ML20038A744
| ML20038A744 | |
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| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1981 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
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| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8111160358 | |
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'o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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October 1981 CFFICE OF THE SECRUTARY COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:
Transcript of Briefing on Information Flow Concerning the TMI Accident, Part 1 of 2 Parts January 22, 1981, Pages 1 - 74 Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.108(c) and 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (7) and ~(10),
the Comritission has determined that the attached transcript should be released to the public in its entirety.
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am e J. Chilk Secr ary of the Commission 811116035g 811029 PDR 10CFR PDR PT9.7 j
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C5 NUCI2AR REGIEATORY CCMMISSICN 0o c
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In d:a Mattar of:
BRIEFING ON INFORMATION FLOti CONCERNING THE TMI ACCIDENT CLOSED MEETING - EXEMPTIONS 7 and 10 PART 1 OF 2 PARTS
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DATE:
January 22, 1981 pgggg 1 - 74 g.
tiashington, D. C.
I T- (REPORTING ALDR%Y L
400 Virginia Ave., S.W. Washing :en, D. C. 20024 Talachc=e: (202) 554-2245
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.y-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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2 NUCLEAR REGU'LATORY COMMISSION' 3
4 5-BRIEFING ON INFORMATION FLOW CONCERNING THE TMI ACCIDENT 6
CLOSED MEETING - EXEMPTIONS 7, 10 7
8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9
Room 1130 10 1717 H Stree ts
.N. W.
Washington, D. C.
11 Thursday, January 22, 1981 12 13 The Commission met, pursusnt to notice, at I
14 10:20 a.m.
15 BEFORE:
16 JOHN F.
AHFARNE, Chairman of the Commission 17 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissionar JOSEPH h. HENDRIE, Commissioner 18
' PETER'A. ERADFORD, Commissioner 19 ALSO PRESENT:
20 L. EICKWIT 21
- 5. CHILK V. STELLO 22 W.
DIRCKS D. MOSELEY 23 H. SHAPAR J. FCUCH T,R D 24 25 i
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E 3.9 f I I 2 I E s E 2-CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:.The Director of ICE has 3
recommended and the General Counsel has agreed with the 4-recommendation that this meeting be closed this morning.
5 Therefore, I would propose that the meetino on the briefing 6
and information flow concerning the TMI accident be closed 7
using Exemption 7, investigatory reports, and Exemption 10, 8
adjudication.
9 All those in f avor of closing this meeting ray 10 "Ayo."
11 (Chorus of Ayes.)
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I have no difficulty with 13 Exemption 7 How does At come under adjudication?
14 MR. BICK'4 IT:
It come s under Exemption 10 because 15 some of the matters that will be discussed here will have 18 litigation significance either before a board potentially or 17 before a court potentially.
18 CHAIRMAN AHFARNE:
All right.
19 On March 21st of last year I sent a mero to Mr.
20 Dircks, Mr. Cunmings and Mr. Pickwit essentially sayina that 21 the Conmission had decided to refer to ICE the question of 22 further enforcement action against det. Ed. regarding 23 information transferred on the day of the TMI accident.
24 Although I think our original deadline wa s June, it is not
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25 thst you have beat that deadline by several months, but it ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 564-2346
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1 has taken a few more months than you had originally 2
th o ugh t.
Nevertheless, we are finally here.
3 William, since you were the nominal person to whom
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4 this was addressed for the task in the agency, would you 5
care to off er any opening comments?
8 HR. DIRCKS:
I passed the mail to Victor and he 7
got it.
The study as it went out, the investiga tion was 8
confined to the information flow at TMI.
It did not get 9
into broader ramifications.
I think he will explain that as 10 he gets into this.
11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
All right.
Vic.
12 MR. SIELLO:
What we propose to do this morning is 13 to first very briefly summa rize the report, the conclusions
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14-that were reached and make it clear that'there are questions 15 tha t are no t answered.
There are not answers to every 16 question that one can ask about what happened during the day 17 of the accident.
18 Then when we are finished summariring the report I 19 will present what I believe are the appropriate ICE actions 20 thst ought to follow from the results of this investigation 21 as well as others relat2d to this issue for which they 22 obviously have considered in develeping a report.
23 So what I will ask Mr. Mosely to do first is to 24 introduce the people that are here who participated in the 25 report sin =e it has been a long and difficult jcurney and ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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then co-on to briefly summarize the contents.
2 MR. MOSELEY4
.If you will stand, please.
The 3
participants are Terry Harpster f rom ICE, John Craig from 4
ICE, Bill Fisher from Region 3 ICE and we also had 5
assistance from Dave Gamble of OIA and' Dick Hoefling of ELD.
6 (First slide.)
1 7
MR. MOSELEY:
Going back to the original ICE 8
investigation and the enforcement action tha t was taken on 9
that in October in the letter that Vic sent to tha licensee 10 t ra nsmitting the enforcement action he pointed out that 11 reporting was being deferred and tha t additional enforcement 12 action may he taken.
As the Chairman just nentioned, he 13 restarted tha t action in a March 1980 memorandum which led k
14 to us beginninc our investigation.
15 Along the way some of the Uet. Ed. employees would 16 not talk to us without a subpoena and when the subpoenas 17 were issued they were contested and a ra ther lengthy legal 18 process resulted which delayed the beginning of the 19 interviews with the Met. Ed. people until September which 20 contributed significantly to the delays which have already 21 been mentioned.
22 The investigative approach was that we started 23 with the use of key indicators.
We decided that an 24 assessment of reporting of information should begin with who 25 new inf orma tion of significance.
'd e then selected a group ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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t' of events and parameters which we believed to be a key in l
2 -this particular event.
3 We then attempted to d>termine which of the 4
think-tank members or the group in charge on site on that 5
day knew of these key indicators, when they knew, how they 6.nssessed the key indicators and with whom they discussed 7
each of these.
8 The key parameters which we used are the HPCI and 9
the let-down flows, reactor coolant pump phenom'ena, the 10 EMOV, the hot-leo temperature, the core exit thermocouples, 11 superheat, count rate behavior and the containment pressure, 12 spike.
As you recall, each of these is discussed in Section 13 3 of our report.
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14 We then attempted to use the existing record.
15 There is a voluminous record that existed before we 16 started.
Our effort was to use that record to the maximum 17 extent possible.
We found in reviewing that that there were 18 a numbar of questions that hadn't been asked of specific 19 individuals and there was confusion between the answers that 20 some of the people had givan.
So we did ha ve to interview 21 what we thought was coing to be a small number of people but 22 it turnad out that we interviewed about 50 people before we 23 had completed.
24 As I mentioned earlier, at the outsat there were 25 apparent conflict?.
Some of these appa rent conflicts were ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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not'resolvad during our own interviews.
When you read all 2
of the transcripts we do come up with what appear to be 3
conflicts between what a person says at one time and what he 4
says at another and also between what two different 5
individuals say on the same subject.
6 As we pointed out in the report, one explanation 7
for this is that someone has lied.
There are,_however, 8
other explsnations which include simply faulty memory, the 9
question being answered is not the same in two different 10 cases, and even though the question looks similar the 11 preceding questioning can predispose an answer which is 12 consistent in context with the previous discussion.
There 13 - are individuals, not everyone, who had trouble k
14 distinguishing what they knew on March 28th and what they 15 learned later and, of course, the effect of time.
16 It is difficult when readinc the record not to 17 take one or even several statements that a person may make 18 and conclude that that indeed is what he knew or thought.
19 We tried, however, to take all the statements that were made 20 and relate'them to the context in which each of them was 21 made and then on an overall basis 'try to conclude what we 22 believed that person knew or thought.
. 23 This involved a great deal of interchange among 24 the people in the group.
- 4e had a lot of discussions and in 25 fact arguments before we were able to reach many of the ALDERSON RF#oRTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (2C2) 564 2346
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1 conclusions that we reached.
2 I do believe that the conclusions that we reached 3
on these ap>arent conflicts are valid.
Mcwever, this is not 4
to say that someone else might-not come to a different 5
conclusion on their review of it.
6 (Slide.)
7 Now,.there are somo questions, a number of 8
questions for which we don't ha ve a specific answer.
Our 9
investigation simply did not produce a specific answer of 10 the type we would like to be able to provide you.
We have 11 listed on this slide a sum of those questions.
It is not 12 meant to be an exhaustive list but I think it is 13 represantative of the type of questions that we just simply 14 cannot state with certainty that we have a response to.
15 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Do you mesn to imply, Norm, 16 tha t you didn 't look at these questions or that you looked 17 at them but couldn't find answers?
18 MR. eOSELEY:
Both.
There are elements of both in 19 these questions.
For instance, the one on Miller's 20 briefing.
We probed very extensively in trying to establish 21 whst Miller was briefed on at 7 a.m. when he arrived.
We-22 believe that having a m' ore definitive knowledge of that 23 would ha ve given us much clea rer insigh t but we rimply were 24 not able to establish it.
People's memories vary and we 25 just had to come with what we could got.
1 ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA A' C S.W WASHINGTON, D.c. 20024 (202) 564-2348
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COMMISSICNER GILINSKI:
'Jho was he briefed by?
2 MR. MOSFLEY:
He was briefed by Zeve.
3 So understand tha t this list is not met to be
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4 all-inclusive.
It is simply an attempt to show you that we 5
recognize some of the things that we would like to have been 6
able to do but weren't able to.
7
( Slid e. ).
8 dR. STELLO:
Let me interject, Normi in order to 9
ask a question.
Do you think that any further study in the 10 specific questions that have been raised would be able to 11 get you answers?
12 MR. MOSELEY:
No, I don't.
I think we are in a 13 time frame now when whatever effects there are on. people's
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1-4 memories over time that I don't suspect that anyone is going 15 to be able to resurrect or to modif y or to pull out from 16 those memories new information.
I just don't believe it 17 would be a worthwhile effort to pursue those any further.
18 C0KMISSIONER HEFDRIE:
It has.been my imprecsion 19 tha t that has been the case for a while for all of us who 20 were involved and that the events that went on on the 29th 21 and the 30th and the 31st and every day since then have 22 - added elements in our minds.
23 I find for my own uses, for instance, that it is 24 not impossible for me to know precisely whether I knew 25 certain things or was told a certain thing at some time on ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,.
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the 28th or whether I learned later about that thing and 2-reflected I should hava known it and memory clouds and I now 3
think I kncv it.
