ML20039C622
| ML20039C622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1981 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Hague R, Konklin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039C610 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-81-19, 50-301-81-21, NUDOCS 8112290528 | |
| Download: ML20039C622 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000266/1981019
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0rP1ISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-266/81-19: 50-301/6.'-21
Docket No. 50-266; 50-301
Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Campany
231 West Michigan
Milwaukee, WI 53203
Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Lower Plant, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Point Beach site, Two Rivers, WI
Inspection Conducted: October 1-30, 1981
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Inspectors:
W.
Guldemond *
/E/18/(I.
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R.
.. Hague y
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Approved By:
J.
. Konklin, Acting Chief
.IS/IO/7I .
ojects Section 2A
Inspection Summary
Inspection on October 1-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-266/81-19; 50-301/81-21)
Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspection of Operational Safety Verifi-
cation, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation,
Followup on Licensee Event Reports, IE Bulletin and Circular Followup,
Followup on Items of Noncompliance, Independent Inspection Effort, Contain-
ment Integrated Leak Rate Test, Receipt of New Fuel, Inspection During Long
Term Shutdown, and Refueling Activities. The inspection involved a total
of 191 inspector-hours onsite by two inspectors including 40 inspector-hours
on off-shifts.
Results: Of eleven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identi-
fied in eight areas. Six items of noncompliance were identified in three
areas (failure to sample boric acid tanks - Paragraph 4.a; failure to
establish a valve lineup required by a hydrostatic test procedure - Para-
graph 4.b; failure to change a hydrostatic test procedure - Paragraph 4.b;
failure to identify isolation of a safety injection train - Paragraph 2;
failure to comply with a radiation work permit - Paragraph 12; and failure
to comply with a test procedure which resulted in a reactor coolant system
pressure transient - Paragraph 4.d.).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Ophrations
- J. J. Zach, General Superintendent
- T. J. Koehler, Superintendent, Operations
J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - I & C
W. J. Herrman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Construction
- R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist
- R. E. Link, Superintendent - EQR
- F. A. Zeman, Of fice Supervisor
- G. J. Maxfield, Assistant to the Superintendent - Operaticas
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the
Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control
Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
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logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
the month of October 1981. The inspector monitored the operability
of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified
proper return to service of affected components. On October 22, 1981,
the inspector discovered the motor operated discharge valve for the
Unit 2 Train "A" high head safety injection pump shut. The observation
was made during a control board walkdown.
This normally open valve
does not receive an automatic open signal upon initiation of safety
inj ection. Thus, the Train "A" high head safety injection for Unit
2 was out-of-service.
The licensee immediately opened the valve and conducted an investiga-
tion.
It was determined that no one in the control room had operated
the valve during the shift. A check of the valve revealed that the
handwheel locking device was in place, which indicated that the valve
had not been operated locally. Through discussions with the Operations
Department it was determined that no tests or evolutions requiring
cycling of the Train "A" high head safety injection pump motor operated
discharge valve had been scheduled or performed.
Followup investigation by the licensee determined that the valve had
been shut when the control board switch was inadvertently bumped by
an operator changing a light bulb in the upper portion of the control
board.
It was further determined that an end-of-shift turnover check-
list which includes the positiot of the Unit 2 Train "A" high head
safety injection pump discharge valve failed to identify that the
valve was out of position.
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This is an item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria
V and XIV (50-301/81-19-01).
Tours of the Unit I containment, the auxiliary building and both turbine
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buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, includ-
ing potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations.
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Results of these tours were as follows:
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a.
Unit 1 Turbine Hall: No discrepancies were noted.
b.
Unit 2 Turbine Hall: Three valves with packing leaks were
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. identified on Octobc. 6, 1981. None had associated maintenance
requests. Two fire extinguishers had no record of inspection,
two had broken seals, and one was overcharged.
c.
Auxilia ry . Building: One fire extinguisher which was one month
overdue for monthly inspection was located in the Unit I con-
tainment facade. Numerous contamination boundaries had un-
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secured cords and hoses extending across them creating the
potential for spread of contamination within the auxiliary
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building.
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d.
