ML20035F431
| ML20035F431 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1993 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035F428 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304210281 | |
| Download: ML20035F431 (19) | |
Text
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Attachment I to JPN-93-028 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES I
REVISION OF TABLE 4.7-2 (JPTS-89-038)
(JPTS-92-009) r i
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New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 9304210281 930415 PDR ADOCK 05000333 p
JAFNPP TABLE 4.7-2 EXCEPTION TO TYPE C TESTS CONTAINMENT VALVE PENETRATION PENETRATION FUNCTION NUMBER LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST PERFORMED 35C Traversing in-Core Probe "C" 07EV-104C This valve is an explosive shear valve which cannot be Type C tested.
35D Traversing in-Core Probe "B" 07EV-104B This valve is an explosive shear valve which cannot be Type C tested.
37A Control Rod Drive 03SOV-120 Will not be tested as lines (there are 137 lines, with 31 to 38 lines per 378 (below piston) 03SOV-123 penetration, and each has the four indicated valves) are sealed by 37C 03AOV-126 process fluid.
37D 03CRD-138 38A Control Rod Drive 03SOV-121 Will not be tested as lines (there are 137 lines, with 31 to 38 lines per 388 (above piston) 03SOV-122 penetration, and each has the three indicated valves) are sealed by 38C 03AOV-127 process fluid.
38D 39A RHR Cont. Spray 10MOV-31 A This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
39B RHR Cont. Spray 10MOV-31 B This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
45 Drywell Pressure Sensing 16-1 AOV-101 A This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
50C Instrumentation - Sensing Various These instrument root valves are tested during a Type A test.
DW Pressure
, [1, Amendment No.
0, 4, 1 212
JAFNPP TABLE 4.7-2 EXCEPTION TO TYPE C ' TESTS CONTAINMENT VALVE PENETRATION PENETRATION FUNCTION NUMBER LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST PERFORMED I
i 202B Vacuum Breaker - Reactor 27AOV-101 A These valves will be tested in the reverse direction.
l Building to Suppression 27AOV-101 B Chamber 205 Pressure Suppression 27AOV-117 These valves will be tested in the ' ret erse direction.
Chamber Purge Exhaust 27MOV-117 (Ai or Nitrogen) 210A RHR to Suppression Pool, 10MOV-16A Will not be tested as lines are water sealed by suppression chamber RCIC, Core Spray Test to 10MOV-21 A water.
Suppression pool 10MOV-34A l
10MOV-167A 13MOV-27 14MOV-5A 14MOV-26A 10RHR-95A 14 CSP-62A 210B RHR.to Suppression Pool, 10MOV-16B Will not be tested as lines are water sealed by suppression chamber HPCI, Core Spray Test to 10MOV-21B water.
Suppression Pool 10MOV-34B l
10MOV-1678 14MOV-5B -
14MOV-268 23MOV-25 I
10RHR 95B 14 CSP-62B 211A RHR to Suppression Spray 10MOV-38A This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
Header e
,1/4,1[3,1[6, Amendment No.-
,1
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...... _ _ _ _. _. _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _.. _.. _.. _. _. _ _.. _.. ~. _. _. _ -. _ _. _. _. _ -,
-JAFNPP 4
TABLE 4.7-2 EXCEPTION TO TYPE C TESTS 4
CONTAINMENT VALVE PENETRATION PENETRATION FUNCTION NUMBER LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST PERFORMED 211B RHR to Suppression 10MOV-388 This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
Spray Header-218 Torus Pressure Sensing 161 AOV 1028 This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
220 Torus Purge Inlet 27AOV-116 These valves will be tested in the reverse direction.
^
(Air and/or Nitrogen) 27AOV-132A 27AOV-132B 4
221 RCIC - Vacuum Pump to Torus 13RCIC-07 Will not be tested as line is sealed by suppression chamber water.
l-222 HPCI - Turbine Drain 23HPI-13 Will not be tested as line is weter sealed by suppression chamber water.
i Trap to Torus i.
224 RCIC - Pump 13MOV-39 Will not be tested as lines are water sealed by suppression chamber Suction (Torus) 13MOV-41 water.
225A RHR - Pump Suction, 10MOV-13A Will not be tested as lines are water sealed by suppression chamber -
i RHR to Radwaste 10MOV-13C water.
l 2258 RHR - Pump 10MOV-13B Will not be tested as lines are water sealed by suppression chamber Suction 10MOV-13D water.
