ML20037D401
| ML20037D401 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1981 |
| From: | Blum S, Blums S, Jeffrey Riley BLUM, S., CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, RILEY, J.L. |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8107100193 | |
| Download: ML20037D401 (62) | |
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NUCLEAR REGU14 TORY COLS11SSION x
u BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BtIARD In the thtter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 50-369-OL
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50-370-OL (William B. McGuire Nuclear
)
Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
CESG'S BRIEF--APPEAL OF INITIAL AND i
SUPPLEMEiTAL INITIAL DECISIONS CESG took exceptions to the Initial Decision (ID) and Supplemental Initial Decision (SID) in the instant ratter Jun e 8, 1981.
It herewith files its brief in support of the exceptions.
The brief is in three parts, General, Procedural, and Substantive.
GENERAL 1.
CESG appeals the ID and SID because it perceives that neither of these decisions reflects an impartial reading of l
an equitably developed record but is, instead, the product of a process, the object of which is the fostering of a nuclear generation industry by the issuance of licenses once the criteria of NRC staff have been met.
An ASLB is given control of the course of a hearing, 2.
substantial l
A consequence is a degree of control over the outcome of the hearing.
By the rejection of witnesses, the denial of subpoenas for witnesses, the selective exclusion of proferred exhibits, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board l
l (ASLB) materially interfered with and bampered CESG's opportunity to make its contribution to the record.
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PDR ADOCK 05000369 O
-2 3.
The SID is an exercise in making a license authorization appear credible to one unacq.uainted with the full record and with intervenor's proposed findings of fact.
The primary, implicit consideration of the ASLB appears to have been the implementation of the current NRC policy of the expedited issuance of operating licenses. This is consist ent with the NRC's concern that "the cost of.
. delay could reach billions of ds11ars."
(Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, p. 2, May 20, 1981) 4.
No intervenor has succeeded in having an operating license application denied.
The several construction permit applications that have failed were withdrawn, not denied by the NRC.
Yet there have been serious accidents.
The licent ing process clearly cannot be relied on to provide a safe plant.
5.
The Fermi-1 license was vigorously contested.
The license issued.
An accident involving partial meltdown occurred early in the operation of this newly licensed
" commercial reactor".
The NRC I and E ;eocess did not detect the operational absurdity of leak detection in the vicinity of combustible polyurethane foam at Browns Ferry.
The result was a Srave accident which, but for the ingenuity of an operator in devising an unspecified procedure, would have resulted in an exposed core and possibly meltdown.
The public will be a long time paying the hundred million dollar cost to re. pair the gutted electrical system of the plant.
The accident at Three Mile Island unit 2 is the best known
. and most extensively documented case of the failure of the e
NRC's regulatory process to work.
The Appeal Board is urged to refer to the two articles by Daniel Ford in the New Yorker
- magazine, Repeated valid indications of technical faults were ignored at the management level.
6.
Although the NHC has appeared to make a fetish of learning lessons.from the TMI experience it has shown no indication of having learned the major lesson.
Given the enormous amount af radioactivity generated by fission, and the geologically long periods of time for some of the radio-nuclides to decay to harmless levels; Siven a process which requires of some itess of equipment completely reliable performance and freedom from failure; given a dependence on the making of correct jud6aents and the correct execution of a variety of actions of a great number of ordinary humnn beings ranging from pipe fitters to corporate presidents and NRC commissioners: the regulatory process is doomed to be inadequat e for the near term and far term preservation of public health and safety.
7.
The instant ID and SID have the potential for irreparable harm to the public by reason of the immediate effectiveness rule.
It is reasonable and proper for the actions of an agency staff to be reviewed by authority within the a6ency.
However in matters of cardinal importance a competent review by an authority outside the a8ency is necessary.
The immediate effectiveness rule of the NRC authorizes licensing action before review' ta a federal court.
If the action has L.
l
~4-I the potential for harm, the harm can be done before a stay can be ordered by higher authority.
A complicating problem' in the reluctance' of the D.C. Circuit to deal with substan-tive matters outside the arm of legal expertise.
More often than not these matters are returned to the 120 for reconsider-ation.
A science court of competent, disinterested persons would be a valuable adjunct to the Circuit.
8.
The mindset within the NRC is an almost insuperable' obstacle to unbiased decisions.
CESG's psychologist witnesses speak to this point.
The structure of the IEC is hierarchical.
Lower level members in the or6anization accept the values of higher level members; they act in accord with policy (Tr. 3840-3).
In a group situation individual jud ments tend to a higher level 8
of risk takin6 than the individual, by himself, would take (Tr. 3837-40).
Once committed to a course an individual takes note of items that support that course,16nores or under-weights items that cb not (Tr. 3854-5).
An or6anization involved in a risky venture develops a coherence of views.
The Fentagon is apparently confortable in a process which would make nuclear warfare a viable military option.
The coherence of views v.ithin nuclear industry and the IEC re6ardin6 both the near term and the long term risks of nuclear Seneration is another case in point.
Psychologists recognize this form of behavior und term it 6roup think (Tr. 3856-8).
They also recognize means, not visible in the present matter, for counteractin6 Group think, cognitive dissonance and risky shif t (Tr. 3843, 3858-9).
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. 9.
Group think and risky shirt in the HRC are clearly pres ent.
In the face of three unexpected, costly and dangerous o
accidents in 400 reactor operating years, NRC dogma still asserts the probability of a serious accident as one in 20,000 years.
After the humbling experience of TMI-2, the agency requires supplemental EIS's for very serious accidents, af ter June, 1960.. McGuire, a thin shell containment near a population center is grand-fathered.
Although CESG pointed out these two special circumstances in its argunent to accept Contention 5, calling for such an EIS supplement, the ASLB denied the request.
The Staff, in this proceedin6, accepted the Applicant's theory that TMI-2 was the only credible accident.
Credibilty has to do with believeability.
Is the event possible?
The greatest number of postulated accidents involve pipe breaks.
File breaks are not unusual.
Indeed a large pipe break occurred at Indian Point.
It was on the secondary side.
Had it been on the primary side it would have icn regarded as a major accident.
The Staff concern with the st.ntu
'l integrity of the primary side, the requirement of an ECC3 a. e all prima facie testimony to the credibility of pipe treaks on the primary side.
10.
Group think and risky shift ure evident in regard to the waste problem.
Although it is recognized that geologicul, G aciation chanSce will occur during the period l
seismic, and radioactive waste remnins significantly active, and althou6h there is no demonstrated capucity to accurately predict such changes, and altho' ugh clearly no one is in a position to impose j
monitoring responsibflities on governments and peuples of the l
. future, nevertheless it is 120 policy to 6enerate ever increas-ing amounts of waste by continuing to 1. cense plants for construction and operation.
11.
The Applicant made it clear to the ASLB that it wished to obtain its operating license in time for summer peak, alleging that it was necessary to shut down Oconee-1, an 671 L.Tl nuclear station, for a fifteen week period for refuelin6 and maintenance in July.
The ASLB v.as responsive to the Applicant's plea.
In accordance with the Applicant's proposal.
the ASLB decided to not hear admitted contentions 3 and 4, both concerned with the consequences of containment breach based on a determination made during the course of the hearing that the Applicant was not likely to repeat the sequence of events resulting in core exposure at TLE-2.
The ASLB left CESG danglin6 in resard to its determination.
CESG's counsel raised the catter in the closing hours of what proved to be the final day (Tr. 5233).
Applicant's counsel, having announced that he was prepared to make a closing arcunent (Tr. 5230), proceeded to do so with the concurrence of the ASLB (Tr. 5233).
Staff was not ready with concluding remarks and did not think "it is appropriate to conclude" (Tr. 5242).
The Chairman's inquiry as to whether C.ESG was ready to proceed on Contentions 3 and 4 gave no intimation that the ASLB was not disposed to hear these contentions (Tr.
5247).
In the course of what CESG's counsel was permitted to believe were " intermediate remarks" in response to Applicant (Tr. 5248) the Cha'irman interjected thnt contentions 3 and 4 "were acceptable in this proceedin6 contingent upon other
.. matters being met which the Commission set' for us" (Tr. 5249).
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This was the first clear indication to CESG that Applicgnt's theo.'y had been accepted by the ASLB.
The hearing closed (Tr. 5257) without an explicit ruling in the matter, or any further reference to it.
It was a de facto decision with no opportunity provided for reply.
12.
Although the hearing was reopened to deal with the hydrogen question, research in the matter is far from complete.
There i
are serious differences in some of the findings.
Four research reports were provided the ASLB and the parties during the hearins, all without evaluative comment from the Staff as to significance, despite the rules in this regard (Tr. SG48).
These were the Sundia report, and covering letters, CESG Exh.
40 and 40A; the Strehlow report and coverinc nemorandum, Staff Exh. F; the Brookhaten report and accorandum, CESG Exh. 59; and an ExDA report, Staff Ezh. M.
Of these the Strehlow report was not offered into evidence by the Staff and the Brookhaven and RiDA reports were not admitted for the truth of the natter O
(SID Exhibits, footnote).
The last minute appearance of these documents, which relate igniter performance, hydrogen detonation, and alternative means of dealing with hydro 6en generation to accident scenarios, made impossible further discovery or the securing of witnesses by CESG.
CESG's efforts to subpoena witnesses who could validate these documents were opposed by i
the other parties and denied by the ASLB (Tr. 4674-5012).
Staff's counsel was concerned with closing the record; research, however unresolved the matter, is ongoing (Tr. 5012-3).
~8-13.
The ASLB rejected CESG's technical witness on the grounds of lacl:ing qualification.
This witness has been active as a
a witness for and representative of CESG since the construction permit stage.
The voir dire by Applicant showed that he was not a structural engineer.
Witnesd. prefiled testimony (Tr.
at 3780) and supplemental direct testimony (Tr. 3767-3875) et no point have him expressing opinion as a structural engineer--unless it be that he testified on the basis that i
af ter a containment pressure exceeds the failure pressure that it no longer can be relied on to contain its gaseous content.
Even if his testimony relating to containment capability were excluded there is no basis for excluding his testimon, on chemical and physical matters, as the ASLB did.
By excluding the testimony of CESG's witness and denyin6 subpoenas which could have resulted in the validation of NRC contract reports raising doubts about the efficacy of the hydrogen igniter system and considerin6 scenarios more hazardous than S2D, Applicant's approximation to the TMI-2 event, the ASLB assured a record which, on balance, would provide more testimony su1 porting license authorization than not.
The destruction of CESG's proferred contribution to the record was completed by the refusal to receive as exhihits 18 CESG exhibits, seven of which were from NRC contracted research, six from NSAC studies of the TM1-2 accident, anu five of which l
l were NRC letters.
l l
14.