Unit 1 Containment: While performing confirmatory general area
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radiation surveye ou the 66 foot level of the Unit I contain-
ment, the inspect)r discovered a frequently occupied area in
the vicinity of "B
reactor coolant pump cubicle where the
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radiation field was approximately twice the posted value (20
mrem /hr vs 10 mrem /hr). This was brought to the attention of
the licensee's health physics organization. Further investi-
gation revealed the source of the higher than expected readings
to be a tank used to store "A" reactor coolant pump internals.
This tank was properly posted with a " hot spot" tag and the
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licensee provided further posting warning of the higher than
normal radiation levels.
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All of the above items were discussed with licensee management.
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The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the
physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the
station security plan.
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The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the
month of October 1981, the inspector walked down the accessible por-
tions of the safety injection, containment spray, emergency electrical,
auxiliary feedwater, and fire protection systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
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operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
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technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administretive procedures.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components
were observed / reviewed to verify that they were conducted in accord-
ance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or
standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The
following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating-the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by quali-
fied personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls
were implemented.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Removal, cleaning, testing and reinstallation of steam generator
safeties - Unit 1
Disassembly of RH MOV 700 - Unit 1
On October 27, 1981, a roll of " duct" tape war inadvertently introduced
into the Unit 1 RCS. This occurred during the disassembly of the "B"
reactor coolant pump in preparation for an inservice inspection. Health
Physics personnel were installing a herculite cover on the platform
around the pump volute. They called for more tape. A health physics
technician at the pump cubicle railing tossed a roll of tape down. The
roll of tape entered the open pump volute and rolled approximately
twelve feet down the primary loop piping. At the time of this occurr-
ence, no cover was installed over the open volute. Actual work on the
pump was interrupted for an extended period of time. At the close of
the inspection period approximately 1.5 man-rem had been received in
unsuccessful attempts at tape recovery. The tape was later recovered.
In Inspection Reports 50-266/81-17 and 50-301/81-19 the inspector
documented a concern over the licensee's lack of requirements for
installation of cleanliness covers to preclude the introduction of
foreign materials into safety related systems. The examples cited
in those reports included the electric fire pump and the 4D diesel
generator.
Because of this recent occurrence the inspector reiterated
his concern regarding c'eanliness control to licensee management.
The inspector will observe this area closely in future inspections
(50-266/81-19-01).
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The _ inspector observed technical specifications required testing as
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noted below to ascertain whether testing was performed in accordance
with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting
conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the
affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with
technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed
by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any
deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel,
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The inspectors observed all or parts of the following tests / calibrations:
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IT-210 Inservice Testing of Inaccessible Valve LCV-427
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IT-1002 Ten-Year Pressure Test of Main Steam and Main Feed Systems
IT-1003 Ten-Year Interval Pressure Test of the Auxiliary Coolant System
IT-1005 Ten-Year Pressure Test of the Safety Injection System
IT-1007 Ten-Year Pressure Test of Refueling Water Storage Tank Piping
IT-1008 Ten-Year Pressure Test of the Service Water System
IT-1010 Ten-Year Pressure Test of the Boric Acid Storage Tank Piping
Unit 1 Loop A Flow Transmitter Full Calibration
TS-31 High and Low Head Safety Valve Leakage Test
Disassembly of Unit 1, "B" reactor coolant pump in preparation
of 10 year radiographic inspection of volute welds
All. tests were carried out in accordance with approved procedures, with
the following exceptions:
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a.
Step No. 4.9 of IT-1010, Ten-Year Pressure lest of the Boric Acid
Storage Tank Piping," requires that " Chemistry verify boric acid
storage tank boric acid concentration in all three tanks." This
step was signed off on the swing shift of October 8,1981. At
10:00 a.m. on October 9, 1981, the inspector verified that the
tanks had not been sampled as required and informed the shift
supervisor who in turn requested that Chemistry immediately draw
the required samples. This is an item of noncompliance with
Technical Specification 15.6.8.1.
(50-266/81-19-02)
b.
During observation of the performance of IT-1002, " Ten-Year
Pressure Test of Main Steam and Main Feed Systems," three items
were identified.
(1) Step 2.4.2 of the procedure establishes the required test
pressure as a function of test temperature. Specifically,
the procedure requires a test pressure of 125% of design
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pressure for temperatures less than or equal to 100
F.
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For temperatures less than 200* F the procedure requires a
test pressure of 120% of design pressure. At the time of
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test performance, the test temperature _was between 110 F
and 150* F.
