ML20035F261

Discusses Meeting Held 930316 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Plans for Electrical Distribution Sys Functional Insp.List of Attendees & Summary of Presentation Encl

ML20035F261
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	04/12/1993
From:	Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Beard P FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9304210092
Download: ML20035F261 (69)

Text

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e APR I 21993 Florida Power Corporation Mr. Percy M. Beard, Jr.

Vice President, Nuclear Operations ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operator Licensing P. O. Box 219-NA-21 Crystal River, FL 32629 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

- CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 This letter refers to the meeting conducted at your request at the NRC Region II offices in Atlanta, Georgia, on March 16, 1993. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans for an electrical distribution system functional inspection at Crystal River Unit ?.

A list of the attendees and a summary of the presentation are enclosed.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and provided a better understanding of the your efforts and progress in the area of electrical distribution systems.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please let us know.

Sincerely, Ellis W. Mershoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Presentation Summary cc w/ encl:

Gary L. Boldt Vice President, Nuclear Production Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 219-SA-2C Crystal River, FL 34423-0219 cc w/ encl cont'd:

(See page 2) 9304210092 930412 PDR ADOCK 05000302 l

G PDR I

ZE0/

Florida Power Corporation 2

cc w/ encl cont'd:

B. J. Hickle, Director Nuclear Plant Operations Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 219-NA-2C Crystal River, FL 34423-0219 R. C. Widell, Director Nuclear Operations Site Support Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 219-NA-21 Crystal River, FL 34423-0219 A. H. Stephens General Counsel MAC - A5D P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32304 Jacob Daniel Nash Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32301 Robert G. Nave, Director Emergency Management Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Chairman Board of County Commissioners Citrus County 110 N. Apopka Avenue Inverness, FL 36250 cc w/ encl cont'd:

(See page 3)

APR I 21993 Florida Power Corporation 3

cc w/ encl cont'd:

Robert B. Borsum B&W Nuclear Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, MD 20852-1631 bec w/encls:

K. Landis, RII S. Vias, RII H. Silver, NRR Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6745 N. Tallahassee Road Crystal River, FL 32629 RI 1RP RI -

P RII: RP P L ng Klandis MSinkule 4/g1//93 04/p/93 04/ef93

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ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

H. N. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate 11-2, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

H. Silver, Project Manager, Crystal River, NRR M. V. Sinkule, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII K. D. Landis, Chief, Section 28, DRP, RII C. A. Julian, Chief, Engineering Branch, DRS E. H. Girard, Inspection Team Leader, DRS R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant R. J. Freudenberger, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, Crystal River A. R. Long, Project Engineer, DRP, RII S. N. Saba, Electrical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, NRR C. B. Parsons, Senior Project Officer, Power Reactor Division "B", Atomic Energy Control Board, Ontario, Canada Florida Power Corporation P. R. Tanguay, Director, Nuclear Operations Engineering and Projects K. R. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing J. R. Maseda, Manager, Nuclear Operations Engineering A. E. Friend, Nuclear Principal Licensing Engineer D. A. Shook, Nuclear Staff Engineer 1

ENCLOSURE 2 FPC - NRC MEETING ON ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTION FOR CRYSTAL RIVER 3 MARCH 16,1993 1

MEETING PURPOSE OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE NRC TO ALLOW YOU TO CONCLUDE, AS WE HAVE, THAT A " STANDARD" EDSFI FOR CRYSTAL RIVER 3 WOULD NOT BE COST BENEFICIAL FPC AGREES THAT EDSFI'S (AND TEAM INSPECTIONS IN GENERAL) HAVE SERVED AN APPROPRIATE ROLE IN THE REGULATION OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY. HOWEVER, THEY ARE VERY RESOURCE INTENSIVE AND SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SITUATIONS WHERE THE COSTS (TO THE AGENCY AS WELL AS THE LICENSEE) DO NOT EXCEED THE LIKELY BENEFITS.

FPC HAS DONE EXTENSIVE WORK AND THE NRC HAS KEPT ABREAST OF OUR PROGRESS IN RELATED AREAS. THEREFORE, WE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE NRC TO REDUCE THE SCOPE OR LEVEL OF EFFORT OF THE INSPECTION PLANNED FOR JUNE / JULY 1993.

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SUMMARY

FPC HAS BEEN AWARE OF OUR DEFICIENCIES AND HAS AGGRESSIVELY PURSUED MANY ASPECTS OF THEIR RESOLUTION FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE NRC HAS BEEN KEPT VERY FULLY INFORMED BY FPC AND HAS DEVOTED SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES TO MONITORING (REVIEWING AND INSPECTING) OUR EFFORT.