I just can't tell any more and-I will bet 4
you a cookie that the rest of the people involved are in the 5
same shape and have been that way for some months.
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEa Yes.
I found great sympatity in 7
one of these reports with the in?.?rview with Tom Gerusky and 8
his trying to recall what happened in that meeting.
9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE.
He had. lost the piece of 10 paper he had at the meeting and could not tell any more.
11 ER. EOSELEY:
I have grouped the conclusions from 12 the report.
The first group that you see here, these are 13 three overall conclusions that relate to Met. Ed.
The 14 second and third we believe are the most significant and i
15 contributed to the first.
18 (Slide.)
17 This grouping has to do with the freedom with 18 which information was provided to us and relates te our 19 conclusion on the degree of willf ulness or the degree and 20 intent of whatever failure to supply any information that 21 existed.
22 I mir7h t add that we chose the words " fully 23 forthcoming" in an attempt to place a degree on it.
It is 24 very difficult to do this.
'Je considered such words as 25 dissemble, withhold, bias, color and all kinds of different ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345 i
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1 words to describe where ve characterized it and we came out 2
with'the verds that we have chosen after a great deal of s
3.
sole searching on:our own part.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
On tha t one can you talk a 5
little.about the basis for No. 5?
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Can I add to that.
Is 5 7 " consistent with 47 8
MR. MOSELEY:
We believe that it is.
We believe 9
that that they were less forthcoming with the state than 10 they were with the NRC.
11 CHAIBMAN AHEARNE:
It might be useful if you read 12 more detail on page 20.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIa Let me ask you about how
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t.4 you interpret the word " intentionally"?
You can oive it 15 several meanings.
You could interpret that to me that there 16 was some conspiracy in tha worst caso I suppose to lie to 17 the authorities.
You could, on the other hand, interpret it 18 to mean that those informing the state presented a rather i
19 more cheerful picture of.what was going on knowino that ther 20 were doing so.
That is the way I understand 4 21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Wall, No. 4 in his report says 22 that they weren't f ully forthcoming and that they did not 23 appraise the Commonwealth of either the uncertainty 24 conce rning the adequacy of core cooling or the potential for i
25 degredation of plant conditions.
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1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs And were aware that they 2
were doing so.
m 3
CHAIRMA8 AHEARNE:
It doesn't say that.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Le t me put it then in a 5
question.
They were not fully forthcoming or were unaware
'6 that they were not fully forthcoming?
7 MR. MOSELEY:
There is a matter of degree that is 8
ambedded in this.
During the briefing of the Lt. Governor 9
in the af te rnoon we believe that those people who were 10 briefing took some comfort in some of the indications that 11 they saw prior to leaving the site.
They didn't have a 12 basis to feel as comfortable as we believe they probably 13 felt.
Nevertheless, thera were indications that the hot-leg 14 temperatures were beginning to come down and the cold-leg 15 temperatures were going up.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Then why do you say they 17 are not fully forthcoming if they really believed that that 18 was the case?
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But, Vic, what it says is they 20 weren't fully forth' coming on either the uncertainty or the 21 potential for degredation.
That is what they weren't fully 22 forthcoming on.
23 MR. MOSELEY:
Tha t is right.
24 COMNISSIONER GILINSKI:
k'are they aware that they 1
25 were not Sully f or t h co.? in g ?
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MR. MOSELEY:
I cannot go into their minds.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Well, you are going into 3
their mind here.
You are saying information not 4
intentionally withheld from state and information not 5
intentionally withhold from the NRC.
6
- 52. M3SELEY:
That is a conclusion we have reached 7
on the basis of reviewing the evidence.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
I understand, but you are 9
going into their minds.
What I am asking is I suppose to 10 understand better what you mean by not fully forthcoming.
11 To me that means that you hava information of which you are 12 aware and which you are not passing on.
13 MR. MOSELLY:
Ce r tainly they were awa re of some 14 concern for the adequacy of core cooling.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI And the significance they 16 had to have come sense of, otherwise I wouldn't apply fully 17 forthcoming.
18 ME. M3SELEY:
Yes.
It is a matter of degree.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Well, then, there was some 20 intention of withholding it to my mind.
I am just trying to 21 deal with the interns 1 logic of your conclusions here.
22
.dR. M3SELEY:
Well, I think the statement we have 23 is that based on the fact that they did not provide this 24 kind of information_we concluded that they were not fully 25 forthcomino.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W. WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKI I would hr.ve understood if 2
you had left the question open about intent ara just sa id 3
that perhaps you decided you were unclear, but you are
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4 coming down fairly firmly here.
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: -They had to come down firm on
,6 thst.
That"f undsmental cha rge that they were given was was 7
information intentionally withhold.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs-Suppose you replaced the 9
word " intentionally" by " knowingly."
Would you still say 10 information now knowingly withheld from state.
11 MR. "0SELEY:
You are talking about 5 and 67 12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Right, because 13 intentionally has a kind of ---
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14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs
--- intent, de*iberate.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI I was going to say 16 conspiratorial ring about it.
Suppose I asked tha question 17 and replaced " intentionally" with " knowingly"?
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Are you asking did they know 19 that they were withholding information?
20
~0MMISSIONER GILINSKI:
los, that they were 21 painting a more favorable picture than the facts warranted 22 or that they themselves believed to be the case.
23 MR. MOSELEY:
Well they were painting a picture 24 that I think was better than the f acts warranted based on 25 what we know now in hindsight.
I cannot conclude that they ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) $64 2346
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were knosingly painting a picture that was intended to 2
deceive the people who were listening to them.
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- 3 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I think that is the 4. critical point.
I expect 3et. Ed. 's people are hustled off 5
not exactly with great joy to the it. Governor's office to 6
explain what in hell is going on down there.
They have to 7
leave a cretty turbulent control room at plant scene to go.
8 They had seen some things before they left that encouraged 9
them, as you say, with temperatures that were turned 10 around.
They had survived at least that far without 11 creating any very significant offsite releases.
So they 'a a d 12 that ~ under their belts.
13 I suspect that in the natural course of things you 14 would expect thbn that if their understandinc of th ei r 15 situation could be represented by some sort of a band, you 16 know, that I would suspect that their summary fo r. the it.
17 Governor came out somewhere toward the more cheeful edge.of 18 the band.
19 The question is did they go outside the band and 20 tell him things on the cheerful side that they knew at that 21 time or had good reason to think a t that time were not so.
22 As I read the conclusion from the report and what is said 23 here the answet is no.
24 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Fut there is a problem with way 25 it is ph rased.
Not fully-forthcoming can carry with it an ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. (NC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S,W, WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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intent; that is, it can_be interpreted as having some intent 2
underlying.
That is, there are two types of cases.
You
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3 have already pointed out there is information.
The question
-4 is was there information they should have passed on to the 5
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and didn't?
That is one one of
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6 -looking at it.
Another way is is there information they 7
should have passed on and knew they should have passed on 8
but didn't?
9 The problem with the words " fully forthcoming," as 10 I thin Vic was pointing out, is it is not really clear.
It 11 doesn't come dcun side of there was information which they 12 didn't pass on.
It does more than that.
It has an 13 implication, or at least you can infer a little bit more
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14 than they had information and didn't pass it on.
It is that 15 they had information but kind of withheld it.
16 Then when you hit No. 5 and 6 it is that they 17 didn't intentionally withhold it.
So that " fully 18 forthcoming" seems to have a shade to it that goes beyond 19 just tha t they had informa tion which the y didn ' t pass on.
20 Is that a shade that I an inferring or did you mean to imply 21 it?
22 MR. M3SELEY:
I think you covered it when you said 23 there was information that should have been passed on thr.t 24 vssn't.
Clearly that is the case.
25 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKI "Not fully forthcoming" I ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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think could be replaced by " withheld", " withheld 2
information."
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3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE4 It is that shading.
Was it 4
withholding or was it that they had inf orma tion which they 5
didn't pass on?
6 MR. DIRCXSs It depends on how you define 7
information.
To me passed on means facts as they saw it 8
when they left the plant.
Now, they could have embellished-7 9
it.
But ht ving said this, on the other hand, it :ould go in to this direction or that direction.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Well, I would say tha t if 12 they walked out of the plant thinking.that things were okay 13 and that was the information they thought was significant
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14 and that is what they told ti:e Lt. Covernor I guess then 15 tha t they were fully forthcoming.
They told him everything 16 they thought was significant.
But if they really thought 17 that the plant was in worse shape and they were putting a 18 pretty f ace on it, and you talked about the question of 19 deception, but whst other reason would there be other than 20 to ivoid trouble on the outside while they are trying to 21 somehow manage the plant, then I think that it is a matter 22 of intent.
.23 MR. STELLos I guess as we discucsed this, and I 24 tried to understand it over and over acain, the word that 25 seened to fit a lot of this was " dissemble."
I don' t a pply ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIAQiNIA AVE., S.W. WASHINGTON. D.C.20024 (202) $54 2346
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an intent.
The issue of the conclusions of 5 and 6 speak to 2
facts, incore thermocouples and hot-leg tem pe ra tures.
There 3
isn 't anything that suggests.that any of that information
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4 was intentionally withheld facts.
5 The conclusions that are embodied within No. 4 are 8
more a snythesis.
It is understanding what all the pieces' 7
of data and information as they tied together leave you with 8
an uncertainty of whether the core cooling was or was not 9
adequate.
10 It is clear from what we have been able to gather 11 that there was a concern.
'.i o w, whether it was at the Lt.
12. Governor's office at 9 o' clock in the morning or 10 o' clock, 13 I don't think that is relevant.
It is at any time whether
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14 or not they.should have come forward and discussed the 15 uncertainties regarding core cooling or the' potential for 18 the degredation.
17 The f acts that we have, the testimony,-says_those 18 concerns were there.
We have concluded they should have to been passed on.
This is extremely.important information 20 that synthesized this understanding, not facts, to leave you i
21 with the knowledge that things may in fact get worse.
22 We were not able to identif y or a ssociate and come 23 up with intent, that they were intentionally.
You could 24 argue that perhaps there are motives that one can pick like 25 they wanted things to look better to people.
In fact, if ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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t-you recall, some of the people in the Ftate made that 2
observation that they thought maybe they were doing that.
5I 3
But when you try to base your conclusion based on everything
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4 that is available to you you are not able to incorporate 5
with this conclusion intent.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Let's put the word 7
" intent" aside for a moment.