In the SID conclusion that operation of the plant would l
l pose no undue risk to public health and safety the ASLB ignored
. Che Staff conception of risk which is embodied in the supple-
' mental environmental statement for the Virgil C. Summer plant (NUREG-534, discussion of risk).
Risk involves accident probabilf ty and consequences.
An accident not credible is un accident not possible.
An accident not possible has a zero probability of occurrence.
An accident that is possible has a finite probability of occurrence, however small.
When consequence becomes involved, a major consequence requires the probability of occurrence to be correspondingly small.
The possibility for McGuire plant operators, sometime during the 40 year term of the license, to fail to follow correct procedure in the case of a stuck PORY exists.
The probability may not be known to us, but it is finite, nonzero.
There are other accid-ents that are credible, possible.
Pipes and valves can break or serioustr leak.
Over-pressure events can occur.
The credibility of such events, indeed the actual ccourrence of necessary preconditions is attested to in the ATWS paper (WASH-
'270).
Over-pressure substantially increases the probability l
of reactor coolant system boundary failure.
There are many points in the coolant system which can be the site of a flaw or of damage or metal fatigue.
These all contribute to the t
increased probability of failure.
A seismic event by addition-ally stressing a weak spot contributes further to the probabil-ity of failure.
A proper consideration of accident sequences is recogni, tion that the ECCS may fail, at least in part, to operate.
Earlier use may have reduced accumulutor content.
An
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onsite power failure *will deprive the plant of coolant pump,
. air return fan, and containment spray operation.
The proper combining of these probabilities, some as sums, some as products, is necessary to obtain a reasonuble and justifiable essessment of the overall probability of hydrogen release.
Reliable probabilities are actuurially, empirically determined.
The probabilities of CESG Exh. 61, Table 9-1, Dominant accident Sequences--Sequoyah Plant, are estimated.
They are also non-zero.
It is obvious that a large release from a' McGuire containment coul-1, depending on wind direction, do substantial harm to people in Charlotte.
There is the poten-tial for a PWR-1 release making a large area unfit, dangerous for occupation.
Such a risk, the product of a mjor consequence and a non-zero prc.bility does not support the conclusion that substantial quantities of hydrogen will not be generated and that the McGuire facility can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety.
One TMI-2 accident in 400 reactor operating years reduces to farcicality the probabilities estimated in the Reactor Safety Study (Wash-1400) and in Table 9-1.
There is no demonstration, just continued wishful thinking, that the results of " Lessons Learned" will have any effect in the real world.
Undue.
What on earth in quantifiable terms is " undue"?
Just how many deaths would qualify as not "undu e"?
Just how much property da m ge and loss?
If the NRC is going to play a numbers game as it has done in its first supplemental environmental stat ement in regard to the consequences of serious accidents then it must, in consistency and fairness permit a hearing as to the consequences of containment breach
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _d
. at McGuire.
This requires hearing Contentions 3, 4, 5 and 6.
15.
After disqualifyin6 the technical witness proferred by CESG and excluding all testimony by this witness from the record the ASLB chairman indicated that CESG still had the opportunity to make its case, based on the record and reasonin6 in its proposed findings of fact.
This CESG did.
In the ID the ASLB formally rebutted the findin6s proposed by CESG.
In the SID there was neither rebuttal of CE6G's proposed findings nor a recognition that they existed.
The findings proposed show,
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based on exhibits received into the record, primarily Applicant's 5A and 5B, that for the SED scenario taken as Applicant's base case, that there will be regions of the ice condenser from which hydrogen, unmixed with air, will issue.
In the absence of air this hydrogen will not ignite.
Due to its low density it will rise to the top of the containment.
After a sufficient time for diffusive mixing with air this mas will become com-bustible and will be ignited by the dome igniters (CESG Findings of Fact, 36-40 ).
The only supportable conclusion is that,
during the course of a hydrogen release accident the hydrogen in the several regions of the containment will not be uniformly mixed wi ta air and will not combust in the manner testified to by Applicant and assented to by Staff.
This is not a unique view on the part of CESG.
It is advanced by Batelle in HUREG/
C".-1219, CESG's disallowed Exh. 44. It is advanced in the Sandia National Inboratories report on an analysis of hydrogen mitigation for Sequoyah degraded core accidents (CESG Erh. 40A).
The supervisor of this study, Dr. Marshall Berman, was a Staff
. witness (Tr. 4020, 4023-43, 4046, 4082-4111, 4120-26, 4128-59, 4164-5, 4198-4261, 4264-65, 4270-4317).
Of the witnesses introduced, Berman was best qualified.
His research group of five members had been working on the problem of hydrogen releaseo in an ice condenser containment for a year and a ha lf.
Various mitigation schemes had been evaluated, including 16 niters.
Berman. repeatedly testified chat there was danger in reliance on the 1 niter system, not only of combustion 6
but also of detonation (Tr. 4094-4101, 4102, 4125).
It is his
~
testimony that the risk of igniters exceeds the benefit (Tr.
4103).
Sandia and Imc staff are not in agreement (Tr. 4084 ).
Much research is yet to be done (Tr. 4159).
In fa ct the final rule, the present rule is an interim rule, may be as far off us 1985 (Tr. 4052).
The ASLB dismisses Berman's concerns with an ar6ument that does not recognize that hi h concentrations S
of hydrogen are not combustible and can occur (SID pp. 26-7).
Although the ASLB concludes there is no danger of detonation, a meeting with Dr. John Lee, an expert on detonation the day af ter the hearing, but not the record, closed, imC.=taff concluded that detonation in an ice condenser containment was a possibility and should be made the subject of further research to be undertaken by AG, Duke, and TVa.
Staff did not copy the summary of this meeting to the Board and the parties until it was too late to affect the SID.
Staf f and ASLB down-played the most extensive, competent and impartial study of the matter of hydrogen combustion to arrive at an apparent basis for a finding that McGuire bay be licensed to operate.
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_13 16.
On June 24, 1981, the Commissioners requested a response
'by the parties to two questions.
One concerned the triggering signal for the igniter system in a LOCA.
CESG's techn16al witness, after responding to the questions, was permitted to discuss another, related matter, the indication for turning the 1Eniter system off.
He commented that the CLASIX computer code, on which Applicant's defence against dangerous concentra-tions of hydrogen is based, assumesuniform hydrogen / air ratios in the several parts of the containment and that this is unreal-istic.
He further observed that at the high rates of steam and hydrogen release predicted by the MARCH code for the S2D event that the flow of the air return fans would be dwarfed and the result would be the issuance of subst antially pure hydro 6en from large portions of the ice condenser.
Hoger lhtson, Director of Reactor Safety, concurred in the observations as to the inad-equacy of available computer codes and recognized that the observations as to how pure hydrogen would be produced and make its way to the dome contributed an additional nuance to his understanding of the problem.
These matters would be the subject or NRC research during the remainder of 1981 (Transcript of Commission Meeting, June 24, 1981, 2:00-3:30 FM).
Dr. Matson's response to CESG's technical witness does not accord with the ASIB's rejection of this witness.
17.
The Commissioners decided June 29, 1981, to permit auth-orization of the McGuire license.
This CESG believes, is due I
l to the predisposition mentioned foregoing, Staff input to the Commission, lack of a detailed familiarity with the record,
particularly the Berman testimony, and a failure to think
-through the matter of hydrogen non-combustion due to an L
insufficiency of oxygen.
The last line of defense of t he public is this Appeal Board who, it is fervently hoped, will consider the problems in depth and not issue a decision until each member has arrived at his position by his own processes, electing the difficult course of thinking the matters through rather than choosing a witness to rely on.
The consequences of proceeding with authorization are grave.
Although an ice condenser containment w111 withst and more than 15 psig internal pressure, the range of hydrogen deflagration pressures goes to a high of about 190 psig (CESG EIh. 46).
In a detonation mode the pressure can reach twice this value (CESG Exh. 40A,
- p. 31).
There has been no proof that LOCA's other than the TMI-2 stuck PORV cannot occur at McGuire.
There is no experience based probability number for the range of core exposure accidents to which McGuire may be subject.
The CIAS11 computer code on which igniter performance in the S2D scenario is based is inadequate in that it assumes uniforn concentrations of hydrogen in the lower containment and ice ccndenser.
The evolution of essentially pure, non-combustible hydrogen from the ice conden-ser and the accumulation of this hydrogen in the done has been 1 nored.
The transformation of a mass of essentially pure 6
hydrogen in the containment done to a detonable mixture by slow inter-diffusion with air has not been comprehended.
The ignition of such a detonable mass by the dome ignitrrs has' not been cog-nized.
The results of the major research project to date, Sandia,
. - have been disregarded.
No account has been taken of the present.
incomplete status. of active research.
The Staff decisian after the March 20,1981 meeting with Dr. John Lee that in-containment detonation is a credible event and that, as a consequence, Applicant and licensees are to support further research did not enter the record.
No findin6 has been made as to the consequences of very severe accidents, those involvin6 contain-meat breach.
No basis has been provided for assessin6 risk, which involves both accident probability and accident consequences.
No evacuation plan has been required for Charlotte, the nearest population center.
Instead the ASLB has relied on applicant's operator training pro 6 ram and the addition of some instrumentation to prevent a replay of Tul-2.
It has given no consideration to other hydro 603 Senerating accidents, despite admitting Contention 1 which refers to LOCA's in a Seneric sense.
Applicant has failed to satiefactorily respond to CESG's Contentions 1 and 2; essential Contentions 3, 4, 5 and 6 were either admitted and not heard or denied.
The ID and SID s.'.ould be reversed.
e 4
e 4
. Procedural Issues A.
'ntroduction This was the fi.rst contested hearing concerning the operating license of an ice condenser plant.
It was not, however, the first ice condenser nuclear power plant licensed.
As a consequence of conditions attached to the Sequoyah licensing, a program of study of hydrogen consequences and mitigation was undertaken by the ice condenser owners and by the nuclear power consultants' network (e.g. Sandia, Brookhaven and Livemore Laboratories).
See, Separate i
Views of Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford, Full Power License for McGuire One, Order re Immediate Effectiveness, June 29, 1981, page 9.,
hereinafter, Separate Views.
During the pr maration for the hearings in this matter (and after:
- see, e.g. notice of meeting dated April 7, 1931, meeting with Dr. J. Lee re H2 Combustion) there was an outpouring of scientific information from the NRC consultants to add to hydrogen information and other relevant material from investigation of Three Mile Island (TMI-2).
At issue in the procedural problems raised by Intervenor is how an Atomic
/ is
. Safety and Licensing Board to treat new information; what predicate must be laid to allow its introduction; who can utilize the inform-ation; what burden of proof is on Intervenor, post-TML re credibility of accidents; and, generally, how is the notorious TMI-2 event to make a difference in hearing, licensing and operation of nuclear power plants.