MR. TANGUAY WILL REVIEW THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THAT HISTORY SO THAT WE CAN ALL BE REMINDED OF THE PROGRESS WE HAVE i

MADE IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS.

1 MR. SHOOK WILL REVIEW THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN THE CALCULATIONAL AREA AND WILL BRIEFLY REVIEW OUR EFFORTS j

IN MAINTAINING AWARENESS OF EDSFI-RELATED ISSUES.

OUR PROGRAM EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF SEVERAL COMPELLING i

INTERESTS:

THE LOGICAL EXTENSION OF OUR BROADER CM EFFORTS i

THAT WE PROJECTED WOULD BE NEEDED IN CERTAIN AREAS.

RESPONSE TO OUR OWN EXPERIENCES.

RESPONSE TO THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER EVENTS AND INSPECTION RESULTS.

WE DID NOT SET OUT TO AVOID AN EDSFl. IN FACT, WE HAVE LONG ASSUMED ITS INEVITABILITY. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE RESULTS OF A STANDARD EDSFl HAVE ALREADY BEEN REALIZED. THEREFORE, AFTER WE HAVE FINISHED I WILL ASK YOU TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THE CR-3 EDSFl.

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CHRONOLOGY OF ELECTRICAL ISSUES AT CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 Paul R. Tanguay 3/16/93 Page 1

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j CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 ELECTRICAL ISSUES j

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1987 -

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOB_S; i

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THE EXPECTED WORST CASE LOADING EXCEEDED j

j THE 3300KW OR 30 MINUTE RATING OF TFIE "A" DIESEL i

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS; i

IMPLEMENTED LOAD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM i

INSTALLED LOAD REDUCTION MODIFICATIONS i

INSTALLED EDG UPGRADE PACKAGE l

TESTED MACHINES i

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3/16/93

(-

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l CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 l

l ELECTRICAL ISSUES l

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1989 -

OFFSITE POWER SOURCE:

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4 WHILE CONNECTED TO THE UNIT 1&2 S/U i

l TRANSFORMER (CR#3 ALTERNATE SOURCE)

)

l CR#1 BOILER FEED PUMP (3500 HP) STARTED i

AND CAUSED SLUR'S TO PICK UP EDG

STARTED, BUT DID NOT PICKUP LOADS SINCE UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION RECOVERED i

j CR #1&2 S/U TRANSFORMER HAD INSUFFICIENT CAPABILITY FOR CR #1&2 LOADS COINCIDENT

)

WITH SIMULTANEOUS LOADING OF BOTH ES i

BLOCK LOADS AT CR#3 1

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

INSTALLED A NEWTRANSFORMER DEDICATED TO CR#3 IN 230KV SWITCHYARD j

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l CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 ELECTRICAL ISSUES 1989 -

CB #3 BATTERIES:

NEAR END OF 20 YEAR DESIGN LIFE BATTERY PROFILE CALCULATIONS HAD ERRORS BASES FOR TSIP RELIEF REQUIRED ADDITIONAL CAPACITY SBO EVALUATION IDENTIFIED A

NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CAPACITY TO MEET 4 HOUR COPING REQUIREMENTS l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

REPLACED ALL 232 CELLS IN S.R. BATTERIES REVISED BATTERY CALCULATIONS TO CORRECT ERROR i

INSTALLED NON-SAFETY RELATED BATTERIES ALIGNED MOST NON-lE LOADS 3/16/93 Page 4

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 ELECTRICAL ISSUES i

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1989 - ELECTRICAL CALCULATION ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM:

BASED UPON THE NUMBER OF ELECTRICAL l

lSSUES IDENTIFIED FPC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ADDITIONAL EFFORT WAS WARRANTED.

