ML20041E957
| ML20041E957 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041E956 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203160013 | |
| Download: ML20041E957 (4) | |
Text
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Sastop o,
UNITED STATES g
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 g
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Y..... o SAFETY EVALUATION SY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING Af'ENOMENT NO. 29 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-6 ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT NO. 2 CCCKET NO. 60-368_
Introdtction This Safety Evaluation addresses a number of changes to the bod'y of the license and to'the Technical Specifications (TS) as discussed in each of the following sections.
I.
Reactor Buildino/ Containment Coolina Unit Surveillance By application dated September 22, 1981 the licensee proposed changes to the AN0-2 Technical Specifications (TS) for the containment cooling systems.
The proposed change would remove an inconsistericy between TS 3.6.2.3.a and 3.6.2.3.d.
TS 3.6.2.3.a specifies the required actions when one group of containment coolers is inoperable.
There is a total of four containment cooling units (CCus) with 2 CCUs per containment cooling group.
TS 3.6.2.3.d addresses the circumstances wherein one CCU in a group may be inoperable; however, provided the remaining CCU in that group can be verified to pass the required amount of service water coolant to meet the assumptions of the safety analyses that group of containment coolers may continue to be declared operable. The staff has previously evaluated and found acceptable the situation wherein one CCU per group is OPERABLE in the evaluation i
supporting the issuance of Amendment No. 16, issued October 9, 1980.
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S'ince TS 3.6.2.3.a and d are ccmparable in that they each refer to the action required if one group is inoperable the licensee pr.oposes that the time allowed to return the inoperable group to an OPERABLE status should be the same in both specifications. We agree and would concur with the licensee's proposal to change the time allowed before further action must be taken from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days in TS 3.6.2.3.d.
TS 3.6.2.3.d would then be consistent with TS 3.6.2.3.a and with the recommendations of the Standard TS.
However, the staff notes that TS 3.6.2.3.d is specific to the ANO plants and with.the several modifications made to it in Amendment No. 16 and as discussed above, may be confusing. Therefore the staff believes that the licensee's proposed changes of September 22, 1981.should be modified'to remove TS 3.6.2.3.d ano put the same requirements into surveillance 8203160015 820304 PDR ADOCK 05000368 P
TS 4.6.2.3.a.l.
This is appropriate for the following reasons:.(1)The resulting TS will tend to be less confusing, (2) the flowrate requirements
(> 1250 gpm, etc.) properly belong in the surveillance TS with the other fTowrate surveillance specifications, and (3) TS 3.6.2.3 will be consistent with the STS which will provide for improved standardization of the'AN0-2 TS with the current STS. These changes have been discysed with and.
concurred in by the licensee. On these bases these changes are acceptable.
II. Reoraanization of Health Physics Section i
By application dated October 8, 1981 the licensee proposed to amend the l
portion of the TS :ddressing the organization of the plant staff health physics section. The changes consist of creation of the position of Health Physics Superintendant and the addition of a communication interface with the Corporate Health Physicist who is located offsite.
The licensee states that this revision of the A!10 organization addresses a significant finding of the5NRC's Radiological Appraisal Team during
.0ctober/ November, 1980 and also fulfills a commitment made in an AP&L Co. letter dated April 16, 1981 to the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment. We have reviewed the proposed changes and agree with the licensee's statement that they will improve the ANO Radiation Protection Program by elevating the Health Physics Section of the plant staff to a level comparable with the Operations and the Maintenance Groups and will ensure that the Health Physics Superintendant has direct access to responsible management in matters of radiological health, safety and policy.. We have determined that the proposed changes are in agreement with the commit-ments made in the licensee's April 16, 1981 letter and are acceptable.
t III. Main Feedwater Isolation Valves License condition 2.C.3.h requires the licensee to install one additional main feedwater isolation valve in each of the main feedwater lines prior 4
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to startup following the first regularly scheduled refueling outage. The required modifications are described in the Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.2.1.1.2.6.
The staff's evaluation of the technical issue leading to the recuirement to install these valves has previously been. presented ir. Sucplement No. 2 to the staff's Safety Evaluation Report N'JREG-0308 issueo in September 1978. The staff has verified, through an inspection conducted by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, that the valves have been installed as required by the license condition. Therefore, we conclude that the terms of the license condition have been satisfied and the condition may be deleted from the license.