If there is to be no difference; indeed, if the burden on Intervenor is to grow, as has happened in this Board's decision, and seems to be happening in changes in MRC rules, then it would be candid and poH.t.ically fruitful at this time, for the NRC to announce the new style.' If deference is to be made to'TMI 2, it is necessary to start by correcting the sort of errors that appear
in this case.
B.
Evidentiary Contentions:
Exhibits.
1 2.
The ASLB erred in neglecting the affidavit of J. L. Riley' referred to as Exhibit 63 and in its decision that the affidavit was not responsive to the Staff's affidavit concerning the pyrol-ysis of polyurethane foam and other matters before the Board.
See findings 6 and 54 (Tr. 5252) 3 The ASLB erred in rejecting exhibits offered by CESG as evidence for all purposes including Exhibits 42-56, 58, 59, 62 and Staff M.
Note that CESG's Exhibit 59 and Staff's Exhibit M were not admitted for the truth of the matter contained therein.
(Tr. 4654, 4663) l 5.
The ASLB erred in refusing to 6 rant subpoenas for wi tnesses to substantiate and allow the introduction of documents as followws:
Staff Exhibit M, H. W. Hubbard, R. P. Hammond, or S. M. Zivi; CESG Exhibit 59, W. T. Pratt; CESG Exhibit 62, John Doe, an URC staff person.
(Tr. 4879-82, h984-5021) 11.
The ASLB erred in not keeping the record open to determine why the igniter system failed in tests at Livermore.
(Tr. 5227-8; R. L. Tedesco, Memorandum for the ASLB, May 19, 1981, 3 enclosures) i 12 The ASLB erred in not keeping the record open until studies on in-containment detonation had been made.
(Tr.
5229; R. A. Birkel, Summary of Meeting Held on March 20, 1981 enclosing Memorandum, W. Butler to L. Rubenstein, April cl, 1981, Meeting with Dr. J. Lee Re: H Combustion) 2 13 The ASLB erred in not considering CESG Exhibits 61 and 62 as evidence in regard to accident credibility.
(Tr. 1;879-82) i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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'iUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!"IISSION 1I OJ
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g\\.Mgg In the matter of
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Docket Mos. 50 G 9 b
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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AFFIR!!ATION OF SERVIC. -
(William B. McGuire Nuclear Station)
)
)
Of CAROLlilA ENVIRON'! ENTAL
)
STUDY GROUP.
I hereby affirm that copics of:
Brief in support of Appeal were served as follows:
A.
On the following persons at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by nailing sufficient copics to Mr. Samuel Chilk, Secretary, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20535, and hereby requesting him to distribute them to:
p __7, o )'/
s 1. i.
Mr. Joseph HenrdrieChairman 8?'
Q y4(0*! /^ O, Mr. Victor Gilinsky, Comnissioner
/
% Mr. Peter Bradford, Commissioner 2D Y
Mr. John F. Ahearne, Commissioner y JO'r h '7 2
Mr. Samuel Chilh, Secretary 0gg/Ac Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
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1%q,f% g
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Mr. Alan S. Rosenthal, Chmn. ASLAB Dr. John H.
Buck, ASLAB g'
Ms. Christine N.
Kohl, ASLAB G
Mr. Chase R Stephens, Docheting and Service Section N
IN Edward G. Ketchen, Esq., Counsel for NRC Staff B.
By mailing copies to the following persons, via U.S. Mails, postage prepaid:
Dr. John M.
Barry Uilliam L.
Porter, Esc.
Mecklenburg County Dept. of Health Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Duke Power Co.
1200 Blythe Blvd.
P.O.
Box 33139 Charlotte NC 28203 Charlotte, N.C.
23242 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Debevoise and Liberman 1200 17th St. N.W.
Nashington DC 20036
]g/
p 77 p Diane B. Cohn, Esq.
/
Public Citizen Litigation Group Suite 700
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//E 2000 P.
St.
M.U.
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W4N Washington DC 2003f)
Shelley Blu, Ave. Counsel for CESG 1402 Viche ;
Durham NC 7707 6
& t k (919) 493-2233 y
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16.
The ASLB erred in that the entire procedure was so rushed that the Board was unable to consider dangerous gaps in our know-ledge and to utilize ongoing research that changed the safety ~
equation as the Board was sitting.
The Staff was unable to inform Intervenor as to the state of knowledge and did not provide witnesses to authenticate reports it has contracted for.
The Intervenor was unable to secure and to analyze information produced in the ong'oing research in relation to the Sequoyah licensee and by other NRC consultants.
(Tr.
4655-63, 3860) 1
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Evidentiary consideration, handling of new scientific material, conjunction of the need for schedulin", a hearing and the jneed parties legitimate for more time to work with newly received reports are generally within the discretion of the Board.
The test for some of these issues is whether there was such an abuse of discreation that the Intervenor was deprived of its right to procedural due process.
See North Anna, 11 NRC 451 (1980).
With regard to abuse of discretion, however, in evidentiary matters, it should be axiomatic that it is a violation of due process to hold to a higher standard of evidence in an administrative hearing than before a federal court jury.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) has the ability to separate reliabic from unreliable hearsay, for i
exampic, and can judge proffered scientific reports on a relevancy l
and reliability standard.
Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply as the most severe standard of evidence.
If a document or f
an expert could be used in evidence under the Federal Rules, they I
I must be admitted in the Commission's proceedings.
- ~_
- _ g --- - -
I Similarly, if new material bears on the subject of a hearing, i. 'e. is relevant under ordinary rules, and is proximately forthcoming, an administrative bo'ard must admit the evidence via judici'al knowledge.
The public interest demands no less.
Focusing on Exception 3, Intervenor offered a long list of exhibits for the purpose of using the contents to demonstrate its case.
(The initial use of manv was to have been to support the testimony of Jesse Riley.)
The documents are listed in the Order below, but should also be noted here:
Exhibit Title / contents Nureg #, etc.
42 Analysis of TMI Accident, abstract, Ch. 1,2 CR-1219 43 same ch. 5 44 same, ch. 8 45 Duke's proposed testimony-of H.D. Miller NSAC-1,HYD and documents p.
1-11, etc.
46 H2 problems in Sequoyah Containment, Aug., 1980 R&D Assoc.
i 47 Proposed Interim Hydrogen Control Requirements SECY 80-107 -
for Small Containments 48 ECCS diagrams TH 9,10,11 49 Plant Computer NSAC-1, PDS 50 Butler, memo on Selected Containment Related Issues i
51 Sequoyah Containment Analysis, July, 1930 R&D Assoc.
52 Supplement to SER on Hydrogen Control.
11.B.7&3 t
53 Minutes re McGuire Incident, loss of " ambient 243th ACRS cooling system."
meeting
, 54 Electronatic Relief Valve NSAC-1, ERV 55, Plant Data Systems NSAC-1, PDS 56.
pressurizer diagram MSAC-1, OTSG 58 Staff Answers to CESG Int "rogatories McGuire discovery 59 Hydrogen Combustion during degraded core CR-?
accidents in Sequoyah, Brookhaven, 1/15/31 62 Ch. 8, " Accident process analysfs" Sandia CR-1659 Labs re Sequoyah Staff M Hydrogen Control Considerations for Ice-Conden-R&D Assoc.
ser Nuclear Plants, (Feb. 1981) 63 March 27, 1981 Affidavit of Jesse L. Riley (Post McGuire plant tour, re pyrolysis)
The "New" Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted July 1, 1975, a date probably after that on which the legally trained ALJ on the.
?
j NRC Boards entered NRC service.
Rule 803(8) [28 U.S.C.] allows i
i
. ~ _ _
~~_....,2._
admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule concerning "Public records.and reports".
in any form, of.nublic offices or agencies, setting forth.
(B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law.
or (C) in civil actions and proceedins,s factual findings resultinq from an investigation made nursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circunstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
This Rule has been interpreted broadly by the courts, to allow admission of t'he following:
(1) reports prepared by the Judge Advocate General's office and by the Haval Rework Facility on circumstances surrounding an air-crash and engineering analyses based on the airplane wreckage, both containing hearsay from doctors, eyewitnesses and law enforce-ment officers.
Sage v.
Rockwell International Corp., 477 F.
Supp.
1205 (D. Ucw Hamp. 1979).
[The analogy to T:tI-2 reports is ob-vious.]
(2) Airworthiness Directives of the FAA, describing unsafe conditions in an aircraft.
Melville v. American Hone Assurance Co., 534 F.2d 1306 (3rd Cir. 1973).
See p. 1315.
The analogy here is to the Brookhaven ans. lysis, exhibit 59.
(3) FAA circulars containing recommended land ng procedures for i
certain airports.
Muncie Aviation Corp. v.
Party Doll Fleet, Inc.,
519 F.2d 1178, 1132 (5th Cir. 1975).
(4) police auto accident report, including witness statements.
Baker v.
Elcona Homes, 588 F. 2d 551 (6th Cir. 13/8).
There can be no question of the trustworthiness of the documents Intervenor attempted to introduce.
They are government ar,ency or consultant reports, and, presumably, the author's "only conceivabic interestwasininsurinksafety,"MuncieAviationat 1182. The bulk'
- = - -.
of the exhibits are NRC consultants' reports,. e.g. CR-1219 (42-44),
NSAC-1 (45, 43, 49, 54, 55, 56),
R&D Associates reports'to an NRC Commissioner or to Livemore Labs (46,51,M), SECY 80-107 (47),
McGuire SER (52) an ACRS meeting (53) and Brookhaven (59) and Sandia (62) lab studies.
Can there be any question of the governmental connection, the fact that the authors had no goal in mind other than safety, or of t.he relevance of the documents?
How can an Intervenor prove a credible accident without reference to a reporr of a prior accident (#53)?
How does an Intervenor make reference to
~
TMI-2 investigations without use of documents?
Why is a document that an Applicant's witness would have relied on no longer trust-worthy when an Intervenor seeks to use it?
(#45 was testimony and documents from H.M. Miller on TMI-2.)
Although Intervenor can build a case defensively, via cross-examination, Hartsville, 7 NRC 341 at 356 (1978), it ought not be limited to such a case.
It is particularly hard to determine why 59, 62 and M were not admitted for the truth of the matters contained therein.
- 59 concerns computer analyses of various accidents by the Brookhaven National Laboratory.
A beginning was made in investigation of o
operator intervention by re-start if the ECCS.
This is a likely event.
Further, some of the scenarios studied in #59 are those pointed out by #61 and #62 to be more probabic than S2D, the closest programmable accident to TMI-2.
Since Duke believes in operator intervention (see Board finding 33), computer predictions of the outcome must be relevant.
