ML20041F250
| ML20041F250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1982 |
| From: | Crocker H, Mckenna T, Oneill B, Palmiter C, Wojnas E, Woltner E, Zalcman B Battelle Memorial Institute, NRC, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041F243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-81-21, NUDOCS 8203160331 | |
| Download: ML20041F250 (65) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Report No.
50-309/81-21 Docket No.
50-309 License No.
DPR-36 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701 Facility Name:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Inspection At:
Wiscasset, ME Inspection Conducted:
September 8-15, 1981 Inspectors:
[ p' k//7'2 -
Edward J.
loj as, Racr1ation Specialist, NRC
'd a't e Appraisal Team Leader
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' Edward F. Woltner, Radiation Specialist, NRC
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~Barr O'Neill, Ra'diation SpeEialist, NRC
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77-Thomas J. tRKennai EPLB, idC HQ date M
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Clair C. Filmitfr, BattgWle Laboratories date Barry ZAlc..an, Me NRC d
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Approved by; Hilbert W. Crocker, ChTef, Emergency date Preparedness Section l
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 1977) 8203160331 820226 PDR ADOCK 05000309 0
PDR t
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Table of Contents Page
SUMMARY
2 1.0 Administration of Emergency Preparedness 3
2.0 Emergency Organization 4
2.1 Onsite Organization 4
2.2 Augmentation Organization 5
3.0 Emergency Plan Training / Retraining 7
3.1 Program Establishment 7
3.2 Program Implementation 9
4.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 10 4.1 Emergency Facilities 10 4.1.1 Assessment Facilities 10 4.1.1.1 Control Room 10 4.1.1.2 Technical Suport Center (TSC) 11 4.1.1. 3 - Operations Support Center (OSC) 12 4.1.1.4 Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) 13 4.1.1.5 Post-accident Coolant Sampling and Analysis 15 4.1.1.6 Post-accident Containment Air Sampling and Analysis 17 4.1.1.7 Post-accident Gas and Particulate Effluent Sampling and Analysis 18 4.1.1.8 Post-accident Liquid Effluent Sampling and Analysis 18 4.1.1.9 Offsite Laboratory Facilities 19
2 Page 4.1.2 Protective Facilities 21 4.1.2.1 Assembly / Reassembly Areas 21 4
.4.1.2.2 Medical Treatment Facilities 22 4.1.2.3 Decontamination Facilities 22 s
4.1.3 Expanded Support Facilities 23 4.1.4 News Center 23 4.2 Emergency Equipment 24 4.2.1 Assessment Equipment 24 4.2.1.1 Emergency Kits and Emergency Survey Instrumentation 24 1
4.2.1.2 Area and~ Process Radiation Monitors 25 4.2.1.3 Non-radiation Process Monitors 27 4.2.1.4 Meteorological Instrumentation 27 4.2.2 Protective Equipment 28 4.2.2.1 Respiratory '8rotection 28 4.2.2.2 Protective Clothing 29 4.2.3 Emergency Communications Equipment 30 4.2.4 Damage Control / Corrective Action and Maintenance Equipment _and Supplies 30 4.2.5 Reserve Emergency Supplies and Equipment 31 4.2.6 Transportation 31 5.0 Procedures 33 5.1 General Content and Format 33 5.2 Emergency, Alarm and Abnormal Occurrence Procedures 33 5.3 Implementing Instructions 34 l
3 5.4 Implementing Procedures 34 5.4.1 Notifications 34 5.4.2 Assessment Actions 35 5.4.2.1 Offsite Radiological Surveys 38 5.4.2.2 Onsite (out-of plant) Radiological Surveys 39 5.4.2.3 In plant Radiological Surveys 40 5.4.2.4 Post-accident Primary Coolant Sampling 41 5.4.2.5 Post-accident Primary Coolant Analysis 42 5.4.2.6 Post-accident Containment Air Sampling 43 5.4.2.7 Post-accident Containment Air Sample Analysis 44 5.4.2.8 Post-accident Gaseous and Particulate Effluent Sampling 44 5.4.2.9 Post-accident Gaseous and Particulate Effluent Sample Analysis 45 5.4.2.10 Liquid Effluent Sampling 46 5.4.2.11 Liquid Effluent Sample Analysis 46 5.4.2.12 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) 47 5.4.3 Protective Action 48 5.4.3.1 Radiation Protection During Emergencies 48 5.4.3.2 Evacuation of Owner Controlled Areas 50 5.4.3.3 Personnel Accountability 50 5.4.3.4 Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination 51 5.4.3.5 Onsite First Aid / Search and Rescue 52 5.4.4 Security During Emergencies 52 5.4.5 Repair / Corrective Actions 53
.4 5.4.6 Recovery 53 5. <4. 7 Public 'nformation 54 5.5 Supplementary Procedures 54 5.5.1 Inventory, Operational Check and Calibration of Emergenc.v Facilities and Equipment 54 5.5.2 Drills and Exercises 55 5.5.3 Review, Revision and Distribution 56 5.5.4 Audit 56 6.0 Coordination With Offsite Groups 58 6.1 Offsite Agencies 58 6.2 General Public 59 I
6.3 News Media 59 7.0 Drills, Exercises and Walk-Through 61 I
7.1 Program Implementation 61 7.2 Walk-Through Observation 61 i
l' I
SUMMARY
The appraisal of the state of onsite Emergency Preparedness at the' Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station involved seven general areas:
Emergency Organization; Emergency Training; Emergency Facilities and Equipment; Procedures which Implement the Emergency Plan; Coordination with Offsite Agencies; and Walk-throughs of Emergency Duties.
The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station Preparedness Program wis developed by individuals in the corporate office as well as individuals >
the site.
In general, it appeared that the coordination between these twm catities was good.
The emergency organization was defined and the training program was found to be generally adequate but required formalization.
Emergency facilities and equipment were for the most part satisfactory, however, deficiencies were noted in several areas, including lack of space in the Operations Support Center.
Procedures which implement the emergency plan were generally adequate, however, deficiencies were identified in several ;reas, including post-accident sampling and analysis, storage, Emergency Action _evels and communication of protective action recommendations to local officials and the public.
Observation and questioning of selected individuals during walk-throughs of their assigned emergency tasks and functions indicated that the individuals were aware of their assignments and their part in the emergency and were able to perform effectively in spite of some procedural shortcomings.
The auditors concluded that the licensee appeared to be capable of responding to and r.tanaging the response to an accident at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.
j
3 1.0 Administration of Emergency Preparedness The Assistant to the Plant Manager at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station was formally appointed as the Emergency Planning Coordinator.
His corporate counterpart was the Director of Nuclear Engineering and Licensing based in the Central Maine Power corporate office in Augusta, Maine. The Assistant to the Plant Manager spends, on the average, approximately 20% of his time on emergency planning which is considered an additional duty and not his prime responsibility.
The Director of Nuclear Engineering and licensing at.the corporate level spends approximately 75% of his time on emergency planning as well as one additional person totally committed to the planning effort.
There were no provisions in the Emergency Plan for input to the emergency planning effort by site personnel but interviews with site personnel indicated that Emergency Plan input was made during Emergency Plan training and during PORC review.
Interviews with licensee management and staff indicated that they know who is responsible for emergency planning.
Section 5.1 of the Emergency Plan provided for the authority to support the assigned responsibility of the Emergency Planning Coordinator. The Emergency Planning Coordinator (Assistant to the Plant Manager) received management support when exercising his assigned authority and had direct access to the Plant Manager.
The indiv^ dual responsible for emergency planning was involved with routine coordination events such as PORC meetings, budget input, etc.
There appeared to be coordination with and between all licensee organiza-tions in the areas related to emergency planning.
The interaction between site and corporate personnel during an emergency was described in Section 9.0 and Figure 9-1 of the Emergency Plan. Coordination between the licensee and offsite groups, general public, news media, local service support, etc., was described in Section 8.0 of the Emergency Plan as well as Procedure No. 2.50.15, " Release of Public Information". The coordination between the licensee and offsite groups appeared to be well documented.
Selection criteria were established for personnel responsible for emergency planning using existing job descriptions.
The incumbent met the established criteria having over 15 years of nuclear power plant experience. Appropriate training, both site and professional, courses were attended by personnel responsible for emergency planning.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Add.tional management emphasis and resources at the site level be allocated to the licensee's emergency planning effort.
(309/81-21-01)
4 2.0 Emergency Organization 2.1 Onsite Organization t
The auditors reviewed the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station Emergency Plan, (Volume II, dated 12/31/80, revised 3/27/81) and implementing procedures and held discussions with licensee personnel to evaluate the adequacy of the definition of the onsite emergency organization and the assignment of emergency duties and responsibilities. This evaluation was preliminary to determining the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness training program and procedures developed to implement the Emergency Plan.
The starting point for the onsite emergency organization evaluation was Section 5.0 of the licensee's emergency plan. This Section established 9 broad areas of emergency activity and outlined the general duties and responsibilities to be performed by assigned personnel. The broad area designations were as follows:
Functional Area Personnel Assigned Emergency Coordinator Plant Manager Plant Shift Superintendent Assistant to the Plant Manager Emergency Coordinator qualified individuals Shift Organization and Management Plant Shift Superintendent Operating Department Management Plant Manager Operation's Department Head Operation's Crew Operation's Support Staff-Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor Shift Operators and Technical Licensed Members of Operating' Shift Support Personnel Emergency Radiation Survey Health Physics Technician Qualified Radiation Protection Personnel Personnel Accountability Security Force Personnel Department Supervisors Search and Rescue Assembled from available site personnel
_g
5 Functional Area Personnel Assigned Onsite Technical Support Technical Support Department Head Technical Support Staff Nuclear Safety Advisor The above description was supplemented by Tables 5-1, 5-2, 6-1, and Figure 5-1 of the Emergency Plan which listed major functional areas of emergency activity and related tasks, position titles and staffing levels for the functional areas. The auditors noted that the licensee's Emergency Plan description of the emergency organization provided for an individual designated as the Emergency Coordinator (EC) who was responsible for the overall coordination and direction of the licensee's response and that this i..dividual had been given the authority and responsibility to accomplish the required coordination and accident mitigation in Section 5.2 of the Emergency Plan.
Page 5.5, Section 5.2 of the Emergency Plan clearly specified the Emergency Coordinator's duties and responsibilities including specific areas that cannot be delegated. However, Figure 5-4, " Emergency Organization",
did not address such areas as security, first aid / rescue, personnel monitors, etc. down to the working level and designated the Emergency Coordinator on the same reporting level as the Operation's Department Head and Technical Support Department Head, all reporting directly to the Plant Manager.
The Emergency Coordinator did not appear to.
have organizational control and reporting authority over the Plant Operations Manager and Technical Support personnel, although he would be charged with the responsibility for coordinating all resources for accident mitigation.
Interviews with licensee personnel indicated that Operations and Technical Support Dcpartment Heads would in fact report to the Plant Manager who was also a qualified emergency coordinator.
Site personnel knew who w1s responsible for emergency coordination and what was required for accident mitigation in spite of Figure 5-4 in the emergency plan.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Revision of the description of the onsite emergency organization in Section 5.2 and Figure 5-1 of the Emergency Plan to reflect functional areas of emergency activity, reporting chains (manage-ment structure) and interrelationships of the functional areas down to the working level consistent with Table B-1 of NUREG-0654.
(309/81-21-02) 2.2 Augumentation Organization The auditors reviewed Section 9.0, " Recovery" of the licensee's Emergency Plan.
Interviews and discussions with licensee and corporate personnel indicated that both knew their assigned emergency responsibilities which included but was not limited to the following:
emergency response coordination; operational accident assessment; i
^
6 radiological accident assessment; radiological environmental survey and monitoring; health physics; technical support; manpower and logistical support; public ir. formation; and dosimetry and measurements. Licensee personnel selected to augment the onsite emergency organization had work experience in the types and duties of their assigned functional-areas.