Use the word " dissemble" and 8
tha t is a perfectly reasonable word used to portray things 9
other than'what they are.
10 MR. STELLO:
As long as you don't decide that you'-
11 P.re. going to include intent behind that statement that is 12 fine, but I could also read tha t into what you have said, 13 that there was an intent to protray them that way, that
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14 there was a plan, a system.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI That is why I shifted to 18 the word " knowingly."
17 MR. STELLO:
I have argued it both sides.
1 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Well, I think the word 19
" dissemble" has an aspect of consciousness about it that y3u 20 are aware that you are portra ying,a situation differently
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21 than the facts warrant.
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-C 22 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
That is not the way I 23 understood his definition.
He said it doesn't have intent 24 in.it.
25 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE-I disagree with his definitiop i
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1 of the word " dissemble."
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MR. STELLO:
Okay, I can invent a new word.
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. (Lauchter.)
3 4
COMMISSIONER GILINSKI But you talking about 5
protraying an overall situation as being other than the g
V 6
facts warrant.
7 MR. STELLO:
The important thing is 3 and 6 deal
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8 with principally facts, pieces of data, of information.
9 Four deals with the synthesis of those facts that lead to 10 these two impressions that you can't find were discussed 11 throughout the day.
Now, first, should they have been 12 passed on?
Clearly, se are reaching the conclusion that 13 they should have been and that th e y weren't.
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14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Intent somehow to people T
'16 around the table seems to somehow signif y that there was a 16 ' pla n, or you used the word " system", and in that sense I 17 think we just ought to put that aside.
If we can't separate
.1 -
i 18 it from that sort of notion we ought to put the word aside.
.~
19' I think the word " dissemble", the dictionary
/'
20 mcaning of it, and I suppose somebody can go find a j
t 21 h dictionary and look it up, means in fact to portray i
, 22 s!.tuations -- I think we have an English scholar coming up.
+
^
I MR. FOUCHARD:
Yos, sir, I have a Webster's
'23 2/ l Collegia te Dictiona ry.
25 J^ h ^,'
COMMISSIONER uENDRIE:
Would you care to read?
(.'.
J t
jx r
s (,
f 1
L i
i
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(Laughter.)
2 MR. FOUCHARD:
I will do my best, sir.
r
^
3
" Dissemble" - To hide under a false appearance, to 4
conceal facts, intentions or feelings under some pretense.
5 See disguise.
6 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
That doesn 't sound to me 7
like what you had in mind.
8 MR. SIELLO:
Well, you get the bigger dictionary 9
out and ---
10
( La ught er. )
11 MR. STELLO:
--- and you find that it has various 12 shades of meaning, including one that I thought was 13 interesting about what it is that the fair sex ---
(
14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Nev(rtheless, Vic, the general 15 implication of " dissemble" has with it an intent, intent tc 16 deceive.
17 MR. STELL0s Well, then, I will invent a new 18 word.
I think the consensus of the people that looked at 4 -
19 this was that they were not able to come to the conclusion 20 that che in tent was there.
You can argue whether the 4
21 motives that one could reasonably succest, that they vould 22 have liked to have believed and presented this to be better
'r: '
23 than itnreilly was, but when you have to deal with the
! 2;-;
24 pieces of information you are relying on to reach that 7
.,7 25 conclusion, I' don't believe you can get the:e.
/
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKI I think intent seems to be 2
more on that sid) of the table.
~
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs We found somebody that was able
{^
4 to carry it.
5 (A very large dictionary was given to Mr. Stello.)
6 (Laughter.)
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
All right.
Nevertheless, Norm, 8
you do not see any inconsistency then between 4,
5 and 67 9
MR. MOSELEYs No, sir, I do not.
I think that the to problem we are hsving right now is a similar problem that we ti have had for days and weeks in trying to describe what it is 12 we feel.
These are the words that we settled on and we 13 think they convey -- and I am hesitant to even get into this 14
-- but these convey what we felt ra ther thr.n trying to 15 chsracterize it sgain.
16 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess I would to acree 17 with Commissioner Gilinsky that there is to a L.cer uho can 18 infer a logical inconsistency between not fully forthcomino 19 no in tention to withhold.
~
20 MR. MOSELEY:
Shall ve drive on?
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
22 (Slide.)
23 MR. MOSELEY:
The final two conclusions of course 24 relate to NRC and our failure for an effective information 25 system and insufficient reporting requirements.
ALDERSoN RC 80RTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VimOIN4A AVE., S.W,. WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 #202) 564 2346
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(Slide.)
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNES Before you zip by that last 3
slide, Norm, would you mind going back and talking about f
4 No.
8.
5 (Previous slide.)
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
On No.
8, you conclusion is 7
tha t they were not sufficiently specific, sufficient to do 8
what?
9 MR. M3SELEY:
Sufficient to have made it clear to 10 everyone what the reporting requirements were and presumably 11 therefore to have complied.
12 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I must say that from the 13 reading of this volume of material and similar reading not i
14 so very long ago of the stuff that was forwarded to us from 15 the Hill along the same lines it has occurred to me 16 repeatedly that the meanest version of a data link which we 17 have discussed with the fewest number of parameters and so 18 on and even 20-minute update intervals or something like 19 tha t would have been an enormous help on the morning of the 20 28th.
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I reached a different 22 conclusion.
23 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Why?
24 CHAIPMAN AHEARNE:
The conclusion I reached was, 25 yes, that would have been a help, but in going through all ALDERSON REPORTING CoJPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W. WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
23 1
this I guess it clarified to me that all of the NRC action 2
ought to be out in the region.
3 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE Well, I noticed a recent
{-
4 memo from you.
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes, that is what led to that 6
titer wadino through all of this stuff and helping me 7
clarify it.
8 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE A different area.
i 9
CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs Yes.
to COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But what is clear is that F
11 if you had some system from bringing a summary of plant 12 condition out to at least some other group of people.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That is true.
4 14 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
When in fact in the TMI 15 case if it had gone to what is the GPU place in New Jersey?
16 MR. MOSELEY:
Parsippany.
17 00MMISSIONER HENDBIE:
Parsippany.
And then made 18 available to the GPU nuclear section engineers starting at, 19 you know, when it tripped off and began to go at 4 a.m. I 3) think it co ul d have gone a lot differently.
21 3R. MOSELEY:
We have a recomnendation here that 22 we nave given you that is similar to your view.
23 Going back to the beginning I should point cut on 24 our recommendations that we have not attempted to go through 25 these and screen for action that is underva y or even action ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON. O.C. 20024 (202) 554 2346 t
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that may have been taken during the time we have been
~
2 submerged in doing this investigation.
3 The first recommedation, of course, will be
(
4 discussed a little more f'111y by Vic later on and I won't G
dwell on that.
6 The second recommendation with its three parts ---
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess I would prefer you to 8
go through each one a little bit more carefully even though 9
Vic may get back to it.
10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Maybe this is a good time 11 to plunge in.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE Your first recommendation is no 13 citation for failure to report and your reasons are?
('
1 14 MR. M3SELEY:
The reasons are stated in the 15 regulatory requirement.
Let me start off by saying this is 16 a collegial document and dif ferent people have different 17 views.
The three statements here cover the views of 18 different individuals.
So they may or may not be somewhat 19 o ve rl a p pin g.
20 The regulatory requirements in existence at that 21 time were not sufficiently specific.
That is one of the 22 ressons that was given.
Then another one is that sufficient 23 information was provided to satisfy reporting requirements.
24 00MMISSIONER GILINSKIs Can we go back to the 25 specificity of the requirements.
What do you think it would ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA /VE, S.W, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 564 2345
~
25 1
have taken to aska clear that there was a reporting 2
requirement?
What is it that is lacking?
3 MR. MOSELEY We get into that further in the
(' -
4 recommendations, specifically in recommendation No.
3.
We 5
talked to the eress that we believe should be improved.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI As I remember you 7
recommended that specific parameters ought to be identified.
8 MR. 40SELEY:
We were saying that specific 9
subevents ought to be identified to be in themselves to reported.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Suppose we fix all this up 12 and specified all the subevents that we have been faced with 13 in the past but then we come up with a situation that nobody
(
14 had thoucht of and we are again back in the TMI situation.
15 Does that mean that everyone is off the hook even though 16 some terrible accident has occurred?
17 ~
MR. MOSELEY:
No, sir, I don't believe so.
I 18 would hope that we would be able to draft something that 19 would describe how you evaluate an event to see whether it 20 is reportable rather than a laundry list of reportable 21 subevents.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Well, that is what I am 23 trying to get a t.
What sort of things to you have in mind 24 when you say subovent?
25 MR. "3SELEYs An example here, the containment l
ALDERSoN REPoATING COMPANY,INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2346 4
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1 pressure spike, in my view particularly is a clear subevent 2
that becomes reportable in and of itself regardless of what e
3 else may have been reported earlier in the day.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs That is what bothers me 5
about your approach, it leaves little common sense.
If you 6
get into some situation which is clearly a very serious one 7
which hasn't been covered in detail in an emergency plant, 8
you seem to be saying that there really is no legal 9
obligation to report that to the f ederal and state 10 authorities.
11 MR. M3SELEY:
I believe if you look at 12 recommendation 3(b) we are trying to cover that with this 13 very same thina, and this is if you don 't understand the 14 condition you a re that in itself is reportable.
15 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKIs You know, you dismiss the 16 requirements which we had on the books at the time of the 17 accident as being too general and therefore not amounting to 18 a legal obligation to report.
19 It seems to me that a fair sense of the 20 regulations is that in fact the station has to be fully 21 forthcoming with the NRC.
Not to apply that to what even at 22 the earliest stage, and you know the accident was 23 con siderably underestimated, seems to me to just to throw 24 common sense out the window.
Authoritation was viven to 25 operate the plant on the basis that the job will be ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
40C VIRGINIA AVE, S.W, WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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responsibly done.
Every little "t"
was not going to be 2
crossed and every last "i" do tted, b ut there was a clear 3
understanding that with that responsibility goes the 4
responsibility to perform their duties competently-and to 5
report to us when there is serious trouble.
I just don't 6
see how you c:nnot read that into our regulations.
7 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, an argument can be made that 8
licensees must be aware of what is expected of them and that 9
we have the responsibility to be sufficiently specific to 10 anable them to know what is required of th e m.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI You knov, you can apply 12 that sort of logic to a minor event, the borderlino event, 13 you know, that falls in the gray area and they really need
(
14 to do that, but when you are talking about events of this 15 magnitude which even as they were assessed at the beginnina 16 there and here and unestimated and it was still known to be 17 extremely serious.