Eliminating fron consideration a study (albeit hurried) that points out as a consequence of ECCS
. restart, the production of Hydrogen in large' quantities, is far fro,m
(
harmless error.
Similarly, 062 is Chapter 8 of a Reactor Safety Study, Methodology Applications Program, Sequoyah 5 1, NUREG/CR-1659.
It was intro-duced to explicate #61, table 9-1 of the full study.
Chapter 3 was mentioned at the hearing by a staff witness (Tr. 4880).
appears that the entire report, clearly relevant to the s',c,cr ice-condenser McGuire Plant hearings, should have been introduced by i
the Board itself.
(Why documer.ts of this nature are not circulated carly on in the production stage remains unanswered.
It is clear that bitness Meyer had a draft long before the hearing started.]
It is not harmless error to keep out a document which points out there are more probJ le accident sequences than that closest to the one which actually occured at TMI-2.
Staff M was offered as an exhibit by CESG.
It is an R&D Assoc-lates analysis for Livemore Laboratories of stean inerting ex-perienced by the Livemore people in tests of hydrogen burning.
l
, It both supports the Sandia report (Mr. Berman's testimony) and much future investigation.
A steam inerting sequence, found unlikely by Duke's witnesses, would be promoted by admission of ;his docu-ment, making the Board's dismissal of Dr. Berman's theory less simpic.
That is, they would have had to rebut his testimony, if possible.
After the documents were ruled out of order and not admitted under 803(8),, a subpoena request for the authors was filed (Tr 4879-82, 4984-5021).
In what appears to create a dilemma for the Board, l
on which it squarely imoaled itschf, those persons whose distance was v
too great for their work to be sponsored as a government admission we're found to be too close to the NRC to bc able to be subpoenaed.'
The NRC agent subpoena shield,10 CFR 2.7.*0(h) was invoked.' Either documents 59, 62 and M hould be admissible, or CESG should have been allowed to bring in experts to introduce them. [ Note that ALJ Cole voted for admission of M and 59, Tr.1021.]
In this regard, see Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 559 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (2nd C'ir. 1976) allowing ' subpoena of FPC experts under the National Environmental Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.,"when consideration of alternatives and collat-eral effects is unreasonably constricted."
All that was necessary for --*^6enas of applicant's witnesses under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 555fd),
"is,
~m..t or showing of general relevance and reasonability i
af the evidence sought."
The relevance and reasonability of the evidence has been argued above.
The Board had just held that we i
needed a sponsoring expert, and then did not allou us to bring their i
experts in.
Such subpoenas are appropriate where (1) applicant for the subpoena is unable to afford its own experts (the case here,
' although we could have afforded air fare.
We could not afford to repeat the experiments performed at Brookhaven, for example.];
(2) the testimony is highly relevant; and (3) the employer is a government entity with a corresponding obligation to-serve the broad public interest.
Exhibit 53 is Staff's Answers'to CESG Interrogatories.
It is not clear on what basis the document was kept out.
10 CFR 2.740 appears to make this document introducabic, in a manner parallel to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33.
That is, there should be no question about Intervenor's ability to use such responses.
6
,n.
.,n
Again, a major portion of CESG's case was kept out.
[ Exceptions 13, 14 and 17 are subsumed herein.]
It continues to be apparant that there is a need for ongoing research on the questions raised by this hearing.
Such research is, in part, a condition on the license.
Exceptions 11 and 12 relating to this point show the abuse of discretion in not waiting for results on topics of a serious nature or limiting the license, pending the results.
Exception 2 refers to the admission of an affidavit by Jesse Riley, submitted after visiting the plant with ALJ Cole (Exhibit 63) and being invited to comment on polyurethane burning.
(See Tr. 5252.)
It raises a possibility, with some expertisc (see C. below), touched on in the hearing, e.g. the hydrogen flame in the ice condenser, structural steci strength of galvanized sheet steel, and hence accessibility of oxygen to polyurethane foam.
It is obviously relevant and should have been accepted into the record.
As exception 16 states, the entire pace was such as to bring to the mind of Intervenor (and Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford, Separate Views, p. 10) the notion that the conclusion was reached pre-hearing.
The burden of proving a credible accident was placed on CESG, although not articulated until the end of the hearing.
Documents leading to the conclusion that there were credible accidents, or accidents more credible than thatyhich occured at T:11-2 (S2D) were only delivered in the course of the hearing, (argument supra).
The goal was to let Duke prove its case, without paying attention to Sequoyah data, consultants reports or areas of expertise.
CESG called attention to the pace, the failure of discovery, the in-carceration of documents in a semi-public document room (open short I
hours), and other defec'es on various occasions (Tr. 2778-2313, e.g.).
. Intervenor believes that th'e URC rule that allows service of documents.
on the public document room rather than on an Intervenor, after a 4
discovery request, is a clear violation of due process.
The rule was apparantly adopted in the name of not helping Intervenors by
.giving them transcripts.
'4 hat discovery has to do with transcripts, I
and how it all squares with Freedom of Information requests is an interesting question.
It is clear than CESG was hindered in its trial preparation by placing the documentation o f Staff ansders in a library of limited hours 14 or so miles from the conter of Charlotte.
C.
Evidentiary exception:
expert testimony.
1.
The ASLB erred in rejecting the testimony of J. L. Riley 1
as evidence, in whole and in part, and in its decision that Riley nct qualified to testify as an expert. See findir~ 2k, (Tr.
was 3967-69)
CESG was denied the use of Jesse Riley as an expert witness on 1
all topics.
Experts, of course, under Rule 702 (Federal Rules of Evidence) are persons who " assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact or issue" and are persons with appropriate " knowledge, shill, experience, training or education."
t (Rule 702)
The expert may analyze circumstances by " reading, I
calculations, and reasoning process from known scientific principles though even.t he has not had actual practical experience in
{a product's] manufacture,"
Gardner v. General Motors Corp., 507 i
F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1974).
Diablo Canyon, 8 NRC 567 (1978) j equates exper'tise with actual practical knowledge, academic training,
w and relevant experience.
This seems a somewhat stricter standard,
than Rule 702, and henc, erroneous, but may be necessary i.n security matters.
Boards have been reversed on expertise rulings (Seabrook, 6 URC 33 (1977) and some expert's testimony has been discour.ced by i
being given less weight than others, after admission, Hope Creek, 7 NRc 2 (1978), at 647, fn 8, and see 6 NRC 227 (1977) at 231 and fn 20.
Apparantly, in a limited appearance, this lesser expert I
raised an unconsidered point, parallel to CESG's Riley raising of the polyurethane point.
An expert witness with knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, practical or academic, may not be refused, Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.
1975).
The proposed Riley testimony and qualifications, plus additional I
testimony and extensive <cir dire appear of record (Tr. 3767 and ff.).
He was held not to be an expert on topics sought to be testified about in this hearing despite earlier testimony on seismicity, l
radiological monitoring, the ice condenser and technical qualifications l
. (tr. 3873-9), operation of the cooling system, suspended solids,
[
need for power, alternative sources of power, Southport exercise, cost of fuels, ATUS, stud bolt failure, quality assurance, borate scaling, cask drop, and health effe es (3880-32).
He characterized his proposed testimony, with Mr. McGarry's help, "as focusing upon hydrogen burning characteristics and resultant pressures" Tr. 3883-3).
Now, Mr. Riley is a physical organic chemist, who has i
done studies,on explosive, combustible mixtures.
He has read the TMI-2 investigative reports and has the background through academic and practical training,' including, obviously, years of reading AEC l
l
,n-.
-- - -. - - - ~ ~ ~~
~
. x and NRC documents, to understand and evaluate them.
He has the early engineering background to understand containment information.
It is the essence of ri expert to :ake a variety of scientific.
works and analyze them for reliability, much as Dr. Berman took Dr. John Lee's works and found them relevant to ice condenser plants.
A scientific expert,has the kr.owledge to link these sources in a i
piece of testimony that may assist the trier of fact in reaching a conclusion.
Certainly accident investigation, of TMI-2 or those described by Mr. Riley or correcting manufacturing problems are this sort of process.
It should be noted that if to be an expert you must have " designed a nuclear reactor" (Tr. 3336), then the only experts are NRC staff, applicant staff and consultants.
No outside I
opinions would be relevant.
(Indeed, this was the treatment given the CESG witnesses on psychology. They had, after all, never seen a control room.)
We have a situation in which, in the name of keeping out non-expert testimony on the strength of containment structure, and
'o hydrogen burning or detonation (Finding 24) testimony on other matters was excluded.
A physical chemiat was not alloued to testify on the gas laws, chemical reactions, reactor systems, reactor operator j
performance, hydrogen generation and burning, alternate mitigation systen s, orifice calculations, pyrolysis and other matters squarely within his training, knowledge, industrial experience and education Rejection of an expert in this way is not harmless error.
D. Evidentiary exception:
subpoena.
.n
e-.--,
4.
The ASLB orred in refusing to grant a subpoena for Louis Charles Barbo on application of CESG.
(Tr. 3446-8, 3460-1) '
CESG submitted its first subpoena application on 2/26/81, and although some requests were granted, that E Louis C'erlas 4
Barbe was not.
The standards for grantin a subpoena request have o
been discussed above.
Barbe, GESG stated, "is relevant to contentions 1 and 2 in that he can also testify about the human factors involved in reactor operation and to safety factors.
He is an engineer and has worked for Westinghouse in the nuclear division."
The affidavit of Stephen West was introduced to point out that strenuous efforts had been made to locate such a person.
Barbe answered an advertisement in Human Factors magazine.
He has certificates in fire protection and safety engineering.
Questions proposed to ask him were set forth in the application, and relate to fire, safety, human factors and similar hazards in nuclear plants.
Barbe could have grounded the five av demic psychologists' testimony in a " background with respect to operation of nuclear power reactor facilities and
. relate the general phenomena discussed to nuclear power plant operations or to control room activities."
As finding 25 makes clear, this was only allowed to be done by Duke Power's witnesses after Barbe was not called.
One definition of a failure of due process is goveramental ac tio:- that turns one's stomach.
Preventing the appearance of an Intervenor witness who can bridge theory and practice (finding 26)
~
and then calling attenti,on to Applicant's witnesses who performed that
--..n..
a
_g, d
feat, unchallenged except by cross examination, is such an act.
Since" the only ground for denial of a subpoena is the failure of, general relevance, this error was clear and damaging.
E.
Admission of Contentions.
6.
The ASLB erred in not allowing evidence to be taken'on j
Contentions 3 and 4, in that evidence as to the dire conseq0ences of a breach of containment must be entered into the balance as a measure of risk should an unlikely accident occur.
See finding 58 (3). (Tr. 5233, 5247) 7 The ASLB erred in not allowing Contention 5 which stated that an environmental impact statement for the most severe class of accidents was required.
