ML20036B110
| ML20036B110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1993 |
| From: | Belisle G, Lesser M, Taylor D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036B108 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-93-17, 50-339-93-17, NUDOCS 9305180175 | |
| Download: ML20036B110 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1993017
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UNITED ST ATES
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ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-338/93-17 and 50-339/93-17
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Licensee:
Virginia Electric & Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060
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Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339
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Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: April 16-23, 1993
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Inspectors:
PA49--t
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Date Signed
M.S.'L sser, Senior Resident Inspector
Sks/F 3
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D.R. Taylor, Resident inspector
Date Signed
Accompanying Inspectors:
John V. Kauffman, NRC, AEOD
Robert A. Spence, NRC, AE0D
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Approved by:
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G.A. Belisfe,N ection Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This special inspection by the resident inspectors was performed to examine
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the events involving the April 16, 1993, Unit 2 reactor trip and the post trip
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operator intervention which defeated the auxiliary feedwater system automatic
start capability for at least 18 minutes.
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Results:
The plant response to the trip was normal with no significant complications or
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equipment problems. All safety systems functioned as designed._
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The operators defeated the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to
automatically start within 60 seconds when a valid start signal was present.
Corrective action was not immediately initiated for three inoperable AFW pumps
as required by Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.
This is identified as an
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apparent violation, 50-339/93-17-01. A second part of the apparent violation
along with other contributing items in this event are as follows:
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9305100175 930510
ADOCK 05000338
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Operators failed to follow the procedure 2-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip
Response, requirements in that AFW pumps were secured and AMSAC was
reset prior to steam generator narrow range levels returning to greater
than 20 percent level. This is identified as the second part of the
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apparent violation, 50-339/93-17-01.
Command and control by the Unit 2 Supervisor (Senior Reactor Operator)
was weak, specifically during the recovery from a moderate cooldown.
The Unit 2 Supervisor neither provided adequate direction nor
effectively used alternatives provided by the procedure.
Further, he
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failed to adequately supervise actions taken by the balance of plant
operator.
The balance of plant operator exhibited several misconceptions about the
auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system operation.
He was not aware that
throttling AFW was an option to reduce cooldown or of the limitations
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for operating AFW on recirculation. Additionally, he did not understand
the licensee's nuclear safety policy on defeating an automatic safety
function. He did not recognize that a valid engineered safety feature
signal was present.
Operators interviewed had varied interpretations of how to implement the
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Response Not Obtained column of 2-ES-0.1 step 1, if required later in
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the event, after having previously obtained the expected response.
The licensee has an established policy not to defeat automatic safety
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functions.
The licensee promptly reported the event and initiated an investigation to
determine what causal factors were involved.
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Operators interviewed generally believed that " verify" steps in the procedures
allowed them to initiate actions. This is not consistent with the licensee's
procedure writer's guide and may indicate a weakness in procedure
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impl ementation. This is an Inspector Followup Item number 50-339/93-17-02,
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Use of Verification Steps in E0Ps to Perform Actions, (paragraph 6).
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The licensee believed that it would have been acceptable to shut the auxiliary
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feedwater system valves instead of placing the pumps in Pull-to-Lock. The
licensee had not considered this as another method to potentially bypass the
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safety system. This is an Inspector Followup Item number 50-339/93-17-03,
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Potential for Bypassing Safety System Due to Closed Discharge Valves,
(paragraph 8).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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- M. Bowling, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Programs
L. Edmonds, Superintendent, Nuclear Training
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R. Enfinger, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance
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- J. Hayes, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Heacock, Superintendent, Station Engineering
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- G. Kane, Station Manager
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- P. Kemp, Supervisor, Licensing
W. Matthews, Superintendent, Maintenance
J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
D. Roberts, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety
- R. Saunders, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations
D. Schappell, Superintendent, Site Services
R. Shears, Superintendent, Outage and Planning
- J. Smith, Manager, Quality Assurance
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A. Stafford, Superintendent, Radiological Protection
J. Stall, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel
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- M. Lesser, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Taylor, Resident Inspector
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- S. Lee, Resident Inspector
- M. Sinkule, Branch Chief, NRC Region II
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- Attended exit interview
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Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
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2.