The licensee's plan for augmenting the onsite organization with health physics staff beyond 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> under accident conditions relied upon the use of the Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) located in Framingham, Massachusetts and other Yankee system resources (e.g. Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, etc.).
Contractor and private organization's who may be reqcested to provide technical assistance to the licensee as well as augmentation of the emergency organizations were specified.
Combustion Engineering and Stone and Webster have contracts for site support in the event of an emergency.
Private organizations had letters of agreement in Appendix I of the Emergency Plan. The interfaces between the onsite functional areas of emergency activity and corporate augmentation were clearly specified and understood by both parties in Figures 5-3 and 9-1 of the Emergency Plan.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
.=
7 3.0 Emergency Plan Training / Retraining 3.1 Program Establishment The licensee's program for training site personnel and individuals assigned specific emergency duties and responsibilities was outlined in Section 8.1.2 of the Emergency Plan (Volume II dated 12/31/80 revised 3/27/81).
Procedure No. 2.50.5, " Emergency Plan Training and Exercise," provided a means of training emergency response personnel and testing, evaluating and documenting the response of plant staff and offsite agencies during the conduct of drills and exercises.
The Emergency Plan stated in Section 8.1.2.1 that all personnel exco.pt escorted visitors will be given an emergency plan briefing.
Procedure No. 2.50.5 required specialized emergency training which was broken down into the following functional categories:
implemen-tation of the emergency plan, emergency coordinator, radiological accident assessment, offsite/onsite surveys and onsite assistance, security and accountability, radiologicel protection and control, communications, radiochemistry, first aid, repair and corrective actions, and offsite support agencies.
Procedure No. 2.50.5 also stated that " specialized training will be conducted upon initial assignment of individuals to specified emergency duties and will be followed by an annual refresher course and requalif-icatinn." The procedure also stated that emergency procedural steps which are not part of the routine duties of the individuals assigned to perform them are identified by review of the emergency implementing /
opevating procedure and special training requirements determined accordingly.
The auditors noted that actual implementation of Emergency Plan training was fragmented and uncoordinated.
Security personnel were l
trained by the coordinator for security training.
Fire Protection personnel were trained by the Fire Protection Officer. All other health physics, plant, and offsite agency personnel were trained by the Radiological Controls Foreman, although his specific emergency plan training duties were not defined.
During the appraisal, the auditors reviewed documents and records related to the training given to various plant personnel. The auditors interviewed licensee personnel to assess the adequacy of the training conducted, as well as members of the following offsite agencies:
Bath Memorial Hospital Wiscasset Ambulance Service Maine State Police 1
0
8 The auditors also interviewed personnel of the licensee's Training Department regarding the planned proposal to formalize all emergency plan training and incorporate the training into one department.
Training responsibilities were discussed with the Radiological Protection and Controls Foreman.
He stated that normally half of his time was devoted to training which included most of the Emergency Plan and Procedures formal training. He stated that because of the recent preparations being undertaken for the annual exercise (Emergency Plan Exercise which was conducted on September 26,1981) most of his training time was now devoted to the Emergency Plan and Procedures which had recently been revised and approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC).
The auditors noted that training sessions and attendance were documented for all emergency plan training conducted by the Radiological Protection and Controls Foreman, and that lesson plans for the training of such emergency response personnel included the procedure applicable to the attendees emergency function. However, the auditors were not able to verify that a documented training program existed which included all appropriate personnel or that all of those personnel had been or would continue to be trained. The auditors noted that no documentation of the specific training required or given to offsite support personnel such as corporate personnel, medical, and ambulance personnel as well as state police personnel, was available.
The auditors also noted that the specific training given to Security and Fire Protection personnel regarding Emergency Plan Procedures was left to the discretion of the member responsible for training in each of the affected departments.
Based on the above findings, improvements in the following areas are required to achieve an acceptable program:
Development of a coordinated, all inclusive training program for qualifying individuals and groups who are assigned various functional areas of emergency activity to include:
a)
Designation of an emergency preparedness instructor within the training department as well as development of instructor qualifications; b)
Development of lesson plans with defined goals and objectives; c)
Development of a means to be used to train members of the onsite and offsite emergency organizations in changes of assignment, facilities, equipment and procedures which may occur in the period of time between scheduled training iterations; and,
9 d)
Centralization of all Emergency Plan training records such as training given to security, fire protection and offsite personnel and agencies, within the training department.
(309/81-21-03) 3.2 Program Implementation Discussions were held with on-shift plant personnel relative to their routine duties and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and responsibilities.
Training records were reviewed for persrnnel assigned to the duty and on-call supervisor schedule; for personnel assigned to the Shift Technical Advisor schedule; for personnel assigned Health Physics and Chemistry duties; and onsite and offsite monitoring duties.
Because many of the emergency plan procedures were newly revised and because of the pending exercise, much of this training had been recently accomplished.
For example, training on-call supervisor personnel had taken place the day before the appraisal team arrived.
Based on training records, discussions with plant personnel, and observations during walk-throughs, the auditors were able to verify that the training program as administered by the Radiological Protection and Controls Foreman satisfied program implementation requirements.
However, the auditors noted that the emergency plan training duties assigned to the Radiological Protection and Controls Foreman required a significant amount of the individuals time which may reduce his effectiveness in administering the licensee's Radiation Protection program. This observation is addressed in Section 3.1 of this report. The auditors noted that the licensee had developed lesson plans and trainee qualification sheets for the following emergency categories:
emergency coordinator, radiological accident assessment, and offsite/onsite surveys.
Other functional areas of the emergency plan, however, remain to be addressed by a formalized training program.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Develop lesson plans and qualification criteria to assure adequate trair.ing of specific licensee and non-licensee groups or individuals.
(309/81-21-04)
10 4.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 4.1 Emergency Facilities 4.1.1 Assessment Facilities 4.1.1.1 Control Room The auditors reviewed the control room on several occasions during the appraisal. Copies of the current Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures were placed conspicuously on a bookshelf in the control room.
The Control Room also contained the protective monitoring and communications equipment specified in Section 7.0 of the Emergency Plan and Procedure No. 2.50.6, " Emergency Equipment Readiness Check". The use of.the monitoring equipment, communications equipment and meteorological diffusion overlay and maps was tested during walk-through drills with control room shift personnel.
The control room was also provided with a large I
wall mounted copy of the " Maine Yankee Emergency i
Offsite Dose Rate Nomogram" used in Procedure No. 2.50.10, " Evaluation of Radiological Data" to project dose rates offsite based on readings from the containment monitor, stack monitor, and survey team results. A copy of the nomogram used to relate field sample results to thyroid doses was also mounted on the wall.
The nomograms were covered with a clear plastic material to allow the use of grease pencils.
In addition, the control room contained a map of the plume Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) with an overlay that showed the sigma plume for various stability classes.
Licensee personnel indicated that this map would be used for determining the protective actions to be recommended to offsite agencies.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
11 4.1.1.2 Technical Support Center (TSC)
The auditors reviewed Section 7.0, " Emergency Facilities and Equipment", Section 7.1, " Technical Support Center" of the licenee's Emergency Plan, and Procedure No. 2.50.19, " Technical Support Center".
The auditors determined that the Technical Support Center (TSC) was located as specified in the Emergency Plan.
It was located near the control room in emergency situations. However, it was not possib ' to have face-to-face interaction between pertannel responsible for control room and TSC '.tivities. There appeared to be adequate working
' ace for personnel assigned to the TSC.
Data disp' ays, records, and communications were available and easily accessible.
The TSC did not have the same radiation shielding capability as that of the control room, nor did it have a ventilation system functioning in the manner comparable to the control room ventilation system. There were no particulate (HEPA) and charcoal filters installed in the ventilation system.
There were dedicated individual voice links i
between the TSC and control room, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and NRC.
Licensee personnel indicated that there were no designated commercial telephones for NRC use, however, there was an operable Emergency Notification System (ENS) extension installed. There was also an operable Health Physics Network (HPN) extension installed in the computer room immed-iately adjacent to the control room. There were no dedicated telephone links between the TSC and local government response agencies.
Licensee personnel also indicated that there were approx-imately ten other telephones available for communications between the TSC and other onsite and offsite emergency control centers and response agencies and organizations. There were no radio communications available between the TSC and field monitoring teams.
The TSC contained up-to-date records such as current plant technical specifications, plant operating procedures, emergency operating procedures,
e 12 drawings, schematics, and diagrams showing current conditions of the plant structure and systems; however, licensee personnel were unable to find a copy of the Final Safety Analysis Report, although it was stated that one was located in the TSC in the past. A copy was placed in the TSC prior to the team's departure from the site.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Improve the habitability of the TSC.
(309/81-21-05) 4.1.1.3 Operations Support Center (OSC)
The auditors reviewed Section 7.0, " Emergency Facilities and Equipment" of the Emergency Plan, specifically the section entitled " Operations Support Center and Plant Entrance Gatehouse" as well as Procedure 2.50.18, " Operations Support Center".
The OSC was located as stated in the Emergency Plan and procedures. However, this area was also the security personnel area, and its asso-ciated nerve-center. Therefore, it appeared that there could be a conflict in the use of the area by OSC personnel and security officials who must carry out their activities and assigned responsibilities.
It did not appear that the present OSC would be large enough to accomodate the number of personnel who would be assigned to the designated area.
The licensee indicated that approximately 25 to 30 people (operations and health physics personnel) would be assigned to the area at various times. The present OSC did not offer personnel protection from direct radiation or airborne contaminants nor were the means to detect and measure contaminants available.
The ventilation system was unfiltered.
Licensee personnel indicated that there were no provisions for a back-up location in the event the primary facility becomes uninhabitable. The OSC did have primary and back-up voice communication links between the OSC, Control Room and TSC, which consisted of two paging systems, one of which is dedicated to security personnel and i
telephones.
13 Based on the above findings, improvements in the following areas are required to achieve an acceptable program:
Provisions of adequate space to accommodate 25 to 30 individuals as well as supplies of radiation survey instrumentation, continuous air monitors and other equipment needed for performance of emergencv activities that may be required of per,onnel assigned to the OSC. (309/81-21-06) 4.1.1.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The auditors reviewed tre paragraph dealing with the Emergency Coordination Center (primary) in Section 7.0, " Emergency Facilities and Equipment",
of the Emergency Plan.
It was noted that in contrast to the TSC and OSC, the Emergency Coordination Center or Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) did not have a specific procedure.
The Emergency Coordination Center or EOF was located in the Information Building, a single story ground level steel frame masonry-sided, metal roofed building.
Figure 7-3 of the Emerg-ency Plan indicated that the Emergency.Coordina-tion Center was a small room approximately 10 x 15 feet in the Ir armation Building. However, a licensee representative indicated that it was principally located in the conference and training room in the northeast corner of the Information Building as well as various other areas within the information building. During the appraisal it was noted that the room was in constant use during the day as a training room, and therefore was set up for that purpose and was not arranged for the purposes of an Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
As noted above, if the classroom was turned into an Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), it appeared that there would be provisions for an active EOF from which direction, evaluation, and coordination of all licensee activities related to an emergency could be performed.
It appeared to be large enough to provide the working space for assigned personnel and had space for a number of members of the news media. The informa-
=
tion center building was equipped as stated in the emergency plan and procedures. There were
14 low range GM beta / gamma survey meters; however, low range ion chamber beta / gamma survey meters and high range gamma survey meters would have to be brought into the facility. There were air samplers having the capability for particulate and radiciodine sampling, sample counting equipment, and personal dosimetry. There were no check or calibration sources available. Current Emergency Plan and implementation procedures were available in the emergency kits.
State and local emergency plans and implementation procedures were also included in the kits as well s maps marked with cardinal polar coordinates.
There was no emergency assignment board with team designations and emergency assignments available in the EOF.
As-built plant layout drawings and diagrams were available showing current conditions of plant structures, systems, etc. Writing materials and 2
note pads and related equipment were available.