(CESG's Memorandum of Jan. 21, 1981; ASLB's Memorandum and Order, February 17, 1981; CESG's request for certification to the Commission, March 2, 1981; ASLB's Memorandum and Order denying certification, April 21, 1981) l 8.
The ASLB erred in not allowing Contention 6 which stated i
that the McGuire emergency plan be revised to include a response for Charlotte, N. C. in the event of a Class 9 accident.
(cf.
l
- 7. foregoing for references.)
9.
The Board arred in accepting Applicant's theory that it 1
was necessary for CESG to demonstrate a specific " credible" l
accident.
(Tr.
5236, $248-9) 10.
The-ASLB erred in giving inadequate consideration to the i
lessons learned from the TMI-2 experience.
l
{
l
..~
Although the Board admitted CESG Contentions 3 and 4 concerning the consequences of'a breach of containment, it did not allow evidene.e on these areas.
CESG was ready to provide such and had requested subpoenas of doctors and others and had profiled testimony in this area.
The Board, at the urging of Staff and Duke, silently adopted a bifurcated hearing procedure requiring that CESG prove a credibile accident (finding 8), a failure to react adequately (finding' 33) and a breach.
Having this unannounced burden in mind and determined to find no accident credibile despite TMI-2 (See Separate View, p.
10),
they then never got tc contentions 3 and 4.
The contentions must be taken as true, i.e. proved, at this stage, having essentially lost via a decision to grant summary judgment.
If so, they establish a serious residual risk, which must be taken into account under the regulations and placed in the balance of a cost / benefit analysis.
The only possibic conclusion therefore, is that the risk is unaccept-ible and the project should not go forth.
Contentions 5 and 6 are the subject of exceptions 7 and 8 and have been briefed by CESG in connection with its request for certific-ation and that need not be reprinted here.
CESG requests the revicu of the documents referred to in exception 7 by the ASLAB.
Similarly, Exceptions 9 and 10 have been briefed in Separate Views by Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford.
Still, the Board read its unfortunate mandate in the narrowest possible way and laboriously evaluated the " credibility" of an accident similar to that at T:tI-2.
The Board found that,
in view of new instinctions to reactor operators and other O
g r
+g t
A-
d
' improvements, an event which actually occurred two years ago i
was no longer " credible" and that, therefore, there was no need to pursue possible remedial steps.
It is a finding that could only have been made by a group schooled in the* arcane subtictics of nuclear regulation.
No ordinary person is capable of such foolishness.
After the TMI exnerience, this review of the " credibility" of an accident involving hydrogen' has been a waste of the parties', the Board's, and the Comm-ission's time.
It can only contribute to public cynicism about nuclear regulation and the role of public hearings in the decisionmaking process.
But the Comnissioners' cursory look at the problem is no substitute for an in-depth review, foreciosed by tiie toard below.
TMI-2 was i
an occurence to be prevented and it is now likely that the industry can prevent that exact accident from happening again.
This Board i
seems to have not learned the lesson, however, that there are other possible accidents waiting to happen.
Based on the enormous procedural defects herein, and more, on i
their cumulative effect resulting in Intervenor being unable to present its case, the entire matter must be renanded for rehearing F
before another, unbiased, Board, after reversal by ti.is Appeal Board, and the license heretofore granted must be withdrawn.
O f
1 l
1 i
e w--
v,y,--r e.,
--._y
32 SUBUTANTIVE ISTT1:RS Exception 6 states that the ASLB erred in not hearing Contentions 3 and'4.
Contention 3 stated that an emergency planning radius of 10 miles wr.s insufficient to protect the public from the releases frou a hydro 6en-explosion-ruptured ice condenser containment.
The Appeal Board is asked to note the NUREG report advising comalnities on energency procedures.
For a I?!R-5 atmospheric release a city the size of Charlotte could anticipate several hundred fatalities and twice as runy illnesses.
A nvH-1 relcase, using the notation of WAbH-1400, would be much more severe.
Information of this tyle is an essential to making a finding in regrd to risk Vhich the Staff recoi;nites contains elements of likelihood M conse-quence (HUREG-0534, Sec. 6.1).
Severe accidents would require crisis relocation planning, Contention 4, v.hich has not been undertaken by Applicant nor required by Staff.
Exception 7 holds that the ASLB erred in not requiring a supplenental E3 concerned with the inpacts of severe accidents.
Such an ES supplement would be a basic document in arriving at an estirnte of the consequences of containment breach.
Exception 8 maintains that as the possibility of a containment breach accident has not been precluded by the actions of Applicant or Staff assuning, cperation of I.'cGuire, that the welfure of the people of Charlotte receive consideration by providing a suitable emergency evacuation plan.
Exception 9 asserts that the ASLB erred in accepting the applicant's theory that CESG nust " demonstrate" a specific
" credible" accid ent.
As Applicant holds that only the TMI-2 accident is credible, because it happened, it is clearly impossibir for CESG, v.hich does not own a string of nuclear plants, to demonstrate accordi.ng to this standard.
The "RC provides nassive evidence of the credibility, in the en61ncering sense, of a variety of accidents.
The entire regulatory co ncept requiring. PSAR's, RESAR's, FSAR's, Staff evaluation of applicant's submissions, reviews, research and requiring the expenditure of great effort and cost is based on the credibility of a wide ran6e of accidents.
There is no point in seeking to prevent accidents unless the accidents are possible, i.e. credible.
CESG has pointed to the spectrum of LOCA's as credible accidents.
It is only necessary to have an inoperative ECCS to have a potential hydrogen generation scenario. Indeed such scenarios are computer modeled in two of CESG's exhibits (40A, 59) one of which was received and would attest to the credibility in the view of experts of sequences more damaging than Applicant's SED " base case".
Given the Senerally recognized credibility of a spectrum of potential hydrogen release accidents, and CESG's recognition thereof, any further, arbitrarily conceived " demonstration" l
1s an absurdly improper requirement to place on CESG.
Further views in the matter of the demonstry tion by intervenor of a j
credible accident have been expressed by Commissioners Gilinsky i
and Bradford (Separate Views, June 29, 1981, pp. 6, lu, 11) and by Bradford (Separate Opinion, June 29, 1981, p. 1 and footnote 2).
l (Tr. 5236, 5248-9) l
=,-
Exception 10 avers that the ASLB gave inadequate consider,
ation t o the lessons learned from TMI-2.
Clearly it is, credible f or a hydrogen release involvin6 50% metal water reaction to occur (CESG Exh. 45, Gilinsky and Bradford, Separate views, June 29, 1981, pp. 1-2, 6-7).
and clearly the NRC failed to take adequate measures to prevent this type of accident.
Nor bLs it learned yet to lo' k before leaping--as Gilinsky and Bradford o
1 state, "the problems of hydro 6en control are not yet fully understood" (Separate Views, June 29, 1981, p. 11).
Exception 11 recognizes that the ASLB erred in n.t keeping the record open until the matter of igniter system failure at Livermore had been resolved.
(Tr. 5227-8)
If steam ro66 ng 1
prevents the 1 nition of otherwise combustible hycrogen/ air 6
miszturea, whatever limited predictability inhered in the CLASIX code prediction. of pressure / temperature / time relations will be lost.
There will no assurunce that when 16nition does occur that peak pressures will full within the range of contain-ment capability.
o Exception 12 maintains that the 4613 erred in closing the record before the detonation question had been resolved.
In detonation flame spread is so rapid as to be almost instantuneous.
A consequence is the development of pressure reaks of the order of twice that reached in a slower burn. All witnesses were agreed as to the hi her pressures reached in detonation.
A S
discussion-of detonation pressures is given in the bandia report (CESG Erh. 40A, pp. 30-34, Fig. 16).
Small scale detonations are less likely to be damaging than large ones.
' A large combustible cloud would put the containment at risk.
The plenum at the top of the ice condenser is such a region (CESG EIh. 40A pp. 29, 3 0).
An ac cumulation or a combustible cloud in t he dome would present a similar hazard, although t h8 Seometry is less conducive to inducin6 detonation.
Detonation in large volumes is not well understood and recent findings by Dr. John Lee make it credible that detonation could occur in the containment (Tr. 4094-4097).
Dr. Derman is of the view thet detonation in containment cannot be ruled out and that further study and analysis are called for (Tr.
4097-4101).
Dr. Berman cannot rule out a detonation in t he upper plenum and regards the igniter system as causin6 an overall risk which exceeds the benefit in reactor safety (Tr. 4103).
The ASLB erred in disregarding this testimo=y and in going forward toward the licensing of a plant in such uncertain status, considering the magnitude of the hanard.
Exception 13 states that the ASLB erred in not receiving CESG EIh. 62, Chapter 8, Accident Process Anulysis (Sequoyah) and in not finding, based on EIh. 61, Table 9-1, Dominent Accident Sequences--Sequoyah Plant, in conjunction with EIh.
62, that CESG had provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate the credibility of hydro 6en release accidents.
It would be a strong and unfavorable reflection on the liRC if it spent vast sums of public money contracting for studies concerned with incredible, non-possible circumstance s.
This is the sort of arcane subtlety of nuclear regulation to which Gilinsky and Bradford refer which 'would be seen by ordinary people as foolishness.
.(Separute Views, J une 29, 1981, p. 10 )
Similarly the MARCH code effort and the Brookhaven National Laboratory stud (es (CESG Exh. 59) are wasteful foolichness if the subject of concern, LOCA'S, including those without ECCS operation, is not credible.
LIception 14 holds that the ASLB erred in not receiving CESG Exh. 59 for the truth of the matter.
The computer studies are simply an extension of those in CESG Erh. 40A, a received (Tr. 4304) exhibit./ This material surfaced to ASLB and prtien during the course of the hearing.
The ASLB denied CESG's request for an authenticating expert witness.
Apin a catter of arcane, legalistic foolishness.
Dr. Denwood Ross, the NRC's officer for executing research contracts (Tr. 4032, 4045, 4058, 4063) authorized the BNL study (CESG EIh. 59) (Tr. 4067-8).
He testi-fled extensively as to the back6round for the study and the prior experience of BNL with such studios (Tr. 4068-4070).
Applicant 's received E2h. SA and 5B are based on the same MARCH code.
The computer studies of the BNL report show other hydrogen release se enarios, including resumption of ECCS oper-ation during the course of the LOCA, which causes a large hydrogen release, and meltdown, which causes a very large, very rapid release.
This confirms CESG EIh. 40A which, also operating with the MARCH code, indicates that " Calculations carried beyond core slump always predicted containment failure."
(Exh. 40A,
- p. 35)
The eIclusion of such material militated asainst a finding that McGuire was not in a status to be licensed.
O
CESG is convinced that the ASLB erred in making findings that neither reflect the record nor comprehend scientific truth'.
