of each weld in assemblies which cannot be visually inspected and which cannot be returned to Dravo due to i
schedule or if erected.
If film shows backing ring,no further in-spection for MIG wire is needed.
If film shows MIG wire protrusions the joint must be cut out and rewelded.
If no backing ring and no MIG wire shows, the remaining 2/3 of the joint must be radiographed for MIG wire protrusions.
Other defects, as lack of fusion, porosity, inclusions, slag, etc., are to be evaluated on an individual basis as to the need for repair.
Dravo is presently reviewing the sketches for all welds in question and proposes to omit the radiog-raphy for those welds with backing rings. Their l
current summary of 83 pages with 18 welds per page or 1495 welds inspected by visual and RT inspection l
indicates 250 welds have MIG wire protrusions. The piping ranges in size from 4" OD to 54" OD.
(2)
Excess Weld Reinforcement The excess weld reinforc'ement on the first shipment in September 1967 of waste disposal pipe for Turkey Point 3 was discussed. This piping was thin wall stainless steel (schedule 10) and a manual stick i
electrode was used which left an excess crown on the welds. Af ter the initial shipment, Dravo re-vised the welding procedure to the Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) method with bare filler wire. This pro-cedure is more suitable for the thin wall pipe and provides the proper weld reinforcement.
Dravo believes this change has adequately solved the
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. Details (continued) problem. Although the corrective measure appeared adequate to the CO inspectors, it does not relieve Dravo of responsibili t y f or the integrity of the I
welds made by either method.
5.
Nondestructive Testing (NDT) a.
General Evaluation of Dravo's nondestructive testing capabilities was based on review of procedures, qualification of per-sonnel, radiograph films and past performance on piping fabricated for the projects which are the basis of this report.
b.
Procedures l
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Nondestructive testing requirements are cetlined in detail specifically for each project in Dravo 1000 Sheet I
Fabrication Procedures and/or supplemental sheets as follows Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2 Fabrication of Recirculation Pipe, E-2337-1000 Special Instructions, E-2337-1001 Chronological Inspection List, E-2337-CI-LI Dye Penetrant, E-2337-1002 Radiography, E-2337-1003 Solution Anneal, E-2337-1004 Marking, E-2337-1005 Ferrite Control, ESM-FC-1 Indian Point 2 Fabrication, Inspection and Testing, E-2366-1000 Cleaning and Pickling - Lube Oil Pipe, E-2366-1001 i
Cleaning Procedure - Primary Pipe, E-2366-1002 Handling and Shipping Stainless Steel Fabrication, E-2366-EP-1 Quality Control - Safeguard Systems, E-2366-QC-2 i
Purchase Instructions - Safeguard Systems, E-2366-PI-l
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Turkey Point 3 and 4 Chop Fabrication Procedure, E-2386-1000 Cleaning Procedures, E-2386-1002 Butt-Weld Inspection Schedule, E-2386-QC-1 All of the above procedures were reviewed by the CO inspectors for conformance to codes, standards and good practice and were found to be acceptable.
I c.
Personnel Qualifications Dravo's Inspection Department NDT personnel are qualified to Navships 250-1500 Standard for Dye Penetrant Testing (PT), Magnetic Particle Testing (MT), and Radiographic Testing (RT).
Qualification for Ultrasonic Testing (UT) is to the Nondestructive Testing Society Standard SNT-TC-IA.
Personnel complete outside formal courses in the various nondestructive ins,pection techniques and are then given a written examination covering theory, application, procedure and acceptance standards and on performance on shop production by the Bureau of Ships technical representative and Dravo's Chief Inspector, Mr. John Moore.
i Certificates of completion (which included final score) for several inspectors including Mr. Moore, were examined by the CO inspectors and found to be acceptable.
Dravo also has authorized an "N" stamp for Nuclear Piping under ASNE Code Section III and USASA B31.7.
Dravo has six qualified radiographers.
Their performance aas evaluated by the CO inspe'ctor's review of 48 films covering 10 pipe welds in four different piping systems in the Indian Point 2 unit. Some films were made by the double wall technique using x-ray machines, and some by use of iridium 192 or cobalt 60 source with single wall technique.
All films reviewed confirmed the techniques were good based on sensitivity of penetrometer hole image, thick-ness and letter identification, good contrast, and freedom of film from processing defects.
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Details (continued) t C.
Heat Treating of Stainless Steel The solution heat treating procedure and performance on austenitic stainless components was reviewed in depth in relation to the recircula-tion piping for the Dresden and Quad Cities units. All solution heat treating is performed by Pittsburgh Commercial Heat Treating Company in accordance with Dravo Procedure E-2337-1004 outlined as follows:
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All pipe sections exposed to hot bending are included.
2.
