ML20040E159
| ML20040E159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/07/1981 |
| From: | Keyserling M Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Ward D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040E156 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1388, NUDOCS 8202030192 | |
| Download: ML20040E159 (5) | |
Text
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W. MONROE KEYSERLING. PH.D.
j 26 ST. PA11 STREET NO. 5 BmoonLINE. MASSACNUSETTs 02146 (en) n.i 7
7 November 1951 E':05 A! DU%
TC: David h'ard, Chairman, ACR3 Subcommittee on Human Factors FROM: Monroe 1:eyserling, ACRS Consultant RE: Comments on Subcommittee meeting, 2 November 1981 Attached are written comments regarding the presentations and discussions during the recent meeting of the ACRS sub-committee on Human Factors.
I hope that you will find them useful in preparing your report to the full committee.
Due to the short preparation time, the attached comments are-rather terse.
If any points are either unclear or need further elaboration, please feel free to call me at (617) 732-1167 C202030192 811107 PDR ACRS CT-1388 PDR
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A.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING BRANCH (HFEB) PRESENTATIONS 1.
NUREG-0700 " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews" Comments:
1.
The HFEB should be commended for its efforts in developing this document. The table of reference materials included in the Appendix is a particular-ly nice feature.
2.
Similar guidelines should be developed for evaluating Human Factors deficiencies for facilities, equipment, and procedures external to the control room.
2.
NUREG-0801 " Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Reviews" Concerns:
1.
As an educator in the Human Factors area, I am con-cerned that an insufficient number of qualified Human Factors specialists (see Section 2.1.1.1, page 8) exist at the present time to meet the demand which will be created by this document.
2.
With increased Federal defense spending and the develop-ment of new weapons systems, the defense industry will experience an increased demand for Human Factors special-ists in the near future. This will aggravate the shortage faced by the nuclear power industry.
3.
The NRC must be prepared to deal with this shortage of qualified personnel.
Careful audit procedures should be implemented to assure the qualifications of the Human Factors " expert" on each review team.
3.
NUREG-0835 " Acceptance Criteria for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)"
Comment:
1.
The SPDS is clearly needed in every nuclear power installation. NUREG-0835 is a good initial step in accomplishing this goal.
Concerns:
1.
At the present time, the HFEB favors a CRT-type display over other alternatives because of its relatively low cost. A potential problem with the CRT concept is that a single tube is not large enough to display all SPDS parameters at a single time.
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2.
Because of this limitation, operators will have to select the parameters which are displayed at any instant. This could result in two basic types of problems:
Important infornation will not be seen by a.
operators because it is not currently dis-played.
b.
Unless formats are uniquely distinguishable for each display mode, operators could associate displayed information with the wrong parameter.
The effects of this error could be disas;erous in an emergency situation.
3.
The HFEB should give strong consideration to using con-ventional displays (e.g., dials, tiles) for the SPDS.
If CRTs are used, safeguards must be developed to assure that the problems described above do not arise.
B.
PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS 1.
Ms. Lund Comments:
None.
2.
Mr. Coley Comments:
None.
C.
PROCEDURES and TEST REVIEW BRANCH PRESENTATIONS 1.
NUREG-0799 " Draft Criteria for Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures" Comments:
1.
The document recognizes the reality that human and equipment failures are going to occur in nuclear power operations, and that highly reliable job aids (i.e., operating procedures) must be developed to assure that operators restore the plant l
to a safe condition.
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2.
The present draft of this NUREG is vague, and considerable enhancements are needed.
It is recommended that the NRC should sponsor additional research in this area because of the ultimate contribution of good emergency procedures to l
the public safety.
(This is reiterated in the budget section below.)
Inputs from INPO and other operator groups should be en-couraged.4n developing the final document.
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D.
LICENSEE QUALIFICATIONS BRANCH PRESENTATIONS 1.
Management Organization and Infrastructure Comments:
1.
During Mr. Crocker's presentation, he listed nine areas of corporate technical expertise.
(See page 6 of his handout.)
It is strongly suggested that Human Factors expertise be added as a tenth area.
E.
DHFS SAFETY TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM PRESENTATION Comments:
1.
A major concern of this program is in the area of operator licensing.
Specifically, improved procedures are recommended for operator selection, training, and examination.
2.
It is suggested that new licensing procedures should not be implemented until they have been validated. This is easier said than done.
It is difficult to validate test-ing procedures under the best of circumstances (i.e., when it is easy to evaluate operator performance).
This is not the case in nuclear power operations because of tbe great difficulty in developing relevant criteria for evaluating an operator's on-the-job performance.
3.
It is recommended that the Office of Research become more heavily involved in this area.
Specifically, methods for evaluating operator performance must be developed through new research. Once developed, these procedures can be used to improve the validity of operator licensing procedures.
F.
OFFICE OF RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS Comments:
1.
In general, the Office of Research hos developed a progres-sive and well-balanced program of-human factors studies.
2.
Because of the slowdown in the design of new facilities, current and future research activities should concentrate on improving the reliability and safety of existing designs.
Only minimal research funds should be spent c.) developing knowledge for designing the " ideal" control room, unless a stronger national commitment is made for nuclear power.
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Recommendations:
1.
The research budget in the areas of human reliability and plant procedures should be reevaluated. While it is desirable to model human error rates and predict the reliability of a system, such an analysis'becomes moot after an accident (either due to human error or equipment failure) has occurred. After an accident occurs, the risk to public safety is minimized by observing well-planned emergency procedures.
I would favor reassigning S1 million from the human reliability area to the plant procedures area.
2.
Mr. DiSalvo described several studies concerned with the design of CRT displays. Problems with CRTs are not unique to the nuclear power industry.
It might be considerably more. cost effective to perform an intensive literature search in this problem area rather than trying to "re-invent the wheel".
3.
One or more studies should be funded to determine the best design format for the Emergency Parameter Display System.
The current comnittent to the CRT format may be premature.
(See discussion above.)
4.
Funding should be provided to conduct a formal " Critical Incidents" survey among experienced RO's and SRO's.
The results of such a study could provide important insights to generic human design deficiencies in nuclear power facilities.