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Amendment No.1[,
213a t
________________________..-_;-.--__..__._----.-,-.~,.-...__.. _ -..
_.-_..__......~.,____._-_:-_
Attachm:nt 11 to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REVISION OF TABLE 4.7-2 (JPTS-89-038 AND JPTS-92-0091 1.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications are detailed below.
I Minor changes in format, such as type font, margins or hyphenation, are not l
described in this submittal. This type of change is typographical in nature and does i
I not affect the content of the Technical Specifications.
Paae 212. Table 4.7-2. Correction of Valve Identification Numbers and Clarification.
l of Penetration Arranaement l
Revise the following valve identifiers by adding the system number as a prefix:
l Old Valve ID New Valve ID _
l 1
l SOV-120 03SOV-120 SOV-123 03SOV-123 AOV-126 03AOV-126 i
l CRD-138 03CRD-138 -
l SOV-121 03SOV-121 SOV-122 03SOV-122 -
l l
AOV-127 03AOV-127 l
For penetration 37A-D:
Change "(Inlet)" to "(below piston)."
Replace the sentence "Will not be tested as lines are sealed by process fluid" l
with "Will not be tested as lines (there are 137 lines, with 31 to 38 lines per penetration, and each has the four indicated valves) are sealed by process fluid."
For penetration 38A-D:
l Change. "(Outlet)" to "(above piston)."
Replace the sentence "Will not be tested as lines are sealed by process fluid" with "Will not be tested as lines (there are 137 lines, with 31 to 38 lines per l
penetration, and each has the three indicated valves) are sealed by process l
fluid."
i Paae 213a. Table 4.7-2, Removal of Non-Containment isolation Valves
.j i
' Delete valves "10MOV-57" and "10MOV-67" for containment penetration X-225A.
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Att chmrnt il to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PaDe 2 of 11 Pace 213a Table 4.7-2. Addition of Containment isolation Valves Add valve "10RHR-729A" for containment penetration X-225A.
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Add valve "10RHR-729B" for containment penetration X-225B.
Paaes 213 and 213a. Table 4.7-2. Errors introduced by Amendment 143 l
For containment penetration X-210A, page 213, in the " Local Leak Rate Test Performed" column, delete the phrase:
" Valve 10MOV-34A is tested during the Type C test of Penetration X-211 A."
r For containment penetration X-210B, page 213, in the " Local Leak Rate Test Performed" column, delete the phrase:
j
" Valve 10MOV-34B is tested during the Type C test of Penetration X-2118."
For containment penetration X-221, page 213a, replace the phrase:
"RCIC - Vacuum to Torus" i
with "RCIC - Vacuum Pump to Torus" l
lI.
PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES i
This proposed technical specification amendment makes four changes to Table 4.7-2,
" Exception to Type C Tests." The first adds system numbers to the valve j
l identification numbers for seven control rod drive containment isolation valves to be l
consistent with valve identifiers in the Technical Specifications, and clarifies the penetration arrangements. There is no change to the valves themselves or to the i
penetrations. The second change removes valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 from the table because they are not containment isolation valves as defined by the current FitzPatrick licensing basis. The third change adds valves 10RHR-729A and 10RHR-729B to the table to exempt them from Type C testing based on the current FitzPatrick licensing basis. Fourthly, three errors introduced in Amendment 143 (Reference 1) are corrected.
Paae 212. Table 4.7-2. Correction of Valve Identification Numbers and Clarification of Penetration Arranaement This change corrects the valve identifiers used on seven valves on Control Rod Drive (CRD) (insert and withdraw) lines which penetrate primary containment. The change
Attichm:nt 11 to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVAL.UATION Page 3 of 11 makes the valve numbers consistent with the FitzPatrick equipment numbering system, plant drawings, and elsewhere in the Technical Specifications. The Authority uses a two digit system prefix in the equipment identification numbers.
The prefix "03" is used for the control rod drive system.
The change also clarifies the fact that each penetration is actually a cluster of 31 to 38 lines for a total of 137 lines, one inlet and outlet pair for each CRD. Each inlet line below a CRD piston has the four specified containment isclation valves while each corresponding outlet line above the CRD piston has the three specified containment isolation valves.