No paint or ink markings are left on the pipe before heating.
Any required markings shall be applied to the square end wall surface by metal stamping.
3.
The bent sections shall be braced to prevent dimensional distortion during heat treatment.
4.
Before heating the pipe surface shall be cleaned with detergent, acetone, alkaline solution or a combination.
5.
Heat the piece uniformly to 1900-20500F and hold at temperature for a minimum time of one hour per inch of wall thickness.
6.
After the holding period, quench the pipe sections by i
complete submergence in constantly agitated water.
7.
The furnace shall be instrumented to provide a permanent record of temperature during the holding time.
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The entire heat treating procedure will be subject to witness by GE personnel. They shall be informed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in advance i
to witness or waive the surveillance.
l In discussion with Dravo, it was learned that sections of a header for Quad Cities 2 had recently been heat treated and were being i
pickled at Dravo's plant. The heat treating charts for these headers bad not been received by Dravo.
However, the heat treating temperature I
chart and certificate for six 12" OD offset bend raisers were available and were reviewed by the CO inspectors. The chart showed the pieces had indeed been held at 19500F (i 250F) for the required time. The certificate showed piece designations, material 304 stainless holding k
temperature of 1950 F (1250F) for onc hour per inch of thickness, and l
water quenching.
It was observed that the certificate was signed and
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Details (continued)
D.
Documentation and Record Traceability In addition to the fabrication, welding and nondestructive testing documentation previously reviewed in this report, the traceability of material Mill Test Reports (MTR) was made and the MTR's reviewed.
Dravo was asked to pull MTR's for the following randomly selected piping assemblies:
1.
Dresden 2 and 3 a6d Quad Cities 1 and 2 28" circulating pump suction pipe 28" circulating pump discharge pipe 12" raiser pipes 28" x 22" pump discharge crosses 28" pump discharge elbows 28" x 16" pump discharge tees 28" x 16" pump suction tees 28" pump suction elbows 28" pump suction elbows 4" seamless pipe for valve bypasses j
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l 22" x 12" header Sweepolets 2.
Indian Point 2 28" OD main steam pipe 20" schedule 80 boiler feed pipe 6" 450 elbows - safety injection i
3.
Turkey Point 3 and 4 a.
Waste Disposal System I
l 3" schedule 10 - pipe i
2 1/2" schedule 10 - pipe 2 1/2 schedule 10 - tee 3" schedule 10 - tee 4" schedule 10 - tee i
0 elbows l
2 1/2",, 3",
4" schedule 10 - 90 4" x 3" schedule 10 - reducing tees 6" x 4" schedule 10 - concentric reducer 4" x 3" schedule 10 - concentric reducer 3" x 2 1/2" schedule 10 - concentric reducer
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Safety Injection System 16" x 14" - reducing tees 10" x 8" - reducing tees 16" x 10" - concentric reducers 14" x 10" - reducing tees 14", 12", and 10" schedule 40 - Sweepolets 14" x 12" schedule 40 - concentric reducer 10" schedule 140 pipe - reactor coolant takeoff pipe 4" schedule 120 - 45 elbow - reactor coolant takeoff pipe By use of fabrication sketches and bill of materials, Dravo produced the requested records.
Review of the MTR's by CO inspectors showed deletion of radiography results as required by ASTM Product Specification A-403 and lack of ASTM Class or Grade of material.
In general, the other required information as Supplier, Purchaser, ASTM Product Specification, Serial Number, Purchase Order Number, Chemical Properties, and Physical Properties were properly noted.
Chemical and physical properties were noted to be in conformance with ASTM Standards.
The specific deletions of radiography as required by Product Specification ASTM A-403-65 on three Crane Co. MRT's covering four 28" OD stainless reducing tees and four 28" OD stainless reducing crossings were discussed by telephone with Mr. Stiles of Dravo.
Mr. Stiles stated Dravo had noted this omission.
He stated further that Dravo had all the films on thesu fittings in their possession in addition to Crane's l
radiographic review record sheet approved by GE-APED.
He also stated l
that Dravo had reviewed these films and found them acceptable.
The other item of radiographic omission was en a Bethlehem Steel Corp. MTR covering fabrication of 1291 ft. of 28" OD by.912" l
wall carbon steel pipe for Indian Point 2.
The pipe was ordered i
fabricated to ASTM A-155-63, KC-70, Class 1 which required that the i
pipe be radiographed and stress relieved.
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Dravo explained that they were aware that Bethlehem was ft-experienced in making pipe to ASTM and ASA Piping Code requirements, and aad their chief inspector, Mr. J. Moore, visit Bethlehem af ter shipment of the first lot of pipe. Radiography of seam and butt welds had been performed as required but review of films by Mr. Moore showed many defects and several lengths of pipe were sent back to Bethlehem.