Not to provide full information on that 18 in just something that seems to me is out of bounds.
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Perhaps part of the question is 20 wha t inf o rma tion 1.c it that is in ques tion.
You say that 21 the regulatory requirements weren't sufficiently specific.
22 Sufficiently specific to require what?
23 MR. MOSELEY:
The stuff that is under 24 consideration in the citation that is at the end of the 25 report, specifically the containment pressure spite, the ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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28 1
calculation in Goldsboro, the thermocouple readings, the 2
EMOV and this inf ormstion.
The argument can be made on the 3
basis of is 20.403 applicable to these other events.
{
4 In order to make 20.403 applicable to any of these 5
events you have to conclude that they are seperate events 6
from the initial event which was already reported.
The 7
citations against the procedure rest on a note or footnote 8
which is very broad and very general which in effect places 9
on everyone the responsibilities to supply information to 10 the NRC and a large group of other agencies.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI You are talking about this 12 note "Shall be the responsibility of all the nbove," et 13 cetera?
(
14 MR. MOSELEY:
Yes.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI4 But to tnen conclude that 16 there was no responsibility.
17 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE Tha t is not what is 18 concluded.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Well, maybe I 20 misundersta nd it.
21 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Well, let me read it to 22 you.
This is one of the reasons given by the report team 23 for not believing that there should be a citation for 24 failura in the information pattern that morninc.
As Norm 25 says, this may represent sort of a central reason for no ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 564 2345 m
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citation for one or more members but not necessarily all of 2
the them ---
3 MR. MOSELEY:
That is correct.
4 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE4
--- and on others we would 5
put more weight on one of the other two factors that are 6
cited.
7 The particular one you are talking about is "The 8
reg ula to ry requirements in existence on March 28th with 9
regard to reporting were no t sufficient specific to support to such a citation.
It is clear that the regulations in place 11 on March 28th laid a responsibility upon the licensee to 12 inform both the state and the NBC of what vss going on."
13 Tha t is quite clea r.
(
14 In the splend'id clarity of hindsight, and 15 hindsight in this case said, I don't know, late on the 29th 16 or early on the 30th, se it isn't many months later, but in 17 the bright light of hindsight it is clear that they should 18 have done much better.
They would have been better off and 19 we would have been better off and the state would have been 20 better off if the information flow had been much better.
21 Now,.the question is since it wasn't much better 22 and things therefore weren't better Ctf uo they get cited?
23 Wha t is. being said here is that the informa tion flow 24 tequirements as laid down in the requistions, the tech.
l-25 s pe cs. a nd the licensed c7nditions and so on, it isn't so l
ALDERGoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIAGINIA AVE., S.W, WASHINGTON, o.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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clear that a citation is supportable in tho view of at least 2
some members of the report team.
3 Now, what happened in the morning?
You know, they
{
4 had the trip and so on and for a while they didn't have 5
signs of radioactivity and thought they were off on a 6
secondary plant transient that had shut the thing down.
7 Okay, they began to see radinactivity and they co into a 8
site emergency and they call the state people and they call 9
the NRCe They don't get any answer e.t the NRC.
10 The situation deg rades r" pidly, the levels get 11 higher and they are pretty soon, 15 or 20 minutes,later or 12 something like that, half an hour, they are on a generai 13 emergency.
They tell that to the state and they try to tell -
14 the NRC.
The NRC isn't there to be told.
15 Forty-five minutes later they manage to get 16 through as people begin to get into the regional offices ard 17 call back and they tell the NRC they have had this trip, 18 that apparently something has gone on at any rate and they 19. have got radiation signs around.
They have declared a site 20 emergency back then and they declared a general emergency 21 some minutes ago sad so on and things are eff and running.
22 Now, indeed, th ey have notified the NRC at that 23 poit of what is going on.
What is really bothering us here 24 is.that events on down through the day as they became to one 25 or another of the Met. Ed. people in the control room l
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weren ' t f aith'f ully reported through in sufficient clarity so 2
that we had a parallel picture running here or at the 3
regional office.
4 But I must say it is clear from all of the 5
testimony that has been taken and va rious people 's 6
statements that Het. Ed. didn't have that kind of clear l
7 picture of what was going on.
This guy thought he knew this 8
but didn't tell that one or said it some other way or wasn't 9
understood and they didn't tell this one and so on.
The 10 communication links were also not in such great shape as to 11 make the reporting all that clear.
I 12 Now, I rite these things not particularly by way 13 of saying everything was hunky-dory, to be sure, or it I
(
l 14 certainly doesn't imply that they didn't have a l
I 15 responsibility.
I am just saying it seems to me a not 16 unreasonable basis for some of the conclusions that the 17 investigators came to tha t there wasn't a sufficiently I
18 clear-cut reporting requirement there for there to be a
[
19 citation for what actually did happen or didn ' t ha ppen.
But 20 it doesn't say that there wasn't a responsibility and it 21 dcecn't say that there wasn't a reporting requirement in the 22 reculations.
23 I must say furthermore that it is a bit of a 24 question to me whether, you know, going on-beyond what 25 happened and on to the question of what you should do about ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGWIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. o.C. 20024 (202) 554-2346
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32 1
it, it is in fact not so clear to me that the proper way to 2
deal for the future with that possible type of situation is
('
3 in fact to generate a detailed series of reporting 4
regulations for an emergency.
I would just as soon that the 5
Gay Miller of the future, if there is to be one, does not 8
have to. sit there running his paper down the page to try to 7
see whether every damn thing he just heard fits into 8
category 1 through 12 of the'subeven t reporting 9
recJirement.
I would rather have him understand, you know, 10 the things that he needs to keep a sort of stead contact 11 going.
12 But I would hope that the way we deal more 13 e f f ective.' f with that for tne f uture is tha t the 14 a rrangements f or that informa tion flow are such that that 15 occurs much more easily and hence much more naturally and 18 that it is by virtue, as you say, of a more common sense of 17 responsibility and so on than having a detailed matrixi does 18 this piece of information, no, it doesn't fit category one 19 and slide to category two, move over one ba r and see which 20 of three options it fall under.
Good Christ, I don't see 21 how you can manage a plant in that case.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI.
Well, we can't set up a 23 Napoleonic code to deal with eme rgencies.
I think that is 24 clear.
25 To get back to the question of citation, you can ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345 m
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question whether they ought to be cited or not and that is a i
2 policy question and whether it does any good and so on, and l
3 I have my own views on that.
You do seem to be saying that
{~
4 they were obliged to report it to us more by the regulations 5
more than they did.
You said they had the responsibility.
6 You also used the word "should."
You can use that in the 7
sense that it would have been nice if they had or you could 8
sean that they were obliged to do it.
9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I don't know how they could 10 report things they didn't really understand themselves and 11 recognize themselves.
Considering both tha t aspect and then 12 the mechanical difficulties that they were having and which 13 their communicating meant that they had to go find a phone 14 and get a clear line through to us and so on which, you 15 know, is worth five or ten minutes of a guy's time who was 16 very busy with other things.
I am not uncomfortable with 17 the way the team comes out.
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Norm, if the plant knew 19 that it had temperatures of 2,500 degrees in the core, know 20 tha t unequivocably, is there any doubt that on March 28th, 21 1979, they would have been under a duty to report that 22 immediately?
4 23 MR. MOSELEY:
If you are asking for my personal 24 opinion, there is no doubt in my nind that it should ha ve 25 been reported immediately.
ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
34 1
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
So that the conclusion 2
here rests in some way on the fact that there is some gap 3
between the individual who had a duty to report and the
{-
4 knowledge of the conditions in the core?
5 MR. MOSELEY:
On that particular subject, yes, 6
there is some doubt as to what they made of this 7
information.
I don 't think we want licensees to report 8
every anomalous instrument indication that they come 9
across.
Otherwise we and they will be burdened with 10 numerous transmissions.
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's stick with this one 12 for a minute.
There isn't any doub t, is th ere, that the 13 company at least had strono indications that there were very 14 high temperatures in the core; that is some individuals in !
15 the company had clear indications to that effect?
16 MR. MOSELEY:
There were some readings that were 17 taken that were generally a vailable, a small number, five or 18 six or so, some of which were high and some of which were 19 low.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's see.
Weren't the 21 thermocouples in fact read eight or nine times throughout 22 the day?
23 MR. MOSELEY:
From the computer, but the computer 24 doasn't read in that range.
The computer's maximum I 25
"?lieve is 650 degre-s.
l At.DERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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COMMISSIGNER BRADFORD:
Pinht.
So what they were 2
getting were question marks from the computer on the one 3
time they went behind it.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Put not in all locations.
5 MR. MOSELEYs That is right.
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And the one time they went 7
behind it they had readings from the hundreds to the 8
thousands of degrees?
9 MR. MOSELEY:
That is correct, yes, sir.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I just have real 11 dif ficulty understanding why the company taken as a whole, 12 leaving aside the flow of information within it, isn't under 13 a duty to get that information into our hands immediately.
14 MR. MOSELEY:
I think it is up to the company to 15 devise a system that will produce that information flow.
16 MR. MOSELEY:
That is one of our recommendations.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI4 But I think they wera 18 under that obligation at that time.
19 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, I think we have to go back to 20 knowledge by those people who were in a reporting position 21 on that day.
I don't think any of us can expect a person to 22 report something he doesn't know.
You have to ask yourself 23 the question of should he report something he doesn 't know.
24 COMMISSIONER BR ADFORD:
That is why I was askino 25 the question in terms of the company.
I think somewhere in 1
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
36 1
your report there is a statement to the effect that if an 2
individual within the company knows something you would 3
impute that knowledge to the company.
{s 4
HR. MOSELEY:
What we really say is that if it is 5
a responsible individual.
In this report we assume that the 6
information got to the think-tank and that it was then 7
subject to consideration for reportability.
8 MR. STELL0s I think in fairness I ought to 9
interject that tha issue of whethe't we ought to or ought not to to go with enforcement, that is issue a notice of violation, 11 later in the presentation I intended to go through this and 12 I do not intend to accept that recommendation.
I have a 13 proposal that I v' ant to make and I would like to at some
(
14 point offer sone of the reasons why I couldn't accept the 15 recommendations.
