ML20041C254
| ML20041C254 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Skagit |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041C252 | List: |
| References | |
| NUREG-0800, NUREG-0800-13.6, NUREG-800, NUREG-800-13.6, SRP-13.06, NUDOCS 8202260407 | |
| Download: ML20041C254 (5) | |
Text
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.I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
%v,oI STANDARD REVIBM PLAN
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8 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION N
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13.6 PHYSICAL' SECURITY '
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REVIEW RISPONSIBILITIES
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Primary' - Physical Security Licensing Branch, Division of Safeguards, HMSS Secondary - Standardizat on & Special Projects Branch, Division of Licensihg, NRR
- I.
AREAS OE REVIEW At the preliminary safet) analysis report -(PSAR). stage, the review of this section covers plans for implementing security measures relating to (1) preemployment of
.I personnel employed to work at the proposed plant and (2) the layout pf the plant an'd other design features and equipment arrangements intended to provide protection of vitd ?quipment against acts of radio. logical sab,otage in accordance with 10 CFR l
Part 73, 573.55.
At the final safety analysis report (FSAR) stage, the' review involves th'e evaluation of the physical security: plan, the Guard Training Qualification Plan, and tKe Con-tingency Plan'which collectively describes a comprehensive. physical secur.ity. pro, gram for the plant site. The review encompasses the physical security organifation, access controls to the plant protected and vital areas including physical barriers, searches of personnel and packages and means of detecting unauthorized intrusions, provisions for monitorin' the access to vital equipment, selection of personnel for g
security purposes', communications systems for security, intrusion alarm systems, arrangements with law enforc'ement authorities for assistance in responding to secu-rity threats, training o.f security personnel and response to contingencies. The-
.icplementation schedule for the physical security program is reviewed, including,
phases,for a multiunit plant where applicable.
Specific information to be revie,<ed, referenced to applicable sections of 10 CFR
' Part 73, 973.55, includi'ng 10 CFR P. art 73, Appendices B and C, include the following:
1.
' Clear diagrams, to approximate, scale, displaying the following:
Designated protected and vital areas of the plant site, including physical a.
barriers.
i ux l N@
Rev.J.- July 1981 no i
,lQ USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN f
CD n standard review piens are prepared for the guidance of the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of o
applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the pubtle as part of the g
Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures are policies, standard review osc 40 plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The 00 standard seview plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
1 Not all sections of the standard format have a corsesponding review plan.
ha.
Published standard eeview plans will'be sevised periodically.'es appropriate. to accommodate comments and to reflect newInforma.
J ngo tion and emperience.
CD Q.h.
Comrnents and suggestions for nt wit! he consideved and should be sent to the U.s. Nuclear Reg 6tatory Commission.
_ _ _ _ of fice of Nuclear Reneior negulation. %hington. O.C. 20555.
b.
The locations of alarm stations.
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c.
The locations of access control. points to protected and to vital areas.
The 1 cations of parking lots relative to the clear areas adjacent d.
9 to the physical barriers surrounding protected areas.
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e.
Special features of the terrain which may present special vulnerability problems.
f.
The loc ~ation of relevant law enforcement agencies and their geographi ~
chl--jurisdictions.
g.
The 1,nteraction'of plant operations,with.the security p'rogram.
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The response capabilities of local law enforcement agencies, including esti-mates of the number of officers that can arrive at the plant site in the event
.of a secur.ity threat after receipt of a call for assistance.
('his response capability bears upon the adequacy of the size of the onsite guard force.)
Secondary responsibilit,ies wi,ll be conducted by,SSPB to assure balance between safety and sa.feguards.
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II.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA'
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At the PSAR stage, preliminary planning for physical security is considered acceptable if it provides reasonable assurance that conformance to the applicable' provisions of 10 CFR Part 73, 573.55 are expected'to be achieved, including:
1.
10 CFR Pa'rt 73, 973.'55 in its entirety and,Part 73 Appendices B and C 2.
10 CFR Part 25 and 10'CFR Part 95 (if appliceble) 3.
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- 5. - ANSI N18.17, Paragraph' 4 3 Employee Screening.
6.
10'CFR Part 50,550.70(b)(3)
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7.