There was no readout of the station meteorology available in the EOF.
However, the licensee indicated they plan to provide readout capability within the facility. Decentamination supplies were available.
The EOF did have dedicated voice communications with the TSC and the Control Room.
There was a sufficient number of non-dedicated voice commun-ication links to provide access to the NRC, other Federal, State and local agencies, and emergency support organizations.
In addition, mobile communication links (radio) had been provided for communications with field monitoring teams.
Reliable backup means of communications had been provided by Plant Page (Femco) units and State Police radio. There was just one l
designated commercial telephone for NRC use; however, there were working Emergency Network System (ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) extensions installed at the NRC assigned location.
The alternate Emergency Coordination Center was located in the Lincoln County Civil Emergency Preparedness office in Wiscasset, Maine.
It also served as the Lincoln County Emergency Operations Center. The facility contained State
I 15 emergency telephone circuits, teletype, Civil Defense radio equipment, NAWAS, and a decontam-inatic;i supply cabinet. The facility had its own emergency power unit. The director of the Linccin County Civil Emergency Preparedness division indicated that there would be approxi-mately 12 to 14 of his personnel in the center if it were activated.
It appeared that space would not be adequate to accomodate the antici-pated number of personnel from the County unit as well as those associated with the licensee's imergency Operations Facility.
The licensee stated that the required maps for the E0F would be placed in the alternate Emergency Coordination Center.
The licensee also indicated that they would bring emergency kits and additional radio communication links if the center were to be activated.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Provisions in the emergency plan clearly indicating that the classroom and training
.anter in the Information Building could be rapidly transformed into an active Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
(309/81-21-07) 4.1.1.5 Post-accident Coolant Sampling and Analysis The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling", and visited the-post-accident coolant sampling location and chemistry laboratory as well as conducted inter-views with plant personnel.
The reactor coolant sampling station was located in the Primary Auxiliary Building at the 21 foot elevation.
Sampling would require personnel access to the area and manual valve operation to obtain a coolant sample. The licensee estimated the exposure rates one hour after an accident emina-ting from the sampling tubing inside the sampling room for a NUREG-0578 source term, to be 1600 R/hr whole body (26 R/ min) and 4000 R/hr hand exposure.
There were provisions to purge the system before sampling.
o 16 The chemistry laboratory was located in the Service Building which included the health physics offices. The area was separated from the Primary Auxiliary Building and did not contain any primary coolant interfaces. The estimated dose from a LOCA or TMI type accident in this area from shine would be about 1 R/hr the first hour after an accident, dropping to
.03 R/hr 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> later.
The laboratory was a short distance (2 minute walk) from the caolant sample location. There were remote handling tools and one lead pig at the chemistry lab. However, this lead pig was also to be used for the containment air and primary vent stack samples.
The sampling procedure did not indicate that remote handling of samples was required.
In addition, during a walk-through, it was apparent that the plant staff did not know what tools would be required.
The chemistry laboratory had four Ge(Li) detectors, one NaI detector, a multichannel analyzer that could support all detectors at one time, a gas chromatograph and an ample supply of bottles, pipettes, syringes, etc.
The licensee demonstrated that the lead pig could be transported to the sample location with ease.
If the laboratory was inaccessable, the licensee would use the mobile lab from the Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory (See Section 4.1.1.9).
Post-accident sampling required that an I&C technician jump several valves in the control room to allow the sample to be taken following a containment isolation signal. However, there was not an I&C technician onsite during the backshift.
Licensee personnel indicated that.it may require as much as an hour to obtain an I&C technician during the backshift.
There was an area radiation monitor in the sample area and the sample procedure provided for surveys and Radiation Work Permits (RWPs).
Licensee personnel stated that a system to allow collection and dilution of high level samples will be installed by January 1982.
Based on the above findings, improvement in the following areas is required to achieve an acceptable program:
17 Provision of post-accident coolant and containment sampling systems that will allow sampling a-d analysis within three hours without receipt of excessive personnel exposure, along with provisions for remote handling, storage and transport of samples.
(309/81-21-08) 4.1.1.6 Post-accident Containment Air Sampling and Analysis The containment air sampling station was located at the H analyzer in the Primary Auxiliary 2
Building at the same elevation as the chemistry laboratory and primary coolant sample station.
The licensee had estimated that the dose from nearby piping at the station after an accident to be 20 to 70 R/hr for the whole body and 30 to 300 R/hr for extremities.
In addition, the charging pumps are near the station and shine from them may render the station inaccessible.
In addition, the licensee informed the auditors that remote handling tools were available and could be used to take the sample; however, their use was not described in the relevant Chemistry Procedure No. 7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling" (See Section 5.4.2.4).
There were provisions to purge the system before sampling.
The laboratory facility was described in Section 4.1.1.5 of this report.
Licensee personnel indicated that a new contain-ment sampling system that will allow taking of high level samples will be installed by January 1982 and that the sample location would be accessible during an accident. There were no area radiation monitors in the sample area, however, the procedure called for surveys and RWPs.
Based on the above findings, improvement in the following areas is required to achieve an acceptable program:
See Item 309/81-21-08 of this report.
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18 4.1.1.7 Post-accident Gas and Particulate Effluent Sampling and Analysis The post-accident primary stack samp1 ~.ng location was at the upper level of the primary auxiliary building.
Samples were collected using charcoal and particulate filters. The area appaared to be accessible during accident conditio;.s. There were no provisions for remote handling cf the samples.
Procedure No. 7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling", indicated that a lead pig was to be used to transport filters to the lab for counting.
This would require the use of an existing crane to move the pig to and from the laboratory level.
There were no area monitors in the sample area, however, the sampling procedure provided for a survey and RWP.
.In addition, the licensee staff indicated that if this area was unaccessible that an air sample would be taken offsite, h mile down wind. This provision was not clearly called for in the procedure (See Section 5.4.2).
The laboratory is described in Section 4.1.1.5 of this report.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensees program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Provisions for remote handling of gas and particulate effluent sample filters.
(309/81-21-9) 4.1.1.8 Post-accid it Liquid Effluent Sampling and Analysis The auditors reviewed Health Physics Procedure, No. 3.7.1.1, " Liquid Radioactive Waste Discharges" and discussed the procedure with radiation protection person,el.
Primary plant liquid waste was collected for processing by the waste disposal system. The processed waste water was held up in the liquid waste test tasks for sampling before release.
Two 12,000 gallon test tanks were located
19 outside, next to containment. The liquid waste is sampled at the tanks and during an accident this area could be inaccessible due to radiation being emitted from containment.
There were sample bottles and remote handling tools availabic in the lab for use in taking samples; however, as discussed in Section 5.4.2.10 of thi5 report, the specific tools required to handle high level samples had not been specifically identified.
The lab facilities described in Section 5.4.2.5 of this report would be-used to analyze samples and contained all the required instruments, equipment, etc.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensees program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Provisions for remote handling of high level liquid samples taken from the test tanks.
(309/81-21-10) 4.1.1.9 Offsite Laboratory Facilities The licensee uses the services of the Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory located at Westborough, Massachusetts. This laboratory is also used by the Yankee Rowe, Vermont Yankee, and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The laboratory is sponsored by the licensee companies of the nuclear power reactors noted above. The labo atory is under the direction of the environmental laboratory group which consists of engineers, chemists, and environmental scientists with expertise in areas of environmental health physics, radiochemistry, public health, and nuclear instrumentation.
The auditors reviewed the laboratory's "Adminis-trative and Technical Responsibilities Manual",
and Procedure No. 520, " Emergency Response Mobile Gamma-Ray Spectrometric Technique for Identification and Quantitative Determination of Radionuclides". The laboratory, which was visited by the auditor during July 1981, appears to be well equipped with current instrumentation for chemical, as well as nuclear analyses.
It
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20 had the capability to analyze various biological and aquatic media samples as part of an on going environmental surveillance program, providing external radiation and in situ radionuclide deposition and concentration measurements, emergency response and record keeping, and documentation of the various analytical data.
The laboratory can provide the necessary backup capability for analyzing various in-house samples related to the radiation control measures of the licensee, as well as follow-up on bioassay measuremerts.
In addition, the laboratory, when requested, assists in the assessment of offsite radioactivity levels during an emergency situation.
The laboratory also had the capability of an emergency response mobile gamma-ray spectrometric technique for identification and quantitative determination of various radionuclides. The emergency vehicle for this capability consisted of a 4-wheel drive van which contained the following equipment: An electrical generator, a Ge(Li) detector, a Canberra 8180 multi-channel analyzer, 3105 high voltage power supply, 2011 amplifier, 2001 pre-amplifier, 2000 bin / power supply, Ge(Li) Spectremeter Systems 7000 series, a Hewlett-Packard 9825T calculator, 9885M disk drive, and a 9866B thermal printer.
For the three plant emergency classifications (alert, site area, and general emergency),-the laboratory staff would quality control test the emergency response gamma-ray spectrometry instrumentation and equip the emergency vehicle for in situ gamma-ray spectrometry, air filter sample preparation, and air filter gamma-ray spectrometry. During an alert classification, the equipped emergency vehicle would remain at the laboratory until relieved.
Fr a site area or general emergency, the vehicle would be driven to the affected plant's emergency operations facility. At the facility, staff would receive further instructions on what sampling will be conducted, and what analyses will be requested.
As noted above, there were provisions for fixed and mobile laboratory facilities for offsite monitoring and analyses. The laboratory had the capability of providing for dedicated instrumenta-tion, a well as instrumentation that is used within the laboratory where the quality control
21-system offers checks on the capability and functional performance of such instrumentation.
The instruments were adequately maintained, calibrated, and-routinely checked, and, where necessary, repaired and replaced promptly.
The auditors reviewed the program conducted at the Bailey Farm where the environmental evaluation studies are performed.
This facility was under the supervision of the Environmental Studies Department-of the Central Maine Power Company.
The activities of the laboratory follow the requirements of Appendix B to the technical specifications of the facility license. The laboratory collects samples of hydrography, chemistry, plankton, benthos, various types of fish, and marine algae.
In addition, the laboratory also samples milk, vegetation, and TLD readouts at 17 stations with a planned future expansion to 40 stations and air samples for particulates and iodine contamination. This is conducted at nine stations on a weekly basis. The other samples are collected on frequencies such as-semi-monthly, monthly, and quarterly.
The laboratory surveys the samples for a gross count, and then sends them to the Yankee Environmental Laboratory at Westborough, Massachusetts for analyses.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program' appears to be acceptable.
4.1.2 Protective Facilities 4.1.2.1 Assembly / Reassembly Areas The auditors reviewed Section 6.5.1, " Protective Cover, Evacuation, Personnel Accountability" of the Emergency Plan which identified the Information Center as the primary assembly area.
The auditors toured the above area to determine the size, location, and the types and quantities of emergency radiological protective equipment available in the area. The size of the area appeared adequate to accommodate the anticipated number of potential evacuees.
The equipment included emergency survey kits, decontamination supplies, high range meters,
22 dosimeters, respiratory protection and miscellaneous items. There was an emergency equipment check list for routine inventory, check sources for instrument operability checks and instrument calibration data.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
4.1.2.2 Medical Treatment Facilities The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.8,
" Medical Emergency Plan" which described the licensee's medical treatment facilities as well as Section 7.4, "First Aid and Medical Facilities,"
of the Emergency Plan. The licensee maintained an onsite first aid station located on the first floor of the service building which is normally staffed by a nurse during the day shift. The facility was easily accessible to a stretcher being carried by two individuals and was equipped with first aid supplies and equipment. Telephone communications were available within the first aid facility which was equipped to handle only minor injuries. More extensive treatment would be provided at the Bath Memorial Hospital.
If decontamination is required, it would be performed with the assistance of Health Physics technicians at the Health Physics Control Point in an adjoining area.