If it is convenient we can do it now but 16 we will be doing it maybe twice.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Norm, why don't you go throuch 4
18 the rest of your recommenda tions.
19 MR. ?.CSELEY:
Going back to recommendation No. 2, 20 these are recommendations that I would expect that would be 21 implemented through reg. guides.or modifications to the 22 standard review plan to be guid'ance for acceptability for 23 emergency plans and emergency procedures.
24 COMMISSIONER CILINSKIs What has happened to 25 improve that situation from your point of view since Three ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
37 1
Mile Island?
In other words, do you still feel that we need 2
to go much further than we have since then,'or have we made 3
any changes?
~
4 MB. MOSELEYs I have been so involved in this 5
investigation that I frankly am not up to date on where we 6
are today.
I guess I would have to defer that to someone 7
else.
I don't know.
8 MR. STELL0s This group did not icok at the 9
changes that have been made with regard to each of the 10 recommendations.
It is clear that with respect to all of 11 these recommendations significant things have already 12 happened.
Whether or not we ought to go further beyond 13 wh?re we are now is a matter that we want to look at pretty 14 carefully.
15 You ought not to look at these recommendations in 18 the context that these are beyond what we have already 17 done.
It is only from a limited point of view of them 18 looking at the information flow and what they see coring out 19 of that as recommendations that they thought, and I agree, 20 ought to be put forward.
21 I am not prepared to say that any of these 22 recommendations at the moment suggest that we need to go 23 beyond where we ace.
In some cases I think we want to look 24 a little harder especially in light of how the NRC is going
)
25 to go about its task.
We know there is an awful lot more to ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W. WASHINGTo*l 0.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
38
~
1 do and I think there are tremendous insights in this report 2
to' deal with that and I want to come back to that issue as 3
well.
4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Just as an aside, I think we 5
have to go farther than that.
6 MR. STELLO:
Excuse me.
I for the moment don 't 7
suggest that we are finished, but we have laid out tasks, 8
any of which are not finished, which deal with these 9
specific issues.
10 (Slide.)
11 MR. MCSELEY:
I believe we touched on these really 12 in our earlier discussion so let's flip to the next slide.
13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I would like to also chime'in 1-4 and support the point that Vic was making and I think Joe 15 was supporting, tha t the f undamental responsibility has to 16 be viewed as far as reporting goes as common sense or rule 17 of reasons I guess in some other contexts.
As someone sa i d,
18 you really don't want to put them in a situation where they 19 are thumbing through a set of tables to see whether or not 20 this item now rises to reportsbility.
21 3R. MOSELEY:
I think we are all in agreement on i
22 thst.
23 MR. SIELLO:
I guess we are getting back to where 24 ve vere before.
I have weighed heavy in my mind as to where 25 we ought to co with respect to enforcement action.
We ALDSRSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGIN!A AVE., S.W., WASHlhGTON. D.120024 (202) 554-2345
39 1
discussed the reasons why it might not be appropriate to go 2
with a notace of violation.
I disagree that the reasons
('
3 given are appropriate, and one of them in particular with 4
whether there is a value or not in taking enforcement action.
5 Of course we ought not to take the enforcement 6
action, that is issue the notice of violation, unless it is 7
warranted.
So the first two points that have been 8
discussed, that is the clarity of the regulations and 9
whether or not adL4aate information was provided are clearly 10 the key issues.
But I do want to make clear that it is my 11 view that there is quite a bit that is derived from coming 12 forward with a notice of violation.
13 Let me return to the first issue of whether there
(
14 is sufficient clarity in these two requirements.
I think in 15 sy view 20.403 is reasonably clear.
If an event of some 16 tpecific challenge is presented to a faci 3ity where there 17 can be a significant release of radioactivity or harm to the 18 public that occurs even after you have made the first phone 19 ' call that says to me there is a clear obligation of an 20 additional incident.
21 You can come up with all kinds of exsmples of 22 things that could happen, b ut clearly a challenge to the 23 containment is one tha t ought to have been reported.
24 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You are talking about the spike?
25 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
Although you might have some ALDERSoN PEPoRTING COMPANY,INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2346
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difficulty pinning down the precise hour when we were 2
informed of it, it appears that it was probably not until 3
late sometime on Friday morning when we became aware of it.
{-
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD You have to conclude then 5
tha t Chwastyk and Mehler are both mistaken in saying that 6
informed an NRC inspector on Wednesday afternoon?
7 MR. STELLO:
It is our judgment, and he has also 8
said that he was not informed.
We have concluded, while 9
there is argument, tha t he had not been.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIa I thought that the report 11.
concluded that he had been.
12 MR. MOSELEIa Do you want me to tell you what the 13 report says?
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI4 I am not arguing with your 15 conclusions.
16 MR. STELL0s Say what your report says.
17 MR. h0SELEYs The report says that we believe that 18 there probably was a conversation or a discussion between 19 these people and the inspector.
We don't believe that this 20 included the fact that this was a real presrsre spike.
21 The re were some indications for it which were observed and 22 actions were taken on it.
23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs Do you believe that they talked 24 about the indication on the precsure indica tor but concluded 25 that it was a false spike?
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRG!NIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, o.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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MR. MOSELEY:
Both of the people who say they were
~
2 in the discussion with the NRC inspector say that they 3
didn't conclude it was real antil sometime later and yet
(
4 they talk about the discussion with the NRC inspectors 5
during the time the event was ongoing.
So we conclude that 6
the inspectors may well have observed on their own and 7
probaby did some of these phenomena, that is, the alarms 8
tha t went on, the spray pump coming on and so on.
9 MR. SIELL0s The spike is the point I had in mind.
10 CNAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Norm, you are concluding that 11 from your view that th ere were NRC people who were aware of 12 that information?
13 MR. MOSELEY:
They were aware of the phenomena, t
i 14 that something hsppened, but not that it was a real pressure 15 spike.
We don't conclude that they were aware of that.
16 00HMISSIONER GILINSKIs Are we ever going to have 17 a chance to go over the body of this report?
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I assume so.
I haste no cut-off 19 time.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs One of the things that I 21 vondered about, particular because it is a fairly long 22 report, is larce s series of conclusions.
I assume that 23 somewhere you have a backup that which lays out your 24 reasoning.
One of the things in particular that I wondered 25 about was the conversations I believe that Chwastyk claimed ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) $$4-2345
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1 he had with NRC inspectors, on the one hand, and Gary 2
Miller, on the other.
He claims, if I recall it correctly, 3
to have informed Miller of the pressure spike and NRC
{~
4 inspectors of the pressure spike.
Miller doesn't remember 5
the conversation and the NRC inspectors don't remember the 8
conversation.
Yet you conclude that he did talk with the 7
NRC inspectors but didn't talk with Miller.
8 HR. MOSELEY:
The conclusion on Chwastyk, the 9
principle conclusion in relation to Miller is whether or not to tha t was hydrogen as discussed on March 28th.
Miller left 11 the site shortly after the pressure spike.
12 COMMISSICNER GILINSKI Well, I understand.
13 MR. M3SELEY:
We know from the testimony that we
/
14 have that Miller himself says he was out of the control room 15 at about the time that it occurred and we have the testimony to of Ross that some discussion happened between Miller and 17 Ross at that time.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI But what leads you to 19 conclude that he did talk with NRC inspectors?
20 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, we conclude that it is likely 21 that he did.
22 COMMISSIONER GILIN3KI Why any more likely than 23 that he talked to Miller?
24 MR. 20SELEY:
Our conclusion on Miller is more 25 related to whether or not hydrogen was discussed.
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COMMISSIONER GIIINSKI But you do think he talked 2
with him about the subject?
3 MR. MOSELEY:
Whether he talked with Miller or 4
not, I' don't believe.ve reached a conclusion on tha t in the 5
report, that is with Miller about the spike itself.
We do 6
resch a conclusion tha t no one talked about hydrogen on the 7
28th.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You do conclude that 9
Chwastyk and Mehler have testified that the y thought the 10 spike was real.
However, the investiga tors conclude that 11 they did not explain or discuss this belief with their 12 supervisors on March 28th.
It seems to me Chwastyk says 13 pretty unequivocably that he did discuss the spike with
(
14 Miller and I think he says, although I am not sure he is 15 entirely consistent on it, that he believed that it was 16 hydrogen and discussed that belief with Miller.
17 MR. NOSELEY:
He says that, but we believe that 18 conversa tion took place on another day other than " arch 28th.
19 COMMISSIONEP BRADFORD:
Even though Chwastyk says 20 that he is sure it took place on March 28th?
21 MR. MOSELEY:
Yes, sir.
22 CHAIRMAS AHEARNE:
len, you wanted to say 23 something.
24 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes, I just want to interject 25 something.
While the issue of whether or not the l
ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2346
44 1
conversation took place with the inspectorr is certainly 2
relevant to what the Commission would want to do, the 3-regulation,you are talking about, 20.403 requires a 4
notification to the Director of the Regional Office.
5 MR. STELLO:
Yes, I am aware of that.
If one of 8
our inspectors had the information I would not be able to 7
reach the conclusion that I thought it was appropriate to 8
issue a notice of violation.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIa Len seems to be saying the 10 opposite.
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Len is saying as a matter 12 of law and Vic is saying as a matter of discretion.
13 MR. SHAPARs As a matter of policy.
(
14 MR. STELLO:
If we get this information that some 15 inspector is notified we consider that in most cases to be a 18 fulfillment of that requirement and would not then tak e 17 action if we became aware of it.
18 CHAIRMAS AHEARNE:
Your conclusion really really, 19 Vic, is based upon you don't believe that the inspector was 20 informed of this?
21 MR. STELL0s I thoucht I was careful to say spike 22 meaning the 29 psi.
23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The interviews I can recall 24 specifically with Higgins and Neely there is a question an 25 to whether they even knew some of the surrounding events ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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that occurred.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What I am trying to get clear 3
on, though, i,s that your conclusion that a notice of
(
4 violation is appropriate is or is not predicated on the 5
belief that the inspector was not informed of that spike?-
6 MR. STELL0s It is predicated on the belief that s
7 the inspector not anyone in NRC was aware of that 28 psi 8
spike.
That to m6 is the important informa tion.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Insof ar as that alenent is 10 concerned, and there are other itens ---
11 MR. STELL0s There sre a variety of others if he 12 puts the next slide up.
13 MR. MOSET EYs There is not an inconsistency if he i
14 is saying it is a real pressure spike.