Regulatory Guide 5.20 Tobeconsideredaccepta51e,thisplanni.ngshouldincludecommitmenttodesign phase review for physical security and should show how, to the satisfaction of
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the staff, this responsibility is to be implemented by the applicant.
At the FSAR stage, the ariplicant'.s. security plan is considered acceptable if
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it conforms to.the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,550.34(c),10CFRPart73, 573.55 and 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix -B and Appendix C.
If applicable, 10 CFR Parts 25, 75, and'95 must be addressed.
In addition, the requirements and reco::nendations of ANSI N18.17 establish the basis for an adequate security plar. for the protection of nuclear power plants against radiological sabotage.
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Specific acceptance criteria, including staff positions, regarding some of'th'e more general requirements of 10.CFR Part 73, 573.55 and Part 73, Appendices B and C are as follows:
3 a.
Section.b of 573.55?- Physical sec'urity organization.
The licensee'shall establish a security ' organization, including guards, to protect his facility ~
against radiological sabotage.
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b.
Section c of 573.55 - Physical Barriers.
The licensee shall locate. vital.
equipment only within a vital area, which, in turn, shall be located within
. r.9 a protected area such that access to vital equipment requires passage through
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at least two physical barriers.
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Rev.'2 - July 1981
~13.6-2
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c; Section d of S73c55 - Acc'ess Requirements,.
Tha licensee shall contro)
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all points'of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.
Identifi-G'-
cation and search of all individuals shall be made and authorization shall
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be checked at such' points.
l d.
S'ection'e of S73.55 - Detection Aids.
All alarms required pursuant to this part shall annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station, not necessarily onsite, such that.a single act cannot.
remove the ' capabilities of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm.
Section f of $73.55 - Communication Requirements.
Each quard,' watchman" e.
or t.rmed response individual, or any other individual performing an active security function on duty shall be capable of maintaining cont.inuous com-munications with an individual 'in each continuously manned alarm stations.
'f.'
Section g of $73.55, ion alarms, emergency alarms, communications equipme
- Testing and Maint'enance.
Each licensee'shall test and maintain intrus access control equipment, physical barriers,. an_d other security-related devices or equipment.
g.
Section h of 573.55 - Resp'onse Requirements.
The licensee shall maintain liaison.with local. law enforcement authorities.
Each licensee shall main-tain an adequat'e nismber of guards 'for response 'and assessment of'possible security threats. *Each licensee shall require that those guar'ds take' steps to neutralize the threat when detected with sufficient force to protact'..
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.the' health and safety of the public.
h.
Part 73, Appendix B - General Criteria for Security Personnel. These general criteria establish requirements for the selection,ill be responsible
- training, equipping, testing', and qualification of individuals who w for the protecting cf special nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, and nuclear shipments.
i.
Part 73, Appendix C - Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans.' A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel.in order to accomplish specific defined objectives in the event of threats, thef ts, or radiological sabotage relating to special nuclear material o.r nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy
.' Act of 1954, as amended.
Implementation of the physical security progr.am should be accomplished 1 to 2 months tiefore fuel loading.
Security features required for new fuel in storage prior to loading of the first unit should be implemented as of the.
time fuel is onsite.
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III.
REVIEW PROCEDURES.
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At the PSAR stage, the' review consists of a careful examination of the.informa-tion submitted and comparison with the acceptance criteria set forth iY s6b-section.II above.
The general plant description in Chapter 1 and site-related
-information in Chapter 2 of the PSAR should be examined to determine, if there r '.....
are unique features that should be considered in establishing the physical e
protection program.
It will be desirabl.e at this stage to discuss the formula-K i-tion of this program with the applicant.
13.6-3 Rev.,2 - July 198'1
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At the FSAR stage, the, physical security plan is reviewed to determine its I
conformance with:the ' regulations, the information requirements of subsection I q
above, and the acceptance criteria of subsection II above.
Applicable regula-30*
tions and the requirements and recommendations of industry standards (such as M
ANSI 18.17) are used as checklists for this review.
The reviewers may also use appropriate Division 5 Regulatory Guides and Review Guidelines 1 through 24 to the extent they are applicable to' physical protect. ion programs -
nuclear power plantst -Those having potential applicability are listed in the references.