The failure of the SID to recapitulate and to rebut CESG's proposed findings (32-45, 47-51) support the view that comprehension and cognizance of these findings would be totally incompatible with accepting applicant's and staff's findings and with authorizing a license.
The CLA'ali code contains,
patently erroneous assumptions.
This Appeal Board is asked to not e the record of the Commissioners meetin6 re McGuire on June 24, 1981.
There Dr. Matson confirms the discrepancy between available codes and the situation in containment (Comm. Tr. 43-45)
This observation was made by CESG in Finding 32.
The flow model considered by Applicant and Staff is overly simple.
This was recognized by Dr. Matson as a nuance new to him. (Comm. Tr. 36)
The mixing rate of return air with steam / hydrogen is patently unrealistic (Finding 33).
The distribution of air / hydrogen ratios around the condenser i
over the course of the S2D was mistakenly assumed to be uniform by applicant and Staff.
Careful consideration will show that it could not be (Findings 37-40).
The explicit proj ections of pressures and temperatures in the containment compartmen ts, and specifically the maximum 16 psig pressure peak of Applicant's base case are not supportable (DPC Exh. 5B, Table 6, Fig.1-8; CESG Finding 41).
All hydrogen considerat$ on stops short of core slump-No adequate basis was developed for this exclusion (Finding 51, Tr. 4071,2), "Our interest at this point was l
limited to the events which produce $ 75 percent core metal / water I
reaction" Yet it was postulated that " seventy-five percent core metal water reaction would produce enough hydrogen, which if burned all at once, and without any energy absorption, could produce pressure to fail the containment", Denwood Ross (Tr. 4056,7).
CESG supplicates the members of this Appeal Board to take the effort and the pains to comprehend what it is saying in its proposed findings 38-45 and 47-51.
It may
^
assist ha the understanding of this complex subject to read a presentation in'different words made before the Commission (Comm. Tr. 25-30, attached).
The possibility of forming large accumulations of hydrogen during a LOCA despite the operation of the igniter systen, and the subsequent touching off of these accumulations after they have become enriched with air poses a hazard the AsLB did not comprehend.
This matter, which is reco5nized by the division of reactor safety (Comm. Tr.
35,6, attached), should be resolved before conclusion of the McGuire license proceeding.
l l
The aSLB clearly erred in exceptions noted,18-28.
Most of these matters have been defined by experience in the passage
~
of time since the closing of the ID record in 1978.
Growth in 4
l peak demand nationally has decreased from the 7,~
at the time 1
the CP was applied for to i%.
A glicant's growth in peak demand has reduced fram 9% to 3%. The 6rowth pattern is nat exponential, it is most nearly linear.
Despite applicant's expectation that the plant would be required in the winter of 1975-6, Applicant's reserve still lies between 15 and 20%,
_.y_
depending on the deviation of temperature at the time of peak from average peak temperature.
The effect of the busine,ss cycle, contrary to the AsIB's finding, is accomodated in taa economic correction factor in CESG's IONCOE model.
To our best knowledge 10NC03 has outperformed all other models for predicting peak electrical demand.
The alle6ation that nuclear generation is cheaper than coal is now known to not be generally true.
It appears to be true for Applicant.
If McGuire goes on line, it will no longer be true due to the tremendous capital cost escalation from under $400 million to over @l.8 billion.
applicant has already requested a rate increase of 10.7% from the N.C. Utilities Cons-ission to accomodate increased earnin6s when, and if, McGuire goes on line.
The AdL3's finding that nuclear generation would lower costs neglects to say for whom.
Fuel coats will be less for the Applicant.
Electrical costs will be more for the l
consumer due to the enormous fixed chscges associated with nuclear generation.
Any comparison of coal / nuclear generation costs cust take cognizance of fixed charges, as well as expense, i.e. fuel and salary costs.
At the present slow rate of growth in peak demand, correctly forecast in the record by CE3G of about 300 MVi per year, small coal unit s would, as CESG contended, cost less to the consumer than the larga McGuire units.
These are still not required to meet demand though the consumer has been paying bond interest, and AFDC and CWIP earnings for a decade.
Vely obviously the building of generating units in smaller denominations decreases the cumulative time in which generating
l _ _ _.
' capacity stands idle, but fixed charges and earnin6s continue t o ac crue.
Perhaps the most ironic findin6 is that a cost comparison of McGuire nuclear to coal should not include the cost of the nuclear plant (ID p.45).
This finding was made at a time when the cost of McGuire was about Q900 million.
It has since more than doubled.
A finding denying an OL to McGuire in 1978 would have resulted in a saving in consumer costs and disposed of the safety problems which all parties recognize exist.
Of course the findin6 that added small coal units would not result in lower reserve requirements was erroneous.
The more large,1000 MW or great er, units in the system, the larger the reserve requirecent, as several units can be down simultaneously.
Denial of a McGuire OL would hold down to two the number of lar6e units in Applicant's system (the Belews Creek coal fired units ).
The M LB erred in considering only the small costs of electric production and operatin6 costs in the cost benefit a nalysis.
The McGuire plant when, and if, unit 2 is coupleted, O
will cow about Q2 billion.
The present estimate is above 01.8 billion end growth has been continuous in estimates st noe the plant was first proposed.
Plants over 1000 MW in capacity have demonstrated capacity factors of about 0.5.
This would lead to an annual electrical ener6y production of 1.034 I 1010 kWh.
At a combined return and indebtedness interest rate of 12), the fixed charge calculat es to 2.32//kWh.
This compares to a pronuclear, busbar cost in 1970 of 0.69p/kWh.
The actual outs' tripping of coal generating costs in the
Applicant's system by the anticipated McGuire nuclear Senerating cost at McGuire.
This disposes of the ASLB's finding that capital costs could be disregarded for McGuire in findi[1g that McGuire Seneration would be immune from the tendency for the prices of equivalent energy sources to equalize.
It has been noted fore 6ciD6 that dependin6 on fluctuations from average seasonal peaks that Applicant will have between 15 and 20) reserve capacity in 1981.
The other utilities'in the SERC are appreciably overbuilt.
Applf cant has access to the TVA system, the largest in the nation, and frequently inter-changes with TVA.
It is far more cost effective, and beneficial to the rate-paying public, to meet peak demands at times of unexpected outage with firm purchase commitments than uneconomic, excess base load capacity.
In fact over an eight year period in the 1960's Applicant operated with an average reserve of 3.776.
There were two minor brownouts during this period which most customers became aware of by noticin6 the news reportage af t er t he event.
The continuing decline in growth rate as Applicant's custoners turn increasingly to woodstoves for o
heating and ventilation for coolin6, and the economic impac,t of ever increasing ener6y prices, and of the continuing outstripping of wage increases by consumer prices, make it appear likely that McGuire generation will not be needed to maintain a reasonable reserve level through the 1980's.
CESG anticipates that demand will level out before 1990 and that the peak will be' approximat ely 11,500 MW.
The ASLB erred in concluding that the "no plant" altern-ative did not merit consideration on the basis that McGuire a
was nearly completed.
By no stretch of the imagination or act of charity can one concede that a projeet at the halfway mark in expenditure is nearly completed.
Within the last several months the largest brokerage firm in the U.S., Merrill Ilynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, has published a study finding that, in view of the extremely hiSh and ever escalating nuclear plant capital costs, and the Great overestimation of the growth in electrical demand, that plants no more than 30$ complete are better abandoned.
In view of the sum of McGuire costs not yet having been reached, it is alto 6 ether possible that CESG's contention at the time of the hearin6 met the Iterrill Lynch criterion.
The returns are far from being in for the actual costs of decomnissioning and spent fuel disposal.
I6aoring for the moment safety considerations, the cost today of abandannent may be less than the cost of use.
When safety considerations are entertained, abandonment uppears to be by far the best alternative.
Respect *ully submitted,
)
Shel'leyBlum/
(Of counsel on brief~-
1402 Vickers Avenue Debby Allen, second year Durham, N.C.
27707 law student at N.C. Central Law School.)
Am
. / E Je se L. Riley 8 4 Henley Place July 8, 1981 Charlotte, N.C.
r6207
W " R REwa: CRY COMC33 IN x
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PUBLIC MEETING MCGUIRE APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE m.
Jur.e 24, 1991 pAggg 1 - 49 A:
Washington, D.
C.
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REPORTI.YG ALDOL 91Y f.
40 0 71 -p " a Ave., 5.W. ~4 2 * - - g..r.,
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2 0 0 ~. 4 Ta '.aph:=e : (202) 554-0243 8
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
-2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
+
4 McGUIRE 5
6 PUSLIC MEETING 7
S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1130 9
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
l 10 Wednesday, June 24, 1981 11 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 12 2:10 p.m.
13 l
3EFORZ.
14 JOSEPH ". HENDRIE, Chairman of the Commission i
15 7ICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner PETER A.
BRADFORD, Commissicner 16 ALSO PRESENT:
17 S. CHILK 18 L.
SICKWIT J.
SCI 5?C 19 R.
MATTSON D.
RATHBUN 20 J.
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M.
3ALSCH 21 E. KETCHEN
. TINKLER 22 J.
RILEY, Ca rolin a En vironmen tal Study Group 1.
McGARRY, Duke Power Company 23 W.
RASIN, Duke ?cver Company W.
PORTER, Duke Power Company 24 25 E
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1 Despite I am sure the effort that was made to 2 train its opera tors to follow certain procedures, as there d
3 is a possibility of attempts at mitigation of pressure e
a 4 increase, I feel that early activation of i; niters vould be 6 essentially harmless.
6 With respect to vacuum effects, the containment I i
7 f eel vould be well equal to it.
Mr. Rasin I think 00rrectly 8 points out that some systems would start operating with a 9 negative quarter pound being reached, and again it would be 4
to a matter of inconvenience.
11 I would like to indicate, though, a source of 64 12 concern af turning on the igniters and not making provision 13 f or turning them off, berause I believe that your analyses 1
1 14 in the f uture are going to show that a time vill be reached 15 in which the less hara rdous thing to do is to turn off the 16 igniters and permit the recombiners to dispose of the tisv 1? hydrogen in the en vironmen t.
If it vould be a. pleasure of 4
18 the Commission I would like to indicate why I think this is 19 the case.
20 Ihe second part of the handout indicates some of 21 the situation.
Th e re a re seven a t tachmen ts to the pipe Civ 22 which leads to pressurirer relief ta nk yf.
One of these isu.
1 23 spray norrie.
Three are power relief valves and three are' i
24 saf ety valves.
I have red-checked the pressures a t which 25 these cpera te.
e e
e AttERSoN EDoADNG d*F trW :NC
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26 l
1 COMMISSIONI3 GILINSKY:
I wonder if we could 2 return to this after we have completed dealing. with the -
+
3 actuation question, or however you want to do it.