We concluded that 15 the inspectors were not aware it wat s real pressure spike.
16 There is not ar. inconsistency there.
17 OHAIRMAN AHEABNE:
The Met. Ed. quy sees a spike 18 and concludes -- and I am not sure if this is a proper 19 scenario -- and concludes that it is not a real spike.
He 20 turns to the SRC inspector and says "Look there, hera is a 21 f alse spike. "
The NRC inspector now is told tha t it is a 22 f alse spike.
Therefore it is not reported to his as a real 23 spike.
How can you cite the guy who told it to him for not 24 reportino a real spike when he thought it was a false spike?
25 MR. STELLO:
If we concluded that the inspector ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) $54 2346
3
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I physically looked at the chart and saw the 28 psi, if we had 2
reached that conclusion, and I am persuaded that that was 3
the issue, I would have a much more difficult time arguing 4
about it.
5 That is a very.significant piece of information.
6 If my memory serves me correctly, and maybe somebody can 7
help me, I think it was late Friday morning about 8'o' clock 8
when he did finally learn of the 28 psi spike; is that-9 correct?
10 ER. ALLISON:
That is generally correct, about 7 11 or 8 in the morning.
12 MR. STELLO:
It is with that under'scanding in 13 mind, and they knew c3out this earlier.
I think that was
(-
_ -[
14 important information.-
j 15 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:. I. Em just t&ying to see if ther 18 is an inconsistency.
Where k'seem to be coming o'et is the.t-s 17 Norm is saying, at least I am intercreting what he is saying s
\\
18 is that probably VRC people did know tbat there had been e
-r..
19 some kind of event and the significa-
'of the event,-the 20 reslity of it as 1 pressure spike you are saying is not 21 obvious.
w.
22 MR. M3SELEY:
That is right.
23 MR. STELLO:
That is the basis for the cita tion.
24 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, I guess the baric 25 citation has to be independing of whether or not it was real.-
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' COMMISSIONER HENDRIEs It can't be.
You mean the
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licenste is responsible to report everything in the goddamn c
3 ' control room?
7, 4,
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE Norm had come out and said that S
no inspector knew about it.
I am having a little trouble
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6dedwing that gap link where Norm says that probably s
7 indp9ctors know something had happened and Vic is citing the t
tha t it wasn't reported to us.
But if the inspector 8
fact
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kney that it was real then it was all right.
It is t
to unlogica,1.
11 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It does seem to be s..
12
.d is co nn e cte d.
How do you axplain that?
13 (laughter.)
-14 MB. STELL0s' If a 28 psi, at the time that that s
15 was known to be real, whenever tha t was they should have to reported it to us.
17 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
When it was known te be 18 real.
19 hR. STELLO:
Is there any disagreement on that?
20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
No, I guess not.
When do
+
21 you think it was known to be real?
-s 22 MR. STELLO:
Sometime Thursday eveninc.
I think 23 we have facts that say it was sometime Thursday evening.
1 24 COMMISSIONER HENDRIEs So the citation is not for-
. 25 ths trJf tilure to report on Wednesday in the early afternoon l i, s ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
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1 but rather for their failure to report Thursday afternoon or
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2 evening?
3 MR. STELLO:
Well, I don't know when it was that a L jf 4
they knew it earliest, and I don't know that we can 5
satablish it.
There were two people in the control room who
,n e 6
indicated they believed it to be real.
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Isn't one of them the same one 8
who indicated that he told an NRC inspector?
9 MR. STELL0s Yes.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
ho, both of them I think.
11 Didn't Mehler and Chwastyk both say that they told NRC 1-12 inspectors?
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs How can the belief that a 14 reading is not real be an excuse for not reporting it if it 15 is of signifiasnee?
16 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE See, what he is saying is that 17 if they believed it not real and reported to the inspectors 18 that it var not real then that ~ doesn't count as reporting.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Let ne just put the 20 inspectors aside here for the moment.
21 COMMIS!iIONER HENDRIEs Vic, I propose to you that 22 this afternoon there will be an earthquake-under the '4 hit e 23 House which will result in the demolition of the structure.
24 Right?
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Fight.
m
'T ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIAGINIA AVE, S.W WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) f 54-2345 1
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(Laughter.)
2 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I have now told you this.
i.
3 I doubt that you think that this is in fact real.
Under 4
your standard, however, you are now required to go and call 5
the White House situation office and say "I don't believe 6
this but I just heard the White House is going to fall in a 7
hole this af ternoon and you ought to do something."
That is 8
not a standard you can apply here.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI That goes to the absurd 10 and doecn't prove the point at all.
11 COMMISSIONER BR ADFORD:
I don't take that to be 12 the actual situation a t all.
I thought there was a question 13 here also as to wnether the people shouldn't have known that 14 it was real given the number of things that hsppened 15 simultaneously, that there wasn't just a spike.
There were.
16 a bunch of things that came on and a bunch of alarms that 17 went off.
I thought the conclusion ran through this that 18 anybody who was twaro of all of those events couldn 't have 19 concluded other than that the spike was real.
20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE4 I don't think that is.where 21 the y are.
It is a point which could be argued and I won't 22 speak to it.
The point that seems to be being made here 23 'is ---
24 COMMISSIONEP ERADFORD:
Yes, I was uneasy with the 25 point that was being made here~.
ALDERSoN REPORT!NO COMPANY. INC.
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
You know, Vic, I don't know 2
that you quite meant what you said, but you said was that it 3
ought to be reported if it could have been significant 4
whether they thought it was real or not.
I am saying no, 5
you can't establish a standard like that.
It is an 6
impossible standard.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
It is another standard 8
that has got to be applied with common sense.
9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIEs The only way you can make a 10 citable proposition about this thing, in my view, is to 11 establish or have good reason to believe tnat the person in 12 charge of the plant at some point came to understand that 13 the spike either was real or he felt there was very good 14 rea son why it was real and that it was significant to the 15 sequence of the accident and that at that point and for a 16 perceptible period thereaf ter he deliberately f ailed to 17 in f o rm the NRC or the state.
18 Now, I can't bring myself to conclude that the guy 19 in charge who apparently wa s Miller on the Wednesday was at 20 thet state of knowledge on Wednesday.
Now, if he got to 21 that state of knowledge, I don't know, at noon on Thursday 22 and they didn 't tell us until Friday, why there are some 23 questions to be asked, but by that time in many ways it was 24 getting to be a moot point with regard to eff ective actions 25 'during the emergency.
But I just can't conclude from ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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anything I have seen in here, the displays, the report and 2
so on, that Miller was at that state of knowledge on
. Wed nesda y.
3 4
COMMISSIONER GILINSKI4 This isn't just a case of 5
Joe Hendrie strolling by and saying the world is goino to 6
end in five minutes.
We are talking about very significant 7
parameters and they are not in isolation.
Now, it isn't a 8
question of whether the guy said dammit, you know, that is 9
100 percent real'because you are never sure, and I don't 10 think he was in a position where he could say it is 100 11 percent not real.
If there was some significant doubt about 12 it then it
'.s just terribly important and it is important 13 enough to report.
(
14 COMMISSICNER HENDRIE:
Ycu can't decide that 15 post-accident, Vic, and go back and penalize people-for 18 things they didn't do on the basis that months later or even 17 days later we could see that it was significant when it may 18 not have been that to him at the time.
You know, you impose 19 a standard which you couldn 't live with and no human being 20 could live with.
21 What you are coming down to is to say, by God, if 22 anything happens in one of these plants we want a culprit 23 and whoever is in charge will get shot.
It has absolutely 24 nothing to do with whether he has any culpability or 25 necligence.
As lona as he is the guy who is marked as At.DERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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52 1
responsible on that day we will shoot him.
2 Now, if you want to propose that as a basis of 3
regulation it at least is clear and people can then decide
(
4 whether they want to become responsible for these plants or 5
not.
But to establish a standard in which we will sit down 6
af ter the event and pick back through a decide things like 7
this as a basis of culpability you just impose an impossible 8
proposition.
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let Vic have a chance, Joe.
10 COMMISSIONER GII.INSKI I don't think it helps to 11 overstate these things.
You know, you are not reflecting-12 what I said.
That is the end of rebuttal.
13 (Laughter.)
14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Joe, please.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Wi? 1 somebody please get 16 their heights and weights.
17 (Laughter.)
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs I suspect that we will have at 19 least an hour more on this.
What is your pleasure?
Do you 20 just want to continue until we are through or do you want to 21 take a break and come back?
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Well, I have gotten into 23 the habit of eating lunch.
24
( La uchter. )
25 CO%MISSIG;iER HEND RIE:
Salf indulgent.-
i ALDERSoN REPORTING CoWPANY. INC.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
We have to finish today so my 2
question is really do you want to break now.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Break for an hour or 4
something.
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE4 You have to leave at 2:30?
6 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE4 I have to leave at 2:55.
7 CHAIRMAN ~AHEARNE:
That would still give us time.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIa Well, we can come back at 9
12:50.
10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Peter?
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFOSD:
I am happy with that.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Vic, does that cause you guys 13 any problem?
(
14 MR. STELLC We are here to serve.
15 CHAIBMAN AHEARNE:
All right, fine.
16 We will take a break until 12:50.
17 (Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m.,
the meeting recessed, 18 to recontene at 12:50 p.m.,
the same day.)
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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54 1
AFTERNCON SESSION 2
(12 55.p.m.)
3 CHAIRMAN AHEABNE:
Well, we are back here again.
4 MR. SIELLO:
Let me, before we discuss any of 5
these items any further, say what it is that I have in terms 6 'of the action on the notice of violation and make sure that 7
that is v,ery clear.
8 Our previous action used up the civil penalty 9
authority we had.
I do not propose obviously to issue any i
10 further fine.
There is no further fine that car be issued.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Why do you say obviously?
12 MR. STELL0s The last action we took aginst Met.
13 Ed. related to the accident we used up the ceiling of-14
$25,000 for a 30-day period.
Any further violations that-15 are noted in that period there is no further civil penalty 16 tha t can be issued.
17 COMMISSIONER CILINSKI:
Well, we can't get the 18 payment but you can certainly issue a penalty.
19 (Slide.)
20 MR. STELLO:
The intent is to issue the notice of 21 v iola tion.
I further intend.to tell the licensee that these 22 are matters for which their r'esponse to this particular 23 notice of violstion has already been forthcoming in another 24 forum and no further response to this violation is required..