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ACCELERATED THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF CM EFFORT i

INITIATED THE CALCULATION ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM i

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 ELECTRICAL ISSUES 1990 -

ES 4160/480V TRANSFORMER FAILED (NEARING END OF SERVICE LIFE):

PROGRAM INITIATED TO REPLACE BOTH SAFETY AND NON-SAFETY TRANSFORMERS CALCULATION PROGRAM IDENTIFIED THAT DC COMPONENTS WERE OUTSIDE THEIR VOLTAGE RATINGS WHILE THE CHARGERS WERE ON EQUALIZE:

REPLACED COMPONENTS OR DEMONSTRATED QUALIFICATION EDG STARTED AND SLURS ACTUATED WHEN CR#3 CONDENSATE PUMP STARTED:

INSTALLING A SECOND ES TRANSFORMER EDG RESPONSE TESTING DID NOT ACHIEVE DESIRED PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS:

INSTALLED HIGH ACCURACY, SOLID STATE TIME DELAY RELAYS EDG TO BE RETESTED IN MIDCYCLE 9 OUTAGE 3/16/93 Page 6

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 i

ELECTRICAL ISSUES i

i 1991 -

ELECTRICAL CALCULATION PROGRAM CONTINUED:

i 1992 LARGER EFFORT THAN EXPECTED EXPANDED THE SCOPE TO ADDRESS ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY OTHER EDSFis 1993 -

ELECTRICAL ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM CONTINUING CALCs COMPLETE EXCEPT FOR POWER CABLE AMPACITY IMPLEMENTATION OF FIXES FOR ITEMS IDENTIFIED IS CONTINUING PREPARATION FOR A JUNE EDSFI HAS RESUMED 3/16/93 Page 7

)

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i FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION

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i CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ELECTRICAL CALCULATION ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM 1993 OVERVIEW MARCH 16,1993

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a E.C. ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM l

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j PROGRAM SCOPE WAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF FPC CONTINUING TO FIND ERRORS IN THE ORIGINAL ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS.

OLD CALCULATIONS WERE HIGH LEVEL AND DONE WITH SLIDE RULES ( 1969 - 1970 ).

i OLD CALCULATIONS STOOD ALONE AND WERE NOT INTEGRATED.

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7 PAGE 3 ORIGINAL CALCULATIONS l

l DESCRIPTION DATE ISSUED PAGES i

ISOLATED PHASE BUS DUCT CURRENT 4/29/69 4

GENERATOR NEUTRAL GROUNDING EQUIPMENT 5/6/69 3

AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL POWER FAULT CURRENT 9/8/69 18 UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER LOADING 5/13/69 1

ELECTRICAL IMPEDANCE CALCULATION 6/23/69 11 l

UNIT AUX & START-UP TRANSFORMER 1

l VOLTAGE DROP, CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS 4/27/70 3

BATTERY 3A - SIZING 10/1/70 14 BATTERY 38 - SIZING 10/1/70 12 BATTERY CHARGER SIZING, "A

• BATTERY /*B" BATTERY 10/1/70 3

INVERTER SIZING 9/10/70 5

SHORT CIRCUlT STUDY, MISCELLANEOUS 12/21/70 5

AC DISTRIBUTION j

DC SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY 1/20/71 11 480V SWGR DISTRIBUTION PNLS, SHORT CIRCUIT 7/9/71 1

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD

SUMMARY

12/26/72 11 FENCE GROUNDING STUDY 2/12/74 5

REl.AY SETTING CALCULATIONS 12/73 37 TOTAL 144

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ELECTRICAL CALCULATION ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM 1

i PROGRAM ENHANCEMENT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING THREE AREAS:

i EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS.

i AC SYSTEMS.

DC SYSTEMS.

NEW CALCULATIONS NOT REVISION OF THE OLD CALCULATIONS.

EDSFI ACTIVITIES.

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LICENSING

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f IN-DEPTH REVIEW:

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CR3 LICENSE.;OCUMENTS.

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NRC GENERIC LETTERS.

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NRC BULLETINS.

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NRC NOTICES.

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l DIESEL GENERATOR EXTENSIVE CALCULATIONS.

i LOAD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN PLACE.

DETAILED ENGINEERING PROCEDURES ARE IN PLACE.

MACHINES RECEIVED HIGHER RATINGE AND A FOURTH I

RATING:

i TIME DURATION OLD RATING NEW RATING KW KW l

l CONTINUOUS 0-2750 0-2850 2000 HOUR 2751-3000 2851-3000 200 HOUR 3001-3250 30 MINUTE 3001-3300 3251-3500

PAGE 7 f

t AC and DC CALCULATIONS

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(Safety Related)

SOFTWARE:

STATE OF THE ART PC BASED SOFTWARE, WHICH l

WAS EITHER :

BOUGHT ON THE OPEN MARKET DEVELOPED SPECIFICALLY FOR CRYSTAL RIVER #3 l

VAllDATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE ENHANCEMENT EFFORT.

MODELS OF THE SYSTEMS ARE MAINTAINED THE CALCULATIONS ARE ACTIVE AND MAINTAINED AS PART OF THE DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS.