Event Summary
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On April 16, 1993, at 7:17 a.m., Unit 2 experienced an automatic reactor
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trip on turbine trip from 100 percent power due to a generator voltage
regulator failure.
Safety systems responded as designed. Approximately
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9 minutes into the event; however, a reactor operator defeated the
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automatic actuation of AFW in order to reduce the primary plant
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cooldown. A valid AFW start signal- from a low-low SG level' was still
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present. The condition was not recognized as a bypassed safety system
until at least 18 minutes later when other operators identified the
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situation. The AFW system was then returned to automatic standby.
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3.
Sequence of Events
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The following sequence of events was compiled based upon review of post
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trip event printouts and curves, logs and interviews with operators.
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The specific event occurred at approximately the time indicated.
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April 16, 1993
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7:17 a.m.
" Exciter Field Forcing" annunciator received indicating
generator voltage regulator failure
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" Volts / Hertz Relay Actuation" annunciator received
indicating generator overexcitation
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Turbine generator trip
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Reactor trip on turbine trip from 100% power
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AFW automatic start due to SG level shrink.
AFW total flow
rate = 1425 gpm
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Feedwater isolation due to Tave < 554*F with Reactor Trip
7:20 a.m.
Operators verify safety injection is not required and
transition from 2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to
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2-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery
7:21 a.m.
RCS temperature verified to be at or trending to 547'F
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7:24 a.m.
Primary plant R0 voices concerns to other Control Room
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personnel that RCS temperature is cooling down below 547*F
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7:26 a.m.
BOP R0 starts feeding 2 of 3 SGs with Main Feedwater, places
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MDAFW pumps in PTL and shuts steam supply trip valves to
TDAFW pump.
This defeats automatic start; SG A NR Level =
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5%, SG B NR Level - 12%, SG C NR Level - off-scale-low
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Minimum RCS Tave at 539.5'F; Tave starts trending up towards
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547'F; Minimum pressurizer level at 23%
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7:30 a.m.
With Main Feedwater pumps running, SG B Low-Low Level Alarm
clears
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7:35 a.m.
RCS Temperature stable at 547'F; Pressure stable at 2235
psig
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7:41 a.m.
SG C Low-Low Level Alarm clear
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7:44 a.m.
SG A low-Low Level Alarm clear
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7:45 a.m.
AFW returned to automatic standby
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4.
Event Description
The inspectors reviewed post trip data and conducted discussions with
licensee personnel to assess the plant's and operators' responses.
Following a typical reactor trip, plant systems are designed to bring
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RCS temperature to the no-load Tave value of 547'F and return RCS
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pressure to its normal value of 2235 psig. Normally assigned to Unit 2
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are the 0ATC (Reactor Operator) and the Unit 2 Supervisor (Senior
Reactor Operator).
Following a Unit 2 reactor trip, the 0ATC operates
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primary plant control systems, the TS required third reactor operator
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assumes control over BOP equipment, the Unit 2 Supervisor assumes the
Control Room Command function and the Unit 1 Supervisor acts as the E0P
reader.
The plant's initial response to the trip at t = 0 minutes was
satisfactory.
AFW started automatically due to SG level shrink and
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total AFW flow reacheri 1425 gpm with all throttle valves fully open.
The Main Feedwater R(qulating Valves closed as Tave dropped below 554*F.
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The Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves were closed but available
for feeding SGs.
At about t - 3 minutes, the operators had completed the applicable steps
of procedure 2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and were
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transitioning to 2-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
Step 1 of 2-ES-0.1
checks RCS average temperature stable or trending to 547'F and provides
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steps to throttle AFW to 400 gpm if the cooldown continues. As the
downward trend in RCS temperature was not yet evident at that time,
these steps were not implemented.
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In the next few minutes, the high AFW flow rate to the SGs caused RCS
temperature to continue to decrease.
The primary plant R0 voiced
concerns with RCS cooldown rate, in that it was trending below 547*F.
At this point, command and control problems started to occur. Several
equipment problems were being evaluated and dealt with. These included
feedwater relief valves lifting, failed SRNI (N-31), a RCP high
vibration alarm, an IRPI problem, an air ejector radiation monitor alarm
spike and a condensate recirculation valve failure.
