ML20041B856

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE Insp Repts 50-352/82-03 & 50-353/82-02 on 820111-29. Noncompliance Noted:Improper Repair Welding Procedures for MSIV & Failure to Conduct Hold Point Insps for Full Penetration Groove Welds
ML20041B856
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  
Issue date: 02/08/1982
From: Durr J, Mccabe E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20041B842 List:
References
50-352-82-03, 50-352-82-3, 50-353-82-02, 50-353-82-2, NUDOCS 8202250266
Download: ML20041B856 (7)


See also: IR 05000352/1982003

Text

i

  • e

ee e

,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

50-352/ 82-03

Report No. 50-353/ 82-02

50-352

Docket No.

50-353

CPPR-106

License No.

CPPR-107

Priority

-

Category

A

Licensee:

Philadelphia Electric Company

2301 Market Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101

facility Name: Limerick Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

Inspection at: Limerick, Pennsylvania

Inspection conducted:

January 11 - 29, 1982

Inspectcrs:

b ) uA4/

  1. /J/fil

p.P.Durr,'SeniorResidentInspector

'date signed

'

date signed

date signed

Approved by: _ _ MbOeN

2 / Bl#1

t.

L. NcLaoe, Unter

Heactor

date signed

Projects Section 2B

Inspection Summary:

Report 50-352/82-03 and 50-353/82-02 perfomed January 11-29, 1982.

Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the Senior Resident Inspector

of Licensee's actions on Bulletins and previous inspection findings, the corporate

quality assurance program, plant tours, and piping. The inspection involved

46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> at Unit 1 and 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> at Unit 2.

Results: Two violations were identified in the five areas inspected, (violation

of valve manufacturing requirements and failure to perfom inspections, para. 3). ,

Region I Form 12

(Rev. April 77)

8202250266 820209

PDR ADOCK 05000352

O

PDR

..

..

DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Philadelphia Electric Company

D.T.Clohecy,QualityAssuranceEngineer(QAE)

J. M. Corcoran, Field QA Branch Head

F. J. Coyle, QAE

J. P. Evans, QAE

G. R. Hutt, Office QA Branch Head

G. Lauderback, Jr., QAE

M. J. McGill, QAE

R. A. Mulford, Project Manager

Bechtel Power Corporation

C. Berezich, Lead Cable /Tenn. Superintendent

H. D. Foster, Project Field Quality Control Engineer (QCE)

J. M. Kelleher, Electrical Engineer (Cable)

E. R. Klossin, Project QAE

J. B. McLaughlin, Lead Electrical Staff Engineer

K. L. Quinter, Assistant Project Field QCE (APFQCE)

D. Shaw, APFE

D. C. Thompson, APFQCE

M. G. Tokolics, QAE

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. P. Durr, Senior Resident Inspector

R. Paolino, Reactor Engineering Inspector

A. Varela, Reactor Engineering Inspector

The above listed personnel attended meetings on January 27 or 29,1982.

Other craftsmen, engineers, quality control technicians, and supervisors

were contacted and interviewed as the inspection interfaced with their

work.

. ..

-

.

-

. _ _ - _ - - .

.

_ . -

. _.

_- -- -

.

.-

-.

..

.-

!

3

2.

Plant Tours (Unit Nos.1 & 2)

Periodically during the inspection, tours were made of the Unit Nos.1

and 2 primary reactor containments, the reactor buildings, the control

,

structure, and surrounding yards and shops. The inspector examined

i

!

completd work, work in-progress, quality control activities, and equip-

ment storage, handling, and maintenance.

He discussed the technical

>

aspects of the work with craftsmen, supervisors, and engineers to assure

work was being perfomed in accordance with requirements.

During a tour of the control structure, the inspector observed a

j

cable tray (LAG 015), gutter (lCG002), and conduit (1CH036) installation

in the cable spreading room that may not satisfy established separation

.

criteria. The cable tray and gutter will house different divisions of 1E

'

cables. They are currently 1" apart vertically.

A cable exits from

the top of the gutter and enters the conduit. This will put the cable between

'

enclosed raceways, the cable tray and gutter. The cable will travel

approximately 6" in air before entering the open end of the conduit.