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DATA BASE:

COMPONENT INFORMATION.

CABLE LENGTHS.

l SHORT CIRCUlT ANALYSIS.

VOLTAGE DROP ANALYSIS.

LOAD FLOW ANALYSIS.

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CABLE AMPACIT(.

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PAGE 8 AC and DC CALCULATIONS (continued)

(Safety Related)

MAJOR EQUIPMENT RATINGS:

START UP TRANSFORMER.

NON SEGREGATED BUS DUCT.

SWITCHGEAR.

INVERTERS.

BATTERIES.

i CHARGERS.

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PANEL BOARDS.

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BATTERY (DC) DISCHARGE PROFILES.

COORDINATION OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES.

CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED AT THE FOLLOWING VOLTAGE LEVELS :

i 4160VAC, 480VAC,120VAC,125VDC, 250VDC THE CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED DOWN TO THE l

COMPONENT LEVEL EXAMPLE: VOLTAGE DROP

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EXPANSION OF THE CALCULATION PROGRAM CALCULATIONS WERE IDENTIFIED THATWERE NOT INCLUDED

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IN THE ORIGINAL ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM AND WERE WARRANTED. THESE WERE IDENTIFIED BY THE ENGINEERS PERFORMING THE CALCULATIONS AND THROUGH THE REVIEWS OF EDSFI'S PERFORMED ON OTHER NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS COVERED:

l VOLTAGE DROP AND LOAD FLOW DURING HELB.

l TRANSIENT MOTOR STARTING.

OVERLOAD SIZING FOR UNDERVOLTAGE.

t CT/PT BURDEN.

STATION GROUND VALIDATION.

NEUTRAL GROUNDING RESISTOR SIZING.

i PAGE 10 EXPANSION OF THE CALCULATION PROGRAM CONTINUED i

SIGNIFICANT NON-CALCULATIONAL ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED AS A RESULT OF OUR PREPARATION FOR THE EDSFl.

SAFETY RELATED FUSE CONTROL PROGRAM IS BEING l

lMPLEMENTED:

ENGINEERING DEFINES THE CORRECT FUSE FOR EACH LOCATION.

TAG NUMBER IS ASSIGNED TO EACH FUSE.

DRAWINGS ARE BEING REVISED TO SHOW THE TAG NUMBERS.

1 COMPREHENSIVE DATA BASE IS BEING ADDED TO CMIS(CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM).

DATA ENTERED INTO CMIS.

FIELD VALIDATION.

PROGRAM 18 WELL ON ITS WAY.

MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKER CALIBRATION PROGRAM IS BEING ESTABLISHED.

MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN DEVELOPED ANDISSUED.

SCHEDULES AND SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM ARE NOW BEING DEVELOPED.

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EXPANSION OF THE CALCULATION PROGRAM CONTINUED l

IMPROVED CONTROL OF OUR PROTECTIVE RELAY SETTINGS:

SINGLE LOCATION.

IMPROVED INTERFACES:

SUBSTATION RELAY DESIGN.

l RELAY CALCULATION GROUP.

SYSTEM DISPATCHER.

SYSTEM PLANNING.

SUBSTATION MAINTENANCE.

PT/CT BURDEN CALCULATIONS FOR THE BREAKERS THAT ARE PART OF THE OFFSITE POWER.

SOME MODIFICATIONS ARE BEING MADE.

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PAGE 12 l

l NEW CALCULATIONS Date No.

Distributed Pages AC LOAD FLOW CALCULATIONS j

E-904044 FAULT ANALYSIS 06/19/90 2595 E-904077 VOLTAGE DROP / LOAD FLOW 02/26/91 3797 E-91-0018 TRANSIENT MOTOR STARTING 12/16/90 5937 E-914024 ELECT LARGE EQUIP UST 09/27/91 32 l

E-91-0045 VOLTAGE DROP / LOAD FLOW DURING HELB 12/30/91 7

AC CONTROL PROTECTION CALCULATIONS l

E-90-0015 VBDP BREAKER / FUSE / CABLE S!ZLNG 08/15/91 8

E-904076 IMPEDANCE DIAGRAMS - MCC/ACDP'S 11/07/90 301 E-910011 IMPEDANCE DIAGRAMS - VBDP'S 08/14/91 290 E-91-0012 MCC/ACDP VOLTAGE DROP 02/14/91 1308 E-914013 VBDP VOLTAGE DROP 05/22/92 1358 E-91-0016 UST OF SR LOADS - VBDP'S 07/31/91 864 E-91-0043 MCC/ACDP MASTER DATA BASE 05/24/92 1216 E-91-0044 VBDP MASTER DATA BASE 09/13/91 2784 I

l AC OVERLOAD PROTECTION CALCULATIONS i

l E-90-0029 ES MCC 3A1 03/16/90 55 l

E-90-0030 ES MCC 3A2 03/22/90 40 E-90-0031 ES MCC 3B2 07/10/90 33 E-90-0032 ES MCC 381 07/10/90 44

)