Emergency dosimetry capabilities and calibrated personnel survey instruments would be provided by the Health Physics Department from the Health Physics Control Point.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
4.1.2.3 Decontamination Facilities The auditors reviewed Section 6.6.2 of the Emergency Plan which described the provisions for personnel decontamination as well as the decontamination facilities which were located on the first floor of the Service Building in close proximity to the Health Physics Control point and First Aid Station. The provisions consisted of showers for washdown of an individual and
23 various decontamination supplies.
Liquid waste resulting from decontamination would go through the normal waste disposal system lines to an onsite sewerage treatment facility where solid waste is recovered and disposed of.
There were also provisions for decontamination of personnel and/or vehicles / equipment at the Information Center.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
4.1.3 Expanded Support Facilities Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that the Emergency Plan did not provide for expanded support facilities.
Provisions for general work locations to be used by expanded support personnel was not addressed in the current planning effort.
Based on the above findings, improvement in the following area is required to achieve an acceptable program.
Specification of facilities in the vicinity of the site which would be used for administrative and logistical support by the expanded support organization in the event of a large scale response to an emergency situation and incorporation of such facilities into the Emergency Plan. (309/81-21-11) 4.1.4 News Center The auditors reviewed Section 5.2 of the Emergency Plan which described the public affairs role during an emergency.
The Central Maine Power Ccmpany Public Affairs and Information Services is responsible for providing a spokesperson to brief the news media and release information concerning an emergency. The briefings occur at the Central Maine Power Company Headquarters in Augusta.
News media personnel at the Emergency Operations Facility will be briefed by the above office using a trailer immed-iately adjacent to the Information Center.
The auditors toured the trailer that was designat'ed as the News Center and determined that the area designated as the main briefing area was large enough to accommodate approximately 30 media representatives.
The licensee, however, had no provisions for communications nor other equipment needed to operate the News Center consistent
l 24 with its designated functions during an emergency (e.g.,
telephone service, electric supply to carry added TV load, copying machines and public address system).
Provisions for security (media badging, crowd control, etc.) had not been addressed. However, security, communications and other equipment needed to operate a News Center were available in the Information Center which was located immediately adjacent to the trailer.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matters should be considered for improvement:
Provisions at the News Center for security, communications and other equipment needed to operate the Center consistent with its designated functions during an emergency.
(309/81-21-12) 4.2 Emergency Equipment 4.2.1 Assessment Equipment 4.2.1.1 Emergency Kits and Emergency Survey Instrumentation The auditors reviewed Section 7.3 of the Emergency Plan, " Assessment Facilities", and Procedure No.
2.50.6, " Emergency Equipment Readiness Check".
The licensee had reserved supplies and survey instrumentation at specified locations in kits and in various site areas for use during emergencies.
The equipment and supplies located at the specified areas in the plant were in those areas designated in the Emergency Plan and procedures. The emergency team would have access to the instrumentation, equipment and supplies as described in the procedure.
Such equipment would be applicable to their emergency duties.
The auditors did not inspect all kits on site, however, the five kits that were inventoried were correct and the equipment operable.
The licensee stated that there was no specific kit dedicated for re-entry team use, and there was no specific provisions for extremity monitoring and detection and measurement of beta / gamma radiation fields. However, it was indicated that the Health Physics procedures in effect at the time of re-entry would instruct the teams if extremity monitoring was required and which specific instruments were needed depending upon
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25 the job to be done. The licensee also indicated that instrumentation used for emergency environ-mental surveys had the capability to detect and measure radioiodine concentrations in air of at least IE-7 mci /cc under field conditions in any kind of weather without regard to the presence of noble gasses and resulting background radiation.
The instrumentation also had the capability to detect and measure particulate activity in air to IE-9 mci /cc (Cesium-137 equivalent) without regard to background radiation.
Portable ion chamber instruments with beta / gamma distinguishing capability for measuring whole body dose rates, inplant and plume exposure rates were available for use. The same was true for GM instruments with beta / gamma capability for detecting contam-ination of individuals and the environment.
Emergency kits provided sufficient numbers of instruments and supplies to equip the team members for its intended function.
Kits contained high range direct reading dosimeters for onsite-re-entry and survey teams.
Extremity dosimetry for repair teams and post-accident sampling would be provided through appropriate Health Physics procedures required for the specific job undertaken. There was an inplant capability for detecting airborne iodine in the presence of noble gases.
Instruments were properly maintained on a routine schedule and the operability and calibration checks were performed on a regularly scheduled basis.
It appeared that these checks and calibrations were accurate.
Inoperable instruments were promptly repaired or replaced and there were written procedures for calibration of all types of radiation instruments used in an emergency.
Based on the above findings,,this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
4.2.1.2 Area and Process Radiation Monitors The auditors inspected the area and radiation monitor readouts in the control room and reviewed selected calibration records for those monitors used for accident detection and classification and for the determination of protective actions.
All radiation monitors described in the following procedures were inspected:
26 Procedure No. 2.50.0, " Declaration and Categorization of Emergency Conditions" Procedure No. 2.50.10, " Evaluation of Radiation Data" The auditors determined that the monitors were in place and operable. The monitors were found to have the required ranges.
In the case of the Primary Vent Stack monitors there was no overlap between the low range and interim high range monitor; however, this was recognized in the procedures. A Site Area emergency would be declared when the low range monitor was confirmed offscale.
Dose calculations would be performed assuming the lowest range of the high level stack monitor (1 mr/hr) when the low range monitor was offscale.
The high range (10 R/hr) containment monitor was installed and had been calibrated at its very low range.
The interim high range stack monitor had also been calibrated. The auditors noted that up-to-date calibration stickers were on the control room monitors.
Licensee personnel stated that it was impossible to calibrate the high range containment monitor in its high ranges at the site, however, they stated that it was possible to " pulse" test the detector electronics and that this had not been done.
The auditors inspected the installation of the interim high range stack monitor and the post-accident coolant sampling area radiation monitor. The interim high range monitor " looked" at a sample line off of the stack and was well shielded from possible outside sources. The area radiation monitor was above and had an unobstructed " view" of the sample location.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Calibration / testing of the high range containment monitor over its entire range.
(309/81-21-13)
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4.2.1.3 Non-radiatior, Process Monitors The auditors reviewed the non-radiation process monitor readouts in the control room for those monitors such as temperatures, pressure, flow indication, valve status, etc.
used for accident detection and classification and for determination of protective actions.
The auditors also reviewed the process monitors used to classify General Emergencies and spot checked the monitors required to classify other emergericy levels as specified in Procedure No.
2.50.0, " Declaration and Categorization of Emergency Conditions".
The process monitors used to identify conditions referenced in the following procedures were reviewed:
Procedure 2.50.0, " Declaration'and Categor-ization of Emergency Conditions" Procedure 2.50.10, " Evaluation of Radiation Data" The auditors determined that the monitors eure in place and operable and appeared to have the necessary ranges to classify an emergency.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
4.2.1.4 Meteorological Inctrumentation The bases for the auditor's review of the licen-see's meteorological measurements program included Regulatory Guides 1.23 and 1.97, and the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, NUREG-0696, and NUREG-0737.
The licensee provided a brief description of the meteorological measurements program in Section 7.3 of the Emergency Plan.
Since the FSAR meteorological measurements system description was not current, Section 7.3 of the Emergency Plan could be expanded to outline the available meteorological' parameters and measurement heights.
The integration of meteorological data into the licensee's dose assessment scheme was described in Procedure No. 2.50.10, " Evaluation of Radiolog-ical Data".
The auditors reviewed the Licensee's
-28 preventative maintenance program as outlined in Procedure Nos. 6-205-2 and 6-205-3.
The auditors determined that the licensee's meteorological capabilities address the require-ments of NUREG-0737, Item III.A.2 and the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, Appendix 2 in adopting interim compensating measurements. The meterolog-ical measurements system provided the basic parameters from the primary system that are necessary to perform the dose asse>3 ment function, namely, wind direction and speed and an estimate of atmospheric stability.
Data from the primary system were provided on strip charts located in the control room.
Labeling measurement heights on the recorders and correrponding noeations in Procedure No. 2.50.10 would provide the user with an _ unambiguous set of parameters for perform-ing dose projections.
All measurement systems appeared to be in operation.
The licensee's preventative maintenance program consisted of a multi-tiered, graded set of checks, surveillance, and calibration activities that provided reasonable assurance that appropri' data would be available for use.
In the event of system unavailability, the licensee had made provisions for access to alternate data sources that may be characteristic of the site: Brunswick-NAS and Portland-NWS station.
Control room personnel would be advised by the load dispatcher from Central Maine Power in the event severe weather conditions could impact the site.
Provisions had been made for transmission of meteorological information among the licensee's emergency response _ facilities and from the plant to offsite authorities. Direct telephone access by the NRC staff to individuals responsible for performing dose calculations can be accomplished using the NRC Health Physics Network (HPN).
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
4.2.2 Procective Equipment 4.2.2.1 Respiratory Protection The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.6,
" Emergency Equipment Readiness Check", and
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29
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Health Physics Procedures 9.12, 9.13, 9.21, 9.23, 9.24, and 9.25, all of which related to the licensee's respiratory protection program.
There were approximately 16 self-contained breathing (SCBA) devices that were stationed at various points within the plant site for emergency use. There was a capability of refilling SCBA devices and licensee staff indicated that this equipment would be usable under conditions in which the internal areas of the plant have high airborne or direct radiation levels. The equipment for refilling these devices was located in the turbine building, and it was reported that there would be a five-minute filling time for each tank.
In addition, there were facilities in the nearby communities where the tanks could be refilled on a four to six hour turnaround basis, however, no written agreement exists for this offsite support.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but i
the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Written agreement with offsite agencies for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) support.
(309/81-21-14) 4.2.2.2 Protective Clothing The auditors reviewed Health Physics Procedure No. 9.1.4, "Use of Protective Clothing and Equipment".
The emergency kit in the Control Room contained several clothing kits reserved for emergency use.
In addition, the normal stores which was located in the primary auxiliary building would be used in an emergency. The licensee indicated that there were approximately 1,000 to 1,500 sets of protective clothirg available on a day-to-day basis.
If additional sets were necessary, it would take approximately one-day to obtain additional sets. The reserve supply would be accessible under emergency conditions unless the primary auxiliary building and asso-ciated area were not accessible. The licensee could obtain the necessary supplies of protective clothing from external sources, utilizing existing agreements with other Yankee organization plants.
30 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program' appears to be acceptable.
4.2.3 Emergency Communications Equipment The auditors reviewed Section 7.2 of the Emergency Plan,
" Communication Systems", and Procedure No. 2.50.17,
" Emergency Notification".
The onsite and offsite communications equipment specified in the Emergency Plan and procedures were located as 2
stated, including the equipment for notifying and instructing the public. There were alarms having specific meanings, for example, an evacuation alarm and a fire alarm.- However, there was no specific radiation emergency alarm.
Following sounding of the alarm, announcement. would be made over the plant page indicating what type of emergency is in progress. Alarms and other communication devices appeared operable.
The alarms were audible in high noise areas.
The alarm system was activated during the appraisal when an unusual event was declared because of a steam line break.
There were provisions for routinely checking the operability of emergency communications devices and equipment; for example, on Fridays at noon in the plant the evacuation alarm is tested.
There was a 24-hour capability to notify the NRC, State and local authorities.
The licensee indicated that the following communications have backups for initiation of emergency response: between the site and the licensee's near site emergency operations facility; between the site and the local emergency operation centers; between the site and the radiological monitoring teams; between the site and State emergency operations centers; with Federal emergency response organizations; and with NRC Headquarters and Regional headquarters offices.
The licensee reported that there were redundant power sources and systems available for communications.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
4.2.4 Damage Control / Corrective Action and Maintenance Equipment and Supplies The auditors reviewed Section 9.0, " Recovery" of the Emergency Plan and Procedure No. 2.50.11, " Plant Entry and Recovery Plan", and held discussions with licensee personnel.