Paae 213a, Table 4.7-2. Removal of Non-Containment isolation Valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 receive the same Primary Containment isolation Signals (PCIS) as shutdown cooling suction containment isolation valves (CIV) 10MOV-17 l
and 10MOV-18. These valves are on a line (Figure 1) that connects the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system to the radwaste system to provide drain down capability and are normally closed. Additional isolation is provided by closed manualisolation valves, i.e.,10RHR-250A&C,10RHR-251 A&C, and 10RHR-729A, located upstream of 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67. The presence of PCIS signals implied that valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 performed a safety related purpose.
A safety evaluation (Reference 2) was performed to determine if these valves were CIVs as defined by the FitzPatrick licensing basis. The safety evaluation concluded that 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 were incorrectly classified as CIVs. PCIS signals activate 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 to automatically isolate this line to prevent a loss of water from the lines between the RHR pumps and 10MOV-17 after 10MOV-17 has been closed and to prevent flow diversion on Emergency Core Cooling System l
(ECCS) actuation.
j Paae 213a, Table 4.7-2 Addition of Containment isolation Valves l
During the evaluation process of determining if 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 were CIVs, it was noted that the drain down lines for both the "A" and "B" sides each included a manual isolation valve,i.e.,10RHR-729A upstream of 10MOV-67 on the "A" side and 10RHR-729B upstream of 10RHR-253 on the "B" side. The safety evaluation (Reference 2) which determined that 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 are not CIVs also concluded that isolation of the "A" side RHR drain down line branching out of penetration X-225A leading to the radwaste system is performed by 10RHR-729A (see Figure 1). Isolation of the RHR to radwaste system "B" side drain down line is similarly handled by 10RHR-729B for penetration X-2258.
These valves are normally closed forming part of the containment boundary. Valves 10RHR-729A and 10RHR-729B are on lines which terminate within the torus and are sealed by torus water. These valves are exempted from Type C testing as specified
)
in Surveillance Requirement 4.7.A.2.c.(3.) and are added to Table 4.7-2 by this I
submittal.
t AttaChm:nt il to JPN-93-028 l
SAFETY EVALUATION Page 4 of 11 FIGURE 1 l
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This figure is a simplified reprosentation of the affected portion of the RHR system. It contains only the major components of the piping leading to valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67. See Fit 1 Patrick drawing 11825-FM-20A, Revision 29 or FSAR Figure 7.4-7, Revision 5.
Att: chm:nt 11 to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PaDe 5 of 11 Paaes 213 and 213a. Table 4.7-2. Errors introduced by Amendment 143 The changes to page 213 clarifies that CIVs 10MOV-34A and 10MOV-34B are exempt from Type C (localleak rate) testing by deleting the references to their j
inclusion in the testing of penetrations X-211 A&B, respectively. These valves are on lines which terminate inside the torus below the low torus water level (see Figure 2).
Technical Specification 4.7.A.2.c.(3.) specifically exempts " Valves, which are sealed with fluid from a seal system, such as the liquid in the suppression chamber..."
from Type C testing.
Because of the configuration of penetrations X-210 and X-211, valve 10MOV-34 l
must be closed to test valves 10MOV-38 and 10MOV-39. In the test configuration, all three valves are closed to create a test volume. During the test, this volume is pressurized and the totalleakage from the volume is measured as a function of time.
Because 10MOV-34 is exempt from a Type C Test, the leakage from the test volume is attributed to valves 10MOV-38 and 10MOV-39. This is conservative because it over estimates the leakage through these two valves.
The change to page 213a corrects a typographical error introduced by Amendment l
143. The description of the penetration X-221 function added in Amendment 143 l
inadvertently omitted the word " Pump" in the penetration function column. "RCIC -
Vacuum Pump to Torus" accurately describes the penetration function.
Ill.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications have no adverse safety implications. These changes to Table 4.7-2 improve the clarity and consistency of the table without altering the conclusions of the plant accident analyses as documented in the FSAR or the NRC staff SER. The safety implications of each of the four sets of changes is addressed below:
Paae 212. Table 4.7-2. Correction of Valve Identification Numbers and Clarification of Penetration Arranaement There are no safety implications associated with the correction of these seven containment isolation valve identification numbers. The new numbers are consistent with plant documentation (e.g., procedures, drawings, etc.) and the numbering format used to identify valves in other systems at FitzPatrick. Changing the way a particular valve or set of valves is identified in the Technical Specifications will not alter their functionality or operability. The clarification of the penetration arrangements for the CRD hydraulic system does not alter the physical arrangement of the lines penetrating the containment nor does it alter the surveillance testing requirements for the associated containment isolation valves. This change, therefore, will not have any adverse safety implications.
