ML20039E841
| ML20039E841 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1982 |
| From: | Bayne J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-TM JPN-82-5, NUDOCS 8201110532 | |
| Download: ML20039E841 (22) | |
Text
-m c
i M.)
- =
o POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK to CoLUMeus CIRCLE NEW YORK. N. Y.1o019 t2f2: 397 6200 Greac,E T s t,a a v
.....,... o,,, c e.
rausters
- * * "Nv v"c.e so w e orsoN e.r.cu igt- +,ocsou a.
c.......
otomos L. shoaLLs
,g,,,,,,,
vets Cn.9...N g g ggy9,,g y,gg
'".'.l.'.*"'"
.,c
..o u
,Ly~~
January 7, 1982 L t m o.y w. s.4 N CL A.I R....,
most af 1. MILLoN2a
.. v.cc racocaica a. coma c JPN-82-5 0,',"' 'l. " '"'
c TMoMAsR FREY Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
" ' T.".'.'6 c !",'.'.E'
O.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 l CD g
Attention:
Mr. Thomas A.
Ippolito, Chief se s
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 c'
' o.)
, T '?j.
I Division of Licensing
' Og
- %D
,w
Subject:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant' g
Docket No. 50-333 1, \\....,
A
/'s@*g
//
Containment Isolation Dependability L
NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2
%'l -
Q
$'/yCg\\d
References:
- 1. NRC letter, D.G. Eisenhut to all Licensee of Operating Plants, dated October 31, 1980
- 2. PASNY letter, J.P. Bayne to T.A.
Ippolito (JPN-81-25) dated April 8, 1981
- 3. PASNY letter, R.J.
Pasternak to Boyce H. Grier (JAFP-81-0871) dated August 24, 1981
- 4. PASNY letter, J.P. Bayne to T.A.
Ippolito (JPN-81-4 9) dated July 7, 1981
Dear Sir:
The Power Authority has completed a comprehensive review of the containment isolation dependability of the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear P'wer Plant, as requested in Reference 1.
o The enclosed report documents this review and is submitted in accordance with the commitment made by the Authority in Reference 2.
The review identified the following systems which do not fully meet the NUREG-0737 acceptance criteria:
Reactor Water Cleanup; Traversing Incore Probes; Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge; Leak Rate Analyzer; Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water; and Contain-ment Vent and Purge.' The Power Authority intends.to achieve full compliance by modifying these systems as described below.
The Reactor Water Cleanup, Traversing Incore Prohas and Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge Systems will be modified 'oy the addition of automatic isolation valves with diverse actuation signals.
The Authority will perform an engir aering evaluation and an assessment of equi ~pment availability and develop a schedule for the completion of these modifications.
This schedule will be A
/
submitted by February 2, 1982.
[70Y4 S
!I 8201110532 920107 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
FDR
(
. The Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System has several return lines from the containment which have one manual isolation valve.
In accordance with the Authority's commitments in Reference 3, a schedule for the installation of power operated valves with remote m'anual actuation will be submitted by February 2,
1982.
The Containment Vent and Purge Valves do not isolate on high radiation in tha drywell.
The Power Authority intends to provide a drywell high radiation isolation signal to these valves in ac-cordance with the commitment in Reference 4.
Dependent upon material availability, this modification will be completed during the current refueling outage.
~
The Leak Rate Analyzer System does not comply with the NUREG-0737 criteria which does not permit. ganged reopening of isolation valves.
Dependent upon material availability, the Power Author-ity will modify this system to eliminate ganged reopening, during the current refueling outage.
The Power Authority considers these modifications an addition to the margin of safety in the plant.
However, the Authority con-siders the existing design to be adequate to assure safe operation until the modifications are complete.
Each of these systems has an existing isolation capability, which will be described below.
Any leakage from these systems into the Reactor Building would be processed by the Standby Gas Treatment System.
In addition, reactor coolant leaking past the existing isolation valves can be replaced by the EPCI system.
ae existing isolation capability of the systems is as fol-lows:
A.
The Reactor Water Cleanup return is isolated by re-dundant check valves. In addition a motor operated valve capable of remote manual operation from the control room provides further isolation capability.
B.
The Traversing Incore Probe purge line does not com-municate with dither the reactor coolant system or the con-tainment atmosphere and is isolated by a check valve.
C.
The Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge lines are isolated by two 3/4 inch check valves in series and are comparable in size to instrument lines.
D.
The Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water lines do not communicate with the reactor coolant system or the contain-ment atmosphere, are Seismic Class 1 inside containment, and are equiped with manual isolation valves.
In addition, the reactor operators will'be reminded that these lines do not automatically isolate.