4
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0 31 Neither the plan nor procedures, nor the discussions with licensee personnel indicated that the needs for onsite damage control, corrective action and/or maintenance equipment and supplies had been specifically considered.
Licensee personnel indicated that they would rely on normal stocking levels of supplies.
Based on the above findings, improvements in the following area is required to achieve an acceptable program:
Revisions in the Emergency Plan and procedures for the needs of onsite damage control, corrective action and/or maintenance equipment and supplies.
(309/81-21-15) 4.2.5 Reserve Emergency Supplies and Equipment The licensee relied upon the onsite inventory of such equipment as survey instruments, dosimetry, protective clothing and other equipment to support emergency operations.
These supplies and equipment appeared to be readily available.
It was indicated by licensee personnel that there were no specific controls in existence to control minimum stock levels and to ensure that adequate reserves of normal supplies to handle emergency situations were maintained.
However, their normal controls to verify stock levels appeared to be adequate.
The licensee stated that they can request supplies from other Yankee organizations.
There were no emergency reserve supplies included in the periodic verification of stock. The licensee also indicated that the equipment and instruments received from other sources is of the same quality or equivalent in their operational characterisitics as that of the licensee's present instruments and equipment, and therefore would be compatible.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Provision of inventory controls to ensure that adequate emergency equipment supplies would be available in the event of an emergency.
(309/81-21-16) 4.2.6 Transportation The licensee had eight vehicles available for supporting emergency response. These included one security pick-up truck that was radio equipped as well as one additional pick-up truck and two station wagons that were set up for insertion of portable radios which were controlled by security. The radio equipped vehicles were to be used for offsite monitoring.
.-t 32 Medical transportation would be supplied by the Wiscasset Ambulance Service and/or company station wagons.
Keys for the vehicles were controlled by security with the exception of one pick-up truck that is assigned to the resident engineer.
In an emergency, the keys and radios would be placed in all vehicles by security.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the ifceasee's program appears to be acceptable.
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33 5.0 Procedures 5.1 General Content and Format The licensee's Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures generally specified the individual or organizational element having the authority and responsibility for performing the tasks covered by the procedure.
Procedures such as Procedure No. 2.50.0, " Declaration and Categorization of Emergency Conditions", might be performed by several individuals and therefore would use a more general assignment.
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and protective action guides (PAGs) were specified along with emergency actions or protective.ctions to be implemented.
Where actions are to be taken, these actions and their sequential steps were not always clearly defined (See Section 5.4.2 of this report).
Procedures generally described and highlighted the prerequisites and conditions that must exist before the specific actions are to be performed, as well as the precautions and limitations to be observed during the performance of the actions. Guidelines were provided for each area in which the user of the procedure is permitted to exercise judgement in the action levels, the application of protective action guides or the recommendation of protective actions.
Procedures referred the user to other procedures already in existence (chemistry, health physics, etc.) to complete the detailed actions.
The references appeared in the body of the procedure at the point at which implementation of the other function or procedure is to be performed or considered.
References were available to the user.
The procedure had sign-off sheets, data sheets, and checklists. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures appeared to be direct and clearly worded. They provided detailed action instructions for the emergency staff, yet were short and simple enough to be useful during an actual emergency.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.2 Emergency, Alarm and Abnormal Occurrance Procedures The auditors reviewed procedures used by the operations staff to identify and classify abnormal plant conditions and to initiate actions to return the plant to normal or stable condition.
Procedure No. 2.50.0, " Declaration and Categorization of Emergency Condition" was used by licensee personnel to classify abnormal plant conditions in accordance with the Emergency Plan. Once plant condition was diagnosed, one of the four following implementing procedures would be utilized:
2.50,1, " Unusual Event, 2.50.2, " Alert", 2.50.3, " Site Area Emergency", or 2.50.4, " General Emergency".
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j' 34 These event classifications were identified in Attachment A, "Classif-ication Table", to Procedure No. 2.50.0 which listed various plant parameters and indicators and led the user into the Emergency Action Levels (EALs), however, licensee Personnel appeared to have difficulty identifying and classifying abnormal plant conditions (See Section 5.4.2 of this report).
The auditors observed the use of Procedure No. 2.50.0 during the exercise of September 26, 1981 by licensee personnel responsible for event classification.
Licensee personnel properly classified the accident using data supplied by the exercise controllers.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.3 Implementing Instructions The auditors reviewed Emergency Plan implementing instructions which were contained in Procedure Nos. 2.50.0, 2.50.1, 2.50.2, 2.50.3, and 2.50.4, and determined that a separate implementing instruction was prepared for each class of emergency.
Implementing instructions were written for use by the Emergency Direct *r and outlined the tasks the Emergency Director must perform, including making protective action recommendations to State and local agencies. The licensee had recently completed training of the control room staff and on-call superintendent personnel on the above procedures.
The implementing instructions included the scope of the authority and responsibility vested in the Emergency Director, and orchestrated the implementation of other, more specific procedures which had been developed to implement or support implementation of the Emergency Plan.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4 Implementing Procedures 5.4.1 Notifications The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.17, " Emergency Notification", which contained instructions and a sequence of notifications for onsite and offsite organizations in the event of an emergency at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.
In general, the action levels for performing the various notifications were tied to the declaration of the various emergency classes. The procedure provided for authentication schemes, lists, telephone numbers and described the means of contacting major response agencies.
It also contained current emergency call lists and directions for use of a separate pager system for extended notification coverage to key personnel during backshifts and weekends.
35 The auditors determined that the notification system described in Procedure No. 2.50.17 which is periodically tested, functioned as stated in the procedure.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4.2.
Assessment Actions The auditors reviewed Procedure Nos. 2.50.0, 2.50.1, 2.50.2, 2.50.3, 2.50.4 and 2.50.10; ciiscussed assessment actions with plant radiation protection management, inter-viewed plant Control Room personnel and conducted walk-throughs (See Section 7.2).
Procedure No. 2.50.0, Revision 2, " Declaration and Categorization of Emergency Condition" was used to classify events. Once a condition was classified one of the following implementing instruction procedures was used:
Procedure No. 2.50.1, " Notification of Unusual Event", Procedure No.
2.50.2, " Alert", Procedure No. 2.50.3, " Site Area Emergency",
and Procedure No. 2.50.4, " General Emergency".
The auditors reviewed the EALs for compliance with the criteria in NUREG-0654. The EALs that were established did not provide observable explicit indicators that characterized each condition.
A detailed review of the General Emergency EALs determined that they were directed towards identification of conditions that would lead to core degradation. The EALs appeared to cover all the appropriate system failure modes which could lead to a General Emergency.
However, the EALs were not developed to indicate the actual existance of core damage or loss of fission product barriers as required. As is discussed in Section 7.2 of this report, the auditors presented the Control Room staff with containment pressure, temperature, radiation and isolation conditions that were representative of a General Emergency.
Since there were no General Emergency EALs associated with basic core containment status, the Control Room staff could not classify the event using the' existing classification procedure.
The licensee indicated that while there was a high range containment monitor, the relationship of its readings to core status was not provided as part of the EALs. Therefore, while the containment monitor was available for determining and projecting core and containment conditions, it was not being used for this purpose. Discussions with Control L
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36 Room staff and walk-throughs indicated that the organization of the EALs in Procedure No. 2.50.0, Revision 2, did not allow for prompt event classification.
The licensee had attempted to improve usability of their classification procedure, in the most recent revision, by grouping the EALs under categories such as:
reactor coolant system lea: age; steam line break; and ECCS initiation, instead of organizing the EALs by emergency class. However, the auditors determined that the Control Room staff needed to read every EAL in several categories to ensure that an event was correctly classified.
For exar.ple the "ECCS Initiation" Category contained no EALs for " Site Area" or
" General" Emergencies and did not direct the user to check other categories for Site Area or General Emergency situa-tions that may also include an "ECCS Initiation". This could result in an event being classified at a much lower level than is appropriate. The problem appeared to be that the EALs were not organized such that once the procedure is initiated for a condition (e.g. ECCS Initiation) the user is directed to consider all emergency classes for which the initiating condition may be present. This could be accomplished by a flow chart.
Procedure No. 2.50.3, " Site Area Emergency" and 2.".4,
" General Emergency" explicitly provided for recomms :ing shelter offsite to the Maine State Police if a General Emergency is declared or if there are releases. Discussions with State officials indicated that once the State Police receive the shelter recommendation, they would activate the emergency broadcast system (EBS) and use prerecorded messages to instruct the public to take shelter.
Procedure No. 2.50.16, "Offsite Protective Action Recommendations", provided protective action criteria, based on projected doses for shelter and evacuation, however, this procedure was not referenced in emergency class implementing procedures 2.50.3 or 2.50.4.
There were no provisions for recommending protective actions based on plant system status (core / containment) or consideration of offsite conditions such as evacuation times as is required by NUREG-0654.
The licensee and offsite officials have provisions for immediate sheltering of the public, however, there were no provisions to follow-up promptly with protective action recommendation's to include evacuation that have been based on consideration of: core / containment status (See NUREG/CR-1131); projected release time and type (continuous, puff);
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37 U
offsite considerations;. evacuation times; special population; and key-hole approach of evacuation.
Procedure No. 2.50.10 stated that Appendix A (whole body dose projections based on Control Room instrumentation) may be used by Control Room or Emergency Center (EOF) personnel to obtain and estimate offsite doses. However, Procedure No. 2.50.10, Appendix A, was not specified as one of the required or subsequent actions assigned to the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) by the emergency imple-menting instructions for " Site Area" (2.50.3) or " General" (2.50.4) emergencies. As part of the steps in calculating offsite doses through use of the primary vent stack monitor readings and nomogram, the release rate in curies was calculated based on accident type and time after shutdown.
However, the licensee had determined that offsite dose rates were directly related to the primary vent stack monitor readings and not to the curies released when the change in isotopic mix with time is considered. Therefore, the calculation of release rate was not used in projecting J
offsite doses. The auditors determined that since this step is not required to estimate offsite doses it should be removed from the steps performed by the Control Room staff.
Procedure No. 2.50.10, " Evaluation of Radiological Dats" required that the duration of the accident be estimated by the Control Room and did not specify a default value to be used if an accurate estimate could not be made.
In addition, Appendix A of the procedure (which was to be used by the Control Room) contained separate operations for projecting doses for each of the following conditions:
1.
In-Containment High Range Monitor above 2 R/hr; 2.
Primary Vent Stack (PVS) Monitor above 1 mR/hr; and, 3.
Atmospheric steam dump with indications of steam generator leaks.
However, these separate subjects were not clearly divided and the entire Appendix must be read to realize that each would have to be addressed.
Procedure No. 2.50.10, Appendix B " Thyroid Dose Assessment" did not projtet thyroid doses based on gross gamma stack monitor readings. The procedure required that either the stack filter or field monitor results be used to project thyroid doses.
.t 38 In addition to the nomograms, the licensee was in the process of installing a computer system in the Control Room that would perform offsite dose projections out to 10 miles using primary vent stack and containment monitor readings. The licensee also had installed a CRT next to the computer system that displayed the input required to run the dose projection model.
Licensee personnel stated that the system was to be operational by October 1981 and was actually demonstrated during the exercise of September 26, 1981, 1
There were no provisions for estimating offsite doses if Control Room instruments (radiation and meteorological) were off scale or inoperable.
Based on the above findings, improvement in the following areas are required to achieve an acceptable program:
Expansion of the emergency classification scheme to include revision of projected dose levels and use of basic core / containment status indicators to identify general emergencies as well as determine the relationship of the containment monitor to core / containment status.
Revision of the classification procedure to ensure prompt classification of all emergency conditions.
(309/81-21-17)
In addition to the above findings, the following matters should be considered for improvement:
Revision of the dose assessment procedure to highlight the steps to be performed by the Control Room and emphasize the need for prompt assessment of potential iodine releases.