E-904033 ES MCC 3AB 05/01/90 24 E-90-0035 ES MCC 3A3 10/12/90 56 E-90-0036 ES MCC 3B3 10/15/90 57 E-90-0073 MOV'S 10/04/90 46 E-904075 ES MCC CONTROL XFMR FUSE SIZING 10/03/90 28 E-91-0021 SR PANEL LOADS 12/06/91 98 E-924036 OVERLOAD SIZING FOR UNDERVOLTAGE 03/10/92 22 AC/DC CABLE CALCULATIONS E-91-0020 SR POWER CABLE EVALUATION (TO BE ISSUED) 03/21/91 E-914051 CABLE CHARACTERISTICS 05/26/92 40 E-91-0056 AC\\DC HELB CIRCUITS 11/20/91 112 DIESEL GENERATOR NLCULATIONS E-914026 EGDG iA LOADING 05/24/91 267 E-91-0027 EGDG-1B LOADING EVALUATION 05/24/91 257 DC CALCULATIONS E-904014 INTRODUCTION 09/04/91 8

E-90-0099 BATTERY & CHARGER SIZING 12/12/90 137 E-904100 VOLTAGE PROFILE 12/20/90 324 E-90-0101 SHORT CIRCUIT 12/12/90 157 E-904102 COORDINATION 12/12/90 339 E-904103 CONmOL CIRCUIT VOLTAGE DROP 12/12/90 1883 E-90-0105 MASTER DATA BASE 12/12/90 3689 E-910006 NON-1E BATTERY COORDINATION 02/21/91 96 E-91-0017 WRAPPED CABLE AMPACITY EVALUATION 04/30/91 49

PAGE 13 (CONTINUATION)

NEW CALCULATIONS i

Date No.

i Distributed Pages PROTECTIVE RELAY SETTINGS l

E-904077 STARTUP & UNIT AUX XFMRS. Pl.3 GENERATOR 02/26/91 3797 E-90-0049 230/4.16KV STARTUP XFMR #9 06/04/90 75 E-91-0028 6.9KV & 4.16KV BUS UNDERVC'.TAGE 04/30/91 148 E-90-0108 6.9KV REACTOR BUS 3A &3B 12/17/91 55 E40-0050 6.9KV MOTORS 06/11/90 58 E-914003 4.16KV UNIT ES BUSSES INCOMING BREAKERS 02/06/91 114 E-90-0109 4.16KV UNIT & ES BUSSES 12/17/90 40 E-91-0041 4.16KV REACTOR BUS 3 & XFMR #3 08/22/91 2784 E-900051 4.16KV SR MOTORS 06/19/90 157 E-90-0052 4.16KV NSR MOTORS 06/22/90 163 E-904071 EGDG-1A 06/22/90 85 E-90-0072 EGDG-1B 10/17/90 85 E-90-0078 480V ES BUS 3A 07/31/91 197 0

E-904079 480V ES BUS 3B 07/31/91 177 E-904080 480V PLAPT AUX BUS 3 07/31/91 179 E-904080 483V HEATING AUX BUS 3 07/31/91 195 E-90-0082 480V INTAKE BUS 3 07/31/91 211 l

E-90-0083 480V REACTOR AUX BUS 3A 07/31/91 212 l

E-90-0084 480V REACTOR AUX BUS 3B 07/31/91 183 l

E-90-0085 480V TURBINE AUX BUS 3A 07/31/91 275 E-90-0086 480V TURBINE AUX BUS 3B 07/31/91 273 E-91-0060 PL4 PT BURDEN 02/26/92 11 i