~
t
(
. The enclosed report supercedes the Power Authority's pre-vious submittals in response to NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2.
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours,
~
J.
a nior Vice esident Nuclear Generation cc:
Mr. J.
Linville Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Reactor Regulation P. O. Box 136 Lycoming, New York 13093 Mr. Ron Barton United Engineers & Constructors, Inc.
30 S.
17th Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 S
O i
e j
l i
(
(;-
POWER AUIYiORITY OF ' HIE S'IATE OF NEW YORK JFIS A. FITZPATRICK hE1 EAR POWER PIET l
CONTAIIED.7 ISOIATION STUDY RESPotsE 701;PC IW&-0737 ITH4 II.E.4.2 ENCLOSURE TO JPN-82-5 0
S e
m Table of Contents Introduction Section I Definition and Identification of Essential SystemsSection II Bases for Designating Systems as Essential Section III Identification of Non-essential Systems and Modifications to Upgrade Their Isolation Dependability Table I Containment Penetrations m
k 4
m
.x-
>c.'
(
INTRODUCTION.
NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2 requires licensees to review operating plants for containment isolation dependability.
The acceptance criteria stated in the NUREG include General Design Criteria 54, 55, l
56, 57 and a requirement to provide diverse containment isolation signals.
i The Power Authority has completed a comprehensive review of the containment isolation design of the James A. FitzPatric Nuclear Power Plant, and a comparison of the design to the'NUREG acceptance criteria.
This report describes the resul:. of this review including:
the definitions of essential and non-essential; the bases for designating systems as essential; descriptions of non-essential systems not in full compliance with the NUREG criteria and how they will be modified to achieve full compliance; and, a comprehensive table which contains all non-essential containment penetrations.
I n
e 1
e i
4.
e
- n. -
fa Section I Essential systems are defined as those systems which are required for, or could be of direct aid in mitigating the consequences of a postulated accident.
Systems designated in the FSAR as Engineered Safeguard, Nuclear Safety, or special safety systems are essential since they are specifically designed to have post-accident functions and are required for accident mitigation.
Systems which could be of direct aid are non-Engineered Safeguard systems which have a direct accident mitigation capability.
These systeus should not be isolated until the operator determines that~
their continued opera ion is unnecessary or undesirable.
The essential systems which penetrate containment are:
1 1.
Control Rod Drive, except for the return line to the reactor pressure vessel which is isolated by a closed valve and no longer used; 2.
All modes of Residual Heat Removal, except for the reactor head spray lines and lines which discharge to radwaste; 3.
Core Spray; 4.
High Pressure Coolant Injection;
. e,,
5.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; 6.
Emergency Service Water; s
>[
7.
Drywell Instrument Air (Nitrogen line only);
9.
Feedwater; 10.
Containment Atmosphere Dilution; and, 11.
Vacuum Relief (Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers).
The bases for designating these systems as essential is provided in Section II of this report.
The Containment Atmosphere Dilution (vent and purge) System is the only essential system which is not used at the beginning of an accident.
This system is either in the isolated mode during reactor operation or automatically isolates on receipt of a containment isolation signal.
The system remains isolated until the operator has determined the need for its use and, at the appropriate point in the accident sequence, takes positive action to initiate its O
2
(_:
p>
operation.
Therefore, although it is essential, ' the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System has been reviewed for compliance with the General Design Criteria and the results are summarized in Table I.
All other systems are non-essential.
Non-essential systems are identified, described, and compared to the requirements of Nureg-0737 Item II.E.4.2 in Section III of this report.
e
+
l e
4 9
6 i
e e
e 9 4 m
g-w-
w-
(
(
\\
g Section II Plant systems have been designated as essential or non-essential based on their capability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
For each system designated as essential, the specific basis for that designation is provided below.
1.
The primary function of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System is to shut down the reactor upon receipt of a signal from the Reactor Protection System.
However, the CRD system has the capability, recognized in Nureg-0619 "BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking",
to provide cooling water to the reactor vessel.
Based on this established capability, automatic isolation of the CRD system is undesirable and it has been designated as essential.
2.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Core Spray (CS) and High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) are Engineered Safeguard systems designed to provide emergency core and containment cooling in the event of an accident.
The design of these systems are described in the FSAR.
These systems are designated as essential since their operation is required for accident mitigation.
3.
The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System is designed to provide cooling water directly to the reactor vessel under non-accident conditions.
- However, Post-accident operation of the RCIC system would provide an additional source of cooling water to the reactor.
Therefore, RCIC is designated as an essential system.
It should also be noted that as a result of post-TMI regulatory requirements, RCIC will be modified to automatically restart on low-low water level in the reactor vessel.