(309/81-21-18) 5.4.2.1 Offsite Radiological Surveys The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.12,
" Emergency Off-Site Radiation Monitoring" and interviewed radiation control supervision as well as observed a walk-through.
The procedure was written for use by the moni-toring teams and described the following steps:
before leaving the E0F licensee personnel would perform operational checks of instrumentation to be used, take background readings, ensure communications are operational, perform briefings, and ensure that all team members have adequate dosimetry.
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39 Enroute to the sample location, survey team members would establish communications with the EOF, observe instrument readings from the vehicle window, locate plume centerline by observing the highest reading by traversing the plume and looking for a plateau, and report the sampling location to the EOF.
At the sample location, survey team members would take a 15 minute air sample, monitor 2" above the ground with the instrument window open and closed and record radiation levels, count aie filter sampling media outside the plume area,' record data on the form provided in the procedure to include the names of team members, date/ time / location, background reading (CPM), and dose rates.
Monitoring teams would determine airborne iodine and gross activity using conversion charts provided in the procedure and radio results to the EOF.
During the walk-through and exercise of September 26, 1981, the auditors observed that the monitoring team had no problem using the procedure.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4.2.2 Onsite (out-of plant) Radiological Surveys The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.7,
" Emergency On-Site Radiation Monitoring" and Procedure No. 2.50.12, " Emergency Off-Site Radiation Monitoring," discussed the subject with licensee radiation protection personnel and observed walk-throughs.
Procedure No. 2.50.7 outlined, for each emergency class, the tasks the health physics technician would perform during the initial phase of an emergency.
It specified that, "when time permits, update the site survey map with current survey information". The EOF contained a site survey map, however, there was no map provided with the procedure, in the OSC or in the Control Room.
Licensee pc. sonnel stated that Procedure No.
2.50.12, " Emergency Offsite Radiation Monitoring" along with Health Physics Procedure No. 9.1.1,
" Surveys" would be used in performing these surveys, however, Procedure No. 2.50.12 was not referenced in Procedure No. 2.50.7.
t 40 See Section 5.4.2.1 for a discussion of Procedure 2.50.12.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Reference Procedure No. 2.50.12 in Procedure No. 2.50.5 as well as provide Procedure No.
2.50.7, the Control Room and OSC with site survey maps.
(309/81-21-19) 5.4.2.3 In plant Radiological Surveys The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.7,
" Emergency On-Site Radiation Monitoring" and discussed this procedure with licensee radiation protection personnel and staff.
The procedure specified that habitability surveys must be performed at the TSC, Control Room and EOF for Site and General Emergencies.
In addition, it stated that surveys will be performed at the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent 4
(PSS) and if time permitted, the site survey map would be updated.
The licrnsee maintained in plant survey forms at the Health Physics Control Point and in the EOF.
These forms provided for recording date, time, technican name, instrument, dose rate at waist 2
level and contamination levels (DPM/100 cm ) on a map of each plant floor. However, the procedure did not refer to these survey forms.
As discussed in Section 5.4.3.1, Health Physics Procedure No. 9.1.6, " Establishment and Posting Controlled Areas" described provisions for surveys and posting of high radiation areas but this procedure was not referenced in Procedure No. 2.50.7.
Licensee personnel stated that Procedure No.
2.50.7 was designed to outline the tasks to be performed immediately by the shift health physics technician, however, this was not discussed in the procedure.
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41 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Reference to the in plant survey forms and maps in Procedure No. 2.50.7 to include their location as well as clarification of the purpose of the procedure.
(309/81-21-20) 5.4.2.4 Post-accident Primary Coolant Sampling The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling", and discussed the subject with licensee chemistry staff.
The procedure listed the steps required to take a liquid sample from the primary sample sink as well as provided a diagram.
The procedure stated in the precautions section that surveys and a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) were required and that once sample lines are aligned and purged, there may a dramatic increase in radiation levels.
The procedure specified the sample size, bottle type and required that the simple should be placed in a shielded transport device, (e.g.,
lead pig). However, the procedure did not identify the requirement for remote handling of the sample or the tools to be used.
It also did not note where the lead pig was stored.
In addition, while it highlighted the need for radiation protection, it did not specifically designate what would be required for respiratory i
protection, hand dosimetry, and where protective devices would be issued. During the walk-through (See Section 7.2), the auditors discussed this with the on-shift health physics technician. He did not realize how high the dose rates in the sample area might be and indicated that the dose rates may not be known in advance to aid in determining the type of respiratory protection required since this requires an air sample. As discussed in Section 4.1.1.5 of this report, the area identified for coolant sampling may contain very high radiation levels (1600 R/hr whole body, 4000 R/hr hand). This should be clearly specified in the procedure. The licensee stated that a post-accident coolant sampling system that meets NUREG-0737 requirements will be installed by January 1982.
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42 j
Based on the above findings, improvement in the i
following areas is required to achieve an acceptable program:
Provisions for remote handling of primary coolant samples.
(309/81-21-21) 5.4.2.5 Post-accident Primary Coolant Analysis The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
i 7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling" and discussed the subject with licensee chemistry staff.
j The procedure discussed the steps required to prepare the sample and to perform analyses for boron, and chloride.
It referenced Chemistry Procedure No. 7.209.12, " Boron as Boric Acid" and Chemistry Procedure No. 7.209.20.2, " Chloride Ion Test for Mercuric Nitrate Titration".
These procedures were reviewed by the auditors and they appeared to define the steps required to perform the analysis. However, neither the post-accident sampling procedure nor the chemistry procedures contained any information or precautions on how to handle samples if they contained high j-radiation levels.
I The auditors determined that the coolant sample results were associated with fael cladding degradation in Procedure No. 2.50.0, " Declaration and Categorization of Emergency Conditions".
The auditors were told training was to be provided to chemistry personnel operations staff and Shift Technical Advisors (STA). However, the 4
relation of core chemistry and conditions was not contained in any procedure and therefore, there was no assurance that TSC personnel would have access to this information.
Based on the above findings, improvements in the following areas are required to achieve an acceptable program:
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Revision of the primary coolant sample analysis procedures to provide for analysis of high level samples.
(309/81-21-22) 5.4.2.6 Post-accident Containment Air Sampling The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling" and discussed the subject with licensee chemistry staff. Section 7.1 of the procedure " Containment Gas Sample from the Post-Accident Hydrogen Analyzer",
provided a step by step procedure of how to obtain a containment air sample.
In addition, it indicated that a RWP was required and as discussed in Section 5.4.2.4 of this report, the i
procedure contained a precaution concerning
?
possible dramatic increases in radiation once the system had been purged.
As discussed in Section 4.1.1.6 of this report, a licensee analysis indicated that, one hour following a major accident, the dose rates at the containment atmosphere sampling station may be 20 to 70 R/hr, whole body and 30 to 300 R/hr, extremities.
However, as in the case of coolant sampling, the procedure did not provide for remote handling of the samples nor a detailed description of the radiation protection steps to be taken. The procedure specified that the " sample bomb" would be placed in a lead pig for transport but did not specify where to obtain the lead pig. Also as previously discussed, there was only one lead pig.
The auditors determined that the sample could be taken within three hours.
l Based on the above findings, improvement in the following area is required to achieve an acceptable program:
Provisions for remote handling of containment air samples.
(309/81-21-23)
In addition to the above finding, the following matter should be considered for improvement:
44 Specification of the radiation protection steps to be taken as well as the location of special tools (e.g., lead pig) required for containment air sampling.
(309/81-21-24) 5.4.2.7 Post-accident Containment Air Sample Analysis The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling" and discus: H the procedure with licensee chemistry staff.
The procedure specified the steps required to prepare the containment sample for gamma spectroscopy and H analysis. However, as in the case of 2
coolant sampling analysis, the procedure did not specify the precautions or other steps required to handle a high level sample such as how to protect the facility from contamination.
The procedure referenced Chemistry Procedure No.
7.209.39, " Hydrogen Test, by Gas Chromatograph" which contained the required information to perform the analysis.
This procedure also contained precautions on the flammability of hydrogen but there was no mention of a possible radiation hazard.
t Based on the above findings, improvements in the following area is required to achieve an acceptable program:
Revision of the containment air analysis procedure to provide for the analysis of high level samples to include appropriate precautions.
(309/81-21-25) 5.4.2.8 Post-accident Gaseous and Particulate Effluent Sampling The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling" and discussed the procedure with licensee chemistry staff. The procedure provided a brief description for the sampling of the primary vent stack (PVS).
It 4
stated, "the fact that these samples could contain activities several orders of magnitude greater than experienced normally gives rise to this special procedure". However, the "special" portion of the procedure was that Health Physics would conduct a survey of the PVS sample area and that the samples should be placed in a lead pig for transport. This procedure referenced
45 Procedure No. 3.7.1.2, " Gaseous Radioactive Waste Discharge", which provided a description of the routine procedure for taking stack samples.
The procedure also provided a brief discussion of handling high level samples.
Procedure No. 2.50.10 " Evaluation of Radiological Data" used the results of the analysis of the PVS charcoal cartridge to determine the I-131 concentration offsite. These results were in turn used as part of the plant Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be ecceptable.
5.4.2.9 Post-accident Gaseous and Particulate Effluent Sample Analysis l
The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
7.1, " Post-Accident Sampling" and discussed the procedure with licensee chemistry staff. The procedure provided a brief description for the analysis of primary vent stack (PVS) halogen and particulate filters.
It stated, "the fact that these samples could contain activities several orders of magnitude greater than experienced normally gives rise to this special procedure".
However, the "special" portion of the procedure was that Health Physics would conduct a survey of the PVS sample area and that the samples should be placed in a lead pig for transport.
This procedure referenced Procedure No. 3.7.1.2,
" Gaseous Radioactive Waste Discharge" which provided a description of the routine procedure for stack sample analysis. The procedure also provided a brief discussion of handling high level samples.
Procedure No. 2.50.10, " Evaluation of R:diuiogical Data" used the results of the analysis of the PVS charcoal cartridge to determine the Iodine-131 concentration offsite. These results were in turn used as part of the plant Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
i Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
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46 5.4.2.10 Liquid Effluent Sampling The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
3.7.1.1, " Liquid Radioactive Waste Discharge" and discussed the subject with licensee chemistry personnel.
The procedure was designed for sampling and analysis of liquid wastes before discharge as part of the licensee's normal program. The procedure did not address sampling or analysi' under accident conditions.
The procedure did not specify what special radiation protection cautions / precautions may be required, what special handling tools may be required or the possible exposures involved with sampling under accident conditions.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following should be considered for improvement:
Development of a post-accident liquid waste sampling procedure that addresses radiation prctection and special handling of high level samples.
(309/81-21-26) 5.4.2.11 Liquid Effluent Sample Analysis The auditors reviewed Chemistry Procedure No.
3.7.1.1, " Liquid Radioactive Waste Discharge" i
and discussed the subject with licensee chemistry personnel.
The procedure specified what would be required to analyze liquid waste samples and included the following:
sample prepration, counting, data management, computer analyses, criteria for release and further analysis and preparation of liquid radioactive release permits. However, as discussed in Section 5.4.2.5 and 5.4.2.10 of j
this report, the procedure did not address the special handling and precautions that may be
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required to perform liquid effluent sample analysis of high level samples.
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47 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following should be considered for improvement:
Development of a post-accident liquid analysis procedure that addresses radiation protection and special handling of high level samples.
(309/81-21-27) 5.4.2.12 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.10,
" Evaluation of Radiological Data", the " Yankee Emergency Mutual Assistance Plan" and discussed this subject with licensee radiation protection personnel.
Procedure No. 2.50.10, Appendix D, " Evaluation of Environmental Station's Samples, Soil Samples, and Other Environmental Media" described the collection of filter media, soil, vegetation, water and milk. The procedure provided for labeling of samples with time of collection, location of sample and name of collecting indi-vidual.
