ML20040C941
| ML20040C941 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1982 |
| From: | Architzel R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040C934 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-81-27, 50-318-81-25, IEIC-81-13, NUDOCS 8201290393 | |
| Download: ML20040C941 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000317/1981027
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DCS Nos. 50317 811223
50318 811109
50318 811204
50317 811116
50318 811113
50320 790328
50317 811127
50318 811105
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Region I
Report Nos. 50-317/81-27
50-318/81-25
Docket Nos.
50-317
50-318
Licenses
Category
C
Pricrity
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Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203
Facility:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
In!pection at: Lusby, Maryland
Inspection Conducted: December 1,1981 - January 5,1982
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Inspectors:
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R. E. Architzel, Senior Resident Reactor
date signed.
Inspector
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iIi3.582.
Approved by:
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E. C. McCabe, Jr. , Chief, Reactor
date signed
Projects Section 2B
Inspection Summary:
December 1,1981 - January 5,1982 (Combined Report 50-317/81-27,
and 50-318/81-25)
Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspection by the resident
inspector (68 hours7.87037e-4 days <br />0.0189 hours <br />1.124339e-4 weeks <br />2.5874e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included the control room and the accessible
portions of the auxiliary, turbine. service, and intake buildings; radiation' pro-
ter. tion;. physical security; fire protection; plant operating records; maintenance;
surveillance; plant operations; radioactive waste releases; open items; IE Circulars;
-TMI Action Plan Items; and reports to the NRC.
Noncompliances: Three: Failure to follow Radiation Control Procedures (detail
failure to lock Service Water Valves (detaii 3.d); and failure to maintain high
concentration boric acid ' piping insulation (detail 3.f).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
The following technical and supervisory level personnel were contacted:
G. E. Brobst, General Supervisor, Chemistry
J. T. Carroll, General Supervisor, Operations
J. A. Crunkleton, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance
C. L. Dunkerly, Shift Supervisor
W. S. Gibson, General Supervisor, Electrical & Controls
J. E. Gilbert, Shift Supervisor
J. R. Hill, Shift Supervisor
S. E. Jones, Supervisor, Training
J. F. Lohr,. Shift Supervisor
E. T. Reimer, Plant Health Physicist
J. E. Rivera, Shift Supervisor
P. G. Rizzo, Engineering Analyst
L. B. Eussell, Plant Superintendent
R. P. Sheranko, General Foreman, Production Maintenance
J. Shire, Instructor, Training
J. Sites, Supervisor, Instrument Maintenance Unit 1
R. L. Wenderlich, Engineer, Operations
D. Zyriek, Shift Supervisor
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (318/81-11-02), Diesel Generator Surveillance Test
Procedure. Surveillance Test Procedure STP 0-8-0 was revised (Rev.11) on
December 30, 1981 to reflect performance with the Diesel starting timer.
(Closed) Noncompliance (317/81-12-01; 318/81-12-01), Failure to Calibrate Gauges.
The inspector reviewed the following preventive maintenance procedures which the
licensee has developed to ensure calibration of gauges used in pump Inservice
Inspection testing for Units 1 and 2.
1+2-ll-I-Q-14, Rev. 0, Service Water Pumps Suction and Discharge
Pressure Gauges
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1+2-12-I-Q-6, Rev. O, Salt Water Pumps Discharge Pressure Gauges
1+2-15-I-Q-15, Rev.1, Component Cooling Pumps Suction and Discharge
Pressure Gauges
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1+2-36-I-Q-8, Rev. O, Auxiliary Feed Pumps Suction and Discharge
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Pressure' Gauges
1+2-40-I-Q-15, Rev. O, Boric Acid Pumps Suction and Discharge
Pressure Gauges
1+2-52-I-Q-51, Rev. O, LPSI and HPSI Pumps Suction Pressure Gauges
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1+2-61-I-Q-8, Rev. O, Containment Spray Pumps Suction Pressure Gauges.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (317/79-23-02), Failure to Correct a Grounded Condition
in the 21 DC Battery Bus. The licensee responded to this item in a letter
dated May 3, 1980. Requirements were added to the Control Room Operator's
logs to check for grounds once per shift, require the writing of MR's for any
ground less than 50 K ohms,and close coordination between the Shift Supervisor
and Electrical Foreman regarding which DC loads could be deenergized. The
letter stated that further plans included using the reserve battery as a
parallel power supply while attempting to identify grounds. During review
of logs and observations in the Control Room and Cable Spreading Rooms, the
inspector has noted implementation of the stated actions.