RCIC is also being modified to provide automatic switchover of RCIC suction from the condensate storag*e tank to the suppress, ion pool.
4.
The Emergency Service Water (ESW) System has the post-accident function of providing cooling water to components of various systems required for accident mitigation.
This function is documented in the FSAR and is the basis for designating ESW as an essential system.
5.
As described in the FSAR, Standby Liquid Control (SLC) is a special safety system designed to. shut down the reactor in the unlikely event of the failure of the CRD. system, and is therefore essential.
In addition, SLC 'is always in the isolated mode until it is deliberately placed into operation by the operator.
h
- Q:.'
~
6.
The nitrogen portion of the Drywell Instrument Air (IA) system is required for post-accident operation of valves inside the inerted containment.
It is therefore an-essential system.
7.
The Feedwater (FU) System has no required post-acci. dent function.
However, this system is a reliable high capacity, high pressure source of cooling water for the s
reactor.
Based on this capability, the FW system is essential and should not be automatically isolated in the event of an accident.
It should be noted that the FW system meets G5neral Design Criteria 54 and 55.
8.
The vacuum Relief System (vacuum breakers) is part of the l
Engineered Safeguard Primary Containment System.
As l
described in the FSAR, it is required to maintain containment integrity under post-accident conditions.
Therefore, it is an essential system.
e 9
+
e 4.
y-73
(.
(
Section III In the event of an accident, non-essential systems penetrating primary containment are required to be automatically isolated by diverse signals in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria (GDC) 54, 55, 56 and 57.
The non-essential systems identified at the FitzPatrick Facility have been evaluated against these criteria.
The results of this evaluation are presented in this section.
The following-systems which penetrate primary containment have been identified as nca-essential:
1.
Main Steam; 2.
Residual Heat Removal (Reactor Head Spray Mode);
3.
Radwaste (Drywell Floor & Equipment Sump Pumps);
5.
Service Air; 6.
Instrument Air; 7.
Breathing Air; 9.
Leak Rate Analyzers (Drywell Pressure Sensing, Torus Pressure Sensing);
10.
Reactor (Recirculation Loop) Sample; 11.
Suppression Chamber & Containment Atmosphere Sampling Lines; 12.
Traversing Incore Probes; 13.
Instrumentation Lines; 14.
Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water; and, 16.
Recirculation Pump Mini-purge.
All non-essential systems are listed in Table 1 which identifies the applicable line and containment penetrations, and describes the type of inboard and outboard isolation valves, and their isolation signals.
Table I also' identifies the' applicable GDC.'s for each line, states whether or not the line meets the GDC's and states whether or not diverse isolation signals are provided.
a.
(
(p:
Non-essential systems, which do not comply in all respects to the GDC's and the requirements of NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2 will be modified.
The systems requiring modification are discussed below.
The discussion includes the extent of compliance and the modifications which will be made to achieve full compliance.
No discussion is provided for non-essential systems which are in full compliance with NUREG criteria.
1.
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP The present design does not comply with GDC 55 and the isolation valves do not receive a diverse isolation signal.
To comply with GDC 55, the line which discharges into Feedwater system requires two isolation valves - one inside and one outside containment.
Presently, there is an isolation check valve (28A) inside containment on the Feedwater line.
Therefore, the Reactor Water Cleanup line outside containment will be modified to have an automatic isolation valve with the following features:
(1)
Automatic isolation by diverse parameters; (2)
Valve position indication in the Control Room; and, (3)
Means for testing the isolaticn valve and determining leakage will be provided.
The existing valves (MOV-15, MOV-18, MOV-80) do not receive diverse isolation signals.
Therefore, an additional isolation signal-will be provided.
2.
. TRAVERSING INCORE PROBES (TIP)
The TIP system includes in-core probes enclosed in dry tubes which do not contain reactor coolant and which are not open to the containment atmosphere.
Therefore, GDC 57 applies to this system.
The present design does not comply with GDC 57 since the nitrogen purge line of the TIP system has only one check valve outside containment.
To upgrade the system, an automatic isolation valve with the following features will be installed outside containment:
(1)
Automatic isolation by diverse parameters; (2)
Valve position indication in the Control Room; and, (3)
Means for testing the isolation valve and determining leakage.
9.
(
f n
3.
REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED LOOP COOLING WATER The Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) effluent lines have only single manual isolation valves outside containm'ent.
As per the Power Authority's letter from R. J. Pasternak to Boyce H. Grier of the NRC dated August 24, 1981, these lines will be modified to have power operated. isolation valves with remote manual actuation.
4.