The samples would be analyzed by the Yankee mobile lab or sent to the Yankee Environ-mental Lab in Westborough Massachusetts. This arrangement was confirmed by the Yankee Emergency Mutual Assistance Plan. The mobile lab would normally be located at Westborough which is about a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> drive, however, it could be at any of the plants supported by the Yankee organ-ization so the arrival time could be either longer or shorter depending on where the mobile lab is at the time.
Licensee personnel indicated that TLDs were a part of the normal monitoring program and had been placed around the plant, however, a system of TL0s that meets the requirements of NUREG-0654, criteria H.6.b had not been established.
The licensee indicated that they were in the process of installing a new TLD system that will meet the requirements of NUREG-0654, criteria H.6.b.
Installation was being delayed since the required calibration equipment had not yet been received.
In addition, there were no procedures to collect and read the existing TLDs were an emergency to occur or for a continous TLD monitor-ing program during an emergency.
s 48 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Establishment of an emergency offsite environmental monitoring program that meets the requirements of NUREG-0654, criteria H.6.b and development of appropriate support-ing procedures.
(309/81-21-28) 5.4.3 Protective Action 5.4.3.1 Radiation Protection During Emergencies The auditors reviewed emergency and health physics procedures and discussed radiation protection during emergencies with licensee radiation protection personnel.
Procedure 2.50.14, " Emergency Radiation Exposure Control" identified specific whole body exposure guidelines for entry into radiation areas to remove injured personnel, undertake corrective actions, and to conduct surveys. The procedure also specified guidelines for emergency center habitability as well as discussed the conduct of search and rescue, support of corrective actions, and personnel dosimetry record keeping.
The procedure stated that all personnel assigned duties in a high radiation area would be issued "high" range dosimetry and that the emergency kits contained high-range self-reading cosimeters, however, the location of these kits or other possible locations of such equipment was not identified. The procedure also stated that all non-licensee personnel who report to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) would be assigned TLDs.
The procedure provided for maintaining exposure records and consolidation of records at the end of each shift at the EOF by the Radiological Assistant.
It also specified that TLDs would be processed by the Yankee mobile lab. This lab could be at the site within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of request (see Section 5.4.2.12 of this report) and was equipped with a 4
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In addition, the site dose record computer system was a time sharing system that could be used from any location equipped with a telephone.
The procedure specified that search and rescue personnel be briefed on what happened, what may happen, what hazards are present and what tasks are to be accomplished.
In addition, the procedure stated that search and rescue personnel were to discuss the rescue attempt with senior medical and health physics personnel if possible, however, these briefings were not specified for personnel performing corrective actions.
The procedure specified that potassium iodide (KI) would be administered to all rescue, assistance personnel, site boundary and offsite survey teams prior to potential iodine exposure if practicable.
Procedure No. 2.50.20, " Prophylactic Administration of Potassium Iodide" provided guidance on administration of potassium iodide but did not specify who had the authority to direct its use.
Procedure No. 2.50.14 stated that radiation protective measures and equipment should be used whenever practical, in addition, the kits in the Control Room, EOF, and the H.P. checkpoint had high range survey instruments (1000 R/hr) but the procedure did not state that survey instru-ments with a 1000 R/hr or higher range should always be used.
Health Physics Procedure No. 9.1.6, " Establishment and Posting Controlled Areas" described the provisions for positive access control to high radiation areas. This procedure stated that posting of areas may be required as a result of plant emergencies, however, this procedure was not referenced in Procedure No. 2.50.14.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Specification of the location of equipment and other supplies used for high-radiation entry as well as the need for a high range survey instrument (1000 R/hr); reference to
50 other procedures (e.g., Procedure Nos.
2.50.7 or 2.50.20) in Procedure No. 2.50.14,
" Emergency Radiation Exposure Control"; and specification of who has the authority to authorize the issuance of potassium iodide (KI).
(309/81-21-29) 5.4.3.2 Evacuation of Owner Controlled Areas The auditors reviewed Section 6.5.1 of the Emergency Plan and discussed the subje-t with licensee personnel as well as reviewet the licensee's procedures for classification of an emergency as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Any one of the actions results in the sounding of an emergency alarm and an announcement on the plan' ;;ging system.
In this manner, the evacuation of personnel to the assembly area depends upon operational parameters and EALs used to classify the emergency.
The licensee had provisions for concise oral announcements over the plant paging system to describe immediate actions for non-essential personnel.
Emergency Plan procedures included reference to personnel accountability.
The licensee's emergency plan addressed only one assembly area for evacuation purposes, the Information Center.
Protective actions for the various emergency conditions were described in specific terms for all non-essential personnel, both contractor and visitor.
However, no offsite assembly areas were specified, in lieu of the Information Center, if emergency conditions so warrant.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Provision for direct offsite evacuation to a predesignated assembly area (s).
(309/81-21-30) 5.4.3.3 Personnel Accountability The auditors reviewed Section 6.5.1 of the Emergency Plan and discussed personnel accounta-bility with licensee personnel.
Personnel
1 51 accountability actions were the responsibility of Department Supervisors during Unusual Event and Alert emergencies and the Security force during Site and General emergencies.
Their responsibilities were incorporated within each of the procedures which deals with the different emergency classes as well as the Emergency Plan.
Search and rescue of personnel was addressed in Section 5.0 of Procedure No. 2.50.14, " Emergency Radiation Exposure Control".
Procedure No. 2.50.9, " Security Force Radiation Emergency Plan", specified the actions to be taken by security personnel. The auditors observed an Unusual Event on September 11, 1981 during which Security personnel required 18 minutes to complete the accounting of all visitors and contractors during the day shift.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4.3.4 Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination The auditors reviewed the emergency procedures to verify that the licensee had established provisions for monitoring and decontaminating individuals and equipment leaving restricted areas and at assembly / reassembly areas.
Procedures for monitoring personnel leaving restricted areas were the routine monitoring procedures in effect. Health Physics Procedure No. 9.1.8, " Monitoring for Personnel Contamination" and 9.1.9, " Personnel Decontamination Procedure,"
were utilized.
There were provisions for monitoring and decontaminating personnel at assembly / reassembly areas.
The routine decontamination procedures provided a me'ns to record personnel contamination incidents.
Procciure No. 9.1.9 provided guidance for decor.caminating personnel utilizing soap and lukewarm water. More serious cases, including injury, would be sent to Bath Memorial Hospital.
There was also a medical agreement with Affiliated Hospitals Center Inc., Boston, Massachusetts for accepting injured personnel.
1 52 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4.3.5 Onsite First Aid / Search and Rescue The auditors reviewed the licensee's procedures and held discussions with licensee personnel to verify that provisions for locating and treating injured personnel were adequate.
The following procedures addressed the licensee's provisions for locating, transporting and handling injured persons who may also be contaminated:
Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2.50.1,
" Notification of Unusual Event";
Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2.50.2, " Alert";
Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2.50.3, " Site Area Emergency";
Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2.50.4, " General Emergency";
Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2.50.8, " Medical";
Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2.50.14,
" Radiation Exposure Control";
Health Physics Procedure No. 9.1.8, " Monitoring for Personnel Contamination"; and Health Physics Procedure No. 9.1.9, " Personnel Decontamination Procedure".
The auditors noted that the procedures covered the key aspects for onsite first-aid / rescue such as search team organization, search methods, radiation protection considerations, interface with offsite medical treatment facilities and transportation.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program. appears to be acceptable.
5.4.4 Security During Emergencies The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.9, " Security Force Radiation Emergency Plan" and checklist as well as held ~ discussions with licensee security personnel to determine the adequacy of security measures.
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i 53 The procedure provided for personnel accountability, security of the owner controlled area, roadblock establishment, equipment removal, vehicle availability, establishment of base radio communications, communications with State and local law enforcement groups, security force recall, and emergency equipment.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4.5 Repair / Corrective Actions The auditors reviewed Section 6.4, " Corrective Actions",
and Section 9.0, " Recovery", of the Emergency Plan, and Procedure No. 2.50.11, " Plant Entry and Recovery".
The emergency plan and procedures described the concept of operations for repair or corrective action activities.
Individuals were identified in the procedures to whom teams would report and the steps that would be taken to assure that individuals were properly briefed as to the radiological conditions, stay times, etc., prior to the conduct of operations of repair and corrective actions.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4.6 Recovery The auditors reviewed Section 9.0, " Recovery", of the Emergency Plan and Procedure No. 2.50.11, " Plant Entry and Recovery".
The organizational authority was specified in the plan and procedures for declaring that a' recovery phase was to be entered. There were provisions for an evaluation of plant operating conditions, as well as the in plant and out-of plant radiological conditions in the decision making process.
i Section 9.3 of the Emergency Plan, " Notification of Response Organizations of Initiation of Recovery Activities" stated the following, "The recovery manager (or Plant Manager) will ensure that response organizations are informed when recovery activities are to be initiated, or when changes to the recovery organizational structure are to occur".
Key positions in the recovery organization were identified in the emergency plan and procedures.
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54 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.4.7 Pubite Information During an actual emergency at Maine Yankee, a spokesperson from the Central Maine Power Public Affairs and Information Services would serve as the primary contact for representatives of the news media, and State and local public information offices in accordance with Procedure No. 2.50.15, " Release of Public Information". The public affairs and information services group had eight full-time professionals.
If an emergency were declared, the group e
would staff the Central Maine Power Company Corporate Public Affairs Office in Augusta, Maine, and if needed, the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) at the site as well as the Emergency News Center at the Augusta Armory.
A centralized news media center could also be established-in the Bath Armory.
All public information-during an emergency would be disseminated by the Central Maine Power Company Public Affairs and Information Service located in Augusta. There were no provisions in the Emergency Plan or procedures to annually survey and assess local population awareness of the public notification system.
Based on the above findings, this portion of-the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Provisions to annually survey and assess local population awareness of the public notification system.
(309/81-21-31) 5.5. Supplementary Procedures 5.5.1 Inventory, Operational Check and Calibration of Emergency Facilities and Equipment The auditors reviewed Section 7.3, " Assessment Facilities",
of the Emergency Plan, cnd Procedure No. 2.50.6, " Emergency Equipment Readiness Check".
The procedure provided a specific inventory listing of all emergency equipment. The frequency at which emergency equipment would be inventoried, operationally checked, and/or calibrated was specified in the procedure. The responsibility for the performance of the emergency equipment readiness checks and for correcting any noted deficiencies was specified in the procedure.
For example, if the seals
i
.i 55 are broken on any of the emergency kits, the kit would be inventoried for all items listed on the checklist, with missing or inoperable items being promptly replaced, and the kits resealed. The emergency kits were inventoried on a semi-annual schedule. After the inventories are completed and the checklist completed, the forms are returned to the Health Physics Supervisor who reviews them and takes appropriate action on any exceptions noted on the checklist inventory form.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
5.5.2 Drills and Exercises The auditors reviewed Procedure No. 2.50.5, " Emergency Plan Training and Exercise", which stated " Annually, the Emergency Plan Coordinator in conjunction with senior plant tranagement, will select a simulated accident which, were it to occur, would result in a General Emergency".
The last such licensee Radiation Emergency Drill was conducted on Thursday, December 4, 1980. The annual drill was performed on Sacurday, September 26, 1981.
Procedure No. 2.50.5 required that drills be conducted at the following specified frequencies:
Communication Drills - monthly; Fire Drills - in accordance with the fire protection plan; Medical Emergency Drill - annually with ambulance and hospital support groups; Radiological Monitoring Drills - annually; and Health Physics Drills - semi-annually.
The auditors reviewed records as well as interviewed licensee personnel and determined that the last Medical Emergency drill had been conducted on December 31, 1980.
The last Radiological Monitoring drill was conducted during August 1981 in conjunction with State agencies.
Security and Fire Protection drills had been conducted as required, however, no Health Physics drills had been conducted since December 4, 1980.
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.o 56 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Provisions for the performance of all necessary drills and exercises in accordance with the requirements set forth in Procedure No. 2.50.5, " Emergency Plan Training and Exercise".
