ML20042B098
| ML20042B098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Indian Point, Turkey Point, Quad Cities, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1969 |
| From: | Thornburg H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | James O'Reilly US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042B096 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203240563 | |
| Download: ML20042B098 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES 0) 3 g
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DIVis!ON OF COMPLI ANCE
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GLEN ELLYN, ILLINols 6013/
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J. P. O'Reilly, Chief, Reactor Inspection and Enforcement BrancP Division of Compliance, Headquarters ICOMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (DRESDEN 2 & M. 50-237 & 50 'M -
COMM0fiWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (QUAD CITIES 1 & 2), 50-254 & 50-265 CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY (INDIAN POINT 2), 5G-25^ MG-245 D Q 4 ~1 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (TURKEY POINT 3 & 4), 50-250 & 50-251 A coordinated vendor inspection was made at the shops of the Dravo Corporation in Marietta, Ohio, on January 7 through 9,1969, by Regica III inspectors. Audit of items specifically related to Commonwealth Edison projects was conducted by Mr. C. Jones, while Mr. R. Oller audited items applicable to other licensee's projects. The attached report of the subject inspection is forwarded for action and dis-tribution.
Dravo Corporation (Dravo) is a major fabricator of pressure piping.
Items of nonconformance covering omission of radiography required by ASTM Standards were found on Mill Test Reports from Crane Company and Bethlehem Steel Company.
These items were caught and ccrrected by Dravo at the time of occurrence.
Dravo's internal inspection program appears to have been deficient in the past, especially for some of the less critical piping (Indian Point 2 secondary system piping).
Dravo has prepared written inspection procedures for all types of piping, which include inspection points and procedures, acceptance criteria, and hold points. We consider this to be adequate corrective action on the part of the vendor.
It was also noted that questionable material was not being segregated from acceptab'e material although it was cicarly tagged. This situ-ation could ultimately lead to the release of discrepant material from the shop.
The volume of work performed by Dravo in their Marietta shop and the demands on available space have led to the storage of large diameter stainless steel piping assemblies in a shop formerly reserved for the l
j fabrication of carbon steel and low alloy pipe fabrication.
In addition, numerous small diam =ter stainless pipe assemblies were out-i side covered with snow.
If Dravo's production schedule should continue
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J. P. O'Reilly February 3,1969 to increase, material and production control could be compromised.
We note that Dravo is currently preparing a new facility for the fabrication of carbon steel pipe assemblies.
The inspectors noted that General Electric's vendor inspection program was deficient in several respects:
1.
The frequency of inspection appeared to be inadequate.
2.
The vendor inspection program. appeared to be oriented toward I
a visual inspection of the finished product and not toward l
such critical items as:
i a.
Use of proper materials, b.
Review of fabricating and heat treatment.
c.
Nondestructive test procedures and results.
t d.
Material and production control.
e.
Audit of vendor quality assurance.
j The vendor inspection program carried out by United Engineers and Con-structors appeared to lack organization and was sporadic until recently.
Bechtel's vendor inspection program appeared to the inspectors to be more acceptable.
It appears to us that the questionable welds in the carbon and stainless steel secondary system piping for Indian Point 2 piping were the result of a combination of the following:
j 1.
Lack of detail in project specifications.
2.
Vendor and purchaser did not have formalized inspection programs which included visual inspection of noncritical piping.
1 l
The inspectors noted that a length of fabricated stainless steel piping intended for the Indian Point 2 emergency core cooling system is being l
returned to Dravo because of fissures associated with a bend in a section of piping.
The metallurgical examination of this problem had not been initiated at the time of the inspection.
In our opinion, the presence of the fissures in critical piping is important and might l
indicate discrepant material, loss of production control or some other l
deficiency or combination of deficiencies which would be cause to l
question the condition of other piping assemblies fabricated by Dravo.
Mr. Oller expressed concern regarding the ultimate quality of nuclear piping in general. He is concerned that piping systems are being specified at a minimal level of code and specifications. For example, I
J. P. O'Reilly February 3,1969 ASTM Standards A-106, A-358, A-155 and others provide special supplementary tests to insure purchase of superior quality materials for critical ser-vice. He has not noted that any of these special requirements specified for nuclear piping while it is connon practice to do so for modern coal fired plants.
We recommend that the following action be taken as the result of this inspection:
1.
On the basis of the results of this vendor visit and several in the past, GE should be contacted regarding the glaring weak-nesses we have found in their turnkey quality assurance program.
We have recently identified such significant weaknesses as the poor vendor inspection program.
2.
UE6C should be contacted regarding the weaknesses in their vendor inspection program and equipment specifications.
3.
A vendor visit should be made to Dravo in the next year to audit shop conditions if their production schedule increases.
4.
The investigation of the fissures in the stainless steel emer-gency core cooling piping destined for installation at Indian Point 2 should be followed closely by C0 to determine the possible implications on Dravo process control, etc.
t 5.
DRL should be informed of Mr. 011er's position that power reactor piping systems are not being specified and built to maximum reasotsble standards. This area should receive the same attention as pressure vessels in our opinion. The nuclear piping code, USASA B31.7, should provide relief in this area j
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when it becomes fully effective.
The subject inspection covered a wide scope, including such areas as quality control, material control, welding procedures, nondestructive test procedures, fabricating procedures, etc.
Mr. Oiler and Mr. Jones brought considerable background, knowledge and experience to bear on the inspection, resulting in a productive effort in my view.
f Ha old D. Thornburg Senior Reactor Inspector
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Attachment:
Subject report by C. E. Jones and l
R. E. Oller dtd 1-24-69 (orig & 25 cys) h