RECIRCULATION PUMP MINI-PURGE The Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge lines are equipped with simple check valves inside and outside containment.
This design complies with GDC 54 but does not comply with GDC 55 and the requirement for a diverse isolation signal.
To upgrade the system, an automatic isolation valve with the following features will be installad outside containment:
(1)
Automatic isolation by diverse parameters; (2)
Valve position indication in the Control Room; and, (3 )
Means for testing the isolation valve and determining leakage.
5.
LEAK RATE ANALYZER
~
(Drywell and Torus Pressure Sensing Lines)
The Leak Rate Analyzer sensing lines do not meet Nureg-0737 Item II.E.4.2 under clarification (5) which states that-ganged reopening of containment isolation valves is not acceptable, and that reopening must be performed on a valve by valve or line by line basis.
Presently, there are two isolation valves in series (101A and 101B) in the drywell pressure sensing line and two isolation valves in series (102 A & B) in the torus pressure sensing line.
One control switch reopens the A valves (one~in each line) and another switch reopens the a valves (also one in each line).
To comply with Nureg-0737 the logic will be changed so that the 101 A/B valves open independently of the 102 A/B valves, thus eliminating ganged reopening.
e l
l t
. l i
l l
f c.'
Q j
l' >
l7 e
e c
r n
ra a
i 1
g l
1 sn n
7 I o i
p y
i t
5 s
n u
r et y
gi.
r t
C Gi C
ra c
M i
S el x
I t
o n
n
?
es C
n
/.
a ir i
1s g
g O
o I
54 es 74.
55sl 55 ii 4
i w
4 l
eo 5
o r
r r
e6 e en ra tt y
s C i y
l CCen CC e
p I
t5 h
tI n
t t
t AfIG got vg s
o 1
e, e
ey 22 m
t tii n
a /w 5
h4 ht A/ds.
f W5 W5 Wi' ww ww s
zg eC eC e r '*
en rc e.
s ssro ss ei t
s r
t t e' ee tt on l
e as P
tI I
av' ecai.
en i
l a
ii t
ii a t, tM ee S D '5 ti ll ea ll r e s p t
r pyrl pp ar r
rg SW SW n
rt n
uu D'
o ts rwon er i
OOMi Oo Ta 1
2 3
3 123 12 I
2 3
i yUl 5
5 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
5, 5,
5, 5,
5, 5,
5, 5,
5, 5,
5, 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5
~
ll C
C C
0 C
0 C
0 C
0 0
~
S N
N eg"l C
C C
C C
0 C
0 C
0 0
O
(
IT I
I T
a!
0 O
C 0
C 0
C 0
C 0
0 A
L 0
O C
0 C
0 C
0 C
0 0
O S
/
8 hd i C
C C
c C
C C
C r
1 I
A t
J A
D f
(
A I
4 T
i E
E E
E E
M t
P 1
N ls M
N D
N P
N v
D I - N M
r l
M N
I t
I I
I E
E D
t H
W L
B lI I
A N
A
'M I
P A
M F
N h
ls A
A N
I J
I I
A O
E f
k 1
F N
F NI A
l A
I t
T P
F t
F N
t e
T c
A I
A t
6l i
N f
F 0
gl o
O D
O r
C A
S S
S P
L V
L V
L V
L V
K l
P ab E G
B X
B X
B X
B X
C P
i A
f C
t N
0 4
4 4
4 h9 E 4
0 0
0 0
F 1
1 1
1 i.
A A/
J h0 i C
A lh IM l
ls A
O 1
W W
I w
6!
C f?
I I
)
gB N
5 ci G
U! E 93 s
s s
s s
s s
s e
e e)
L e
e e
e e
u A
e t
i te b
b b
i r
t e ie gt go gt go gr gt gt gr r r
r i
it 2
cl cl l
7 nr nr nr nr nr nr nr n r t.
)
I A
pn 0
ep ep A 0
iP iP iP iP iP iP iP iP1 S!
Hn Rn s
s s
s s
s s
a s
P SS M
a a
P M re r re re re re re re r e =p U
r et c 0
.S
.S U
T er e er er er er er wo vnr v>
ar ac aau G
am am. TI IY I
t t
r I
ac a aa ac Y
vo v vn vo v
v x
- S S'
cp cp F
S' rr r
rn rn rns
(
m a
G Y
rn r rn rn TI TI Ti TI(
a Y
e a. B Inn
(
S TI T TI TI t
S a
R h
N.!5 1
1 1
l 1
l 1
t 1
1 1
J 5
[
T I
2 0
5',
7 Y
1 5
O' 3
3 1
1 3
3 3
.O %b$
4 4
3 3
j' y
TABLE 1 PEE 3 of 8 JAPWPP-CONTAINt1ENT ISOLATION Irg10Afo QJIDCWO IG ITIOS Oct tTNrS i
1.