The B0P RO
requested permission to " secure AFW" in order to reduce the cooldown.
The procedure reader asked if he could read aloud the RNO steps for RCS
temperature not stable which would have throttled AFW back to 400 gpm.
The Unit 2 Supervisor said, " wait".
The Unit 2 supervisor noted that SG B narrow range level was greater
than 11% (indicating an adequate heat sink), RCS temperature was at
540*F and the procedure allowed AFW flow reduction to below 400 gpm.
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The Unit 2 supervisor gave permission to the B0P operatar to secure AFW
and commence feeding the SGs via the Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass
Valves.
There were no procedural steps to do this for the existing
plant conditions.
Prior to securing AFW, the operators noted that the AMSAC logic had to
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be reset otherwise the AFW pumps would not stop. The operators reset
AMSAC although this was not directed by the procedure. At t = 9
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minutes, the B0P operator secured AFW by placing both MDAFW pumps in PTL
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and closing the steam supply trip valves to the TDAFW pump (2-MS-TV-111A
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and 2-MS-TV-111B). He did not inform control room personnel of this
action.
RCS temperature stopped cooling down and returned to 547*F over
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the next several minutes.
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The B0P R0 also commenced to feed two of the three SGs via the bypass
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valves. At approximately t - 18 minutes primary temperature and
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pressure had stabilized at their desired values and SG B narrow range
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level was in the required band of 20-33%.
Feed was increased to SGs A
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and C to raise level.
All three narrow range levels were clear of the low-low level setpoint
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at t = 27 minutes allowing the AFM pumps to be stopped and placed in
automatic standby. At approximately this point, the procedure reader
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recognized that the AFW pump switches were in PTL and raised a concern
as to how the condition occurred. The Shift Supervisor was notified and
he directed that the switches be placed in Auto.
Since SG levels were
above the low-low setpoint, the pumps did not restart.
It was concluded
that the AFW system remained incapable of automatic actuation for a
duration of at least 18 minutes.
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Summary of Requirements
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Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires 3 auxiliary feedwater pumps to
be operable.
With 3 inoperable feedwater pumps, immediately initiate
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corrective action.
Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 requires ESFAS instrumentation channels
associated with AFW pump automatic actuation logic, SG Low-Low Level,
Safety Injection and Station Blackout to be operable with response time
s 60 seconds.
2-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, step 1, checks RCS temperature stable
at or trending to 547'F. The RNO column states that if a cooldown
continues then adjust total AFW flow to 400 gpm until at least one SG
narrow range level is greater than 11%.
2-ES-0.1, step 6, checks SG levels greater than 11%.
The RNO column
states that if all levels are not greater than 11%, maintain total AFW
flow greater than 400 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 11%
in at least one SG.
2-ES-0.1, step 12, requires that all SG narrow range levels are verified
greater than 20% , reset AMSAC, and stop AFW pumps by placing the
switches to auto.
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Assessment of Procedural Implementation
The operators were slow to gain control over RCS temperature as it
cooled below 547'F.
Step 1 of 2-ES-0.1 had already verified RCS
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temperature stable at 547'F; however, a subsequent cooldown trend
developed.
Although this was recognized by the primary plant R0 and
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reported to the Unit 2 Supervisor, command and control of the situation
was inadequate.
Steps were not taken to throttle AFW to 400 gpm when it
became clear that RCS temperature was not stable at 547'F.
Furthermore,
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the BOP R0 believed that AFW could not be throttled to 400 gpm until at
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least one SG narrow range level was greater than 11%.
Therefore, he did
not initially take or recommend any action.
Later discussions with the
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operators indicated confusion on how to implement an RNO step when the
expected response had previously been obtained.
While some believed the
RNO steps could be implemented based upon operator judgement, others
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believed that one must formally return to the step.
At this point, the operators were at step 6 of 2-ES-0.1 and observed
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that B SG was greater than 11%.
This would allow them to reduce AFW to
less than 400 ppm.
Subsequent discussions with the operators revealed
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that each one envisioned a different method to accomplish this. The
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shift supervisor and procedure reader assumed that AFW would be
throttled. The Unit 2 Supervisor understood that the pumps would not
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stop unless AMSAC was reset.
