ML20041F923
| ML20041F923 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1982 |
| From: | Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8203170552 | |
| Download: ML20041F923 (3) | |
Text
ST) - Alf A
g GPU Nuclear UCear 100 Interpac Parkway p
Parsippany. Now Jersey 07054 201 263-6500 IhTCf3 FED f)
TELEX 136-482 p.,
MAR 1agg y 4C Writer's Direct Dial Number-aarmer. R y k March 10, 1982 s
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Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfsold, Chief Operating Reactors Branch tb. 5 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Roguiatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dcar Mr. Crutchf leid:
With respect to your letter of tbvember 18, 1981 concerning SEP Topic VI-4
" Containment isolation System", please find enclosed the results of our review.
Wo are continuing to investigato the basis upon which the isolation configuration for the Shutdown Cooling System, Reactor Head Cooling System and the Torus Water Lovel System were Judged to be acceptable.
In addition, we feel that the responso time provided for in the subject letter does not reflect the magnitudo of the requested task.
If additional information is required, please contact Mr. J. Knubel at (201) 299-2264.
Very truly yours, ab f{f 2
. B. Tiedler Vice President Director-Oyster Creek Ir cc: Ronald C. Ilaynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussin, PA 19406
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f NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Cencrating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 0203170552 820310 PDR ADOCK 05000219 P
PDR GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Public Utilities System
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Enclosure The construction permit for Oyster Creek was issued prior to December to, 1%6. The 1972 supplement to Safety Guide 11 (Regulatory Guide 1.11) instructs this generation of plant to provide the regulatory staf f with a suitable analysis of the effects on the secondary containment, if provided, and associated safety systems of a postulated failure of the piping or of any component In an instrument line outside primary reactor containment.
This analysis has been provided in FOSAR Amendment No. 68 dated March 6, 1972.
The lines associated with the valves below are one inch in diameter or less.
The adverse af f ects resulting from the f ailure of one of these lines would be similar to that of an Instrument line f ailure, thus the justification f or containment isolation provisions applicable to the Instrument lines is also applicable to these lines:
Penetration No.
Valve ID Penetration No.
Valve 10 X-3B V-14-21 X-3A V-14-26 X-5A V-14-28 X-5B V-14-39 X-7 V-17-21 X-7 V-17-65 X-7 V-17-76 X-8 V-17-51 X-8 V-17-52 X-8 V-17-66 X-8 V-17-68 X-8 V-17-83 X-9 V-16-4 X-10 V-16-65 X-128 V-20-42 X-15 V-6-394 i
X-16 V-38-7 X-61 V-15-32 X-66 V-21-66 X-70 V-20-44 X-72 V-1-136 X-72 V-1-137 l
X-74 V-14-75 X-22 V-21-19 X-22 V-21-10 X-50 V-38-2 X-50 V-38-3 X-56 V-38-1001 X-16 V-38-9 X-16 Y-38-10 X-57 V-38-23 X-57 V-38-22 X-22 V-38-16 X-22 V-38-17 Valves V-14-27, V-15-31 and V-38-8 are not containment isolation valves in that they are past the second Isolation barrier.
Valves V-14-11 and V-14-76 may represent typographical errors in that they are not applicable to the subject matter.
With respect to essential system utilizing remote manual isolation valves outside containment, valves V-14-30, 33, 35 & 34 are part of the emergency condenser system. As required by the Oyster Creek Technical Specifications, these valves automatically isolate when high flow is sensed in the line.
In addition, a pipe break monitoring system will be installed on the emergency condenser s' stem during the 1982 refueling outage which will enable the operator y
to detect and Isolate a leak.
Containment Spray System valves 6 '1-13 and V-21-17 are administratively maintained closed except when utilized tb system surveillance purposes.
When the valves are opened for surveillance, they automtically isolate on Low-Low
Reactor Water Level.
This provides the valves with an automatic isolation capability when they are in the open position, thus ensuring containment isolation in the event of an accident.
The containment and core spray systems are low pressure, closed loop systems that are designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
A leak detection capability could provide the operator with misleading Information, potentially leading to operator action that would Impedo the performance of the system's safety function, it is our judgement that a leak detection capability Is best utilized in areas where high energy lines are located and Its use for the above systems would not enhance safety.
The domineralized water line associated with V-12-60 is installed only during extended plant outages, such as refueling.
At the completion of the outage, the line is disconnected and blind flanges are placed on both sides of the penetration X-23 piping. The penetration is then !eak tested in accordance with Type-C testing requirements. The Installation of the flanges and the leak rate testing is administratively controlled.
The information requested relative to Table 1 of your enclosure is as follows:
Valve Identification Type Actuation V-1-114, 115, 126 & 127 Gate 1
V-14-31 & 33 Gate 1,3 V-17-19 & 54 5,7 V-16-61 6,7 V-6-395 2
V-5-147, 166 & 167 6,7, Low-Low-Low Rx Water Level V-24-3 & 29 2
Valve V-16-62 Is shown in Table 2 of your enclosure as deviating f rom the GDC with respect to valve type.
The subject valve is a check valve insido containment with an automatic isolation valve in series outside containment.
This is in compliance with the appi! cable GDC and should not be listed as an exception in Table 2 of your enclosure.
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