ML20039E450
| ML20039E450 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1981 |
| From: | Gallo R, Lazarus W, Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039E446 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-81-30, NUDOCS 8201070303 | |
| Download: ML20039E450 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000309/1981030
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
50309-811210
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
50309-811130
Region I
Report No.
81-30
Docket No.
50-309
License No. DPR-36
Priority
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Category
C
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company-
1671 Worcester Road
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701
Facility Name: Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station
Inspection at:
Wiscasset, Maine
Inspection conducted: November 12 - December 15, 1981.
Inspectors:
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Swetlaf)ttj Rea
r Inspector
date signed
P[ h
& 6e
iz n /si
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W. Lazarus, Reactor Inspector
date signed
date signed-
Approved by:
b
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R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects
dat'e sigh 6d
Section No. 1A, DRPI
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on:
November 12 - December 15,1981 (Report ~ No. 50-309/81-30)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, regular and backshift inspection by the resident
inspectors (108 hours0.00125 days <br />0.03 hours <br />1.785714e-4 weeks <br />4.1094e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included the Control Room. Turbine Building,
Primary Auxiliary Building, Spray Building, and Auxiliary Feed Pump Room. Acti-
vities/ Records inspected included Plant Operations, Radiation Protection, Physical
Security, followup of previous inspection findings, observation of maintenance and
surveillance testing, followup of Potential Generic Issues, In-office Review of
Licensee Event Reports, followup of Events Occurring during the Inspect % n.
Results: Of the eight areas inspected no items of noncompliance were identified
in seven areas; one item of noncompliance (Failure to monitor personnel exposure
in accordance with approved procedures, Detail 3.d) was identified in the re-
maining area.
Items were opened on containment isolati n of main steam line
-drains (Detail 3.h) and 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations for jumper / bypass modifi-
cations (Detail 2.h).
Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
R. Arsenault, Operations Department Head
J. Brinkler, Tecnr.ical Support Department Head
G. Cochrane, Health Physics Supervisor
R. Forrest, Fire Protection Coordinator
D. Hakkila, Administrative Department Head
W. Paine, Assistant to the Plant Manager
R. Prouty, Maintenance Department Head
R. Radasch, I & C Supervisor
D. Sturniolo, Technical Assistant to the Plant Manager
E. Wood, Plant Manager
The inspectors also interviewed several plant operators, technicians
and members of the engineering and administrative staffs,
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings
a.
(Closed) Followup Items (309/76-01-01, 76-01-02 and 79-13-01)
Integrated Containment Leakrate Testing Discrepancies.
NRC Licensing action in this area is ongoing.
Further progress will
be tracked by Technical Assignment Control Number 08897.
b.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/78-BU-12) Atypical Weld Material in
Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds.
The inspector contacted G. Georgiev of NRC Licensing to confirm that
the licensee's response supplemented by specific information included
in a generic report submitted by Combustion Engineering (vessel fabri-
cator) was sufficient to meet the short term objectives of this
bulletin. NRC Licensing Generic Letter 81-19, Reactor Vessel Pressurized
Thennal Shock Issue, encompasses long term corrective actions to ensure
reactor vessel integrity.
c.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/79-BU-02) Pipe Support Base Plate Design.
Based on contacts with J. Fair, IE HQTRS and L. Tripp, Region I, the
inspector detennined that no unresolved items were outstanding for this
licensee and that no further action is pending.
d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/80-10-01) Review acceptibility of
prolonged Reactor Protection System operation with a 2 of 3 logic.
NRC Licensing action on this item has been initiated by NRC letter
dated April 16, 1981. Further progress will be tracked by Technical
Assignment Control Number 08902.
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e.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/80-17-01) Licensee to Revise Pump Test
Acceptance Criteria.
The inspector reviewed revised procedure 3.17.6.6, Inservice Testing
of Safeguards Pumps, Revision 2, dated 3/19/81. Acceptance criteria
derived from the ASME Section XI requirements are required to be
specified on the test data sheet. The inspector had no further questions
in this area.
f.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/81-04-04) Adequacy of Standpipe Pressure.
The licensee verified by c ntact with representatives of American
Nuclear Insurers and the National Fire Protection Association that the
maximum fire pump pressure (150 psi) would not hamper the ability of
fire brigade members to control the lh" fire hoses. No further inade-
quacies were identified.
g.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/81-04-05) Adequacy of Fire Water System
to Supply Sprinkler Systems.
