ML20041E082

Technical Evaluation of Licensee Response to IE Bulletin 80-06 Re ESF Reset Controls for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2.

ML20041E082
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	04/30/1981
From:	Laudenbach D EG&G, INC.
To:	Bender P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20041E083	List: ML20041E082
References
CON-FIN-A-0250, CON-FIN-A-250 1GG-1183-4197, EGG-1183-4197, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8203100121
Download: ML20041E082 (9)

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Q.: Y..l** ;--.d ~'.,,._ DISCLA \M E RJ',): ':(l5:::T.E.QQ. f&&ti -

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United " l ' -

States Government.- Neither the United -States nor the United States Department of Energy, nor any of their empl oyees , makes any warranty,

, . express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for , .-

the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe on privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, mark, manufacturer, or other . -

. . wise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, . recommend "

ation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. "

The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state

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or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.  ;

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INTERIM REPORT

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NRC TAC No. 42729/42730.

Report No. EGG 1183-4197 Contract Program or Project

Title:

Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Support -

Subject of this Document: .

Technical Evaluation of the Licensee's Response to I&E Bulletin 80-06 Concerning ESF Reset Controls for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 i Type of Document:

Informal Report l

Author (s):

D. H. Laudenbach Date of Document:

April 1981 Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Of fice or Division:

P. Bender / R. Wilson, ICSB This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internal use. It has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be considered final.

EG3G Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations San Ramon, CA 94583  !

Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

Under 00E Contract No.B&R 201904031 l NRC FIN No.A0250 l-INTERIM REPORT l

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gggg EGG 1183-4197 un.roy u...urem.ni. or.. ,

April 1981 sen n.m. op.retion. .:

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t TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO l&E BULLETIN 80-06 i CONCERNING ESF RESET CONTROLS FOR THE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 i

(DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318)  !

by D. H. Laudenbach Approved for Publication J. R.'

c* W Radosevic l

Department Manager l L

This document is UNCLASSIFIED Derivative l Classifier: ddM~ M NICnolds E/Broderick .

Department Manager Work Perf ormed for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy

' C o nir act N o. LiY-76-C 1183.

l ..

INTRODUCTION On March 13, 1980, the USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement ,1 (I&E), issued I&E Bulletin 80-06, entitled " Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)

Reset Controls " to all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses.

I&E Bulletin 80-06 requested that the following actions be taken by tne  ;

licensees:

(1) Review the drawings for all _ systems serving , safety-related functions at the scnematic/ elementary diagram level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ,

ESF actuation signal all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.

(2) Verify that the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating . signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the per-formance of the testing in your response to this bulletin.

(3) If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification,

{ design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.

(4) Report in writing within 90 days the results of your review, include a list of all devices which respond as discussed in Item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action.

This technical evaluation addresses tne licensee's response to l

I&E Bulletin 80-06 and the licensee's proposed system modification, design change, and/or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem. In evaluating the licensee's response to the four Action Item requirements of the bulletin, tne following NRC >taff guidance is also used:

Upon the reset of ESF signals, all safety-related equipment l

shall remain in its emergency mode. Multiple reset sequencing shall not cause the affected equip :ent to deviate from its emergency mode. Justification should be provided l for any exceptions.

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l EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS I

In a letter dated June 17, 1980 [Ref. 1], Baltimore Gas and

• Electric Company, the licensee for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, replied to I&E Bulletin 80-06. In a telephone conference t call conducted on February 9,1981 [Ref. 2], the NRC Project Manager pro-vided additional information and clarification to the l'icensee's response.

The licensee reported [Ref. 1] that'they have reviewed the design for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not, upon reset of an ESF actuation signal, all as- '

sociated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode. The licensee indicated that the system design ensures that all equipment, except for the 40 valves, 2 dampers, and 2 exhaust fans listed below, will remain in its emergency mode upon reset of.tne applicable actuation signal.

We conclude that the licensee has complied with the requirements of Action items 1 and 4 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 by completing the drawing review of all systems serving safety-related functions and by identifying tne devices that do not remain in their emergency mode upon ESF reset.

The licensee reported [Ref. 1] that a test to verify tnat the actual installed instrumentation and controls at Calvert Cliffs are con-sistent with the schematics reviewed will be completed during tneir next scheduled refueling outage, currently scheduled for Fall 1980 for Unit 1 and early 1981 for Unit 2. We conclude that the licensee has complied with the requirements of Action Item 2 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 by providing a schedule for the performance of testing.

The licensee reported [Ref. 1] that the system design ensures that all equipment will remain in its emergency mode upon reset of the applicable actuation signal except as discussed below. For each of the three categories where the design alone does not prevent mode change, adequate procedures or system design obviate the need for any design modifications.

