ML20039D181

Forwards Evaluation of SEP Topic XV-16 Re Radiological Consequences of Failure of Small Lines Carrying Primary Coolant Outside Containment.Plant Design Acceptable

ML20039D181
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	12/28/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Hoffman D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-15-16, TASK-RR LSO5-81-12-088, LSO5-81-12-88, NUDOCS 8112310398
Download: ML20039D181 (6)

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December 28, 1981 e

P Docket No. 50-155 LS05-81-12-088 3

RECEIVED

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8 Mr. David P. Hoffhan 3 saun emuraman Nuclear Licensing Administrator L '

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Consumers Power Company 3

1945 WE Parnall' Road-Jackson, Michigan 49201

SUBJECT:

BIG ROCK POINT - SEP TOPIC XV-16. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 0F FAILURE OF SMALL LINES CARRYING PRIMARY COOLANT GUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Enclosed is our evMuation of SEP Topic XV-16, Radiological Consequences of Failure of Small Lines Carrying Primary Coolant Outside Containment.

Our evaluation concludes 1that there are n4 lines that qualify for review under this topic and therefore the design of the Big Rock Point Facility is acceptable regarding this dubject. ' \\

i-x The enclosed safety evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility. The assessment may be' revised'in' the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relat-ing to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is com-pleted.

Sincerely,.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. S' Division of Licensing -

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Docket No. 50-155 LS05-81-12-088 Mr. David P. Hoffman Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W. Parnall Road

' Jackson, Michigan 49201

SUBJECT:

BIG ROCK POINT - SEP TOPIC XV 16 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF SMALL LINES CARR'.ING PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Enclosed is our evaluation of SEP Topic XV-16 Radiological Consequences -

of Failure of Small Lines Carrying Primary Coolant.0utside Containment.

Our evaluation concludes that there are no lines that qualify for review under this topic and therefore the_ design of-thei Big Rock Point Facility, is acceptable regarding this subject.

The enclosed safety evaluation will, be a basic input to ttie integrated safety assessment for your facility.

The assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relat-ing to this topic are modified 'before the integrated assessment is com-pleted.

Sincerely, 7

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Dennis M'.'Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

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BIG ROCK POINT 6

XV-16 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF SMALL LINES CARRYING PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT s

I.

INTRODUCTION Rupture' of lines carrying primary coolant outside containment

~can allow primary coolant and the radioactivity

• contained therein to escape to the environment.

SEP Topic XV-16 is intended to review the radiological consequences of such failures.

The review of this topic encompassed those lines which carry primary coolant cutside containment during power operation.

The scope included those lines that are not normally expected to be open to the primary system but can be opened during power operation (i. e., reactor coolant sample Lines, instrument lines, etc.)

II.

REVIEW CRITERION All small lines carrying primary coolant outside containment were reviewed to ensure that any release of radioactivity

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from their postulated failure was a small fraction of the 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines.

Small fraction is defined'in the SRP to be no more than 10% of the 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES Lines which were excluded from the review included lines in which interlocks prevent opening during power operation such as the PWR residual heat removal lines.

These lines are

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s 2-s covered by two SEP Topics, V-10.8, "RHR System Reliability" and V-11.B, "RHR Interlock Requirements."

The review also did not consider large pipes ' carrying primary system fluid outside

- containment such as the main steam and feedwater Lines of a BWR.

These lines are considered in SEP Topics $1I-5.B, " Pipe Breaks outside Containment" and XV-18, " Radiological Consequences of Main Steam Line Failure Outside Containment."

IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES The review was conducted in accordance with SRP 15.6.2.

The Licensee was requested to provide plant specific information such as the identification of lines covered by this Topic, the size of these lines, break locations and flow, etc.

The licensee responded to this request in a letter d a t e d J u l y 1, 1981.

V.

EVALUATION On July 1, 1981, the licensee submitted an evaluation of the radiological consequences of failure of small lines carrying p ri ma ry coolant outside containment.

Four lines were identified in this evaluation:

the main steam line, the feedwater Line, the resin sluice line and' core spray suction line.

The Licensee concluded that Big Rock Point was consistent with current NRC criteria (SRP Section 15.6.2) for failures outside containment of small lines carrying primary coolant.

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The review'by the staff indicates that the lines identified by the licensee are outside the scope of this topic, that is, the main steam and feedwater lines are not considered small lines

'for the purpose of this topic.

Furthermore, the radiological 1

consequences of th,e failure of the main steam line is covered by SEP topic XV-18 and the radiological consequences of a failure of this line bound those of a feedwater line.

As for the core spray pump suction line, the staff determined that this line is not connected directly to the primary system during power. operation and, therefore, this line does not qualify for consideration under this topic review.

The last line, the resin sluice.line, is only open a very small fraction of the time Cuhen resin transfer i s to take place and the demineralizer is isolated from the primary system) and therefore, because it is always isolated from the primary syste'm, this line would not qualify for review under this topic.

There are, however, lines which typically are covered by this review topic (i ns t rument and sample lines).

Discussions of these lines were absent from the licensee's submittal and the staff asked the licensee whethe'r sample or instrument Lines penetrated the containment for this facility.

Mr.

R. Vincent in a telephone conversation with R.

Fell of NRC on October 13, 1981 indicated

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that Big Rock has no instrument or sample lines that penetrate the containment.

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VI.

CONCLUSIONS Because the staff determined that the lines i dentified in the Licensee's submittat, were i nappropriate for consideration under this review topic and because Big Rock Point has no other lines which could qualify for review, the Big Rock Point design i

is acceptable with respect to this accident.

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