Use of the reserve
battery has been approved by the NRC (Amendments 58 and 40 dated November 2,
1981) during normal operations. The licensee questioned the inspector about
use of the reserve battery during corrective maintenance while locating
grounds.
(The reserve battery's charger is not class 1E, and the licensee
is required to use the regular IE chargers when the reserve battery is being
used as a replacement on a battery bus.) The inspector discussed the
corrective maintenance procedure with the Operating Reactors Project Manager
The proposed procedure was for corrective maintenance and involved powering
distribution panels (versus buses) with the reserve battery. Such a line
up would allow use of the installed charger's gmund detector and reduce,
by a factor of six, the individual circuits which must be deenergbed to
locate a ground. The inspector noted that the proposed proccdure did not
contain a specific precaution to limit the amount of time the reserve
battery is used to power a distribution panel. The licensee stated that
such a precaution would be added to the proposed procedure and that the
intent was to limit the time to that necessary to locate which panel had
a ground.
The inspector concluded that the proposed procedure was a
significant improvement in the licensee's ground troubleshooting methods
and did not violate Technical Specifications. Concerns about cab!c
attachments to the panels, transient currents during the paralleling, and
a complete set of precautions should be resolved prior to implementation.
This item will remain open pending inspector review of the approved
Battery Ground Isolation procedure.
(Previously Closed) Noncompliance and Unresolved Items (317/79-24-01 through-
04), Unmonitored Discharge of Caustic to Chesapeake Bay.
The licensee has
reorganized several water treatraent functions which were oerformed by the
Operations organization and transferred them to a new Chemistry (Water
Treatment) group.
During the current inspection, the licensee questioned
the inspector concerning the reed to continue performing certain commit-
ments which had been made to the NRC in light of the reorganization. The
referenced commitments were made at a Management Meeting to prevent
recurrence of a long history of unmonitored releases of caustic and acid.
The licensee had researched past commitments in Licensee Event Reports and
discussed provisions of a draft procedure with the inspector. All previous
commitments had not been thoroughly compared to the proposed shift in
controls by the licensee. For example, current procedures require hourly
logging of tank levels by the Control Room Operator (received from an out-
side operator), approval of the Senior Control Room Operator prior to a
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release, and review of valving checklists by the Senior Control Room Operator.
In addition, specific training for Operations personnel had been conducted
an/ orocedure audits performed by the Quality Assurance organization. The
invector concluded that the proposed revisions to commitments were significant
and did have some advantages (for example, the limited job scope of the Water
Treatment personnel would result in increased familiarity with the operation
of the Waste Neutralizing System), however, the overall impact was a reduction
in the administrative controls. The licensee was informed that any changes
in operation of the Waste Neutralizing from previous commitments should be
addressed in formal ccerespondence with the NRC.
3.
Review cf Plant Operations
a.
Daily Inspection
The inspector toured tha facility to verify proper manning and access
control, and observed adherence to approved procedures and LCOs.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed. Status of contrc'.
room annunciators were reviewed. Nuclear instrument panels and other
reactor protective systems were examined. Control rod insertion limits
were verified.
Containment temperature and pressure indications were
checked against Technical Specifications. Stack monitor recorder
traces were reviewed for indications of releases.
Panel indications
for onsite/offsite emergency power sources were examined for automatic
operability.
Control room, shift supervisor, and tagout log books,
and operating orders were reviewed for operating trends and activities.
During egress from the protected area, the inspector verified operability
of radiological monitoring equipmene and that radioactivity monitoring
was done before release of equipment and materials to unrestricted use.
These checks were performed on the following dates:
12/2, 12/7, 12/8,
12/11,12/14,12/15,12/21,12/22,12/23,12/29,12/30,12/31,and
1/04/82.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Weekly System Alignment InspectJon
Operating confinnation was made of selected piping system trains.
Accessible valve positions in the flow path were verified correct.
Proper power supply and breaker alignment was veria ied. Visual
inspections of major components were cerformed. Operability of
instruments essential to system performance was verified. The fol-
lowing systens were checked:
-- Unit 2 CVCS ;ystem - Boric Acid Flow Paths in BAST Room, checked
on 12/11/81.
-- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Service Water System Line Up in Auxiliary Building,
5' elevation (service to Diesel Generators and to Containment
Coolers) on 12/21/81.
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Unit 2 CVCS System - Charging Line Up in Charging Pump Room
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checked cn 12/30/81.
Findings are addressed in paragraphs e and f below.
c.
Biweekly Inspection
Verification of the following tagouts indicated the action was properly
conducted.
No.12673, Unit 2 Boric Acid Basket Strainer, verified 12/11/81.
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No. 94685, Unit 1, Removal of No. 11 Beric Acid Pump, verified 12/21/81.
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Boric acid tank samples were compared to the Technical Specifications. Tank
levels were also confimed.
d.
Other Checks
During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers, security
practices at vital area barriers, completion and use of radiation
work permits, protective clothing and respirators. The use and operational
status of personnel monitoring practices, and area radiation and air
monitors were reviewed.
Equipment tagouts were sampled for conformance
with TS LCOs.
Plant housekeeping and cicanliness was evaluated. Other TS
LCOs, including RCS Chemistry and Activity, Secondary Chemistry and Activity,
watertight doors, and remote instrumentation were checked.
A large amount of Boric Acid residue was observed in the Ur.it 2 BAST Room
and underneath the mixing tee in the 5 foot Auxiliary Building hallway,
apparently from valve packing leaks. The licensee acknowledged the
inspectors comments. This area is unresolved and will be reexamined to
ensure action has been taken by the licensee to improve the housekeeping
and minimize leakage (318/81-25-01).
e.
On December 21, 1981, during the check of the Service Water (SRW) Sistem
line up to the Diesel Generators (E' elevation, Auxiliary Building) the
following valves were observed to be in the correct position but not locked:
2SRW 174, Diesels to 21 SRW Subsystem Discharge Header Stop (Locked Open).
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2SRW 171,21 Diesel Generator Discharge to 22 SRW (Locked Open).
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2SRW 169,22 SRW Subsystem Supply to 21 EDG (Locked Open).
The General Supervisor - Operations was informed of the unlocked valves and
issued instructions to have the valves locked the same day. Failure to lock
valves as required violates the OI 15, Rey, 11, dated December 16,1980
requirement that those valves be locked and the TS 6.8.1 requirement for ad-
herence to the Service Water System procedures recommended in Appendix A, R_egu-
latory Guide 1.33(318/81-25-02).
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-f.
During the inspection of the CVCS Systems on December 11 and 30,1981,
the inspector noted the following deficiencies (all piping sections
are high concentration Boric Acid).
There was no insulation on the suction elbow in the supply to
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21 Boric Acid Pump.
There was no insulation on the suction line from 21 Boric Acid
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Tank.-
A section about 12 inches long in the 22 Boric Acid Pump minimum
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flow line was not insulated.
-- One of the (two) heat trace circuits in the discharge of 22 Boric
Acid Pump appeared broken and there was no insulation.
-- Additional sections of high concentration piping were covered with
a black paste.
An approximately 10 foot length of Gravity Feed Piping to the Unit 2
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CHV Pumps was not insulated.
The insulation cover was not closed on 12 Boric Acid Pump and there
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was no insulation covering the box.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Safety Related Q list in this area
and noted that both the heat trace circuit and piping in question were
safety related. The inspector also reviewed the FSAR,which states that
high concentration boric acid lines are heat traced and insulated, and
P&ID 6750-E-39-36-5, Unit 2 Boric Acid System, Electric Heat Tracing
Revision 3.
This P&ID requires the system to be covered with 1.5
inches of calcium silicate insulation.
In addition, the black paste is
a heat distribution compound which is required to be covered with
insulation. The inspector stated that failure to properly maintain the
insulation of the Boric Acid System was an item of noncompliance
(317/81-27-01; 318/El-25 ^3),
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4.
Review of Events Requiring One Hour Notification to the NRC
The circumstances surrounding the following events requiring prompt NRC (one
hour) notification via the dedicated telephone (ENS-line) were reviewed.
Acout 1:20 p.m. on December 23, 1981, an inadvertant actuation of the
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Unit 1 Recirculation Actunhn System (RAS) occurred. Although
surveillance testing w s in progress to test individual channels no
cause was found for the actuation. The RAS opens the Containment Sump
Valves and trips the LPSi Pumps if running. No other equipment was
affected. The inspector discussed the everit with I&C technicians and
the Control Room Operator on shift. The: UMt 1 Alarm Typewriter was
also reviewed. This device only printed verification of the actuation
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at 1321 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.026405e-4 months <br /> for both RAS A and RAS B.