The B0P operator intended to place the
pumps in PTL to ensure they would not restart on the valid low-low SG
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level signal. The B0P R0 stated, in later interviews, that he was
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concerned that fully throttling back on AFW and operating the pumps on
the one inch recirculation line was undesirable and may cause damage.
This concern was apparently a result of previous pump degradation
problems during testing which existed at the plant prior to installing a
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6 inch full-flow recirculation line. The 6 inch line is normally valved
out and is presently used only for pump surveillance testing. The B0P
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R0 apparently did not fully understand that the one inch recirculation
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line was acceptable for short term operation during emergencies. The
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B0P R0 also did not realize tha the Low-Low SG Level signal represented
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an ESF.
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A sense of urgency was being voiced by the primary plant R0.
The Unit 2
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Supervisor did not provide assurance to the primary plant RO that the
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condition was being addressed.
The procedure reader offered to read the
steps to arrest cooldown (thrcttle AFW to 400 gpm) but the Unit 2
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Supervisor rejected the recommendation.
The Unit 2 Supervisor's intent
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was to shift SG feeding from AFW to Main Feedwater via the bypass
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valves; however, the E0P did not provide steps by which to do this at
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this specific point in time.
In essence, the operators improvised to
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accomplish their objective.
Poor communications and non-specific
directions such as " secure AFW", "back off on AFW" and "take off AFW"
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were used which resulted in resetting AMSAC out of procedural sequence
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and turning off the AFW pumps and defeating their automatic start
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capability. At this point, all SG narrow range levels were less than
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the 20% criteria of 2-ES-0.1, step 12, to reset AMSAC and turn off the
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AFW pumps. The SG levels were:
A 5%, B 12%, and C off-scale-low.
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valid SG low-low level setpoint was still present.
This is identified
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as one part of apparent violation 50-339/93-17-01, Failure to Follow
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Procedure 2-ES-0.1 in Securing AFW Following Reactor Trip.
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Main Feedwater was used to feed the SGs; however, this would have been
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unavailable during a loss-of-offsite-power event and AFW pumps would not
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have started automatically within 60 seconds as required.
The action
required of TS 3.7.1.2 with all three auxiliary feedwater pumps
inoperable to immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least
one pump was not taken in that it took a minimum of 18 minutes to return
the system to an operable status.
This is identified as the second part
of apparent violation 50-339/93-17-01, Failure to Immediately Initiate
Corrective Action With Three Inoperable AFW Pumps
Operators interviewed generally interpreted some " verify" steps in the
E0P to allow them to take " action".
Step 2 of 2-ES-0.1 states, " verify
total feed flow to SGs: total AFW flow greater than 400 gpm or Main
Feedwater flow to at least one SG - 0.7E6 lbm/hr." Operators believe
that this step allows them to change feeding from AFW to Main Feed.
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Step 6 checks SG levels greater than 11%.
The RNO column states,
" maintain total AFW flow greater than 400 gpm until narrow range level
is greater than 11% in at least one SG."
Operators interpret this step
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to mean they can take action to reduce AFW to zero once a SG level
exceeds 11%.
These interpretations are not consistent with VPAP-0505,
Writer's Guide for Dual-Column Procedures, which states that
verification steps are used to determine whether an action or condition
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has been successfully performed.
Action verbs are to be used to direct
actions to be taken.
Although this has not been identified as a problem
during simulator training, there may exist a pervasive atmosphere
allowing liberal use of verification steps to perform actions.
Pending
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review by the licensee as to the extent of operator use of verification
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steps to perform actions, this is identified as inspector followup item
50-339/93-17-02, Use of Verification Steps in E0Ps to Perform Actions.
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Safety Significance of the Event
The reactor trip resulted when the generator voltage regulator failed to
an overexcitation state. The licensee had been experiencing periodic
momentary " spikes" of overexcitation over the last several months and
had been unable to perform on-line maintenance. With the exception of
several " nuisance" equipment failures, the trip had no complications.
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Although operators were concerned to varied degrees with RCS
temperature, the cooldown was not severe and typical of previous trips.
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The magnitude of the cooldown was 7.5'F below the no-load value of 547'F
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over a 6 minute period. Minimum pressurizer level was 23%. Minimum
pressure was noted immediately after the trip at 1925 psig. The SGs were
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adequately fed and an adequate heat sink was quickly achieved and
maintained.