It is particularly important that the reviewer assure himself that all items of vital equipment are contained within vital areas.
Site visits by the
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reviewers are necessary, during the construction phase, before the evaluation of the p,lan can be completed.
Upon completion of the installation of the security equipment, a confirmatory site visit is made approximately 3 ' months before the anticipated fuel loading.
Only after that final confirmatory site visit is the security program approved.
IV.
EVALUATION FINDINGS The evaluation finding at the PSAR stage should be substantially equivalent to l
the'foilowing statement:
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The applicant has prov'ided a general description of plans for pro-tecting the plant against potential acts of radiological sabotage.
Provisions for the screening of employees at the plant, and'for design phase review of plant layouf. and protection of vital eciuip-ment have been described and conform to 10 CFR Part 73, 573.55.
We find there is reason'ble assurance that the final physical security _
a plan will meet'the requirements of 10 CFR Part 25, 10 CFR Part 73,
-and 10 CFR Part 95 by conforming to regulatory positions in regulatory Ij].-
guides or equivalent guidance.
We conclude that the applicant's arrangements for protection of the plant.against acts of radiological sabotage are satisfactory for this stage of the licensing process.
' The evaluation finding at the FSAR stage 'should be substantially equivalent to the following statement:
The appiscant has submitted a comprehensive physical security plan for the protection of the plant-against potential acts of radiolog-N ical sabotage.
This~ plan has been withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2,52.790(d).
This plan has been reviewed, found to contain all fe'atures considered essential for such a program by the staf.f, and is acceptable.
In
.o particular, it has bee'n found to comply with the Commission's regula-tions' including 10 CFR Part. 50, 550.34(c), 10 CFR Par,t.25,.10 CFR Part 75,10 CFR Part 95,) sections of 10 CFR Part 73,I G7&55-Jand Part 73, Appendix B and A pendix C, and conforms to the regulatory positions set forth in regulatory guides.
V.
IMPLEMENTATION The following reference' are intended to provide guidance to applicants and s
licensees regardinj the NRC staff's plans for using this SRP section,
,g Except in th'ose, cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative g.t
,L method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's. regulations, t
StiLFcA
the meth:d described herein will be used by th'e staff in its evaluatfon of
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E h conformance with Commission regulations.
@! V I.- REFERENCES
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1.
10 CFR Part 73, "P,hysical Protection of Plants and Mathrials."
2.
10 CFR Pa,rt 73, Appendixes B.and C.
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- 3. ' 10 CFR Part 50, 550.34(c), " Physical Security Plan."
4.
Ib CFR Part 50, 550.34(d), " Safeguards Contingency Plan."
5.
10 CFR Part 50, g50.54(p), " Safeguards Contingency Plan Procedures."
6.
10 CFR Part 50, 550.70(b)(3), "Immediate Unfettered Access."
l0' CFR Part 2, S2.790(d)(1), " Security Measures' Exempt fr'om Disclosure."
7.
8.
10 CFR Part 75, " Safeguards on Nuclear' Material - Implementation of' US/IAEA T
Agreement."
9.
10 CFR Part 25, " Access Authorization for Licensee Personnel."
10.
10 CFR Part 95, " Security Facility Approval and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data."
11.
m Regulato' y' Guide 5.12, " General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control r
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of Facilities and Special Nuclear Material."
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12.
Regulatory Guide 5.20', " Training, Equipping and Qualifying.of Guards and Watchmen."
Regulatory Gui'de 5.44, " Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Syste',ms." -
13.
14.
Regulatory Guide 5.54, " Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contin
' gency Plans for Nuclear Power Plants."
15.
NUREG-0207, " Interim Format and Content for a Physical Security Plan for Nuclear Power Plants.
16.
NUREG-0219, "Nucleai Security Personnel for Power Plan'ts.:"
NUREG-0'220, " Interim Acceptance Criteria for a Physical Security Plan for 17.
Nuclear Power Plants."
18.
NUREG-0416, " Security Plan Evaluation Report."
NITREG-0574, " Security Personnel Training and Qualification Criteria."
19.
- 20. -Review Guidelines l' thro 0gh 24.
' 21.
ANSI N18.17, " Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants."
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13.5-5 Rev. 2 - July 1981
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