25 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
'J h a t forum?
MR. STELLO:
The hearing.
That is an issue ALDERSoN REPORTING CoWANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON O.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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pending before the hearing.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That they didn't pass the 3
information?
' b' 4
MR. STELLO:
The adequacy of their emergency plans 5
and procedures.
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The issue of whether or not 7
they did pass on information that they were supposed to pass 8
on I didn't think was an issue in the hearing.
Is it?
9 MR. BICKWIT:
Not to my knowledge.
to MR. STELLO:
That will become an issue in the 11 report.
We are going to send this report to the board, as 12 you will recall I said earlier.
The issue'is how will they 13 modify their system to assure that this will not occur again.
14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Oh, sure, the modification.
15 MR. STELLO:
That is the corrective action for the 18 notice of violation.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes, but I thought you were 18 saying you weren't expecting them or requiring them to 19 respond 20 MR. STELLO:
With regard to the corrective action 21 that they will take in response to this notice of violation.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
They might object to the 23 violation.
24 MR. STELLO:
I will go on to add that should they 25 choose to do that of course they can.
That is the intent on ALDERSoN REPoHTING COMPANY,INC,
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how we vill come forward with the notice of violation.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now, your proposed notice of 3
violation would be that listed here in the noncomplicance
(~
4 citation?
5 MR. STELL0s No.
The summary of the items thst
~
l
~
6 are in here on the slide that is up there.
Thus far we have 7
talked about the pressure spike and I wanted to see if I 8.
could summarize that issue.
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
10 MR. STELLO:
I was trying to start from events l
11 that we do have some facts on of when we were notified here l
12 in headquarters Friday morning about 9 o' clock.
We do know 13 that up at the site sometime on Thursday evening they had.
(
14 that knowledge.
15 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
They?
16 dR. STELL0s Met. Ed.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But not NRC7 l
l l
18 MR. STELLO:
I will get to that in a minute.
l 19 We do know that there were several individuals, 20 two in particular, who sometime later Wednesday evening 21 indicated that they knew it was real.
22 When exactly the NRC individual up there, or 23 individuals, knew about it, we have not been able to 24 establish the particular nour.
Whether the violation would 25 indicate that it was Thursday or Friday is not very i
ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.20024 (202) 554-2345 l
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important to me.
I think Wednesday is a better day in which 2
to make the argument as to when it should have been done.
3 Earlier discussions went to the point of should 4
they report something they don't know.
I recognize the 5
difficulty of that argument, but there is also the counter 6
to the argument of how long is it reasonable-not to know and 7
analyze and understand something as well.
In the case of 8. Indian Point that was the particular issue as to how long it 9
does take to synthesize and analyze and understand.
So 10 there is at least that connota tion which I also feel is 11 important.
12 I think based on the facts we have that a citation 13 of the type that I-have described for this issue that would l'
14 indicate a failure to report according to 20.403 on 15 Wednesday, in my judgment, is reasonably based.
16 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let me just try to step through 17 several if I can.
I want to try to understand how you deal 18 with each.
First, on 20.403 you are concluding that the 19 pressure spike certainly you would view as coming within a 20 threat to caus9 the exposure of 25 ren, et cetera?
21 ME. STELLO:
Yes.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That is the particular 23 condition?
24 MR. STELL0s Yes.
25 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You are also concluding that ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINLA AVE, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (205) 554-2345
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the failure to report to the director of the regional of fica -
2 is the issue and not to report to headquarters because that 3
is not in there.
1 4
MR. STELLO:
No.
If we could have established ---
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I am about to get to that, but 6
it is not to the headquarters piece.
The specific 7
regulation refers to the regional?
8 MR. STELLO4 That is correct.
9 C H.'
AN AHEARNE:
Your position.is that had they 10 reported to an inspector that that would have been adequa te; 11 is that correct?
12 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE4 So therfore your conclusion ---
14 MR. STELL0s Excuse me.
I would not have proposed 15 a citation.
I don't want to leave th? impression that 18 discussions are the best way to conduct business and I think 17 I would hsve proposed to use the discretion and not cite.
18 MR. BICKWITs That sounds like you would say it 19 was a violstion snyway.
20 MR. STELLO I didn't want to say that.
I didn't 21 intend it to mean that.
1 22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What you are saying is it is 23 poo r practice.
24 MR4 SIELLO:
I wsnt to leave the issue open, 25 depending on the facts ss to what will be done.
In this ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
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59 1-particular case had we concluded that an inspector had the 2
28 ;ound pressure spike information then I would have 3
proposed that we would not have.
Had we been able able to 4
conclude that we would not have gone forward with che 5
citation.
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Therefore it does get back down.
7 to, as far as your decision, putting aside where the report 8
came from, but your decision links inevitably back to 9
whether or not Chwastyk and Mehler did or did not 10 communicate accurately to an NRC ir.spector at the time.
If 11 they did then you would have concluded no violation?
12 MR. STELLO:
That is ccrrect.
13 M R. BICK'4IT I just want to rake clear this 14 point.
Are you saying in that case there would have been no 15 violation or are you saying in that case you would not have 16 gone forward?
17
.i R. STELLO:
I would not have gone forward.
18 MR. SHAPARs I think it is clear that if they 19 had n 't reported to the regional inspector the way the rule 20 requires it would have been a violation and Vic would uce 21 his prosecutorial discretion not to take ac tion on the 22 viola tio n.
But it would be a violation is they reported to 23 anybody other than the regional inspector.
24 F.R.
STELLO:-
I-would n ' t be proposing it here today.
25 CHAIPMAN AHEAPNE:
All right.
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The other side of it, Norm, your group has 2
concluded that probably they did mention something to an NRC 3
inspector but not that it was a real spike?
A 4
3R. MOSELEY:
? don't ore any inconsistency 5
between the position that Vic is taking in terms of being 6
informed.
I don't see any inconsistency at all.
7' CHAIRMAN AHEA3NE:
It is a very fine line.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
John, can I track that a 9
little?
10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What is going to happen-12 hypothetically at least if they contest this?
They will put i
13 witness on a witness stand, presumably our inspector and
(
14 their people.
15 MR. SHAPAR:
Since it is a citation and not other 16 enforcement action 17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
They may not contest it.
18 MR. SHAPAR:
Well,.under the statute they are not 19 entitled to a hearing and under our regulations they are not 20 entitled to a hearing which is not to say that they cannot 21 request a hearing and which is not to say that even though 22 the y are not entitled to it as a matter of law that you all 23 won't crant one.
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
If we fine them even ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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though that fine didn' t have any real effect because they 2
had exceeded the maximum would your conclusion be different?
3 MR. SHAPAR:
If understand your question, if we 4
had authority-to impose an additional fine, which we don't, 5
they could contest that, but we have run out of our
- 'e don't have that by statute.
6 authority to impose a fine.
a 7
MR. RICKWIT:
I think we have the-authority to go 8
forward with a notice of an intent to propose civil 9
penalties and to actually impose through the hearing process 10 a penalty snd then we do not have the'authcrity to collect 11 it.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Before Peter loses the train of 13 his question let him ask his question.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
In a hypo thetical hea ring, 15 if in fact one does happen on this point, what would the NBC 16 inspecto r testif y that he was told?
17 MR. HOSELEY:
He has testified to us that he 18 recalls no such knowledga or discussiCn.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Of any sort?
20 MR. MOSELEY:
About the cressure spike on the day 21 of the accident.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And your basis then for 23 concluding that in f act he was told something but not the well, tell me what it is.
24 richt thing 25 MR. MOSF1EY:
Our conclusion is that it is likely i
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that this occurred, and this is based on the testimony of 2
others thatuit was fairly general knowledge, that-there were 3
actions being taken and the testimony of the two people who k.
4 had been placed there.
In fact they, themselves, or at 5
least one of them placed himself back and forth-in that aren 6
near the time of the spike.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Whicn would be?
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs Neely and Higgins?
9 MR. MOSELEY:
Right.
10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Norm, what you are saying is 11 that given the number of things that happened at that time 12 that they must have been aware of something happening?
13 MR. MOSELEY:
If they were in the vicinity there 14 were alarms, equipment was changing function and the general 15 activity where equipment was in a changed state.
It is just 16 hard to imagine someone being there without knowing 17 something was going on.
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But they both said ---
19 MR. MOSELEY:
They don't recall it.
20 MR. STELLO:
Let me also add that at about the 21 time that this happened there was also a failure, an 22 electrical bust whicn caused an awful lot of activity to 23 take place, too.
In the statement that we have from our 24 inspector he indica tes that there was a general level of 25 activity that was going on and he doesn't recall any ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W. WASHINGTON. O.C. 20024 (202) $54-2345
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specifics relating to it.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I guess that answers my 3
question.
There wouldn't actually be anyone testifying that
-(
4 the NRC inspector was told that the there was a spike but 5
that it wasn't related to a burn or a detonation.
That is 6
your conjecture and there is no one who would actually 7
testify thtt that happened.
8 MR. STELLO:
No, Chwastyk and Mehler would be 9
expected to testify.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Would they testify that 11 they told him that there was a spike but that it night not 12 have been a real spike, or would they say that they told him 13 it was a real spike?
14 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, we are speculating real far 15 here, but based on their previous testimony they both said 18 that they did not realize that the spike was real promptly, 17 but both of them say 18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Now, did Chwactyk-really 19 say that?
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Wait a minute, I thought 21 Chwastyk said more than tha t.
I thought he said that he 22 thought he told Gary Miller before Gary Miller left that 23 there was a spike and that it was a real one-24 MR. MCSELEY:
But by promptly I mean a t the time 25 that the event was ongoing, when the pumps were still ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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running and this kind of thing.
Both of them have stated 2
that the y.didn ' t rea ch that_ conclusion until sometime later.
r 3
COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Gary Miller lef t at what, 4
2 o ' clock and this thing happened at 1:50 or whatever.
So 5
if you believe Chwastyk it would have had_to have been 6
within minutes of the event.
7 MR. MOSELEY:
There is conflicting testimony, 8
Commissioner, and all of it doesn't add up.
9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You have Chwastyk saying to it scared the hall out of me.
It only lasted two heart 11 beats I know because I missed them.
12 MR. MOSELEY:
Yes.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
I guess that I am puzzled 14 that you believe the man when he said he talked with the NRC 15 inspectors but don't believe him when he says he talked with 16 Gary Miller.