Defeating AFW for 18 minutes did not cause any plant response
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complications.
However, the significance of that action is a cause for
serious cancern. Had the system been challenged by a loss-of-offsite-
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power, feed flow would have been lost to the SGs, AFW would not have
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automatically started and feedwater restoration would have depended
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solely on manual action.
In that personnel were continuously monitoring
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the SGs, it is reasonable to assume that the B0P R0 would have
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recognized a loss of feedwater and taken action to restore AFW.
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Nuclear Policy on Defeating
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Equipment or System Automatic Safety Functions dated June 8, 1992.
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policy clearly states, " Technical Specification specified automatic
functions w 'l not be replaced with manual actions without prior NRC
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approval...
The policy further provides implementation guidelines and
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examples where automatic control functions may be placed in manual.
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Discussions with operators indicated that they were aware of the policy.
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8.
Licensee Corrective Actions
Once the AFW inoperability was identified to the Shift Supervisor, the
system was returned to automatic standby. Management immediately
recognized the event as a TS violation and promptly reported it to the
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NRC.
The licensee initiated a HPES investigation.
Prior to the end of
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the shift on April 16, the Unit 2 Supervisor and the B0P RO were
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relieved of licensed duties pending results of the investigation. The
licensee's corrective actions appeared to be directed to these two
individuals. The licensee had not considered exploring the possP
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of a pervasiveness in using verification steps to perform activ...
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The licensee considered that fully throttling AFW to zero flow instead
of defeating the automatic start function at step 6 of 2-ES-0.1 would
have been acceptable. The AFW system, feed flow, is designed to be
throttled by the operator for the purpose of controlling SG levels, but
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does not have an automatic ESF open capability.
However, shutting the
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discharge valves for the purpose of removing the system from service
with a valid low-low level signal present may also have constituted a
bypassed safety system.
Further the licensee had not considered the
significance of a valved out system, not actively being controlled, as
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another potential safety system bypass.
Pending determination of when
the AFW system may be removed from service, this is identified as
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inspector followup item
50-339/93-17-03, Potential for Bypassing Safety System Due to Closed
Discharge Valves.
9.
Exit
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 23, 1993,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described
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the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results
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listed below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
Dissentir,g comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
Description and Reference
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50-339/93-17-01
(Apparent Violation) Failure to follow Procedure
2-ES-0.1 in Securing AFW Following Reactor Trip
and Failure to I;nmediately Initiate Corrective
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Action With Three Inoperable AFW Pumps,
paragraph 6.
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50-339/93-17-02
(IFI) Use of Verification Steps in E0Ps to
Perform Actions, paragraph 6.
50-339/93-17-03
(IFI) Potential for Bypassing Safety System Due
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to Closed Discharge Valves, paragraph 8.
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31.
Acronyms and Initialisms
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ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry
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B0P
Balance of Plant
E0P
Emergency Operating Procedure
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Engineered Safety Feature
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
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F
Fahrenheit
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GPM
Gallons Per Minute
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HPES
Human Performance Enhancement System
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IRPI
Individual Rod Position Indicator
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Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
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NR
Narrow Range
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NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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OATC
Operator at the Controls
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Pull-to-Lock
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Reactor Coolant Pump
RNO
Response Not Obtained
R0
Reactor Operator
SRNI
Source Range Nuclear Instrument
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Time
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TAVE
Average Temperature
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Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
TS
Technical Specification
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ENCLOSURE 2
Fodsunt Esglsest / Ve4. sO6o.1EIFTPeder, July 18, iner / Noenas
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seems .
======== send comments toc The
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Soestery of the - U.S.
Nudeer Ragdesary r**
Dedeems and Servies branch.
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Hand deDwer esaments to:One White
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Rint Nenh.11555 Rodrville Pike.
Rockvdle,ndD bonseen y:45 a.m. to 4:15
p.m. Federal workdays,
Copies of commente immy be exammed
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at the NRC puhus h-t Room. 21:0
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L Street.NW.(lawer level).
ruesaanenseemananom oowraev:
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lames Liebermen. Direcser. Offles of
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Enforceneet. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
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CAusemien.Wemblegten. DC 20555
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susessumerase espo maaviosa
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The NBC's aurant pahey en
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Processe for Emderessmaat Actless."