4 CHAIRMAN HINDRII:
Why don 't we let them go ahead 5 and get the proposition sta ted.
Then I want to go around 6 the table again, and people vill have a chance to comment on 7 the other parties' renarks, including this point.
a COMMISSIONI3 GILINSKY:
Good enou;h.
t4:
9
- 33. RILEY:
Further information on pressurirer 4
i to relief tank from the FSAR is given in the following pages.
11 Ihe next stapled portion of material is from 12 N UEIG-CR-1219.
I really think that this is the heart of the, i
13 mat te r.
When the Commission asked a question about 14 3 percent hydrogen, I assume it meant a uniform 15 concentra t.to n throughout the containment of 3 percent.
Nov 4
16 i t is arguad very pe rsua sively in this NUEE~ report that the 1
17 hydrogen concentration at Three Mile Island was not uniform, 18 th a t the place where ignition occurred was a much higher t
l j
19 con centratio n than that on the avera;e of the containment l
~
20 a nd certainly the same heterogeneity aed hydrogen N
l 21 encent r atio n vill be true for McGuire.
22 I really think th a t this is the heart of the 23 m a t t e r.
Until our analyses deal with the case of a range of l
24 hyd rogen concentra tions, I feel that we are going to come 25 out -vith mistaken conclusions with regard to when to turn l
40EASON AE3 A * 'e i
. > N eu 'NC
27 l
l 1 igniters on and when to turn taniters off.
l
'2 Now the remaining documents are from McGuire 3 FSA R.
They will anable you to visualize where the'va:ious 4 elements in the plant are.
On the first sheet you vill see u ud f n a w a z.~ir er (.Cf in 4 y.
5 in elevation the location of th e pressurizerf, Da the second Wlstt' tesL(
6 sheet you will see the location of of l
pressurizer). plan.and
\\
j 7 the nine ha tches through which return air is provided to the r
Slover compartment which contains the :eactor and s h e're the 4
9 leak would presumably occur.
10 The elevation of the sheet just referred to is 11 738.
The elevation of the next one is 768.
'4 e see where 12 the al: return fans are.
~4e see that the inlets for the at:
l 13 :eturn f ans are diametrically opposite the location of the l
i 14 pre ssurizer.
If we co on to the next sheet, we see the 15 la yout of the ice condensers and we see that the air re turn 16 f an inlets are between the ends, the open space in the ice 17 con densers.
And when we go to the last of these legal-size i
18 sheets, we see that the hatches venting the ice condense:
43 l
19 correspond to, of course > the condensers themselves are i
M 20 uniformly distributed w that section.
21 Nov 21 minutes after hydrogen release begins, it i
i %'s ks) 22 vill reach a maximum.
This information is f-ee t h e S 2 D 1
l 23 scenario.
You vill find it in Duke Power's analysis of I
24 hyd rogen control measures in Volume 1,
and the information l
25 is given in Table 2 where the hydrogen release rate, mass i
.a l
ALDEASCN AEPC ATING CCUhfh NC.
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28 1 release ca.te is given.
'2 The water release rate is given in Table 1.
Some 3 simple cairulations show that at the peak of the* accident 4 the flow of steas and hydrogen into the lower compartment 5 vill be three times that of the return air, which means tha t o
6 three-quarters of the p.a'rts into the ice condenser are going 7 to receive hydrogen and steam.
Under these conditions the a thorough mixing of that one-f our th o f air with tho'se 9 three-f ourths of steam and hydrogen is certainly not going 10 t o be complete.
There is going to be a small transition 11 region where t.h e re is some mixing.
12 But what it means is tha t a very cubstantial part 13 of the steam and hydrogen is going to ;o in to an ice 14 condenser unaccompanied by any air.
Now th e steam vill 15 condense out.
And the air in the portions of the ice 16 condenser adjoining vill laterally move toward the close-in 17 t o 2,a k e u p for the volume of the steam.
18
'Jhat it amounts to is that there is going to be a 19 :hannel of a pproxima tely 30 feet by 10 feet in the ice 20 condenser emerging at the top on the c;posite side of the 21 air return f ans where you are getting up to pur e h ydrogen.
22 There is going to be a transition band but you are ;oing to 23 have an extremely high concentration of hyd:cgen in the 24 cen ter.
That hyd cgen has about 7 perrent the density of 25 the air atmosphere.
It vill be en cy':m c u sly buoyant.
l l
ALOEMSON 4EDCATM No tNY. NC rise sco nntma ne v
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29 1
As you can see from the plans, th e thing tha t vill 2 happen is that that hydrogen vill move to the top of the 3 dome where there are a group of igniters.
For a valle that o
4 hydrogen vill burn off because there vill be enough oxygen.
5 present.
In the last sheet of the handout you see the 6 t u r nin(qAttan y diagram which indicates the vicinity in which 7 hyd ccen burns in relation to air and steam composition and S tn a region in which it detonates.
~
9 But after that portion of the hydrogen which has 10 h ad sufficient air to combust has combusted and the supply 11 becomes, hydrogen dhich is unburnable because it lacks 12 o xygen, one vill accumulate a volume of hydrogen in the dome 13 w it h tha i;nitars balov and nothing happening except tha t 14 t he al: return fan system vill still be operating, causing 15 some circulation.
There is vn a t engineers call a flow net 16 which vill have maximum flo w in the vicinity of inlets, the i
17 11: return f ans, and minimum flow in the region fece which j
18 the hydrogen vill have issued.
19 But slowly there vill be mixing and there vill be 20 dif fusion.
It is very obvious, if you visualize this, that i
21 the minimum concentration of air vill be at the top in the 22 vicinity of the i; niters and slowly oxygen vill rise, 23 increasingly taking the mass combustible.
24 Finally there vill be a combustible composition in 25 the vicinity of an ignite: with a large combustible and f
4tceascN 2EACAfM
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30 1 probably detonable volume of hydrogen below it.
That I 2
- hink is what Dr. Berman had in mind when h e said the use of; 3 the distributive ignition systen under certain c'ircumstances 4 1/ fraught with danger, and I believe that is the 5 circumstance.
6 For that reason I would recommend that a study be 7 made by this Commission to determine that point where it is i
Ssafer to turn off the igniter syste.m and every oth'er 9 electrical device in the containment except tne recombiners 10 and allow the recombiners to take care of that hydrogen.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE4 Ihank you, Mr. Riley.
12 Depending on the inclination for ;uestions from 13 this side of the table, I propose to switch back across the i4 parties, asking fo: commente on one another's remarks.
You 15 pro bably have some more questions as we go along.
16 MR. McGARRY.
Could we ha ve the C ommission 's 17 indulgence f or about one minute so we can caucus, as it were7 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I do not see why not.
'4hile 19 you are caucusing maybe we can ;o ahead and ask the staff to 20 com ment.
21 MR. McGARRY:
I thiri ve can be ready in about one 22 min ute.
If you would please hold for that one minute, we 23 would like to hear the comments.
24 CHAIEMAN HENDPIE:
Go (1ead and caucus.
25 (Discussion was held off the record.)
l l
l t
40EASCN AE:oA'iNG :OAoiNv NC.
35 1 Gnlarge the vindow of protection afforded by the igniters, 2 that is a good reason to turn them on.
That is the'vindov o
3 ve are exploring, and we had simply decided some sonths ago 4 to take tha rast of 1980 to answer that question.
5 IHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You mean 1981.
You have 6already taten :ne rest of 1980.
7
- 53. MATTSON:
Yes, 1981.
S (laughtar.)
9
- 32. MATISON:
The question that M r.
Riley raised 10 on when to turn the i; niters off is not a new question and 11 also is included in the work that vs have ongoing, 12 principally generated by some of the testimony in th e 13 McGuire hearino.
14 Suggestions have ranged broadly on hov igniters 15 ought to be controlled, when they ought to be initiated, 16 sho uld they be turned off in some situations, even so f ar as 17 the suggestion that indivifual igniters may need local 18 detection and control devices.
That rould get rather 19 runbersome anf rather expensive but remains ene possibility 20 tha t is in front of us as ve continue to look at what ought 21 t o be the required hydrogen mitigation system for the lon; 22 term anf the small containments.
23 So in addressing those kinds of questions we vill l
24 hav e to come' to grips vita vhan on and when off.
I welcome 25 the suggestion that we look at that question.
CE ASoN 2EPCAT W.
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36 1
In fact the record of this proceefing has on it a
~
2considerabt.e discussion of the inerting of hyd ccen'by s t e a m,'
3 or fog.
.e seems to be adding this is the fa.,rst time I 4 have heard his argument the additional parameter of 5 act ;atbility of air to concentrations of hyd ccen once the 6 steam goes away.
You will leave concentrated areas of f
7 hydrogen and hov vill the air find its way to those 1
Sconcentrations:
that is a nuance tha t was not on ' th e re co rd, i
9 to my knowledge.
But the question of lower plenum inerting to f ollowed o r dry-out anf steam leading to transitions to 11 detona tion and things like that you have heard on the record 12 of this proceedin;.
You ha ve heard us discuss them in the 13 con text of the interim rule for hydrogen control.
These are-14 question s ve ry much in front of us between now and the end 15 o f this year.
j 16 Ihose are the only comments I would make in 17 response to what I have hea rd.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I do not have much more to o
19 a d i.
I guess I would like to ask, are you familia: in i
20 detail vith the calculations leading to the predictions in 21 pressures during accifents?
The question I want to ask is 22 simply this.
It seems to me it is one thing to predict that 23 the pressure vill be 10 psi or 20 psi or whatever.
It i s.
24 ano ther thing to predict the difference between 1 and 2 and 25 3 and u.
And it seems to me, I would think that our ability AL0EASON ASDC A h**4 ^ TWo aN, NC
-,r, y
39 1 calculations.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do they take f ull accoun.t 3 of the ice, the possibility of condensation?
4 MR. RASIN:
Yes.
Iher include the eff ects of th,e 5 ice.
From the be; inning of the blevdown we take into 6 account th e hea t transfer to the ice, the effects of the 7 sprays, the ti r return fans.
Ihe CLASSIX Code also includes 8the structural heat sinks.
So we do look st just h' eating up 9 the metal id concrete in the containment.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Thank you.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Mr. Riley, it is your turn on l
12 this last : : ::9 d.
13 TR. RILEY:
Thank you.
14 Mr. Rasin, does the CLASSIX Code assume the 15 homcceneous compositions within the lover compertoent, 16 ice condenser and the upper compartment with Tespect to the 17 concentration of hydrogen?
18
- 53. McGARRY:
As his counsel I am going to object O
19 t o that form.
I aave hold off on some objections.
I think l
20.r. Riley of course is free to address the Commission.