Based on discussions with the test engineer
and test personnel the inspector determined that the intended
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tast pressure supplied to operatioas was 125% of design
pressure. This discrepancy was pointed out by the inspector
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to operations personnel prior to exceeding 120% of design
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pressure. Operations personnel obtained technical resolution
from the test engineer. However, the procedure was not changed
in accordance with technical specification requirements. This
is an item of noncompliance with Technical Specification
15.6.8.1.
(50-266/81-19-03).
(2) Step 4.3 for the o.at I test requires that the motor operated
valves which isolate the Unit 2 steam generators from the
motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps be shut. The valves
were observed to be open. Subsequent discussions with opera-
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tions personnel revealed that the valves had been shut on
the previous shift in preparation for the test, but had been
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reopened before shift change to establish a normal lineup for
turnover. The oncoming shift failed to reestablish the re-
quired initial conditions prior to proceeding with the test.
This is an item of noncompliance with Technical Specification
15.6.8.1.
(50-266/81-19-04)
(3) The test pressure called out was a single value. No range
was specified, making compliance virtually impossible.
Furthermore, the value called out was not identified as a
minimum or maximum value. This concern was expressed to
the licensee who agreed to specify such information in
future hydrostatic tests.
c.
During the course of the calibration of Unit 1 Loop ' flow
transmitter F-411, several adjustments were required.
It was
noted that the applicable calibration procedure was not at the
work location during these adjustments; however, all calibration
data reviewed was satisfactory.
d.
On October 10, 1981, during the performance of Major Procedure
TS-31, "High and Low Head Safety Injection Valve Leakage Test,"
on Unit 1, a Unit 1 PORV actuated. At the time of the lift the
unit 1 PORVs were aligned for low temperature overpressure
mitigation at 425 psig. The licensee's evaluation of the pressure
transient indicated that reactor coolant system pressure tempera-
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ture limits were not exceeded. The pressure transient occurred
during the performance of Step 6.8 of TS-31.
This step calls for
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switching from one train of RHR to the other and contains a pre-
caution to ensure letdown flow is maintained during the switchover.
This precaution was not complied with. This is an item of noncom-
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pliance with Technical Specification 15.6.8.1.
(50-266/81-19-05)
5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-
mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
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action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence
had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
50-266/81-012/01T-0 Inadvertent Trip of Critical Control Power Breakers
50-301/81-007/03L-0 Inoperable Boric Acid Heat Tracing Circuit
50-266/81-018/03L-0 Failure to Test Safeguards Bus Undervoltage Relays
6.
IE Bulletin Followup
The inspectors reviewed the status of all outstanding IE Bulletins
and determined that none could be closed out.
7.
IE Circular Followup
For the 1E Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
Circular was received by licensee management, a review for applic-
ability was performed, and, if the circular was applicable to the
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facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled
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to be taken.
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81-12 Inadequate Periodic Test Procedure of PWR Protection System
8.
Receipt of New Fuel
The inspector verified, prior to receipt of new fuel, that technically
adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt,
inspection, and storage of new fuel Records of receipt inspections
and storage of new fuel of elements were reviewed for Unit 1.
No
deficiencies or itams of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance
Licensee actions in response to the items of noncompliance documented
in the inspection reports below was reviewed to ascertain whether the
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actions were completed as committed and were in conformance with
regulatory requirements.
Docket Number
Inspection Report No.
Title
50-301
81-11
Failure to report a
reactor trip pursuant
to 10 CFR 50.72
50-266
81-10
Improper Control of
50-301
81-11
transient fire hazards
10.
Independent Inspection Effort
a.
On February 25, 1981, the NRC issued Generic Letter 81-04 address-
ing staff concerns relative to station blackout events.
Licensees
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were directed to furnish within ninety days an assessment of
existing or planned facility procedures and training programs for
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such events.
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The licensee responded to Generic Letter 81-04 on June 9, 1981.
They adopted the position that existing plant procedures were
adequate pending review of a Westinghouse Owners Group proposal
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on emergency operating guidelines for station blackout events.
By letter dated August 21, 1981, the NRC informed the licensee
that this approach was unacceptable and requested implementation
of procedures and operator training such that they would be in
effect by about September 1981.
The licensee responded to the August 21, 1981, NRC letter on
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September 11, 1981.
In their response they committed to have
interim procedures and training completed by September 30, 1981.
On October 6, 1981, the inspectors verified that the interim
actions had been completed.