The technicians stated that
the surveillance test procedure had been followed and could give no
reason for the actuation.
(The RAS actuates on a low level in the
Refueling Water Storage Tank, with a 2 out of 4 level switch logic.
The STP requires testing of one switch at a time with a reset of alarms
prior to preceding.) The Control Room Operator stated that when the
actuation occurred (RAS A and B alarms) three alarms for the actuation
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cabinets ZF, ZD AND ZE were present. The RAS was immediately reset in
the Cable Spreading Room by the I&C technicians. Troubleshooting later
that day and the next (portions observed by the inspector) did not
iaentify any problems with the ESFAS system sad the problem did not
recur. The inspector concluded that either the problem was spurious
or the test conditions were otherwise not being duplicated.
5.
Plant Maintenance
The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation
activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and
maintenance procedures, and codes and standards.
Proper QA/QC involvement,
safety tags use, equipment alignment, jumpers use, personnel qualifications,
radiological controls for worker protection, fire protection, retest
requirements, and reportability per Technical Specifications. The following
activities were included.
I-81-130, Unit 1, ESFAS RAS Channel ZF, ZD, or ZE Hanging, observed 12/24/81.
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PMS-2-36-M-M-1, Change Oil in Turbine Bearings, take samples, 21 AFP,
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observed on 12/31/81.
The inspector observed portions of the testing to determine the cause of the
RAS actuation. This included activities in the Control Room, Cable Spreading
Room and Unit 1 Refueling Water Tank Room. About 9:00 a.m., the inspector went
to sign in on a Radiation Work Permit for access to the Unit 1 RWT Room.
While discussing entry requirements with Control Point pernonnel, the inspector
stated that an RM-14 (survey instrument) would not be neccssary as he would
use the one issued to the technician working in the room.
The Radiation
Control personnel were not aware of any work in the RWT Rooms nor that any
technician had checked out a survey instrument. The inspector told the licensee
he was sure a technician had entered the room because he had observed portions
of the testing in the Cable Spreading Room which required actions in the RWT
Room. A Radiation Control technician accompanied the inspector to the RWT Room
with an instrument. The I&C technician had been contacted by his supdrvisor and
had left the room without surveying. He was located and frisked by the
Radiation Control technician and found not to be contaminated. The inspector
noted that the technician had not signed in on any Radiation Work Permit, had
not checked in with the Radiation Control Point, and had not obtained a survey
instrument for access to this controlled area. This violates the TS 6.8.1 imposed
CCI400B~requirementsforreadingandinitiallingRWP's'(tocertifyunderstanding)
and for self-monitoring upon exiting a radiation controlled area (317/81-27-02).
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6.
Surveillance Testing
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The inspector observed parts of tests to verify: Performance in acccrdance
with approved procedures; LC0's were satisfied; test results (if completed)
were satisfactory; removal and restoration of equipment were properly
accomplished;:and that deficiencies were properly reviewed and resolved.
The following tests were reviewed:
-- STP-0-8-0,11 Diesel Generator Weekly Test, observed 12/22/81.
-- STP-M-220-1, ESFAS Functional Test, observed on 12/23/81. (Note.1)
During-the observation of this test, the inspector noted that the procedure
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still called for the use of a stopwatch to verify start times. As noted
during Inspection Report 318/81-11, the licensee actually uses a test device
for timing the diesels such that a stopwatch is not necessary. The inspector
expressed concern that this procedural deficiency had existed so long after
being highlighted by the NRC (May, 1981). The licensee stated that the change
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had apparently been overlooked and issued a change to STP-0-8-0-on December 30,
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1981 to correct the. procedure.
7.
Radioactive Waste Releases
Records and sample results of the following liquid and/or gaseous radioactive
waste releases were reviewed to verify conformance with regulatory requirements
prior to release.
R-099-81, 11 RCWMT released 12/12/81, est. curies 0.148 (excluding Tritium
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and Noble Gasses).
R-100-81, 12 RCWMT released 12/20/81, est. curies 1.44 E-2 (excluding
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Tritium and Noble Gasses).
G-066-81,11 WGDT,1solated 11/28, released 12/15/81. Release Rate
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GpI 3.18 E+2 m3/sec.; GpII 1.23 E+2 m3 sec.
