ML20040F822
| ML20040F822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos File:GEH Hitachi icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1982 |
| From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040F818 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8202100345 | |
| Download: ML20040F822 (8) | |
Text
- -
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE GENERAL ELECTRIC TEST REACTOR (GETR)
I.
Introduction and Discussion On October 24, 1977, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ordered the General Electric Company to place and maintain the General Electric Test Reactor (GETR) in a cold (defueled) shutdown condition upon completion of the current operating cycle on October 27, 1977. This action was accom-plished and subsequently verified by the NRC Region V Office of Inspection ar.d Enforcement as reported in Special Inspection Report No. 50-70/77-05.
While being maintained in a cold shutdown condition, there is no need to perform certain tests and calibrations required by the current GETR Technical Specifications.Section II of this application contains a proposed addition to the Technical Specifications that will relieve General Electric of the requirement to perform these tests and calibrations for the remainder of the present cold shutdown period. All tests and calibrations postponed during the extended outage will be satisfactorily completed prior to reactor startup. Justification for postponement of the tests and calibrations is provided in Section III of this application.
II.
Proposed Technical Speci'ication Changes Technical Specifications 4.4, 4.5, 6.2, 6.8, 6.9, 7.1, 7.2, and 7.4 require various tests and calibrations which need not be performed while the reactor is in the current cold shutdown condition. A new Section 11 to the Technical Specifications is proposed which permits postponement of these tests and calibrations but ensures they will be done prior to the time when the affected systems are needed in support of reactor operation.
It is proposed that the new Section 11 reads as follows:
8202100345 820204 PDR ADOCK 05000070 P
Da O'
11.0 System Tests and Calibrations 11.1 The following tests and calibrations need not be perfonned during the cold shutdown period begun in October, 1977.
a.
Semiannual operability check of the primary system siphon break valves per Technical Specification 4.4.
b.
Annual calibration of the pool instrumentation per Technical Specification 4.5.
c.
Semiannual control rod drop time measurements per Technical Specification 6.2.
d.
Annual calibration of all instruments listed in Table II per Technical Specification 6.8.
e.
Annual operability test of the poison injection system per Technical Specification 6.9.
i f.
Annual operability test of the pool emergency recircu-lation system per Technical Specification 7.1.
g.
Semiannual load test of the emergency generator per Technical Specification 7.2.
h.
Annual leak test of the experiment exhaust system holdup tanks per Technical Specification 7.4.
i.
Bimonthly operability check of the experiment exhaust system radiation monitors per Technical Specification 7.5...
11.0 System Tests and Calibrations continued 11.2 Following the cold shutdown period in which tests were postponed in accordance with Technical Specification 11.1, all postponed tests and calibrations shall be performed prior to returning fuel or experiments to the reactor or pool (except for the control rod drop time tests which shall be performed prior to startup), as well as any additional tests and calibrations deemed necessary by General Electric or the Comission.
11.3 After startup following the cold shutdown period, the original test and calibration frequencies and schedules shall be resumed.
11.4 Following the cold shutdown period in which tests were postponed in accordance with Technical Specification 11.1, General Electric Company will submit a reactor restart program to the' Nuclear Regulatory Commission 90 days in advance of the planned restart. No fuel (new or irradiated) will be loaded into the reactor until authorized by the Commission.
Change the existing Technical Specification 9.5 to read as follows:
9.5 Any additions, modifications or maintenance to the containment building or its isolation system, the reactor, the primary l
i coolant system, auxiliary fluid systems connected thereto, or the reactor safety system shall be designed, fabricated, l
and tested in accordance with the original specifications or specifications subsequently reviewed in accordance with Technical Specification 9.2.3 and approved by the facility manager.
0 III.
Safety Analysis Under the current cold shutdown conditions, all reactor fuel and experiments containing special nuclear material (SNM) have been removed from the reactor core pool and are being held in the GETR storage canal.
As work in the core pool area is limited to normal surveillance and equip-ment maintenance and modification and an occasional isotope transfer, as there is no SNM in the reactor core or core pool, and as no work involving SNM will be performed in the reactor core or core pool, there is no safety necessity for the core or core pool coolant flows, levels or temperatures, secondary core coolant system, control rods, scram system, core emergency cooling system, or the poison injection system. Therefore, there is no need to perform tests and calibrations on these systems, including their instrumentations and control circuits to affirm their operability within specification _ limits. These Technical Specification changes involve the postponement of tests ~and calibrations of equipment associated with reactor safety.
Fire protection and fire fighting equipment are not affected and, therefore, the ability to detect and control fire, should it occur, remains undiminished.
VNC demonstrated in its submittal of January 30, 1978 (Ref. 1), that 58 days are required for the hottest GETR fuel element to cool to a level (875 watts) at which no damage to the element from stored decay heat can occur even in the worst heat transfer case (i.e., with just the bottom of the fuel storage rack ininersed in water). As considerably more than 58 days have passed since the October, 1977, shutdown of the GETR, all fuel elements in the storage canal have cooled to well below the limit of possible damage. Loss of water, partial or complete, from the storage canal would not result in loss of fuel element integrity and subsequent E i
o.
release of radionuclides into the GETR containment. The fuel will remain in the fuel storage canal which is provided with a stainless steel liner.