Licensee Special Order 81-03 was
reviewed and operator training confirmed through discussion with
the Operations Superintendent and the Training Supervisor.
b.
The inspectors reviewed and updated the status oi TMI Action
Plan Items. The inspector reviewed the licensee's implementation
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of NUREG 0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,"
as required by December 22, 1980, and February 3,1981, letters
from D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to Wisconsin Electric. This review
consisted of a review of PBNP 9.3, "Special Structural Limitations
on the Lifting of Heavy Loads," and discussions with managerial
and training personnel on the indoctrination of crane operators
with respect to NUREG 0612 recommendations. Two items of concern
were identified.
The first item is a discrepancy between the licensee's six month
response to the December 22, 1980, letter and PBNP 9.3.
Paragraph
4.3.2 of the former commits to Manager's Supervisory Staff approval
prior to deviation from any safe load path.
PBNP 9.3 requires such
approval for only certain load paths.
The second concern relates to the use of such portable lifting
equipment as chain falls. The licensee has not addressed control
of such equipment in either his submittals in response to NUREG 0612 or in PBNP 9.3.
That the use of such equipment should be of
concern was illustrated by two observations of a questionable
lifting practice during the inspection period.
In both cases
chain falls to be used in lifting equipment were attached to
overhead piping.
In neither case was an analysis performed to
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demonstrate that the lifting configuration was adequate to
support the intended load.
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These concerns were expressed to licensee management, who have
taken them under consideration.
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11.
Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test
The resident inspectors, in conjunction with Region III inspectors,
monitored activities associated with the Unit I containment integrated
leak rate test.
Included in the review were review of the procedure
for technical adequacy, determination that the procedure was avail-
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able and being used by test personnel, verification that the special
test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in service,
verification of initial conditions and system lineups, monitoring of
key parameters during the test, and verification that post-test blowdown
was within technical specification radioactivity release limits. The
resident inspectors also conducted an independent post-test containment
inspection for equipment degradation.
No items of noncompliance were identified. However, the inspectors
did determine that ORT #9, " Preparation for . Integrated Leak Rate Test,"
contained numerous out-of-date valve lineups. The licensee indepen-
dently made the same determination and processed the necessary pro-
cedural changes. The cause of this problem was failure to update the
ORT as system modifications were made. This situation was discussed
with the licensee, who is considering various alternative corrective
actions. Effort is currently being expended to update procedures and
valve lineups for the Unit 2 containment integrated leak rate test
scheduled for April 1982.
12.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown
The inspector monitored Unit 1 shutdown operations, reviewed
applicable logs, and conducted discussions with operators during
October 1981.
Based on these reviews it was determined that two
significant items were not recorded in the station log. These were
the introduction of foreign material into the reactor coolant system
described in Paragraph 3, and the system pressure transient described
in Paragraph 4.
Tours of Unit I areas were conducted to verify tagout procedure
implementation and to observe plant equipment conditions including
potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations. Also
monitored were housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, implementation
of radiation protection controls, and implementation of the station
security plan.
The inspector performed a spot check of compliance with a Radiation
Work Permit (RWP) issued to support maintenance activities on the
"B" reactor coolant pump on October 15.
The RWP called for personnel
protective clothing, including cotton gloves. The inspector observed
one individual entering the reactor coolant pump cavity and performing
work associated with the RWP without gloves of any kind. This was
pointed out to a Health Physics Technician in the area, who attempted
to correct the situation. The individual in the cavity initially
resisted donning gloves and Health Physics supervision had to get
involved. This is an item of noncompliance with Technical Specifi-
cation 15.6.8.1.
(50-266/81-19-06)
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13.
Refueling Activities
Prior to fuel handling the inspector verified that all surveillance
testing required by technical specifications and licensee procedures
for fuel handling had been completed. The inspectors witnessed several
shifts of fuel handling during the core off-load. Staffing during
off-load was in accordance with technical specifications. Good house-
keeping practices were observed in the fuel handling areas and contain-
ment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications.
During inspection of the off-loaded fuel the licensee observed a tear
in the bottom of the No. 2 grid strap on one of the assemblies. This
assembly is scheduled to be returned to the core and the licensee is
continuing their evaluation. The inspectors will followup on this
finding and its resolution.
(50-266/81-19-07)
14.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period
and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the findings.
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