Att: chm:nt 11 to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 6 of 11 FIGURE 2 400 vos ese MOV I
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Note:
This figure is a simplified representation of the affected portion of the RHR system. It contains only the major components of the Type C Testing area. See FitzPatrick drawing 11825-FM-20A, Revision 29 or FSAR Figure 7.4-7, Revision 5.
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Att: chm:nt il to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 7 of 11 Paae 213a. Table 4.7-2. Removal of Non-Containment Isolation Valves Valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 are not CIVs. These valves isolate the drain line leading to the radwaste system from the "A" side of the RHR system and are normally closed. They are only opened during a RHR system flush, torus pumpdown, or when reactor coolant is tra isferred to the reactor building equipment drain discharge header. Isolation of the RHR/Radwaste drain down line is also provided by manualisolation valves 10RHR-250A&C,10RHR-251 A&C, and 10RHR-729A upstream of 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67. Any valve lineup requiring the opening of 10MOV-57 or 10MOV-67 would also require an operator to enter the west crescent area to open these upstream manual valves. The removal of these valves from Table 4.7-2 will not alter their functionality or operability. They receive the same PCIS signals as 10MOV-18 to prevent a void from developing between 10MOV-18 and the RHR pumps resulting in water hammer induced transients. The closing of valves i
10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 also prevents the diversion of coolant inventory upon ECCS actuation. Smce valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 are not CIVs, their removal from Table 4.7-2, a list of CIVs exempted from Type C testing, has no safety implication.
Pace 213a. Table 4.7-2. Addition of Containment Isolation Valves The conclusion (Reference 2) that valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 are not CIVs also concluded that valves 10RHR-729A, on the "A" side, and 10RHR-729B, on the "B" side, of the RHR to Radwaste drain down lines are containment isolation valves, as defined by the FitzPatrick licensing basis. Valves 10RHR-729A and 10RHR-729B I
form part of the containment isolation boundary by isolating the branch lines out of penetrations X-225A and X-225B, respectively, leading to the RHR/Radwaste drain down lines.
These normally closed manualisolation valves are on lines which terminate within the torus and are sealed by suppression chamber fluid. These valves are exempted from Type C testing as specified in Survei!!ance Requirement 4.7.A.2.c.(3.) and are added to Table 4.7-2 by this submittal. Since these CIVs fulfill the design basis criteria necessary to include them in Table 4.7-2, there are no adverse safety implications associated with these changes.
Paoes 213 and 213a. Table 4.7-2. Errors Introduced by Amendment 143 There is no safety implication associated with correcting the two statements concerning valves 10MOV-34A&B. These valves are exempt from Type C testing because the discharge lines terminate below the low torus water level. Because of the valve lineup required to test valves 10MOV-38A&B and 10MOV-39A&B, not considering 10MOV-34 as a CIV conservatively overestimates the leakage through CIVs 10MOV-38A&B and 10MOV-39A&B.
There are also no safety implications associated with the correction of a typographical error.
i
Attachm:nt il to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 8 of 11 IV. EVAt.UATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed Amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not:
- 1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes involves no hardware modifications, no changes to the operation of any system or component, no changes to structures, and alters procedures only to the extent necessary to clarify surveillance requirements.
These changes will not alter the accident analyses as documented in the FSAR or the NRC staff SER.
Paae 212. Table 4.7-2. Correction of V,alve Identification Numbers and Clarification of Penetration Arranaement Renaming valves will not alter their ability to function or require revision of surveillance requirements. The use of a different identifier for a valve or set of valves will not alter previously analyzed conditions or scenarios..
An editorial change to clarify the arrangement of lines penetrating the containment will not alter the physical arrangement of the penetrating lines nor will it require any change to the relevant surveillance tests and procedures. There is therefore no change to previously analyzed conditions or scenarios.
Paae 213a. Table 4.7-2 Removal of Non-Containment isolation Valves Removing valves 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 from a table listing containment isolation valves will not alter their intended function. These valves are not containment isolation valves and were erroneously included in Table 4.7-2. These valves receive a PCIS signal to prevent diversion of reactor / torus water. Removal of these valves from this table will remove their exemption status to Type C testing but since they do not form part of the containment boundary their revised status has no affect on previously analyzed conditions or scenarios and will not require local leak rate testing.