State Wtether in Qtypliance IIJN-ESSENTIAL W/CDC 55, 56 or 57 SYSn21 2.
State Whether in Orpliance W/GE 54 9
d e
y 3.
State Ntether 'Itere Is g
h h
h h
g Diversity In Isolation a
d Si nal" g
a g
8 y
a! sg~]Byl l I lg
]I N
e 5
g g
9
~
y~
5
^
g b
~
~
g Ad l g>
g 2
c b
g sa ad Q
a m
p; wm c
wm a
SYSTIM 29 k[
0 C
C C
54,55
- 1. Orplies w/GE 55.
7A 24 tuin Steam 80A G
N)lCDPE A
IN I{ "
7A 24 lbin Steam 86A m N)
DmPE A
IN J Cp 0
C C
C 54,55 g
7B 24 tuin Steam 80B G
N) O PE A
IN M[-
0 C
C C
54 55 isolaticn sigmis.
Cf 79 24 Phin Steam 86B Q
N)
D@PE A
IN /
T 0
'C C
C 54,55 Mf O
C C
C 54,55 7C 24 thin Steam 80C G
N) G PE A
IN
- C 7C 24 tuin Steam 86C m N)
DQPE A
IN 0
C C
C 54,55 3
T[
0 C
C C
54,55 7D 24 thin Steam 80D GB N) N A
IN 7D 24 thin Steam 860 G3 N)
DCDPE A
IN 0
C C
C 54,55 3
8 3
tuln Steam 74 Cr FD 6 A
IN N
C C
C AI 54,55 Drain 6
3 fuln Steam 77 Cr PtY BWPE A
IN IC C
C C
AI 54,55 Drain (GDOUP A)
'3 SYSTEM 10 17 4
Ivuctor liead 32 Gr to AP A
IN m
C C
C AI 54,55
- 1. orplies w/mc 55.
Spray
- 2. Orplies w/GE 54.
- 3. 'nnre is diversity in 17 4
Reactor llead 33 Cr PO AP A
IN DC C
C i
AI 54,55 isolation sigmis.
lC Spray (G W P A)
I
T A B to E 1 PNE 3 T 8 l
J A P t1 P P - C O t1 T A I 14 M E 13 T I S O I. A T I O PJ It#0\\PD QJIDOMD IT>ITIOS armt!S 1.
State Nether in Gq)11ance l
tDJ-ESSE 2TTIAI, W/GDC 55, 56 or 57 i
SYS7121 2.
State Miether in Ccrpliance l
W/Gr 54 9
d 6
y 3.
State Whether'Itere Is e
g h
h a
Dimrsity In Isolation y
5 6
8 BB si a
B 8
8
!!s a
n l W
g
- S" ' "
a U
hj D e-h h
h.Q W~
T tj m
2 d
hd h g[
i i 2
~
g s"
h
$9 d 01<;s s
e
~
SYS'ITN 39 22 1
Instnzrent Air 22 CK RF FUE RF tua tua O
O C
ta 54,57
- 1. Cttplies w/GC 57.
- 2. Orplies w/GC 54.
22 1
Instnrnent Air 21 m
it tuE II FUE PHa C
O C
tm 54,57
- 3. Minin1 valve cutside ctn-g tairrnent cpulifies as an 22 1
Instrinnent Air 23 m
li tnE II POE FOU O
C O
in 54,57 isolation torrier taler SRP Section 6.2.4, Item II.3. f.
(GRXJP C) 11emfore, no diverse isola-tion sigmis are rerpiired 1his lire is essential as the N2 is usal for post ac-cident valve ogeration.
SYS1TM 39 61 3
Dreathing Air 5
CK RF taE RP taa ; trM C
C C
NA 54,57
- 1. Ocriplies w/GE 57,
- 2. Ctmplies w/GC 54.
G1 3
Breathing Air 4
Gr 11 taE 11 tDE fna : C C
C ta 54,57
- 3. Mintul valve outside con-tairrrent giulifies as an (CFUJP C) isolation barrier inler SRP O
Section 6.2.4 Itm II.3.f.
11erefore, no diverse isola-tien signals are required.
k.
1 1
I o
m.
^N t
e e
s
'u c-c e
I ryj a
n v
r t
1 i
.s r xr a
a i r i sew ese hs 7
1 l
sn m
go did c ie 3
s p
io l
lrl e
i i i d
7 r
r i
7 a ses sei 0
l a
h 5 v.