17 MR. MOSELEYs We believ'e he has got his days 18 confused on the discussions about hydrogen with Miller.
19 Probably such a discussion may have occurred.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Leaving the hydrogen-21 aside, is it reasonable that operators or senior personnel 22 would have completely discounted all of these sionals the 23 initiation of which they were trained on and the logic of 24 which they were presumably reasonably faniliar with, a t 25 least some of them I think, tha t they would have discounted ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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it in this way?
Is that your feeling?
2 MR. EOSELEY:
I concluded that they shouldn 't have 3
discounted it, but neither should they nave discounted or 4
not taken at least a conclusion from other information 5
received that day.
Clearly they should have known better.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI And that is not just a 7
matter of Monday morning quarterbacking but your judgment 8
about what a reasonable operator should be expected to 9
understand?
10 MR. MOSELEY:
I believe that operators should 11 understand the logic for their safeguard systems, yes.
12 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I think if the operators 3r 13 whoever watched the spike had any reason to believe that it 14 was an instrument m'alfunction or an electrical transient 15 that had triggered the pressure response then he wouldn't be 16 particularly_ bothered beyond that by the fact that he got a 17 series of enunciator alarms, the spray pumps came on and so 18 on because those things would all be triggered by the spike 19 and he would assume then that he knew why that particular 20 sequence of things would happen.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Is that correct?
Would 22 one signal have triggered all of these events?
23 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
If you have got a high 24 containment pressure, why it triggered the sprays and then 25 you would have enunciators showing the spray pumps were ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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running and this was on and that was going.
2 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Well, but you had to get 3
some combination.
4 MR. STELLCs If my. memory serves me right,-at four 5
pounds they go through the safety injection signal which is 6
the ECCS equipment and then at some higher pressure they go 7
through the containment spray af ter reaching -- what?
8 Twenty-eight and a half.
So there are actually two trips 9
that they go through, the one on the ECCS and the one on -the 10 containment.
11 Ihere are arguments by operators that are 12 reasonably stated based on their training and understanding 13 as to whether they could have looked and had questions about 14 whether this was real or not.
15 COMMISSIONER-GILINSKIs You know, it isn't a 16 question of determining yes, it is real.
I mean, there is a 17 terrific amount of uncertainty in these situations as we all 18 a re f amilia r with.
19 MR. STELL0s I think it was Zeve and Ross who made 20 the observation that they don't see how you could get a 21 containment of two million cubic feet and just go up and 4
22 come down.
So phenomenologically, because they hadn't 23 understood hydrogen burn this early in the accident, their 24 previous training is that we have hydrogen problems and it 25 is obviously later.
So that part is not unreasonable.
I I
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But in terms of equipment,.the fail-safe features 2
of equipment, that that somehow could have been accidentally 3
put on by some electrical disturbances, it is harder there t.
4 to make the a rgument that they shouldn't have said, well, 5
the instruments are recor' ding something going on.
6 Now, that gets very, very confused and you can 7
make other arguments.
It would be awful difficult to 8
establish because as I recall at just about the same instant 9
they had an electrical bust failure.
10 So now with all of those things going on at least 11 in defense of the operators I would have to think that there 12 are reasonsble arguments that can be made under those 13 circumnstances.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Well, let 's accept that.
15 Certainly there is a lot of confusion there.
Eut here is 16 something that is so serious potentially if real that I find 17 it hard to understand that someone didn't say well, let's 18 track that down and somebody find out if that was real, and 19 somebody find out whether the 2500 degrees is real.
20 Now, they did send people down and they came back, 21 You know, yes, we are measuring all these high temperatures 22 and then that gets discounted.
Nobody sa ys, you know, we 23 have got to get to the bottom of that one even if you think 24 there is a 30 percent chance that it is real or a 20 percent 25 chance that it is real.
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MR. SIELLO4 Those are the reasons that I have 2
that I identify as the value in coming f orward with this 3
notice in terms of the und.'rstanding of the message that f(
4 others would get from taking this action, that there is that 5
kind of understanding.
6 Let me say with respect to that understanding that 7
one of the actions that we want to take which relates to 8
this very issue is the need to try to develop some document, 9
circula r, I don ' t know what its right name is, that we could 10 send to all of the operating plants and possibly copies to 11 the AEE's, to the nuclear steam suppliers and to perhaps 12 even our own staff that makes them understand that kind of 13 thinking that they need to be acquainted with.
14 So that the value of both the notice of violation 15 and my proposal to develop some sort of a document based on 18 this investigation to pass out is really with those kind of 17 concerns in mind.
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But there is an inconsistency, 19 Vic, I think in your position in that I don 't see how you 20 can hold to the position that had they told an inspector 21 that that would have sufficed.
22 MR. STELLO:
I would not be able to sit here and 23 tell you that if they had passed on that information that in 24 licht of everything else that was going on at the plant that 25 I could feel a sense of fairness and that I could do it in ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
69 1
good conscious and propose that we do that.
I couldn't.
If 2
I believed they did and I reached that conclusion, in 3
fairness I could not be here before you arguing to go with
(
4 the notice of violation.
C COMMISSIONER GILINSKI It seems to me there is a 6
big difference between a situation where, say, the head man, 7
I guess Gary Miller, would say to one of his people,
- look, 8
dammit, get to one of the NRC inspectors and tell him about 9
this event.
They have got to know that.
They guy goes down 10 there and grabs him by his lapels and says, look, we just 11 had a 28 psi spike and we don't know whether it is real.
If 12 it is it is a problem.
And he had. told him and that is 13 description "A" in case "A".
14 But it is another thing if two cuys passing each 15 other in the confusion of the control room and somebody said 16 something to an NRC inspector.
Let's sssume tha t that is 17 the case in fact.
I just would not regard that as informing 18 the NRC any more than in some other circumstance if there is 19 a problem and some guy happened to meet an NRC inspector 20 soci;11y and casually said something about it.
I mean, that 21 is not informing the NRC.
22 MR. STELLO:
I recognize that argument.
If that 23 were the case and he had casually mentioned it to him and he 24 said they did I might want to do something different but I 25 would not be proposing a notice of $1olation.
I wouldn't ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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say I would do nothing, but I. couldn 't sit in a sense of 2
fairness with the atmosphere and the activity that was going 3
on and say this is what I would say is the right thing to do.
(
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI Well, I am not so much 5
criticizing your viewpoint.
It is cnly what I think.
~
'6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE4 len, could I now get back to 7
the points that you were addressing.
As I understand it, 8
the issue was we all agree that there is no actual money
-9 that we can now expect further to get back from Met. Ed.
10 There is'a question that we could put on a civil penalty 11 which would be, say, for so many thousands of dollars and 12 then it would go on to say however, the $25,000 limit has 13 been reached.
.r 14 Then comes the question of whether or not. a 15 hearing is triggered by that and you and Ho ward reem to 16 disagree on that.
17 MR. SHAPARs Yes.
18 MR. BICKWIT:
I think the way Howard phrased his 19 position is correct, but what I think you can do is that you 20 can put out a notice of violation and specify the amount you 21 would have imposed but for the statutcry limitation you 22 cannot impose it as I had said.
That is incorrect.
Eut you, 23 can in fact indicate, as we have done in the previous 24 actions, that you would have imposed a greater amount than t
25 zero if you were entitled ~to do that.
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Now,'the question of whether you are entitled to a 2
hearing on it I think is complicated.
I think if you are 3
going to use that cita tion or you are going to use the fact 4
that you-would have imposed a civil penalty or you could 5
have in any future enforcement action, then I think there is 6
probably a constitutional right to'something in the way of a 7
hearing-either at the administrative level or at the court 8
level..
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You are saying then., for 10 example, this citstion is then used as evidence of poor 11 management from fet. Ed. in a finding of. management 12 incompetence ----
13 MR. BICKWIT:
Or in a future enforcement action.
(
14 -
COMMISSIONER GILINSKI But it would then have 15 been the subject of a hearing, wouldn't it?
16 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I am debating whether they 17 have a right to it, to have the hearing.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
But if in fact this 19 becomes an element in the ongoing hearing it then would have 20 been ---
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs Except if the element was they 22 had been found suilty of thic violation.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI As opposed to actually 2
24 discussion whether or not they should have been found guilty?
25 CHAI2 MAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
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1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORDs You would probably have to i
1 2
get it in the record somehow.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, I think.Vic is going to g
(
4 send this whole thing to the board.
That was really not a 5
question.
6 MR. SHAPAR:
May I respond to that?
l
/
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE Yes.
8 MR. SHAPAR:
I think the difference, if one l
9 existed, has been narrowed.
We certainly can write a letter 10 saying had we authority to impose a fine that we would have l
11 imposed a fine.
At that point I don't think he is entitled l
12 to a hea ring.
You are saying what you might have done had 13 you had the authority to do it but you don ' t have the 14 authority to do it so you haven't done it.
15 (Laughter.)
l 16 MR. BICKWIT:
But do you agree it can go in the 17 notice of violation?
f 18 MR. SHAPAR:
Vic is proposing a notice of 19 violation.
20 MR. BICKWIT:
But can the figure that you would 21 have imposed be put in the. notice of violation?
22
'R.
SHAPAR:
Oh,'sure.
There is nothing sacred 23 shout a notice of violation.
The statement, whatever it 24 says, speaks for itself, and all it says is had you lecal 25 authority to impose a fine you damn well would have done it.
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MR. BICKWITs Okay.
Well, there is no difference
'2 on that score.
3 MR. SHAPAR So you could put it in the notice of 7
\\..
4 violation.
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I can see now Vic's notice of 6
violation.
I would have fined you $10 million had I been ---
7 (Laugher.)
8 MR. BICKWITs our previous notice of violation had 9
referred to all kinds of penalties we'have the authority to 10 impose.
11 MR. SHAPAR:
Well, the question remains is he 12 entitled to a hearing if you do that and my answer is no.
13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, let us get back then to 14 the other issue.
15 Your point is and you conclude that there is 16 sufficient information as far as you are concerned that ther 17 should have reported to us and they didn't and that is.the 18 violation.
What they should have reported to us in this 19 case under 20.403 is the pressure spike'l 20 MR. SIELLCs That is the only one.
That is the 21 only one in my view that fits that req uirem en t.
The other 22 issues evolve from the requirements tha t start with the 23 technical specifications.
24 COMMISSIONEB HENDRIE:
John, you never let me get 25 my question in and bef o re we go away from this I would like 4
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