Dravo then had a meeting with Bethlehem's management at which time requirements were
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Dravo's explanation of these two incidents appeared acceptable.
However, the need for more careful surveillance of supplier's performance and certification records was pointed out by the CO inspectors.
No deficiencies wete found in the MTR's for piping and fittings for the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
E.
Evaluation of Purchaser's Quality Control Discussions were held with quality control representatives of i
the direct purchasers from Dravo for the following unit piping systems:
Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad cities 1 and 2 - GE-APED Indian Point 2 - UE&C
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Turkey Point 3 and 4 - Bechtel 1.
Mr. R. L. Payne has replaced Mr. E. Stoken as GE's quality control representative.
Mr. Payne is not a full time resident inspector. He performs inspections when notified by Dravo that piping assemblies are ready for shipment.
It was noted that there is no hold on Dravo, and if a GE inspector does not show up, the piping is shipped cut without GE inspection. GE has a formal written check list I
for their inspectors' use.
This list includes items of identification, material control, in process inspection, dimensional inspection, final release inspection and remarks and notes.
Due to the GE practice of inspecting only at final release, it was noted that their main emphasis was on review of radiographs, dimensional control, visual inspection, marking, records, and protection for shipment. Very little in-process inspection is performed, and in many cases GE waives all inspection.
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I GE approved subsuppliers to Dravo were reviewed for the l
following items making up a segment for a recirculation ring I
header of one of five BWR units. The components and sources were as follows:
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Item - Header Assembly E-2341-C-51 Supplier National Annealing Box 1 - 11" length of 22" OD SS pipe Washington, Pa.
Hackney Iron Works 1 - end cap Enid, Okla.
Bonney Forge 1 - Sweepolet (12" OD x 22" OD)
Allentown, Pa.
Crane Co., Chicago, 111.
1 - cross fitting (22" x 28" x 12")
Hackney Iron Works 1 - fluid head Enid, Okla.
Alloy Tubes, Huston, Texas 2 - 12" raisers (to jet pumps) l 2 900 elbows Review of material certifications for plate pipe materials and submerged arc weld flux and filler wire from National Annealing Box Company for the 22" header pir 2 was made and i
noted to be in accordance with codes and specifications.
All of the above suppliers have been inspected at various times by Dravo and GE.
2.
United Engineers and Constructors UE&C roving quality control representative, Mr. Sam Hawe, and quality control engineer, Mr. K. J. Vurpillat, were questioned on the extent of their inspection on the Indian Point 2 piping.
To date, UE&C has had no definite plan of inspection.
Their inspection has consisted of random trips to Dravo for audit of special items.
They have now taken steps to correct the situation and starting on January 13, 1969, they will have an assigned inspector to visit Dravo and other piping fabricators in the Pittsburgh area on a regular basis.
For new projects they will have written check-off lists, but the use of these will not be retroactive to projects in process, i
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. Details (continued) 3.
Bechtel Bechtel has a full time quality control inspector, Mr. Art Lord, at the Dravo plant, and a roving inspector, Mr. H. M.
Frissell, for the Pittsburgh area.
Prior to Mr. Lord, Mr. Frank Brown was resident inspector at Dravo, but left for personal reasons. There were several weeks during which there was no Bechtel inspector at Dravo.
During this period the initial shipment of waste disposal piping, with the excess xeinforcement, was shipped from Dravo.
This problem has been resolved as previously noted in this report.
Mr. Lord's specific duties are to perform inspections on l
in process work as well as final complen s' sork. All t
assemblies are 1007. inspected before rele by Bechtel.
Al'1 Bechtel procedures and specifications were well docu-mented.
F.
Other Special Problems Other reported problems were:
1.
Two 12" stainless pipe raisers for Dresden Unit 2 which contained depressed areas on the OD.
These two pieces were replaced and shipped back to Dravo.
I 2.
Dravo's Certificates of Compliance, sent with shipments of piping /to Indian Point 2, were questioned by UE&C at the site.2 Examination of several certificates by the CO inspectors showed them to be only affidavits stating the following:
The material is as required by contract (ASIM S tandards).
a.
b.
The filler metal is as required by the welding pro-cedure (ASTM Standards).
The welders and welding procedures are qualified to c.
ASME Code,Section IX.
d.
Dravo has met customers' requirements in that all required tests and inspections have been performed and accepted.
l 2/ USAS B31.1 Power Piping Code does not define items to be included in Certificate of Compliance.
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It was noted that Dravo's reference number on these certificates provided a cross-reference to the specifi-i cations.3/
I 3.
Surface fissures were found in a length of stainless safety i
injection piping (4" schedule 160) at the (Indian Point 2) site.