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appsedlaCthatwaspubbebedon
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Endensment
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However,theCommissien has decided
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dessamine whetherto meistain the
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Two VaarTrtalProyeesper
new penny that weeld aHow most
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The NRCis impleasanting a two year
!
trialpmpuso to auser pubhc
i
ausmaasmho Nedeer Regulatory
observensa of selected enforcement
i
t m===da= dam (NRCI le leseng his potsy centummess.The NRC win monitor the
'
statement en the i==p4====*=Ma= si a
pragma and detenmine whether to
,
two year trial preyam to aHow edscasd escobikh a pausammet pober for
.
emeeroament comieremens to be spes to
M
!
attendemos by su members of the
conferemens
se an assessment of !
general pubhc.This pobey statement
theiuBoutsgasetssim
desathes the two-year rialpropuso
(1)Whs6er esInst that the
andinferens the pubucof how to put
caminemme men openimpacted the
{
informatten en spesemies opse
NRCe shW to esadmet a mesmngful
i
enfer====sme
coalmense endler t=p4====t the NRC'. l
satset This trial prograz ie efective en
8"#'"
i
July 10.195.while commente sa the
(t)Whether the eyes eenforence
preynes are being received.Suban
impassed to Meansee's participation m .
comummens en er before tlw compionsa
the esmisresser
l
of the ertal preyes scheduled for July
(31Whster the fec expended a
1L1sELComments received after this
=ip=8"==8 anseest of resources in
date er6E be comendered if it is praedcol
maid =a the esadoremos public and ,
l
to do so.but thera =auasion is able to
assure camelderation only for c$mments
(4)The meset of pubucinterest m
i
received on or before this date.
opeans the enforceanent conference.
l
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-
_. .-
-
- ._
-. -
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istme For .a stayOpen
three estagertes ofliosamees wee he
rubiest t2 poussemel essemehg.est -
1
e
s, seauseast r h
h
seassmen,
eigen, hemmere, pom sea, met larger
other h wM
6es 1s" he permated, and that
Edorcommet conferenose mu not be
cpen to the peM&s af the amiercossent
comesa of the remnanas types of
disrupthe penness may be rienewed.
licanema.
Each toglemal eEen anil caostnue to
m
~a..a
(1) W
be taken assaset as
II. Ammonedag Opus Emierceanuma
condest the enferoament eenfersace
mdvutaal or if the acnea, though met
Conferemens
proceedtags la escondence with regnomal
procuca. no emissenement assierence
'
talen agamst an mdividual turns on
As sous as it la determined that as
wdl canuses a to a mesang h
whethat an bckvidualhas e-*'M
enforcement conference will be open to
the NRC and es h Whk se
pu e observation, the NRC wdl oraHy
adorcement comierence is ope for
f:) hvolves aiaah parenmal
t
failures where the NRC has requaaned
n uly 8e
eat es enfmement
public observados,it is not open for
confece wtB be open to puhuc
pubine partidpseen.
dat the bdividual(s) involved be
atmo as part M es asenys W
Perenne setendaag open enferoement
"rnent at the conference:
-
(3)1s based on the Radians of an NRC $h Fnwel
oferemens ase remaded that 11) the
8'
,
at
a pparent vielea6 ems diecmened at open
Of5ce of Invesesations (Of) reporn or
g ,P N 88 g3C8R8888 ,g g g g
enforeement semierences are emb,ect to
,
(4) !avolves safeguards infonaat6en.
8""
_ _ _.