.iel r
et t z t zs c
e O
ra o
E u
uin ui n
t f
5 el n
n o
C cl o
n C
osi osn" U
t a
i8 n
ir i
Vs Gi een M.
i ce /
.t s e eee.ive1 tt c
o I
J a
stt g
.nvr a
/w t r 4 t
r r
r i
l l n
/
l e
s e
6il a l \\"
j e6 e
en I ai1 wv hI ae5o yy D
5l V
Vl r
h5 l
/w Cr yh5 s
el s y
f sr s
yi t
t t
cCi r
n l t 8
te, e
ey 5
h4 ht p
al r o.oio.fi l
v y Gf f
o i
E5 W5 Wi.
r syGo ae sl ril/ n sstt l
/
t et t
t q
q Q'
r c sl w euan v wnnznnnen r
eC eC erm na c
eei-e? ze c r e
t usre.ie we w svmSmvmir r
tL t
t aC aG a v c; i
d 4
ein ri rSr t
o n easl rei d
t/
t/
tii a ". i gia.i
'n j l
E a
a i c e.l e
hrl nmsyva G
t et t
sv n z n "8 i et s1 A
st i
s
- r e1 gzn8 r
n er P
e egeger o a r
n/mio/o i% hen
%1 OSe3 onr i
Sc3 c Dg 1
2 3
DoaOt s
t sa I'
1 23 1
2*
ggi 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
6 6
6 6
5, 5,
5, 5,
5, 5,
5, 5,
5 5,
5, 5,
5, 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 a a a m i
a a a a a t
t t
t C
C C
C t
t t
t t
sG gdh s O O O O O O O O O C
C C
C IT I
E T
zi O O O.
O O O O O O O
0 O
O I
i O O O O O O O O O O
0 O
O D
D 1
D i
J 1
l 1
M "
at II 11 II II II
/
/
/
/
h$ i I
K r
A A
A A
P t
f t
$i E E E E E E E E E O
l U U U nU U O au N
N N
N F
F F
i P
P t
t t
I I
I I
MO l
1 l
D li P
P P
P I
1 Il i
A A
A A
R R
R R
IJ O
,E E E E Z
Z Z
Z E E E E E A
A A
A 5l O aO r r
t U nD P
F P
F t
t F
t nrJ t
F F
l F F P P 1
1 11 II II 0
O O
O 1
1 R
R R
R 5
S A
A K
K K
K P,
r r
r hl C C C
C mmmmm G
G G
G A
B A
I D
A A
D A
D A
D t
4 4
]
1 5
2 6
2 3
]
1 2
2 blh l 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 3
0 10 0
10 1
1 fd 1 l9 k1 ls 1
D PA 1
0a 6l t
I l
hl Nh l rA Ir 5
1
)
7 iM D
C 2
es es es es t r t r t r t r SH N*
P N ae ae ae ae ES n
J Rz Pz Rz Rz SG m m G N N G G W O M
y y
y y
E Y hS S
kl kl kl kl YI i
I I
I I
u S C C
C C C
C C
(G T
am am em aa a
Y C
C A
t A Icn c
e S
m O D
f D
U 0 0 U
A A
I I
R R
P I
1 1
F I
t t
5 b
d,l s 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
1 5
8 1
3 4
3 7
2 4
6 0
5 5
5 1
l 8
2 6
6 G
6 6
6 6
4 4
2 1
)
2
k TA5LE 1 MEST8 JAFNPP-CONTAINNENT ISOLATION i
i It3%PD CUI110MD rui1Tias annm; 1.
State W!vther in Ccrpliance trx4-ESSarrIAL W/CDC 55, 56 or 57 SYS1D1 2.
State whether in Ctrpliance W/GC 54 N
g S
3.
State hhether 1hern Is 8
ha fa Diwrsity In Isolation O
g G
O S
S Signals 3
W R
M H
F-5
~
e A
g g
g o
=
.a$
e ii 9
,3 2
-m u
m
-m u
m g
u
\\
SYS1TM 27 31A1 1
ContairsenUAtm!
54,56
- 1. Creplies w/GC 54.
Sanple Return IJ ne 135A SV SO FAZ A.
IN DC O
O C
C
- 2. Oreplies w/GC 56 on the 1
IN Tc 0
0 C
C 54,56 lusis of two isolation valves in series just outside 55b 1
Contairamnt Sarl e
contairumnt.
l Itv1. Ptmiter 125A SV SO FAZ A
It1 DC O
O C
C 54,56
IN M
O O
C C
54,56 Contairumnt Atn.
n 26A 1
ft1 DC 0
0 C
C 54,56 Smtpl. Line 1
R1 M
O O
C C
54,56
=
l 267 I
171 DC O
O C
C 54,%
is a
l :G.*.