Pace 213a. Table 4.7-2. Addition of Containment isolation Valves The addition of valves 10RHR-729A and B to Table 4.7-2 does not alter or affect previously analyzed conditions or scenarios. The operation and testing of these valves have not been changed by this submittal. Valves 10RHR-729A&B remain normally closed isolating the RHR to radwaste drain down lines from penetrations X-225A and X-2258, respectively.
l
- 1 to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 9 of 11 Paaes 213 and 213a. Table 4.7-2. Errors Introduced by Amendment 143 The deletion of two erroneous surveillance requirements, for valves 10MOV-34 (A and B), and the correction of the functionalidentifier for containment penetration X-221, will not alter the ability of these systems / components in performing their.
intended functions. These errors were inadvertently introduced by a previous amendment. Editorial corrections of this nature improves the consistency of the Technical Specifications without reducing the associated systems (i.e., CRD, RHR, or RCIC) ability in performing their intended functions, i
- 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
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The changes do not alter the operation of any of the affected systems (i.e., CRD, RHR, or RCIC). The changes are administrative in nature and do not alter the accident analyses in the FSAR or the NRC staff SER.
Paae 212. Table 4.7-2. Correction of Valve Identification Numbers and l
Clarification of Penetration Arranaement l
Changing the identifier for a component will not alter the operability or manner in i
which the component functions. An editorial clarification which does not require
[
changes to existing operating limitations or surveillance requirements will not result in a new or different kind of accident.
i Pace 213a Table 4.7-2. Removal of Non-Containment Isolation Valves L
The removal of valves from a listing will not alter their ability to perform intended j
functions. Therefore, this change will not result in a new or different kind of
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accident.
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Epae 213a. Table 4.7-2. Addition of Containment Isolation Valves k
The inclusion of two existing valves in Table 4.7-2, which will remain normally j
closed, will not result in any changes to cause a new or different accident scenano.
j Paoes 213 and 213a. Table 4.7-2. Errors Introduced by Amendment 143 '
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Correcting errors will not affect the functionality of systems or components.
There is no requirement for performing Type C tests on valves 10MOV-34A&B and the correction to penetrr, tion X-221 clarifies the purpose of that penetration.
These changes will not result in a new or different accident scenario.
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, 1 to JPN-93-028 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 10 of 11 i
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- 3. involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
i Pace 212. Table 4.7-2. Correction of Valve Identification Numbers and Clarification of Penetration Arranaement The changing of valve labeling format will not affect the margin of safety nor will an editorial clarification to a penetration arrangement. There is no affect on valve f
operation or function and no affect on existing CRD penetration surveillance requirements.
~
f Pace 213a. Table 4.7-2. Removal of Non-Containment isolation Valves l
The deletion of two valves erroneously included in a table listing containment f
isolation valves will not affect the margin of safety. Operation of these valves I
and their associated systems will not be affected by the inclusion or removal from l
a table since they do not perform a containment isolation function. Since these
.j valves are not CIVs the fact that they are no longer exempted from local leak rate i
testing is irrelevant.
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Paae 213a. Table 4.7-2. Addition of Containment isolation Valves i
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The addition of 10RHR-729A&B to Table 4.7-2 will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Because they meet the design basis criteria of Specification 4.7.A.2.c.(3.), these valves are exempted from Type C testing.
Though they are not currently listed in this table, the correction of this omission will not cause any significant negative change in the margin of safety.
1 Paaes 213 and 213a Table 4.7-2. Errors Introduced by Amendment 143 The deletion of an unnecessary testing requirement, and the correction of an l
error, both of which were inadvertently introduced by a prior amendment, will not
(
affect the margin of safety. Operation of these systems (i.e., CRD, RHR, or RCIC) j and the associated valves will not be altered by these changes.