The fuel storage tanks have no drains or penetrations. VNC also demon-strated in Attachment 5 to its submittal of November 11, 1977 (Ref. 2),
that the loss of water from the storage canal would not result in dose rates which would pose a hazard to the health and safety of the general public. A listing is given of the maximum doses which can occur at various locations, all well within the site boundary.
In view of the negligible dose rates to which the general public could be exposed as the result of loss of water from the fuel storage canal, calibration of water level instrumentation for the canal is not necessary.
From an operational point of view, it is still desirable to be aware of any significant loss of water from the reactor pool or storage canal.
This type of surveillance is provided by radiation detection units located above the reactor pool and fuel storage. canal. A loss of water from the canal would result in an increase in the instrument readings. The reactor pool and fuel storage canal water level instrumentation will remain oper-ative. Calibration is not required, however, since a drop in the water level will not result in dose rates hazardous to the public.
In fact, the level instrumentation calibration is not expected to drift significantly.
There is also a sump high-level alarm which would indicate loss of pool or canal water.
As the condition of the fuel in the storage canal precludes any accident which would result in the release of radioactive material to the environment, and as the nuclear safety systems prescribed by the Technical Specification are therefore not necessary, it follows that there is no longer a necessity to assure the avai16bility of emergency r
c.
power.
If all electrical power were lost at GETR, it would be immediately known because the normal lighting would be lost. Sufficient permanent and portable battery-operated lights are provided to pemit starting the emergency diesel-generator.
(While diesel-generator load testing would be discontinued, routine starting operation, maintenance and surveillance will continue.) Nevertheless, in absence of all AC electrical power, there is sufficient battery-operated emergency lighting to permit a safe termination of activities involving radioactive materials. Portable battery-powered radiation detection instruments are available to provide appropriate surveillance, assuring radiological control is maintained. Work would probably not continue without full lighting, however. Evacuation of radiation areas would not be inhibited by a loss of AC power.
A listing of the tests and calibrations given in Section II. of this application is repeated below with the specific reasons each is not necessary during the present cold shutdown:
a.
Primary system siphon break valves (T.S. 4.4).
No fuel or experiments in reactor core or core pool.
b.
Pool instrumentation tests (T.S. 4.5). Same as in (a).
c.
Control rod drop time tests (T.S. 6.2).
Same as in (a).
d.
Instrument tests (Table II, T.S. 6.8); All of these instruments concern the reactor core.
Same as in (a).
e.
Poison injection system (T.S. 6.9).
Sameasin(a).
f.
Pool emergency recirculation system (T.S. 7.1).
Sameasin(a).
g.
Emergency generator test (T.S. 7.2).
Under the current cold shutdown conditions, the nuclear safety systems requiring emergency power are not necessary.
~.
h.
Experiment exhaust system (T.S. 7.4). There are no experiments in the reactor core or core pool. The system pumps are shut down, and the holdup tanks are depressurized.
1.
Experiment exhaust radiation monitors (T.S. 7.5).
Sameasin(h).
Proposed Technical Specification 11.2 ensures that all tests and calibrations postponed in accordance with proposal Technical Specification 11.1 are performed before the affected systems are needed. All of these tests and calibrations (except the control rod drop time tests) will be completed before the return to the reactor vessel or pool of any fuel or experiments. Accurate control rod drop time tests cannot be performed until the core is refueled; however, the control rods will be tested for operability prior to refueling, and immediately following completion of refueling and prior to withdrawing rods for startup, the drop time tests referred to in proposed Technical Specification 11.2 will be performed.
Proposed Technical Specification 11.3 merely requires that the original test or calibration frequency and schedule be resumed following i
an extended cold shutdown period.
Proposed Technical Specification 11.4 requires 1)advancesubmittal to the NRC of the GETR restart program and 2) prior authorization from the NRC before reactor refueling.
l As stated in the letter, R. W. Darmitzel to D. G. Eisenhut, l
" Technical Specifications for the General Electric Test Reactor (GETR)",
dated March 11, 1981, Technical Specification 9.5 concerns design and fabrication specification control for certain systems. Changes to the original specifications become necessary for a variety of reasons. For example, a trade name is specified and the vendor goes out of business, or an ASTM specification is discontinued. Operation in accordance with 3
the proposed specification 9.5 provides reasonable assurance that additions, modifications or maintenance are perfonned in accordance with specifications whiu provide a high margin of quality and safety.
IV.
References-1.
Letter, R. W. Darmitzel to Victor Stello, 1/30/78, with attachment, "GETR Fuel Temperature for Fuel Stored in the Canal in Air".
2.
" Response To NRC Order To Show Cause Dated 10-24-77",11/11/77.