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G-067-81, Vent Unit 1 Containment via ECCS Pymp Room on 12/17/81.
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Release Rate GpI 6.7 E+4 m3/sec.; GpII 0.6 m3/sec.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
Note 1 - As discussed in paragraph 4 an inadvertant actuation of the RAS occurred
' during this surveillance. The licensee was unsuccessful at finding the cause and
has left the thintenance Action (I-81-130) open pending the next retest.
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8.
Observation of Physical Security
The inspector. checked, during regular and off-shift hours, on whether selected
aspects of security met regulatory requirements, physical security plans, and '
approved procedures.
a.
Security Staffing
Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full time
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member of the security organization with authority to direct physical
security actions was present, as required.
Manning of all three shifts on various days was abserved to be as
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required.
b.
Physical Barriers
Selected barriers in the protected area (PA) and the vital areas (VA) were
observed. Random monitoring of isolation zones was performed. Observations
of truck and car searches were made.
c.
Access Control
Observations of the following were made:
Identification, authorization, and badging.
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Access control searches.
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Escorting.
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Communications.
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C0mpensatory measures when required.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
9.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
LERs submitted to NRC:RI were reviewed to verify that the details were clearly
reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of
corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was
required from the licensee, whether generic implicstions were indicated, and
whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed.
LER t.o.
Date of Event
Date of Report
Subject
Unit 1
81-80/3L
11/16/81
12/16/81
CRACKED WELD ON 12 SPENT FUEL
COOLING PUMP DISCHARGE VENT LINE.
81-83/3L
11/27/81
12/24/81
HYDROGEN ANALYZER INOPERABLE.-
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LER No.
Date of Event
Date of Report
Subject
Unit 2
81-51/3L
11/09/81
12/09/81
22-A RCP MIDDLF SEAL PRESSURE
TRANSMITTER SENSING LINE LEAKED.
81-52/3L
11/13/81
12/11/81
REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM
CHANNEL B TRIP UNITS FOR HIGH
POWER, THERMAL MARGIN / LOWS
PRESSURE & AXIAL SHAPE INDEX
BYPASSED FOR MAINTENANCE.
81-53/3L
11/05/81
12/04/81
CLOSURE OF SALTWATER OUTLET
ARTICULATED VALVE CAUSED HIGH
DISCHARGE PRESSURE ON 22 SW PUMP.
81-55/3L
12/04/81
12/31/81
22 CHARGING PUMP OUT OF SERVICE.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10.
IE Circular Review
The following IE Circulars were reviewed on site to determine that the circular
was received by licensee management, that a review for applicability was
perfonned, and that further action taken or planned was appropriate.
-- Circular 81-13, Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit for Safeguard Service
Valve Motors. This circular addressed a coninon wiring error discovered
in the motor control circuitry for Limitorque Motor Operated Valves at two
operating Boiling Water Reactors. The error involved failure to install a
bypass circuit to override the valve open or valve close torque switch under
emergency conditions to eliminate the chance of the valve stalling before
it had completed its travel. The licensee reviewed the circular and
determined that their design did not incorporate bypass circuits as described.
The licensee uses Limitorque Valves, however, by design, the bypass func' ion
is only activated during the initini travel of the valve (in either the
close or open direction). The purrow of this bypass is to allow the motor
to apply sufficient torque to brea!. the valve off its seat.
During the
rest of the valve travel the torque switches are in the circuit and will
stop the motor if actuated. Once actuated a torque switch can only be
reset at the motor operator after removing its cover. The licensee stated
that installation of the bypass switches had been verified during scheme
checks in t.1e start-up program. The licensee also noted that their design
will allow closing of a valve with an open torque switch by manually holding
the motor starter closed without resetting the torque switch.
In addition,
all starters are located outside containment and would, therefore, be
accessible.
The inspector reviewed selected schematics for the licensee's motor operated
valves, several Limitorque Motor Operator Technical Manuals, Regulatory
Guide 1.106. Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor
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Operated Valves, and discussed various aspects of this circular with
the licensee. The inspector concluded that the licensee's design did
not incorporate bypass circuits as described in Circular 81-13. Such
circuits are apparently installed in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 for newer plants.
(This Regulatory Guide addresses bypassing of
Thermal Overloads during emergency conditions, or as an alternative
conservatively setting (in favor of the safety function) overloads and
periodic testing of the settings.) The inspector discussed the pro-
visions of the Regulatory Guide with the licensee and recommended that
they evaluate the present design in light of the NRC guidance in this
area.