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V.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES These changes will improve consistency in the Technical Specifications, correct errors, and improve the clarity of the Technical Specifications. Implementation of -
these changes will require revision of the surveillance test procedures but will not -
affect the ALARA or Fire Protection Programs at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will they impact the environment.
l
Attschmsnt il to JPN-93-028 l
SAFETY EVALUATION Page 11 of 11 l
l VI. CONCLUSION The changes, as proposed, do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as -
defined in 10 CFR 50.59. That is, they
- 1. will not change the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report;
- 2. will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different i
from any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report;
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- 3. will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical
{
specification; and The changes involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in l
l 10 CFR 50.92.
f Vll. REFERENCES
- 1. NRC letter, D. LaBarge to J. C. Brons, dated November 14,1989, ([[::JAF-89-379|JAF-89-379]]) i transmits Amendment 143.
l 3
- 2. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Safety Evaluation JAF-SE !
033, " Evaluation of 10MOV-57 and 10MOV-67 as Containment isolation Valves,"
Revision 0, dated February 4,1992.
j
- 3. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Operating Procedure, OP-13, " Residual I
i Heat Removal System," Revision 65, dated June 18,1992.
l r
- 4. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, l
Sections 5.2.3.4 " Penetrations" and 5.2.3.5 " Primary Containment Isolation l
Valves," through Revision 5, dated January 1992.
I
- 5. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated November 20,1972, and Supplements.
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! 11 to JPN-93-028 I
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REVISION OF TABLE 4.7-2 MARKUP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (JPTS-89-038)
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New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 i
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I pepp N i-s TABLE 4.7-2 EXCEPTION TO TYPE C TESTS CONTAINMENT PENETRATION VALVE LOCAL (EAK RATE TEST PERFORMED PENETRATION FUNCTION NUMBER 2028 Wouum Brooker-27AOV-101A These velves wel be tested in the reverse directiort Reactor BuBding 27AOV-101B to St,-;- :_ w Chamber i
205 Pressure Saw:_:bri 27AOV-117 These valves wel be tested in the reverse direction.
Chamber Purge Ex-27MOV-117 houst (Air or Nitrogen)
P 210A RHR to Suppression 10MOV-16A WW not ha tasted as lines are wetu sealed by supprema% chamber waf 9r.
{ Wive 10MOV-34A is tested durin0 the Type C test of Penetration X-211 A Spray Test to 10MOV-34A Suppreselon Pool 10MOV-167A 13MOV-27 14MOV-5A 14MOV 26A 10RHR-96A l
14 CSP-62A 210B RHR to Suppression 10MOV 168 WW not be testad as lines _ are M!e seeied by -
-'~1 chamber water.
. (Wive 10MOV448 is tested during the Type C test of Penetration X-2118.
Spray Test to 10MOV-348 Sa--- _2 A Pool 10MOV-1678 14MOV-5B 14MOV-268 23MOV-25 10RHR-958 14 CSP 62B 211A RHR to Suppression
- 10MOV-38A This valve wW be tested in the reverse direction.
Spray Header Amendment NoX %)af, p( [
213
--Je mwe r+.-w e
w m
w--wg-weumr+w
.mm.usem*4
.eemw w
wm
.mei,se,,emmw,,,,,%,,.me,w-w=*as-c'
+'m--pm-=
'r-w' r-i e+e n
weum-.
-.a
JAF I;)
TABLE 4.7-2 t
EXCEPTION TO TYPE C TESTS 1
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION VALVE LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST PERFORMED PENETRAVON FUNCVON NUMBER 211B RHR to Suppression 10MOV-38B This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
Spray Header 218 Torus Pressure 16-1 AOV-102B This valve will be tested in the reverse direction.
Sensing 220 Torus Purge Intet (Air 27AOV-116 These valves will be tested in the reverse direction.
and/or Nitrogen) 27AOV-132A 27AOV-132B 221 RCIC - Vacuum 13RCIC47 Will not be tested as line is seafed by suppression chamber water.
Torus 222 HPCI - Turbine Dra!n 23HPI-13 Will not be tested as line is water sealed by suppression chamber water.
Trap to Torus 224 RCIC - Pump Suction 13MOV-39 Will not be tested as lines are water sealed by suppression chamber water.
(Torus) 13MOV-41 225A RHR - Pump Suction, 10MOV-13A Will not be tested as lines are water scaled by suppression chamber water.
RHR to Radwaste 10MOV-13C_
10 RHR 9d 4 M
2258 RHR - Pump Suction 10MOV-13B Will not be tested as lines are water sealed by suppression chamber water.
10MOV 13D -
j 4
10 RH R.-72.96 Amendment No. I 213a
-