The licensee determined that the questioned design flow rate and
pressure were maximum values to prevent the dilution of the aqueous
film during the extinguishing process. Minimum flow rate and pressure
were verified with W. McNeil of ITT Grine11 to be 79 gallons per
minute at 115 psi. The fire water system capacity was verified to meet
these criteria. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
h.
(Closed) Followup Items (309/SB-80-01 and SB-80-02) Licensee Compliance
with 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's familiarity and compliance with
the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.59. Modifications which are
identified as design changes / alterations receive appropriate review
and documentation in accordance with the licensee's quality assurance
program. The inspector determined that the licensee's procedure for
jumpers and bypass functions allow system modification without the
required safety evaluation. Specifically, procedure 16.1, " Maine Yankee
Operation Safeguard, Yellow Tag Control", controls the use of jumpers /
bypasses within the facility, but the procedure does not provide measures
to insure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 are completed prior to
returnir,g safety systems to service in a modified condition. The in-
spector reviewed the previous yellow tag requests to determine whether
modifications had been made to safety functions using this procedure.
Of the fifty jumpers / bypasses installed during 1981, one jumper (Ser.
- 81-49) altered a safety function described in the Final Safety
'nalysisReport(FSAR).
Automatic trip valve PCC-A-299 isolates
component cooling water flow from the high pressure drain cooler on
high flow in the component cooling outlet line. This high flow is
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indicative of a tube rupture in the drain cooler. Upon failure of
the trip initiation micro switch, the valve failed shut rendering
the drain cooler inoperable. To restore the cooler to service, pending
receipt of spare parts, the licensee jumpered the trip circuit to
allow manual operation of PCC-A-299. This modification defeated the
safety function of the trip valve. No safety evaluation was documented
justifying this action.
The inspector brought this finding to the attention of the Assistant
Plant Manager on November 20, 1981. The licensee concurred that the
Yellow Tag Procedure did not require written safety evaluations for
those jumpers which alter the FSAR description of systems affecting
the safety of operations. The licensee committed to modify procedures
to require that systems returned to operation in a condition different
from the FSAR description shall be evaluated in accordance with
10 CFR 50.59 prior to return to service and to complete this action
prior to February 1, 1981.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review of licensee corrective
actions.
(309/81-30-01)
3.
Review of Plant Operations - Plant Inspections
The inspector reviewed pl'nt operation through direct observation through-
out the reporting period. Except as noted below, conditions were found
to be in compliance with the following licensee documents:
Maine Yankee Technical Specifications
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Maine Yankee Technical Data Book
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Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program
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Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program
Maine Yankee Tagging Rules
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Administrative and Operating Procedures
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a.
Instrumentation
Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between
channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
Ho unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Annunciator Alarms
The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received
and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel
who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. Operator
response was verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1,
Response to Panalarms, Revision 4, dated June 1979. During plant
inspection, the inspector observed the condition of equipment asso-
ciated with various alarms. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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c.
Shift Manning
The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating
requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the
number and type of licenses. Control room and shift manning were-
observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
d.
Radiation Protection Controls
Radiation Protection control areas were inspected. Radiation Work
Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents,
as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was
inspected.
Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation
areas was reviewed in addition'to verifying' requirements for wearing
of appropriate personnel monitoring devices.
On November 13, 1981, the inspector observed two workmen performing
system modifications inside the "A" charging pump cubicle. This area
was posted as a !'High Radiation Area; Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
Required". The workers did r.ot meet the High Radiation Area require-
ments of Technical Specification (TS) 5.12 in that neither a continuous
monitoring device nor health physics personnel coverage was-provided.
The inspector reviewed RWP 81-11-64 which granted access to all three
charging pump cubicles. The RWP required the workers to carry a
radiation survey meter to satisfy the monitoring requirement of TS 5.12.
The work party supervisor had signed the RWP acknowledging
the specified requirements; however, the workmen had not signed the
RWP. The work party left the high radiation area, signed the RWP,
and obtained the required survey meter prior to re antering the
area.
Subsequent verification.of radiation dose rates -in the charging
pump cubicles revealed that cubicles A and B had maximun dose rates
of 40 - 60 mrem /hr while cubicle S had maximum dose rates of 100-110
mrem /hr. Although the workmen were observed in a dose rate area
less than 100 mrem /hr, the exposure controls specified pursuant to
10 CFR 20, TS 5.11 and Radiation Protection Procedure 9-1-10, Radia-
tion Work Permits, Revision 10 were applicable since the RWP did not
differentiate requirements for cubicles A, B, and S. The inspector
brought this finding to the attention of the Radiation Controls
Supervisor on November 13, 1981.