This kind of installation does not appear to be pemitted by IEEE-384

or the licensee's specification. The licensee currently plans to verify

cable separation compliance by final inspections. This item is unresolved

pending the establishment of methods to make this and similar installa-

tions acceptable (352/82-03-01).

The remote shutdown panel 10C201 has an open bottom which provides

comunication between panel sections and divisions. This does not appear

to satisfy IEEE-384, paragraph 5.6.6 and 10CFR50, Appendicies A and R,

for fire separation. This item is unresolved pending verification that

the appropriate fire protection design criteria have been satisfied.

l

(352/82-03-02)

3.

Previous Inspection Findings

(0 pen) Noncompliance (81-16-01)

l

Reference:

Inspection Reports 81-16 and 81-17

The main steam isolation valve body castings do not appear to satisfy

the ASME Draft Code for Pumps and Valves (DCPV). The issues involved

and updated information are as follows:

(1) The welding procedure was not qualified for the post weld heat

treatment (PWHT) temperature range used. The DCPV, Section 314.1.6(c)-

requires that repair welding procedures be qualified in accordance

with the ASME IX Code. The ASME IX Code, Section Q-11,

paragraph V-6, requires that the welding procedure be regaalified if

there is, "a change in the heat treating temperature..." The

Quaker Alloy Procedure, QAP-490, for repair welding was qualified

for a minimum PWHT temperature of 11000F, That procedure also limits

PWHT temperature to a maximum of 13000F. The valve casting repair

welds were PWHT/ tempered at 13400F.

!

.

_

__

- - _ _

_

m

-

. _ _ _

,.

,.

4

(2) Nondestructive testing was perfomed before heat treatment.

The DCPV, Section 314, requires, "Non-destructive examinations...

shall be perfomed after any heat treatments required by the

material specification." The valve was nomalized on 12/20/71,

radiographed on 1/18/72, and tempered on 2/12/72.

,

The foregoing items are contrary to 10 CFR 50.55a and a violation.

(3) Repairs and heat treatments were not perfomed sequentially in

accordance with the procedure.

The licensee produced an Audit

Finding Sheet, AF No. 13, dated March 21, 1973, which shows that

I

the licensee's audit program identified that Quaker Alloy

Casting Company's repair welding procedure was not qualified for

the thickness range for which it was being used.

Based on this

finding and subsequent to fabrication, the casting manufacturer

appended a Procedure Qualification Record (PQR) to " Repair

Welding Procedure for Carbon Steel Castings", QAP 49D. This

would mean that the May 7,1971, revision was in effect at the time

of manufacture. The sequential requirements were not imposed

in this revision. This matter is resolved.

l

(4) Because of the number and apparent severity of the unresolved

'

items associated with this finding, it appeared that there was a

significant breakdown in the licensee's quality assurance program.

It does not appear now that this is the case with the satisfactory

resolution of all but two items. This matter is resolved.

(0 pen) Noncompliance (352/81-17-02)

The review of Quality Control Inspection Record C-1415-W-1 disclosed that

hold point inspections of full penetration groove weld preheat and interpass

tenperature, paragraph 2.4.a had not been perfomed for welds FPGW 17,18,

19, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, and 47.

Project Special Provision

Notice PSP G-6.1, Revision 3, " Quality Control Inspection Plans",

paragraph 3.1.5, states that inspection hold points are mandatory and work

shall not proceed beyond where the designated activity is no longer

inspectable. This is a violation.

4.

Licensee's Action on IE Bulletins

The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for processing IE Bulletins.

He examined the documentation supporting the status and/or completion by

Philadelphia Electric Company of actions to satisfy the NRC requirements.

He sampled various documents to verify compliance with the licensee's

procedure for processing IE Bulletins, Appendix X of the Ouality

Assurance Plan.

-

-

.

. -

..__

__-._ _

-

.-

.

-

.

5

The following table lists the IE Bulletins reviewed and the current

status:

IEB

STATUS

REMARKS

74-08

open

The licensee committed to not

using ITE HE-3 molded case

circuit breakers. Subsequent

to his commitment, ITE HE-3's

were received in the hydrogen

recombiner panels.

Licensee will

verify date codes to assure no

defective breakers used.

