ML20042A005
| ML20042A005 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041E083 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8203220541 | |
| Download: ML20042A005 (2) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSEE RESPONSE TO I&E BULLETIN 80-06, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESET CONTROLS INTRODUCTION Instances have been reported at operating nuclear power plants where it has been found that'following the reset of'an ESF actuated signal certain equipment, e.g., ventilation dampers, motors, and valves, would return to the normal mode, which could compromise the protective actions of the af-fected systems. As a result, on March 13, 1980, the NRC issued I&E Bulletin 80-06 requesting certain actions to be taken by licensees for all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses.
EVALUATION The enclosed report.(EGG 1183-4197) was prepared for us by EGAG, Inc., San Ramon, California, as part of our technical assistance contractor program.
It provides their technical evaluation of the licensee's response to IAE Bulletin 80-06 in accordance with NRC-provided guidance.
EGAG reported the licensee's conclusion that all safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode upon reset of the ESF actuating signals with the exception of 40 valves, 2 dampers, and 2 exhaust fans.
The licensee offered justifications in lieu of design modifications for the components identified in their study.
EG&G did not evaluate these l
justifications. The licensee committed to perform verification tests to l
l verify that all associated equipment is consistent with the reviewed schematics. The licensee committed to perform'these tests during the v
0203220541 820316
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. refueling outage scheduled for Fall 1980, for Unit 1 and early 1981, for Unit 2.
Therefore, EGAG found the plant to satisfy the require-ments of I&E Bulletin 80-06, with the exception of the components t
where the licensee offered justifications. The NRC will. confirm successful completion of these tests.
We have reviewed the licensee's justifications, as reported by EG&G, for not modifying the 3 categories of equipment (totaling 44 components) identified in their study and find them acceptable as follows:
The 32 " Category I" components are acceptable on the basis that the initiating signal does not automatically clear, nor can it be blocked or overridden, and the licensee's emergency procedure (E0P-5) requires placing the individual hand controls for all equipment in the safe position prior to reset of the initiating signal. This is consistent with the intent of I&E Bulletin 80-06.
The 7 " Category II" components are acceptable on the basis that they are administratively controlled and positioned in their emergency position, and then locked or de-energized so that they cannot move from that position.
The 5 " Category III" components are acceptable on the basis that these components operate in a safe manner consistent with their design intent and the intent of I&E Bulletin 80-06.
CONCLUSION Based on the information and documents provided by the licensee, and on our review of the contractor's report, we conclude that the licensee has satis-fied the concerns of I&E Bulletin 80-06, subject to confirmation of successful verification test completion.
Therefore, we find the ESF reset controls for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 to be in complianca with NRC criteria.
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