Failure to acknowledge and comply with RWP requirements is contrary
to TS 5.11 and Procedure 9.1.10, and collectively constitutes an
item of noncompliance.
(309/81-30-02)
e.
Plant Housekeeping Controls
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to
prevention of fire and safety hazards. Plant housekeeping was eval-
uated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne
contamination. There were'no unacceptable conditions identified.
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f.
Fire Protection / Prevention
The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire
fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled and
were not found near vital areas. Selected cable penetrations were
examined and fire barriers were found intact. Cable trays were
clear of debris.
On December 3,1981, the inspector observed the fire door between the
Computer Room and the Main Control Room to be propped open. This
door is required to be closed in accordance with the site fire
protection program. The door was opened by security personnel to
reduce internal control room pressure, to facilitate the closing of
alarmed vital area doors. The fire door was subsequently closed.
The inspector discussed this finding with the Fire Protection Coor-
dinator, Security Supervisor, and the Operations Department Head.
Maintenance of fire barriers was emphasized and coordination of
Control Room pressure conditions as they affect security systems was
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established.
No further abnormal conditions were identified.
g.
Control of Equipment
During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control
were examined. Equipment conditions were consistent with information
in plint control logs.
h.
Equipment Lineups
The inspector verified by observation of the Main Control Board and
by inspections in the Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms
and in the Spray and Turbine Buildings that the major valve and
switch positions were correct to insure operability of the Safety
Injection System, the Safety Injection Accumulators, Containment
Spray, Auxiliary Feedwater, and the Emergency Diesel Generators.
The inspector reviewed the arrangement of containment penetration
isolation systems with respect to the FSAR Chapter 5, General Design
Criteria (GDC) 55, 56 and 57, Operating Procedure 1-12-5, Revision 12,
" Establishment of Containment Integrity", and various plant drawings.
The inspector verified the lineup of selected penetration isolation
valves. No isolation valves were found to be out of position. The
inspector identified six normally shut manual isolation valves in
the main steam line drain system which were not controlled by the
licensee's containment integrity checklist. Three main steam line
drains upstream of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) lead to a
combined header which has an automatic containment isolation valve
installed. A fourth drain from the atmospheric dump line (also up-
stream of the MSIV) is not provided with a similar isolation capability.
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The inspector reviewed this finding with the Operations Department Head
on December 3,1981 and subsequently with the Senior Plant Mechanical
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Engineer.
No documented deviation from the containment' isolation.
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schemes cited by the FSAR and GDC 57 was identified, although the
water hammer hazard created by operation of the atmospheric dump
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- system without condensation drains was proposed.
The licensee tagged the uncontrolled isolation valves closed pending
revision of Operating Procedure 1-12-5 to include these valves. The
isolation of the atmospheric-dump system _was discussed at a meeting
of the Plant Operations Review Cumnittee. Corrective action includes
an evaluation of the. water hammer. potential in this line followed
by system modification or application for deviation from the containment-
. isolation requirement.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review of licensee corrective
actions.
(309/81-30-03)
4.
Review of Plant Operations - Logs and Records-
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed operating logs and
records covering the inspection time period against Technical Specifications
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and Administrative Procedure Requirements.
Included in the review were:
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Control Room Log
- daily during control room surveillance
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Jumper and Lifted Leads Log
- - all. active entries
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Maintenance Requests and Job Orders - all active entries
Safety Tag Log
- all active entries
daily during control room surveillance
. Plant Recorder Traces
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Plant Process Computer Printed
daily during control room surveillance
Output _
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Night Orders
- -daily during control room surveillance
The logs and records were reviewed to verify that entries are properly-
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' made and connunicate equipment status / deficiencies; records ~are being
reviewed by management; operating orders do not conflict with the Technical
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Specifications; logs detail no violations of Tecnnical Specification or
reporting requirements; logs and records are maintained in accordance with
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Technical Specification and Administrative Control Procedure requirements.
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Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and
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discussion with licensee personnel. No unacceptable conditions were
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identified.
5.
Observation of Physical Security
The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, .
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during regular and off-shift hours, that the selected aspects of the .l
security plan we.e in accordance with regulatory requirements, physica
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security plans and approved procedures.