(309/81-21-32) 5.5.3 Review, Revision and Distribution The licensee's Emergency Plan called for annual review and update of the Emergency Plan.
Procedures which implement-the Emergency Plan were reviewed on a continuing basis in order to conform with new requirements and guidelines.
In addition, the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) reviews the Emergency Plan and recommends updating procedures as the need arises.
The auditors observed that the licensee was reviewing the updated implementing procedures, incorporating new instruments and equipment, and other pertintent changes as the need was identified.
Changes to implementing procedures were promptly approved and implemented and their distribution was verified to be appropriate.
However, during the walk-through in the EOF (See Section 7.2), the auditors determined that the controlled copy of Procedure No.
2.50.4, " General Emergency", was out-of-date, Licensee personnel responded that changes had been approved for this procedure within the week and controlled copies had not as yet been replaced in the current procedure.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
Establish a priority distribution system whereby the EOF receives controlled copies of the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures expeditiously.
(309/81-21-33) 5.5.4 Audit The auditors reviewed Section 8.0 of the Emergency Plan which specified that an audit of the Emergency Plan and procedures be conducted annually by the Maine Yankee Nuclear Service Division.
The last audit was conducted November 3-5, 1980 which included discussions with pertinent personnel and inspection of equipment.
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57 The newly issued Maine Yankee Quality Assurance Program dated August 29, 1981 (Section'XVIII) also included require-ments for audit of the Emergency Plan and procedures. The responsibility for conducting all audits was transferred to the Quality Assurance Department headquartered in Augusta, Maine.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
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.s 58 6.0 Coordination with Offsite Groups 6.1 Offsite Agencies The auditors contacted responsible individuals within the following groups to verify that they understood their responsibilities and procedures in response to an emergency at the licensee's facility:
Wiscasset Ambulance Service, Maine State Police, Maine Bureau of Civil Emergency Preparedness, Bath Memorial Hospital and Lincoln County Civil Emergency Preparedness.
Each agency representative contacted expressed satisfaction with the licensee's coordination in relation to planning and information exchange.
As discussed in the Emergency Plan, the licensee did not have any direct interface with local and State government other than the Maine State Police during the notification stage of an emergency.
The auditors confirmed that adequate coordination existed between the two parties.
Upon notification of a Site Area or General Emergency, the State Police arrange with the National Weather Service and the Emergency Broadcast System to play one of four pre-recorded tape messages to promptly inform the public as the Public Emergency Alerting System (PEAS) is activated. The State Police also notify the Maine Bureau of Civil Emergency Preparedness as well as local agencies.
During the course of the appraisal, the auditors noted that written agreements with various offsite agencies required updating, and that no current agreement existed with the U. S. Coast Guard regarding its responsibilities during an emergency.
Two representatives from offsite agencies which were contacted expressed interest in annual refresher training to include basic radiation protection techniques (licensee training deficiencies are discussed in Section 3.1 and 3.2 of this report).
During the exit interview the auditors suggested that a meeting be held with the Maine Bureau of Civil Emergency Preparedness for.
coordination of Emergency Action Levels (EAL) and Protective Action Guide (PAG) recommendations to include discussion of evacuation criteria and plans.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
i 59 Update agreements between the licensee and offsite groups and provide refresher training of offsite agencies including discussion of State responsibilities in conjunction with the licensee's emergency response.
(309/81-21-34) 6.2 General Public The auditors reviewed the licensee's efforts to disseminate information to the public concerning the Emergency Plan as well as the licensee's efforts to instruct the public as to the necessary measures to be taken during a declared Site Area or General emergency.
The auditors noted that during April 1981, the licensee distributed a booklet entitled " Emergency Plan Information for a Major Nuclear Incident-at the Maine Yankee Power Station or Other Regional Emergency" to all customers of Central Maine Power within the communities surrounding the site (approximately 20,000 homes).
In June 1981, the licensee distributed an Emergency Information Notice to the same customers, and to local officals.
The auditors suggested that an assessment of public awareness of these materials and their contacts be performed by the licensee (see section 5.4.7 of this report).
If an emergency occured, the licensee would activate the Public Emergency Alerting System (PEAS).
This system is comprised of both (1) fixed sirens within a ten mile radius of the plant and (2) mobile sirens and public address units.
Once an alert is sounded the public would be instructed to stay sheltered and to tune radios to the Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS) for further instructions.
Although licensee representatives praised the PEAS and commended local community cooperation during the system's development, it still remains to be shown that the PEAS can guarentee 90% notification of the public within a 5-10 mile zone within fifteen minutes of a declared emergency.
During the exit interview, the auditors suggested that the effectiveness of the PEAS system be included as a subject for comment by the local population when the licensee conducts an Emergency Plan awareness survey.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
6.3 News Media The Supervisor of Nuclear Information for Maine Yankee described to the auditors an ongoing informal program to provide information to the news media. The program included tours of the plant as well as training of news media representatives as requested.
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~60 The auditors were given a compilation of news coverage from various sources, e.g. Portland dress Herald and the Brunswick Times Herald, concernir.g events during the last three months involving the Maine Yankee Power station.. The compilation gave examples of the active working relationship between the licensee's information group and representatives of the news media.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's' program j
appears to be acceptable, i
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F 61 7.0 Drills, Exercises and Walk-throughs 7.1 Program Implementation The licensee identified drill and exercise frequency in Procedure No. 2.50.5, " Emergency Plan Training and Exercise". The auditors reviewed records and interviewed licensee personnel.
It was determined that the licensee had the following drills during the past twelve months as specified in their procedure; semi-annual health physics drill, annual radiological monitoring drills, and medical emergency drill (see section 5.5.2 of this report).
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable, but the following matter should be considered for improvement:
See Item 309/81-21-33 of this report.
7.2 Walk-Through Observation The auditors observed performance during walk-throughs in the areas of emergency detection and classification, notifications, dose calculations, offsite environmental sampling and analysis and protective action decision-making in the control room and Emergency Operation's Facility (E0F).
During the control room walk-through, the auditors presented two separate Plant Shift Superintendents (PSS's) a reading on the high range primary vent stack monitor and asked that they determine the offsite dose rates. The PSS's proceeded to Procedure No. 2.50.10,
" Evaluation of Radiological Data" and quickly and accurately performed all the steps reautred to determine the release which included the use of a nomogram located in the control room. One of the PSS's indicated that he did not expect to be required to perform dose projections from the control room since the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) would be activated before any reiease occurred.
The auditors presented one PSS with a condition that would indicate a release via the steam dumps. The PSS proceeded to the correct section of Procedure No. 2.50.10 and dispatched a Health Physics technician to take measurements of the appropriate steam lines as required.
The H. P. technician was observed by the auditors and he demonstrated that he knew the correct procedure.
The auditors presented both PSS's with a set of General Emergency indicators that included: ECCS initiation; containment pressure at 30 psig and rising; containment at 100R/hr and rising; and indication (via indicator lights and annuciators) that containment had not isolated.
s as 62 However, as discussed in Section 5.4.2 of this report, the PSS could not find a General Emergency EAL in Procedure 2.50.0, " Declaration and Categorization of Emergency _ Condition" for this situation because none existed.
In addition, the auditors discussed the organization of the EAL's in Procedure No. 2.50.0 with control room staff personnel. They indicated that even with the new EAL organization (see section 5.4.2 of this.
report), many of the categories would need to be reviewed to assure than an event was correctly classified.
In addition, they expressed some concern that the current EAL organization could result in an incorrect classification. One PSS indicated that a flow-chart or event tree should be used to classify events.
The auditors instructed one PSS to assume that an event was classified as a General Emergency and to proceed appropriately. He correctly and quickly walked-through the appropriate actions in Procedure No.
2.50.4, " General Emergency".
In addition, he expressed concern that Procedure No. 2.50.4 did not specify who had the authority to instruct him not to activate the Public Emergency Alerting System (PEAS). He also expressed concern that personnel accountability would be conducted through the Technical Support Center (TSC) and that there could be considerable delay in accounting for contractors who may be on-site during the backshift (see section 5.4.3.3 of this report).
The auditors also activated the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and reviewed the following procedures prior to its activation:
Procedure No. 2.50.4, " General Emergency";
Procedure No. 2.50.6, " Emergency Equipment Readiness Check"; and Procedure No. 2.50.12, " Emergency Off-Site Radiation Monitoring".
During the walk-through, capability was demonstrated to notify State and local govermental agencies. The observed individuals demonstrated the basic skills and knowledge necessary to perform the assigned tasks.
The designated Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was being used as a classroom during the walk-through, therefore, it was necessary to use another area in the Maine Yankee Information Center (see section 4.1.1.4 of this report). The necessary equipment was brought to the assigned area before the walk-through began. Although this was an ad hoc arrangement, it was adequate to complete the observed tasks.
The equipment and facilities were operable and appeared adequate for their assigned tasks, however, the particular area assigned would not be adequate for long term mitigation of an actual accident.
Licensee staff was aware of this and plans were being formulated for a new simulator /E0F facility.
63 The procedures used were understandable to the user and complete.
However, it was_ discovered during the walk-through that Procedure No. 2.50.4 was out-of-date in the controlled copy in the EOF. Upon questioning licensee staff, it was learned that changes had been approved for this procedure within the past week and controlled copies had not yet been replaced within the current procedure.
It was also noted.that there was no priority assigned to up-date the controlled copies of the procedures. After a telephone call from licensee staff, the controlled copy of the current procedures was brought up-to-date during the walk-through (see section 5.5.3 of this report).
The auditors noted that the monitoring team followed what appeared to be acceptable procedures in preparing and checking their monitoring kits for departure from the EOF and in conducting surveys and sampling at the field locations specified by the Emergency Coordinator.
It was noted that the survey team checked their kits outside of the E0F in accordance with Procedure No. 2.50.12.
The team then simulated the pick-up of their personnel monitoring devices and departed for the sampling area specified by the Emergency Coordinator.
This action was specified in items 10.0 and 11.0, Appendix A, of Procedure No. 2.50.12.
The measurements and samples taken by the monitoring team were received by radio at the E0F. Calculation of the thyroid dose to children and adults in the sampling area were made in an expiditious manner and the decision to recommend protective actions, based on the monitoring data, appeared reasonable.
The findings and observations summarized above were evaluated as part of the findings in Sections 4.1.1.4, 5.4.2, 5.4.3.3, and 5.5.3 of this report.
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INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED 1.
Licensee Personnel R. Arsenault, Operations Department Head (MY)
R. Bickford, Plant Shift Superintendent (MY)
R. Blackmore, Plant Shift Superintendent (MY)
D. Boyton, Reactor Engineer (MY)
- J. Brinkler,. Assistant Plant Manager (MY)
- G. Cochrane, Radiological Controls Supervisor (MY)
D. Cost, Wiscasset Ambulance Service D. Day, Health Physics Records (MY)
D. Forrest, Fire Protection Officer (MY)
- J. Garrity, Director of Nuclear Engineering and Licensing (CMP)
L. Grimard, Training Supervisor (MY)
D. Hakkila, Administrative Department Head (MY)
B. Hoyt, Security (MY)
R. Johnson, Maine State Police R. Jutras, Plant Engineer (MY)
D. Kelley, Bath Memorial Hospital R. Malaney, Maine Civil Emergency Preparedness
- G. Pillsbury, Radiological Controls Foreman (MY)
R. Prouty, Maintenance Department Head (MY)
R. Radasch, Instrument Maintenance (MY)
A. Shean, Training Director (MY)
- D. Sturniolo, Assistant to the Plant Manager (MY)
M. Veilleux, Plant Engineer (MY)
D. Vigue, Public Information Officer (CMP)
- E. Wood, Plant Manager (MY)
- Denotes those also present at the exit meeting.
2.
In addition to the above, members of the appraisal team also interviewed licensee members of plant operations, radiation protection, corporate staff personnel as well as local, county and State officials.
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