8
Pnvsey Act infonna$on, or other
h8"8
further teetser and may be suspect to
.
prw m any reanidag
information which could be considered
so that the NRC
usedule
8"C8 8"E-
atatsman of views
of
Ed
rmterences involytag
{
opint a made by NRC employees at
=edical misadministrations or
State Dakon omcare that en
Pen enforcement conferences er the
crorexposeres will be open assuming
edorosseet conference has b
,
' " " ' '
]
Se confersono can be conducted
scheduled and tantit is open to pubhc
rePresset Sant deterednetese er bellefs.
w:thout <hda==g the arposed
og,.nues,
In addt6en
4
cemen.ts on
individual e naan,a.la addition-
ne NRCinten,ds to announ,ce open se e.mo<e
-
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ecoa m
.doro.amt.o. menose we .ot be
,do,_
eoss e,s.cas to , e ,
,,
Me se guidamos k him a persons
1
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open to the public tf the conferenos wm nonnaDy at least to working days k
L
be conducted by telephone or the
advance of the enforcement conference
attending apa h .mafemoces
will be provided as opporteedly to
I
coderance wdl be condeoted at a
6
g, gage,,,,, ph
evbadt writies comments enemyseomaly
J
l
relatively email thands feahty.
(1)
poseed a to Pebas
to the reglemal adEne.These esenments
FbaDy. with the approval of the
par
Romer
'
Execettre Director for Operstions-
(1) TosMus telephone == mama yaa and
wiH embesgesady he forwarded to the
Director of the OSos of Eelsesment fer
i
adorosament conferences wiB not be
(3) Tou-free electronic beurism board
rev6ew end consideretles,
open to the publicin specialcases
mm- .
where good amass has base abows aAer
Pending esenkhk==at of the tolMree
Deled at Baskista, nE thes rik der eljair
baianang the benent of puhuc
messays eyseems,the pabile may can
test
.
l
obenvamos asainst the potenitallapact (smpes-ers:w abtain a rooordsag of
rar du Neelser Rapdatery th-
en the agency's eniercament actica ta a upcondes eyes endureement
Sammeil.Chk.
particular casa.
conferemose.The NRC wtB tease emother secrosary e(the Commenses.
ne NRC will strive to conduct opes
Federal ReWeser eseos efter the tolktree (Ph es-teen Fund FNes W
l
enforcement conferences durtne the
messegn eyeness are --
a ,,,, -
,
- wo1 ear trial program in accordance
To easiet to NItCla maktag
eth the foHowies three goals:
appropriate arreagements to suppret
D) Appremanaly 25 percent of a2
pubhc oboarvenes of adoresenet
3g
etyph!e enforcement confereadme
omedureesee, andleedmale inessammed ta
I
condated by the NRC wGlbe open for
attendles a pernaaler enforcomment
)
pubae obervae=
conderemos the.id.oe se tedsendaea
COrreCtl0nS
d=8 ***
,
i
(2) At taast cas open enforeement
ideseBed to the mostleg mottoe
vel sr. No. tse
j
eenference en be condessedis ensk of samosesing the eyes enforcement
'
Se res)onal omces: and
condereses no later saa tre >==Maam
Frider.147 U. *
131 Open enforcement conderences
days prier to es endorsement
mu be conducted wrth a vernsty of the
comieremos.
I
avo d po
t6albiasla the
R Cmdes of Open Enfecommet
COtmWSSIGIE
Camdumes
!
selection process and to attempt to meet
.
I
the three pools stated abees, every
be sonoreuses with current proctice.
Twa> Year Tetsi Progress ter
I
fourth eligible amieroament conference
enforceanset coeJerences wdl contrenne
Conshastrig Open Esdoreement
to na-.n be held at the NRC regional
Conferensees Poecy Statement
l
- nvolving one of three catesones of
r
j
licensees wdl morumDy be open to the
emers.Meanbare of the public will be
%
public dunes the trial proyesa,
allowed access to the NRC regional
However,in cases where there to en
omens to amend eyes esfera=maae
la notice documet 9318233 beginnma
1
j
ongems adjud6catory proceeding with
conferences in accordamos wrth the
on page 30Pe2 la the leone of Friday,
j
one or sears tutervenors, enforessenet
" Standard Operating Procedures For
ju}y.10. test, as pega alm. in es
conferences nervolvtag issues related to
Prov6dhig Secetty Sepport For NRC
second cohsen, under navn, beginning
4
l
the subject matteraf the ongoing
Heermes And Meetmss pub!Lahed
in the afth lina, y 11.iest" should
edfudica60s mey also be opened.For
November 1.131(35 flt 2231).These
read ~} sly IL 180s .
)
to purposes of tids trialprograan, the
procedures provide that visitors may be
asAsesesse us****
j
4
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