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Maine Yankee Security Plan, dated October 1979
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15-1, Security Organization and Responsibilities, Revision 6,
April 1980
15-2, Security Force Duties, Revision 9, February 1981
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15-3, Plant Personnel Security, Revision 9, February 1981
15-7, Access Authorization and Contro; . Revision 1, April 1981
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15-8, Protected Area Entry / Exit Control, Revision 1, September
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1980
a.
Physical Protection Security Organization
Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full
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time member of the security organization with authority to
direct physical security actions was present, as required.
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Manning of all three shifts on various days was ' observed to
be as required.
b.
Physical Barriers
Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area,
and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of isolation
zones was performed.
Observations of truck and car searches were
made.
c.
Access Control
Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization and badging
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Access control searches
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Escorting
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Comnunications
Compensatory measures when required.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Observation of Maintenance and Surveillance Testing
The inspector observed the maintenance and problem investigation activities
listed below. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compliance
with regulatory. requirements, including those stated in the Technical
Specifications; compliance with applicable codes and standards; required
QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment
and use of jumpers; appropriate personnel qualifications; proper radiolo-
gical controls for worker protection; adequate fire protection; and appro-
priate retest requirements. The inspector also ascertained reportability
as required by Technical Specifications.
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The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing (listed
below) of-selected components to verify.that the surveillanca test procedure
was properly approved and in use;_ test. instrumentation required by the
procedure was properly calibrated and in use; technical specifications
were satisfied prior to removal of the system from service;~ test was
performed by qualified personnel; the procedure was adequately detailed
to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance; and, test results
satisfied the procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly disposi-
tioned.
The following evolutions were reviewed / witnessed:
Plant Alteration (PA) 8-81 - Diesel Generator Tachometer Modification;
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Surveillance Procedure 3.6.2.2.5 - Steam Generator Pressu e Monthly _
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LTest, Channel C, 12/11/81;
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Surveillance Procedure 3.1.2 - Emergency Core Cooling Monthly Tests,
11/18/81.
PA 8-81 installed digital tachometers on both emergency diesel generators.
The modification requires mounting a magnetic probe in close proximity to
the engine fly wheel. The tachometers have no safety function for the
diesel generator; however, the inspector questioned the potential for
vibration loosening of the mounting bracket and the resultant effect on
system operability. . Since the mounting bracket replaces and is similar to
the crank shaft position indicator already installed, and no loosening of
the indicator has been experienced, the licensee determined that the
installation did not affect the operability of the diesel. The inspector
had no further questions in this area.
On December 11, 1981, during the performance of reactor protection system
monthly testing for channel C steam generator pressure,three safety set-
points were noted to be out of specification. Evaluation of the data
indicated that all values were consistently low. Maintenance had been
performed earlier on -the channel C test trunk cable. Since the test unit
had been de-energized during the maintenance, it was determined that in-
sufficient warm-up was a possible cause.
Subsequent testing of channel C'
verified this evaluation in that new values were well within tolerance.
No inadequacies were identified.
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7.
Followup on Potential Generic Issue
NRC Region IV forwarded a potential safety concern (Serial #81-12) related
to Rosemunt resistance temperature detectors (RTD).
Combustion Engineering
(CE) reported the potential for galvanic corrosion of the RTD terminal
blocks and the resultant inaccuracy of RTD readings. The inspector
determined through contacts with the Instrumentation and Control Super-
visor and the resident CE representative that the licensee was aware of
this problem and that the plant had not experienced any terminal corrosi m
problems. The lack of corrosion was due to using like-metals (nickel
plated) for tenninals, lugs and fasteners. The inspector had no further
questions in this area.
8.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the following LERs received in the RI office to
verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the
accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector also determined whether further information was required
from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether
the event warranted on site followup. The following LER was reviewed:
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81-24 Exceeded Vent Stack Sample Frequency
9.
Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection
On December 10, 1981, during routine Control Element Assembly exercising,
control rod #38 dropped into the core. Operators adequately implemented
Casualty Procedure 2-21, " Control Rod Drop", Revision 12, and maintained
the plant within license conditions. The plant was restored to nonnal
conditions in a professional manner and the notification requirements of
10 CFR 50.72 were met. No cause for the rod drop was determined.
Industry
experience indicates that the reversal of rod sequencing sometimes allows
the rod to be momentarily unrestrained. This information is included in
operator training, and is being studied by Combustion Engineering. The
inspector had no further questions in this area.
10.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to determine whether they are acceptable items or items of noncom-
pliance. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussM
in paragraph 2h and 3h.
11.
Exit Interviews
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were
held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and
findings.
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