Category I of the licensee's response to Action Item 3 indicated that:

1 The ESF actuation does not automatically reset wnen the initiating parameters return within bounds; the system does not allow blocking nor overriding the actuation signals, either manually or via any process control signal. Pro-

. cedures following any actuation, specified in Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP-5), require placing individual hand controls for all equipment in the actuated (i.e., safe) position. These procedures contain detailed checklists 3

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. i which list each hand switch and its required position. When -

initiating parameters return within bounds, several deliber- '

ate operator actions are required before tne equipment can change mode. The operator must first manually reset the individual trips, then return each hand switch to the non-accident position individually. These features ensure that ,

the equipment will remain in its emergency mode upon reset of sthe actuation si gnal , and that no modi fications are recessary. Equipment in this category is.as follows:

CV510, CV511 Boric Acid Tank Recirculation Valves CV512 Makeup Flow Control Valve MOV501 Volume Control Tank Discharge Valve .

CV3840, CV3842 Component Cooling to Waste Evaporator Isolation Valves CV5210, CV5212 Service Water Heat Excnanger Control Val.ves MOV5250, MOV5251 Salt' Water to Circulating Water Pump Room Air Cooler Isolation Valves CV1582, CV1585 Containment Cooling Unit Discharge Valve C'11590, CV1593 ICV 1596,ICvl5'37 Scent Fuel Pool Cooler 01scharge and ICV 1598, ICV 1599 Supply Valves CV1600, CV1638 ' 5ervice~ Water to Turbine Building CV1637, CV1639 '

Isolation Valves CV3828 CV3830 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Discharge

, Valves s CV4150, CV4151 ' Containment Spary Header Isaiation Valves M0V4144,' MOV4145" Co'ntainment Sump Discharge Valves

- MOV659, ?0v660 Containment Spray and Safety Injection Pumps Recirculation Valves 5

SV5285, SV5287 Penetration Room Filter Isolation Dampers

\ .

. Category II of the licensee's response to Action Item 3 indicated that the following equipment is prevented from te:et out of the emergency mode upon reset of the actuation signal by administrative procedures:

MOV656 ----------- Manual HPSI Header Isolation Valve - This svalve is physically locked opan in the C

, emergency position at t.11 times.

~s MOV614, MOV624 -- Safety , Injection Tank bdiation Valves -

(, ' ' MOV634, MOV644 ' The esergency position 'of each of these N' va kes is open. Inese sabes are opened during norma (operationF Power is tnen

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removed from the motor operator of each

• valve to ensure the emergency valve position is maintained at all times.

M0231, M0311 ----- Containment Purge Air Supply and Exhaust Fans - The emergency mode of tnese fans ,

is off. During normal operation, power is removed from the fans to ensure emer-gency. fan mode i,s maintained at all times.

Category - III . of the licensee's response to Action Item 3 indi-cated that the following equipment may change operating mode upon reset of the actuation signal, as described below:

s CV5160, CV5162 --- Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Inlet Valves CV5163, CV5206 --- Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangar CV5208 Outlet Valves Each of these valves receives two actua-I tion signals--Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS). The SIAS signal closes these valves to isolate the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger from the i

__ Salt Water System. Tnis allows more salt water to flow to the Service Water Heat Exchanger during a Loss of Coolant Acci-dent. Following reset of the SIAS signal, these valves reopen to supply cooling, water to the Component Cooling.

Water System. A RAS signal also reopens these. valves to put the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger back in service. 1 Following reset of the RAS signal each of these valves remains open. This opera-

, tion scheme is intentional, presents no

' safety problem, and requires no modifi-cations.

The Calvert Cliffs Project Manager indicated [Ref. 2] that Ex-I haust Fans M0231 and M0311, and Isolation Valves MOV614 MOV624, MOV634, i

and MOV644 cited in Category II of the licensee's respons,e have power re-  !

moved by locking their circuit breakers in the open position, while main- I taining the appropriate contro?. room indicating lignt on active. l The licensee has offered the above tnree -categories of justifi-cation in lieu of any system modification, design change, or other corrective action. We have reviewed' the justification submitted by the licensee to insure that sufficient information is provided as a basis for NRC to prepare a Safety Evaluation Report.

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FINDINGS I

Based on our review of the information and documents provided by the licensee, we find that the ESF reset controls for Calvert Cliffs i Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, satisfy the requirements of Action  !

Items 1, 2, and 4 of I&E Bulletin 80-06. ~

In response 'to Action Item 3 of !&E Bulletin 80-06, the licensee identified 40 valves, 2 dampers, and 2 exnaust fans as not remaining in their emergency mode upon ESF reset and offered justification in lieu of

• any system modification, design change, or other corrective action.

REFERENCES

1. Baltimore Gas 6nd Electric Company letter (A. E. Lundvall, Jr.) to NRC/I&E (B. H. Grier), " Response to I&E Bulletin 80-06," dated June 17, 1980.

2. Telephone conference call, NRC (P. Bender, E. Conner) and EG&G, San Ramon (D. Hackett, D. Laudenbach), February 9,1981.

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