Dravo has replaced this section of pipe and re-quested the original be sent back for metallurgical in-vestigation. At the present they had no opinion as to the cause of the fissures as the pipe has not been received.
-The fissures were circumferential in a bend in the pipe.
This incident indicates laxity of shop inspection by both Dravo and UE&C, and a possible breakdown in production or material control.
Final resolution of this problem should be pursued by Compliance.
III. Shop Inspection Work on various piping assemblies for all projects of interest was observed during a shop tour.
Dravo has a separate building for stainless piping fabrication, however, due to limited space and the large quantity of work in progress, a number of large stainless assemblies were observed stored in the building where carbon steel and low alloy piping is fabricated, and other smaller stainless assemblies were lying outside covered with snow.
It was noted that numerous piping assemblies of thin wall small and medium clameter piping for numerous units were in one pile in the stainless shop.
However, each assembly was properly tagged and Dravo's shop foreman was able to produce fabrication and inspection records for l
i any assembly picked at random.
The following items were examined in J
both shops:
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A.
Three 28" stainless assemblies for recirculation pump suction l
and discharge for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2.
Arc strikes and damage i
to weld end preparations were noted.
Dravo stated the:.these defects j
l would be corrected before shipment.
B.
Two 6" and one 4" stainless spray header pipes (approximately 30' long) for Indian Point 2 were examined.
No visable defects were noted. Assemblies were properly tagged and marked for material type and welder identification.
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-3/ Ibid.
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C.
One 18" OD boiler feed pump discharge pipe assembly for Indian Point 2, consisting of an elbow and straight pipe, was observed being fitted up for root pass welding and another similar assembly was observed being welded. No difficulties were apparent.
D.
Three 22" OD elbows and two reducers for Turkey Point units were observed after having been ultrasonic tested on a 6" grid.
E.
Finished welds and p,ipe surfaces finish for numerous small and medium diameter thin wall stainless pipe assemblies for several units were examined. The welds looked good but some are strikes on the exterior surfaces and heat discoloration was observed on the ID opposite exterior support welds.
Dravo assured the CO inspectors that the arc strikes would be corrected, but the discoloration was not significant.
IV.
Exit Interview Since piping systems for several licensees were inspected and the licensec representatives were not present for the exit f terview, the interview was held with Messrs. Molvie and Stiles. Arrangements were mad.e by Region III for the licensees to be contacted later by representatives from their respective Regional Compliance office.
The inspectors expressed their appreciation for Dravo making the l
requested records available and for their cooperation in answering questions relating to specific problems.
i The inspectors discussed the breakdown in quality control early l
last year that permitted rumerous sections of noncritical piping l
that contained defects to be sent to the field.
Mr. Molvie emphasized the fact the defective pipe was being repaired. All piping shipped since the incident has been checked by their quality controi personnel l
in addition to a final visual examination by a member of the production j
department.
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i In response to a question regarding a formalized quality assurance i
program, Mr. Molvie stated that each purchase order or specification sets forth the requirements for quality control.
In addition, they l
have their own procedures such as requiring 100% radiography if speci-fications require either 10%, 20% or 100%. He agreed that it would j
be desirable for Dravo to have a formalized quality assurance program.
The inspectors questioned several aspects of the quality assurance j
program, specifically regarding record keeping.
Mr. Molvie stated that a list of records to be maintained for the job is proposed by Dravo and included in the'ir bid price.
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Mr. Molvie also provided the inspectors with a sample of the hold card that is placed on material that does not meet specifications or NDT requirements. These cards are reviewed by their engineering department and the defect corrected and the card removed or the material is placed in scrap.
The inspectors reported that they were favorably impressed with the apparent improvements that had been made in quality control during the past year.
Dravo was alerted that other questions could arise as our review of the material progressed. They were also complimented on their efforts to formalize a documentation program as part of contract require-ments.
The control exercised over material as received was also discussed.
The control appeared to be weak in that no physical segregation was provided for nonconforming material. Other than this aspect the control appeared adequate although no written procedure detailed the. process.
The inspectors expressed some concern regarding the crowded con-ditions in the shop and the lack of physical separation of various contracts. Messrs. Molvie and Stiles were well aware of the problem and assured the inspectors everything within reason was done to prevent the mixing of materials or contracts. As a final item, the inspectors questioned their lack of documentation in tracing a specific heat number to a specific pipe.
It was pointed out that material was often ordered for several projects on the same purchase order. Records for the heat numbers are maintained for the system but not for a specific piece of pipe.
i The inspectors stated that reports would be transmitted to the respective licensees by the appropriate Compliance office. They also l
expressed their concern regarding the lack of inspection by certain I
purchasing organizations.
Attachments:
Exhibits I and II l
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