It!
M O
O C
C 54,56 H
@" j
,2GA 1
.A let DC O
O C
C 54,56 a
- M 1
122!
Tel M
O O
C C
54,%
'i I 59 h
IN DC 0
0 C
C 54,56 a
171
/C O
O C
C 54,56 H
59 a
211A 1
Rt ac O
O C
C 54,56 H
3mnt;er Sanpl. Line 2'Hn 1
IN M
O O
C C
54,56 es Instrirnmt Lin< s 1hese comply w/ Reg. G2ide 1 11.
30A 1
Steam Flow Smr ing Q3 11 mE II ME M
O O
O N/A
, Typical of All Class A 30A 1
g y
mm w mm M O
O O %
50C 1
Drywell Pressure G1 11 PUE 11 inE KTE O
O O
N/A Typical of all Class D Instrummt Lines F4maing Line Specific Instrunent Lines
1
,7 s
TABLE '1 PN;E 6 & B JAFNPP-CONTAINMENT I S 'e L A T I O N It210 lwd GJIDOARD IMITIQs GP M itts AlthotrA defirni as an essential II;SnrrIAL systm, there is auto-isolation, SYS'1171 an3 is argW to the a[prTpriate GE's.
j l
Q I
6 6
h N
N lm gh I l
- l. mll t
y h kh N
3 a
S 8-8 lml 1
e a
5 5
a e,
v$
a
~Y b t
a :
2 di 0
SYSTut 27 25/7 24 Or p ll 111/
D NN FAZ A
R1 VE C
O C
C 54,56
- 1. C& plies w/ TIE 54.
Purge Inlet 112
- 2. %e line-tp of 2 isolation i
25/7; 1.'
D 11
- 131A/rl cr NN FAZ A
R1 VE C
0 C
C 54,56
{
contaiturent isolatico 223 20 1brus Purge 116 D
NN FAZ A.
21 VE C
C C
C 54,56 tnier SRP scetion 6.2.4 Inlet Itm II.3.d and therefo're satisfies CDC 56. Also, tnese 11 n 220 1.'
1brus Purge
- 132A Cr NN FAZ A
IN VE C
C C
C 54,56 will be trodified to isolate Inlet on drwell high radiation.
220 1.'
1brus Purge 13211 Gr NN FAZ A
IN VE C
C C
C 54,56 Inlet 220 20 lbrus Purge 115 D
NN FAZ A
R1 VE C
C C
C 54,56 Inlet 267,/I; 24 Drywell itain
- 113 D
N)
FAZ A
R1 AC C
O C
C 54,56 Exinust 2CA/1 18 Drywell tuine 114 D
AO FAZ A
R1
/C C
O C
C 54,56 Exhaust 26A/I 2
Drywell P1ain
- 113 b to F?.Z A
R1 E
C C
C AI 54,56
(
IM aust 205 2
1brus Exhaust
- 117 D
PO FAZ A
IN FC C
O C
C 54,56 81 Valve Dypass 205 20 1brus Puln 117/
D AO FAZ A
IN A/N C
O C
C 54,56 n
Exhaust 118
- % ese lines are essential as they are used by the CAD Syst m j
i l
J ~ "
't,
' 2.1 PAGE 7 0F S
+
It00ATO QJITIOMD TOSITICtB CDMMS 1.
State Mether in qcr.p11ance gyggy W/GC 55, 56 or Si 2.
State Whether in 0:rplianm W/GC 54 f
5 d
g l g
3.
State hhether 'Itcre is 5
oiversity In Isolation N
Q
{
d f
N:
g d
i 8
38 d"
u
>W 3
Signals w
>w g
s y
3 5
D 8 g@:
g?
w y
g e
u l
1 e
s a
a J!
.g ig e
's s
-a mg h i g
g 8
H e
a o
SYS'ITM 02 31AC 3/4 fttire, hop 13A G
O O
2 54,57 1.
Does not cmply w/CDC 55 on Mini Purge the basis of cturk valves.
311C 3/4 theirc. Ptyp 40A G
FOE W TOE tm 0
0 0
tm 54,57 2.
Omplies w/GC 54.
Mini Purge 3.
'Ihere are no isolation signals 31tr V4 Tecire. Ptsp 138 G
w tn4E F
tua: tar 0
0 0
tm 54,57 etini Purge 31rc 3/4 Prcire. Mini Mini Purge 40B m-IF NCPE W
POE NA 0
0 0
tm 54,57 SYS'ITM 12 14 6
reactor Water 15 Gr to M
A IN
/C 0
0 C
AI 54,55 1.