I l
F 21 did not think this session was an interrogation of one party 22 by another party.
23 IHAIRMAN RENDRII:
No, it is not.
i 24 Iell me where you are aimin; and maybe I can help 25 you out and ask him a few questions f o r you.
I an unwilling ALCEASCN AE ACCN1 c '99 o 71
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B0 1 to be a blind conduit.
2 MR. RILEY:
I will be very ;1ad to oblige.
3 The entire schema w th respect to pres'sur.
4 development and burns and so forth that has been provided by 5 the Applicant 1,n what is known as Exhibit 5-3 m akes certain 6 code assumptions.
What I am.trying to determine is if one 7 of these assumptions, the in my judgment LA4 unrealistic 8one, that throughout the course of the accident the hydrogen, 9 concentration is uniform, though increasing and then later 10 decreasing through the lower containment, and then 1 11 dif ferent one through tha ice condensers and still a l
12 dif f eren t one through tne upper containment.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE4 I guess your aim would be to 14 reinforce your previous comments about possible 15 innomogeneity in a tmospheric composition a t various times in 16 an accident sequence.
17 MR. RILEY:
Not only that; it would be to raise 18 the question of vnether or not we can rely on the 19 predictions of CLAS[IX, because if CLASIIX is based on l
20 f aulty ma'or assumptions then I think that we are in a i
i 21 position of distrusting its results.
l 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE4 But with regard to the 23 questions we asked this af ternoon about feasibility on the 24 one hand, reasonableness on the othe r of set points for t
i 25 turning tne igniters on, I am not sure where that gets you.
l AL0EASoN AE=ca'm neapon P.C
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MR. FILEY:
I think that is a very fair
'2 o bserva tion.
I will say this.
It :ay rela te to the a
3 discussion 'of achieving 3 psi p ressure drop and the la ter 4 pressure drop which I think Mr. Rasin said was 6.5 psi a-t 5 which point the air return fans vent on.
It vould have to 6 do with predicting those times which have already been 7 sta ted.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE I think once you ;et enough 3 hydrogen so that questions of hydr 0 gen inhomogeneity are of 10 int erest, we have certainly gone past the tioe and the i
11 sequence at' which one would have hoped the igniters had been 12 o n.
13 MR. RILEY:
The thrust of my testi:ony was that 14 t h a t assu=es a known scenario like 520.
And certainly we 15 did not play out anybody's known scena rio a t Three dile 1
16 Island beca use of the various interventions that took 17 place.
Just because it is a human possibility that if an 18 accident occurs at McGuire it will not play out a precise
. O 19 sce na rio, I think that it is fair game to ask for mutacions 20 wit h respect to scenarios.
Tha t would be one.
I 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
It is certainly f air game f rom
(
22 your standpoin t.
But I have a feeling that that discussion 23 leads us back into the merits of issues whien nave been 24 adj udica ted and they are on the record, people's points of 25 viev one V17 or snother expressed.
And it is not so clear i
ALOE AScN AEPOn N+
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1 to me that it deals directly with the two questions here
~
2 about th e se t point on the i;' liter triggering.-
3 As I unferstand the th ru st of your remarks with 4 regard to particular questions here, I would assume you 5would be inclined to vote for a lowe set point ba rring any
]
6 good reason not thus far discussed f or doing it.
And I 7 think there,is a valid poin t to be made about trip poin ts on 3the fans.
Would that be an unfair characteriratic'n of your.
j 9 view with regard to the particular point on set points?
10 MR. RILI!:
I think it vould be a substantially 11 orrect view.
I would feel more comfortable, all things 12 considered, if the pressure set points were lowered.
I am 13 no t so sure th a t I would want to see the fans ;o on before 14 3 p sig.
I as not certain that it vould be that relevant.
15 I do think thougn that there is some surviving 16 value in the question tha t ! vish to propound to Mr. Rasin.
17 Tha t is it would be helpful I think for the Commission to i
18 know whether the underlying assumption of their calcula tions 1
I a
19 of events issumes homogeneity of hydrogen within the several t
}
20 con tainmen ts at any instant in time.
P 21 The entire igniter operation is premised I believe 22 on knowing what the hyd:cqen concentrations are.
If at one 23 small point you have a burnable 10 per:ent and at other l
24 points you have an unburnable 5 percent or unburnable 1
l 25 B 5 pe rca nt, our en tire reliance on the in; iter thin; falls I
1 I
e ALDEASCN 2E cnma evresy. wc
43 i
1 apart.
In the sense that ! felt we vere concerned about the 2 ef ficacy of the i; niter system, I would :lise thatquestion.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
kvilltellyouwhit I am going 4 to do.
I am going to use it in a somewhat different forp.
5 Rather than turning to Duke. Cover, I will turn to the people 6 I have worked with for many years and ask whether I can 7 comment about the way in which those codes currently are 8being hydrogen concent s tions and once more ask him to so:
9 of summarize by aeeing vnether he sees any si7nificant 10 dif ficulties in set point, saf e ty ob jection.
11 MR. M:GARRY:
If I :an just jump in, Chairman 12 Hendrie, and give Dr. Mattson perhaps 30 seconds to reflect,.
13 I would lite the record to reflect that durin; the 14 exhaustive administrative adjudica tory hearing, the 15 A pplicant presented well over 20 vitnesses and we discussed i
16 the CLAS$'II Code.
- 4e had the people there who developed the 17 CLA S[IX Cod e and the underlying assumptions.
18 CHAIREAN HENDRIEs Fair enough ! quess to note l
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19 th a t.
i i
l 20 Roger?
21 YR. EATTSON:
I would think that the fact tha t the-22 Codes do treat the rather large volumes with single nodes, 23 vith homogeneous assumptions, would have little to do with 24 the validit y of the 3 psi se: ;oint.
You are primarily 25 interested in mass addition in tne lower Olenum.
You add it j
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44 1 up > you put it in the volume; you calculate what th e 2 pressure vill be.
3 Ihe homogeneous assumption vould have a lot to do 4with the question of can you inert large volumes of pure-5 hydrogen with steam, isolate it from air, later remove the 6 steam and then bring the air into the previously isolated 7 volume of hydrogen.
That is obviously a he te rogeneous 8 question for which the existing codes are not particularly 9 good.
10 I also point out that that is what is known as 11 multiphase, multicomponent flow at which very few codes in 12 t h e whole world have ever been any good for any problem.
I t-13 is a very difficult area of analysis.
You often end up with 14 no t finite eierent codes of the sort with which we are 15 accusemed in MCCA and containment analysis but a lot of 16 qualitative arguments and qualitative analysis.
17 It is a difficult tres.
It is one we have said we 18 vould look into.
I do not believe it is particularly 19 germane to picking the 3 psig set point.
i l
l 20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEs Or some other.
21 MR. MATTSON:
Yes.
I 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
But the Codes do treat the 23 con tainmen t subdivided into a number of nodes, lover 24 compartm ent I guess, ice condenser, upper compartment at 25 lai st.
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sR. MATTSON:
You can think of it as a 2 one-dimensional representation with homogeneity in each.
3 node, y e s.-
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CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
Rut in the calculation, 5 dif ferent areas in the containment represented by the single 6 node could have diff erent and do have diff erent compositions 7 as the sequence goes along.
It is still less than a highly 8 detailed re;resentation.
On the other hand it is not so 9 crude as to consider the containment a single volume either.
10 3R. MATTSON:
For a burning and an energy transfer.
11 point of view, it would be important to treat it in multiple 12 volumes so that you could somehow handle the inhomogeneity.
13 But for a mass, an energy addition to determine 14 the pressure, there is no way to sustain much pressure 15 dif ference across such a large space.
The representation by 16 a single node with an assumption of homogeneity would be 17 very good.
18 COMMISSIONIR GILINSKY:
How many nodes are there?
19 A re all th e ice chests lumped together Or a re they treated l
20 individually ?
21 5R. MATTSON:
You are getting into a little more 22 d e t ail than I am close to. - ! could ask Mr. Tinkler of the 23 s ta f f to stand up and see if he could add re ss the question.
24 XR. TINKlIR:
The ori;inal ClASSIX analysis had a i
i 25 one.-node volume of the ice cendenser region.
Revised AltE4SCN AESCAT'eQ ' CMoam v.NO, a
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46 1 analyses have modeled that ce71on with two nodes, the 2 separate node f or the upper plenum of the portion of the ice 3 rondensa r region.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIES Mr. Riley?
5 XR. RILEY:
Mr. Chairman, do I still have an 6 opportunity to resume on our discourse.With respect to 7 questions?
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8 CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
Let me allow you about two more 9 minutes, Mr. Riley, because I as running out of time.
I 10 have some other appointments, and I sense that the 11 Commissionars hava had a fai nanca to probe into the items 12 tha t vere o f intecest here.
13 MR. RILEY:
I think it would be highly desirable 14 to establish the pressure difference between the upper 15 con tainmen t and the lover containment at times of maximum 16 flow from the leak.
Ihe reason I say this is that the air 17 :eturn f ans according to the PSAR have a pressure 18 dif f eren tial of t 40 pounds per square foot.
Psf is the 19 abb re via tion used.
That adds up to a Lttle over I
20 one-hund red th of a pound per square inch.
21 It is my belief that the pressure inside the lover 22 compartmen t vill have a dif f eren tial much g rea te r t h an tha t' 23 vith respect to the upper compartpent and that the fans vill 24 ## back up if anything.
And this aberration in the flov 25 process I do not think has received any consideration.
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1 AL0EASON AEcoA' n ^ W pan < NC en so m.v.
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47 1 think it is a fair question.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I will ask the Commissioners to 3 take it under advisement.
l 4
4 Do you have other comments?
5 Peter?
6 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
No, sir.
7 CHAIR 3AN HENDRIE:
I think we have then schieved t
8 the purpose from the Commission's standpoint of the 9 briefing.
I must say I want to thank all of the parties for 10 a useful and, on your part, very focused and timely sort of l
11 discussion.
I appreciate your coming.
12
- 53. McGARRY:
At the risk of soundin; like a 13 lawyer and comin; in at the last minute, I am going to bar;e 14 ahe ad an yway, Mr. Chairman, for 30 seconds.
i 15 Discussions with Commissioner Gilinsky and Mr.
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I 16 R as ~ n, indeed all the parties, centered on two points.
Ihe l
l 17 first one was whether or not it is necessary to lover the 18 s et point for tne igniters.
"e are aware of course of the l
19 Seq uoyah situation which is premised upon safety injection.
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20 I would like Mr. Rasin to mention just one point 21 to you because our people think it is very im;ortant.
It 22 really was not brought to your attention.
But if indeed you 23 are inclined to ;o in that fashion and make that a 24 :endition, we vould feel strongly that that condition should 25 read that the set point would be at safety injection with an l
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