78-12

closed

Licensee's action complete.

"

"

"

"

79-03

"

"

"

'

79-04

"

79-05

No response required.79-05A

"

"

"

"79-05B

"

"

"

"

79-06

"

"

"

"

79-09

Licensee's action complete.

"

79-11

"

"

"

"

l

79-13

No response required.

"

i

l

79-15

Licensee's action complete.

"

l

l

79-17

No response required.

"

79,7)

n

n

n

n

!

l

79-24

Licensee's action complete.

"

79-25

"

"

"

"

79-26

Open

Although this was for information

l

only, it does not appear that the

licensee performed the correlation

of destructive data to the lifetime

calculations as suggested by their

review.

__

..

..

6

IEB

STATUS

REMARKS

79-28

Closed

Licensee action complete.

"

"

"

"

80-02

80-03

Open

The licensee committed to perfom

inspections upon receipt of the

equipment. There is no evidence

that this commitment was kept.

There does not appear to be a systematic method for assuring that future

comitments to the NRC are kept for Bulletin responser. Further, from

the review of Bulletin 74-08, it also appears that no system exists to

preclude identified defective equipment from being purchased subsequent

to Bulletin issues being fomally closed. This item is unresolved

ending the licensee's review and corrective action implementation.

p(352/82-03-03)

5.

Licensee's Quality Assurance Program (QAP) Audit

The licensee's QAP was audited for compliance with regulatory requirements and

commitments. The audit consisted of a review of the Limerick Quality

Assurance Plan and the Quality Assurance Instruction::.

Specific requirements

and commitments were selected and their implementation verified by

interviews and records review. The audit encompassed the field and main

office branch activities. The audit findings are as follows:

(1) PECO Audit Report No. 240 identified concerns with Bechtel's

Significant Deficiency Report (Construction Deficiency

Reports) procedures. A letter, PECO PLB-12, 409, was generated

in lieu of an audit finding report. The letter requested

corrections to the Bechtel procedures to align the Bechtel/

PECO reporting time frames. The letter requested resolution by

September 1, 1981. There has been no action to date. This item

is unresolved pending completion of actions (352/82-03-04).

(2)

tudit Finding Report No. 213-01 found that the design report

documents supplied by General Electric did not provide objective

evidence that environmental conditions were considered in equipment

design. The NSSS contractor's response was that this infomation

was not required to be supplied in the documentation reviewed. The

licensee closed this finding based on the above response.

The response never adequately answered the question as to whether

the environmental design factors were incorporated into the design

for the equipment. This item is unresolved pending an adequate

response from the NSSS contractor.

(352/82-03-05)

-

.-

7

(3) Quality Assurance Plan, paragraph 1.1.2.3 states that, on an

approximately annual basis, a report will be submitted to the

Vice-President, Engineering and Research for review of

the status and adequacy of the QAP. The last report was issued on

October 31, 1980. The licensee issued a letter, dated January 11,

1982, requesting input from the various QA branches. This item

is unresolved pending issue of the report.

(352/82-03-06)

Except as noted above, it appears that the licensee is executing the

QAP in accordance with regulatory requirements and commitments.

6.

Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety-Related Piping

The inspector reviewed portions of the Job Rule JR-M-12, " Fabrication and

Installation of Small Pipe". He observed the partial installation of pipe

SP-HBC-323-E2 and SP-HBB-143-E8.

It was noted that for some of the small pipe drawings inside of containment

that the design pressures and temperatures are less than the values associated

with the design basis accident. For example, HCB-106 and 107 are drains

from tanks designed for 55 PSIG and 300 F while all other piping is

designed for 55 PSIG and 340 F.

This item is unresolved pending further

review by the NRC (352/82-03-07).

7.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more infonnation is needed to

detennine if they are acceptable, violations, or deviations. Unresolved

items are discussed in paragraphs 2, 5, and 6.

8.

Exit interviews and Meeting

An exit interview was held on January 27 and 29,1982, with members of the

licensee's staff denoted in paragraph 1.

The inspector discussed the

scope and findings of the inspection.

A meeting was held on January 14, 1982 with members of the licensee's staff

and General Electric Company to discuss the technical aspects of the main

steam isolation valve findings, paragraph 3.