Does not emply w/GC 55.
Clean Up 2.
Omplies w/GC 54.
3.
Isolation signal parameters 14 6
reactor Water 18 GT to M
A IN DC 0
0 C
AI 54,55 are not diverse.
Cican Up i, $ '. p 14 1
licactor Water 80 Cr to,
M A
IN DC C
0 C
AI 54,55
?
Clean Up l
c.
m 4
PME B CF B It.TWUO Q1IIX%fD IM ITIOS Rt tDfIS l
- 1. ' State kirther in Ctnilianth tMJ-ESSI2frIAI.
W/GC 55, 56 or 57 SYS*IT21 2.
State khether in Ctniliante W/GC 54 8
D b
g 3.
State khether 'Itern Is c
Diversity In Isolation 0
8 5
d E
5 d
k 2
il llH B
8 0
8 nd lalt.
B la. l-g
=t He y
i-e w
m..
s 9
6 as ad d
md o
sa t
a m
2
~
m m
-m 9A 4
peactor Water 62 G
IF tuE IF fuE ina 0
0 C
in 54,55 Clean (4)
(GinJP A)
SYU'IIM 20 18 4
Padwaste 82 Cr 70 AP A
IN AC 0
0 C
AI 54,56 1.
Ogilies w/GC 56.
(Floor r, 2.
Ogilies w/GC 54.
18 4
njui[ ment 83 Pluq M AF A
R1 AC 0
0 C
C 54,56 3.
'Itere is diversity in Stai isolation sigtul parameters.
19 4
Drains) 94 Cr to AP A
IN AC 0
0 C
AI 54,56 19 4
IN AC 0
0 C
C 54,56 (GUP B)
SYS'I1N 39 21 1
Service Air 10 G
R1 tOU:.RP ran tnJI C
C C
in 54,57 1.
Ogilies w/GC 57.
2.
Onslies w/GC 54.
n 21 1
Service Air 9
GT 11 taE il tKtE TOR C C
C in 54,57 3.
Minual valve outside con.
tairornt qualifies as an (GUJP C) isolation Larrier under Si1P Section 6.2.4 Itun II.3.f.
t
'Iterefore, no diverse iso-lation isgnals are required.
i 9
s e
1"able 1
JA F N,P P - CONTA INMENT ISOLA TION AR8pFVIATInMS Isoletion Signal Codes Definttione 1
teoletion Velve Actuation Mode Croup A - teolation velves are in procese lines that c ommon-teste directly with the reactor veneele end penetrate the primary A.
Reactor vessel low water level - (A scree A = Automatie occure et thte level elen. This le the
- I""'"t*
OP = Overpressure higher of the two t eolation low water DF = Reverse flow level stanslo.)
RM = t emnt e Manue l Crjngt_n - leolation velves are in procese ilmee that do not communicate directly with the reactor veeeel, but penetrate the
."'$ g a
Reactor veneet low water level - (This primary contetnment and ennmuntest e with the pe tmary cont ain-Se the lower of the two low water level ment free space.
signale. Main steam line teolation occure Isolation valve Poettlone et thle level.)
Croup C - teoletion valves are in process lines that penetrate Al = As le C
High redletion - main eteen line the primary cont elpment, but do not emmuunicate directly with the C = alosed
'""' '""I* or t he pr tnery cont e nment flee space.
e O = Open D
Line break - main eteen line (steen line high eteam flow)
E line break - mein eteam line (steem Isolation Valve Tyge line high temperature)
BL = Bale F
High drywell pressure CK = Chech DCV = Diaphrape J
Lgn, break in Reactor Water Cleer.up C ntrol Valve System - high space temperature CB = Clobe CT = cate K
Line break in RCic System etese line Rollel RV =
to turbine (high steen line space temp-SCV = Stop Check ereture. high eteem flow, low steen line SV = solenoid pressure, or high turbine exhaust pressure) vs = Vacuum Breaker XV = Esplostve L
Line break in HPCI System steen line to turbine (high stese line space temperature, g=%
high steem flow, low steen line pressure.
or high terbine enhavet pressure)
- g;4 4
lealetion velve Power Source P
Low main steem line pressure et inlet to A
- Air main turbine (RUN mode only)
neactor hutiding ventitetton enhavet high H = Hand radiation RM Bemote manual switch from control room (auto-leolation Velve Actuactor matic Croup A and Group B teoletion valves are capahic of remote manuel operation from A0 = Air the control runn except contelnment purge' 50 = Solenoid valves anJ esmple velves).
e