11.
Licensee Action on NUREG 0660, NRC Act, ion Plan Developed as a Result of the
TMI-2 Accident
The NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement has inspection responsibility
for selected action plan items. These items have been broken down into
nunbered descriptions (enclosure 1 to NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI
Action Plan Items). Licensee letters containing comitments to the NRC
were used as the basis for acceptability, along with NRC clarification
letters and inspector judgment. The following items were reviewed.
II.B.4 - Training for Mitigating Core Damage. The inspector attended
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two days of requalification training lectures. The area covered was the
mitigation of core damage. The course outline included Incore Instru-
mentation, Excore Instrumentation, instrument failure modes, chemistry,
and radiation monitoring, including sources of radioactivity. The
inspector did not complete review of this item (lesson plans and
attendees) during the current inspection. These aspects will be
reviewed by the NRC during a future inspection prior to closing out
TAP Item II.B.4
II.E.4.2(5) - Containment Pressure Setpoint. As previously noted in
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Combined Inspection Report 317/81-18; 318/81-17, this item had been
scheduled for completion by July 1,1981 but had not been implemented
pending NRC review of the proposed setpoint change. The NRC approved
the licensee's proposed action (lowering the setpoint to 2.8 psig) in
a letter dated October 20,1981. Because a reduction in setpoint was
approved, Technical Specification changes were requested to be submitted.
The letter alsa included a Safety Evaluation Report and a Technical
Evaluation by EG&G Energy Measurements Group. The Technical Evaluation
stated that the staff had (generically) accepted a total loop error of
3.0 psi for isolation setpoint margin over the nonnal containment pressure.
The licensee reviewed this letter and noted that the existing setpoints
were within the staff guidance.
In a letter dated December 7,1981,
they noted that the existing pressure setpoint (less than 4.0 psig) was
conservative with respect to the Technical Evaluation, thus retracting
the commitment to lower the Containment Isolation setpoint. The inspector
expressed concern that the licensee had used the NRC's approval of the
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proposed change as a basis for not making the change. The inspector
questioned the licensee's technical basis for not lowering the
isolation setpoint to 2.8 psig. The licensee stated that the loop
error was 1.0 psi, and the inspector noted that the instruments
measure gauge pressure of the Containnient with respect to the
Auxiliary Building such that atmospheric changes are sensed by
the instruments. The licensee stated that reduction of the Contain-
ment Pressure setpoints would result in Reactor Protective System
Containment High Pressure pre-trip alarms being sensed under normal
conditions.
The inspector noted that II.E.4.2.(5) only addressed
lowering the Containment Isolation setpoints, consequently only the
Containment Isolation and Safety Injection Actuation System setpoints
needed to be changed. The licensee stated that the technical basis
for not reducing the setpoint to 2.8 psig as originally committed
would be reviewed.
The inspector also noted, in discussions with the
Operating Reactors Project Manager, that the licensee's revised
response was undergoing further NRC review for acceptability.
Item
II.E.4.2(5) will remain open pending completion of these reviews and
any indicated licensee action.
12. Meeting with Calvert County Commissioners
The Resident Inspector accompanied Region I Administrator Ronald Haynes for
a meeting on December 8,1981 with Calvert County Comissioners and Public
Safety Officials.
The purpose of the meeting was to introduce Mr. Haynes to the Commissioners
and explain the NRC's roles and responsibilities as a regulatory agency as
they relate to Calvert County. A tour of the County's Emergency Operations
Center (located in the basement of the Court House) was also conducted.
13. Review of Periodic and Special Reports
,
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed. That review included the
following:
Inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/
cr supporting information consistency with design predictions and performance
specifications; planned corrective action adequacy for resolution of problems;
determination whether any information should be classified as an abnomal
occurrence; aad validity of reported information. The following periodic
report was reviewed:
November,1981 Operations Status Reports for Calvert Cliffs No.1 Unit
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and Calvert Cliffs No. 2 Unit, dated December 14, 1981.
14.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
detemine whether they are accep+.able. An unresolved item is discussed
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in paragraph 3.d of this report.
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15. ' Exit Interview
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' Meetings were-held with senior facility management periodically during the
course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
A~
summary of findings was also provided to the licensee at the conclusion of
. he report period.
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