IV.
Emeroency Feedwat'er Pumo Response Time By application dated July 24, 1979 the licensee proposed to change TS Table 3.3-5 items 7a'and 8a from < 21.4 seconds to 97.4 seconds.
Items 7a and 8a currently specify the required response time for the~ steam driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump as 21.4 seconds.
Items 7b and Eb specify the required response time for the motor driven EFW pump as 97.4 seconds when offsite power is available. The 97.4 seconds for the motor driven
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pumps was chosen to ensure that the provision of emergency feedwater to the steam generators will occur within the time limit assumed in the accident analysis. The licensee states that no credit was taken for delivery of EFW from either pump prior to 97.4 seconds following an actuation signal.
We have reviewed the' licensee's request and conclude tNat, based on a required response time of 97.4 seconds to meet the assumptions of the accident analyses, the specification of a lower response time for the steam driven pump is unnecessary and may be modified to a value of 97.4 seconds.
V.
Decay Heat Removal Cacability By application dated October 31, 1980 the licensee proposed to amend the ANO-2 TS in response to the staff's letter to all PWR licensees dated June 11, 1980. The proposed changes are directed at ensuring that redun-dancy in decay heat removal capability will be maintained in all operating modes. The staff's acceptance of the requested changes is contained within the June 11, 1980 letter which also constitutes the staff's safety evalua-tion of this matter. We have reviewed the licensee's application and have determined that it is consistent with the decay heat removal capability guidance presented in the staff's June 11, 1980 letter. We find the licensee's application to be acceptable.
i VI. Secondary Ccolant Activity By application dated March 5, 1981 the licensee prcposed to reduce the maximum secondary coolant activity allowed by TS 3.7.1.4 from 0.10 to 0.046 uCi/ gram dose equivalent I-131 and the primary / secondary leak rate from 1.0 gpm to 100.gpday. The staff issued a request for addit'ional information which was responded to by letter dated May 6, 1981. The licensee's basis for the change is that the values, 0.10 uCi/gm and 1.0 gpm, are the standard values contained in the Standard TS whereas the licensee's specific safety analyses for the ANO-2 plant are based on' values of 0.046 uCi/gm and 100.gpd.
Therefore the licensee proposes to change the TS to provide consistency between the LCO,s in the TS and the assumptions made for the licensee's AN0-2 safety analyses.
The results 6f staff's previous evaluations of the main steamline break and the steam generator tube rupture are presented in Section 15.0 of the SER, NUREG-0308 issued November 1977. These evaluations were based in part on independent determinations by the staff of the event's radiological consequences utilizing the assumptions listed in SER Table 15.2 which include a secondary coolant activity of 0.10 uCi/gm and.a primary / secondary leakrate of 1.0 gpm.
In the SER the staff concluded that the consequehes of these events could be acceptably controlled by limiting activity and leakrate to these values in the Technical Specifications. The staff reaffirms its findings made in the SER and concludes that on the basis of its independent determination the ANO-2 Technical Specificaticns 1
do not require revision in order to ensure acceptable results for the main steamline break and steam generator tube break events.
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VII. Miscellaneous Corrections l.
Amendment No. 20 to the license issued on March 23, 1981 made changes to TS BASES 3/4.3.3.6 which were deleted by mistake with the issuance of Amendment No. 22. Therefore, those Amendment 20 changes are hereby restored with the issuance of this amendment.
.a 2.' Amendment No. 24 to the license issued June 19, 1981 modified TS 3.2.8.
The modified specification is an LC0'on pressurizer pressure but was issued with its ACTION statement referring.to temperature, not pressure.
Therefore, with the issuance of this amencment the ACTION statement is corrected to refer to pressure.
Envirenmental Consideration.
We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result il any significant environmental impact. Having made
'this deterdination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an acticn which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental it.pset and, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this acendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previcusly considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amencment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be concucted in compliance witn the Ccamission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical
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to the common defense and security or to the health anc safety of the puslic.
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4 Date:
March 4, 1982 i
1 Principal contributors' to this SER were W. pasedag and R. fiartin.
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