E-91-0021 INSTRUMENT XFMR PERFORMANCE REVIEW 12/06/91 98 E-90-0091 IMPEDANCE DIAGRAMS FOR CT/PT BURDEN 08/16/91 113 j

TOTAL 38,043 i

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MAJOR ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS THE FOLLOWING LIST OF ITEMS IS IN VARIOUS STATES OF COMPLETION; OFFSITE POWER CRYSTAL RIVER #3 IN ITS ORIGINAL DESIGN USED ITS START-UP TRANSFORMER AND THE CRYSTAL RIVER #1 & # 2 START-UP TRANSFORMER ( COAL PLANTS ) AS THE TWO SOURCES OF OFFSITE POWER TO THE ES LOADS. THE CRYSTAL RIVER #3 ES LOADS NOW WILL BE FED FROM SEPARATE 230KV/4160V TRANSFORMERS. ONE NEW TRANSFORMER HAS BEEN INSTALLED AND THE OTHER NEW TRANSFORMER IS BEING INSTALLED.

o ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION (SUDE )

FINAL CONFIGURATION (SLIDE) o BATTERIES l

ADDED A NON-SAFETY RELATED BATTERY AND REMOVED MOST OF THE NON SAFETY RELATED LOADS FROM THE SAFETY RELATED BATTERIES.

BATTERIES REPLACED BOTH OF THE SAFETY RELATED BATTERIES WITH NEW BATTERIES THAT ARE SLIGHTLY LARGER.

DIESEL GENERATORS UPGRADED BOTH OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS TO HIGHER CAPACITY MACHINES.

1 BREAKERS REPLACED / REPLACING MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

I o

INSTANTANEOUS SETPOINT WAS SET TOO HIGH.

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o WAS LARGER (CURRENT RATING ) THAN ALLOWED BY THE NATIONAL i

ELECTRIC CODE.

o DID NOT COORDINATE WITH THE DOWN STREAM DEVICE.

O WERE UNDERSIZED.

PAGE 16 CRYS ~~AL RIVER #3 (ORIGINA_)

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230<V SL BS~~A~~IOs 500<V SUBSTATIO\\

6.9KV REACTOR 6.9KV REACTOR BUS 38 BUS 3A Gl & 2 G3

[ ]3104 [ ] 3102

[ ] 317 "]3101 TRANSFORMER TRAN ORMER ww STEP-UP TRANSFORMERS ym AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 6K 4.16KV 6KV 6.9K DUMMY) 6.9KV 4.16KV mmmm l

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CRYSTAL RIVER

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UNIT 3 3212

. 3208 3206

. 3205 3207 3211

. 3204 3202 3203 3201 4.16KV ES BUS 38 s 4.16KV ES BUS 3A 4.16KV UNIT BUS 38 4.16KV UNIT BUS 3A 3210 3209 EDG EDG 38 3A

PAGE 17 CRYSTAL RIVER #3 (rUTURE)

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BUS 38 OUS 3A CR3 START

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UNIT 3

. 3212

. 32e8 32e6

. 32es. 32e7 3 211 32e4 32ev 3203 3201 4.16KV ES BUS 38 4.16KV ES BUS 3A 4.16KV UNIT BUS 30 4.16KV UNIT BUS 3A 321e 3209 EDG EDG 38 3A

PAGE 18 MAJOR ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS CONTINUED OVERLOAD ELEMENTS REPLACED / REPLACING THE OVERLOAD ELEMENTS TO MOTORS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

COORDINATION WITH OTHER DEVICES.

PREVENT A NUISANCE TRIP DUE TO OPERATION AT THE SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY SETPOINT ( SLURS ).

THE ELEMENT SELECTED WAS TOO HIGH.

J CONTROL CIRCUITS THE FOLLOWING CHANGES WERE/ARE MADE TO CONTROL CIRCUITS:

REPLACE THE CONTROL TRANSFORMERS WITH LARGER CONTROL TRANSFORMERS TO REDUCE VOLTAGE DROP.

REWIRE RELAYS TO ELIMINATE THE INRUSH OF SEVERAL RELAYS AT ONE TIME, CAUSING HIGH VOLTAGE DROP (INTERPOSING RELAYS).

e ELIMINATE SPACE HEATERS TO REDUCE VOLTAGE DROP. THIS WAS DONE IN MOTORS AND MOTOR OPERATED VALVES.

CABLES REPLACED, PARALLEL, OR RECONFIGURED.

FUSES FUSES WERE/ARE CHANGED OUT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

DC CIRCUITS HAD AC RATED FUSES.

I e

TO PROVIDE COORD! NATION.

e TO ALLOW FUSES DOWN STREAM OF THE INVERTERS TO BLOW IN AN ACCEPTABLE TIME.

e PROVIDE CABLE PROTECTION.

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1 PAGE 19 MAJOR ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS CONTINUED POWER CABLES POWER CABLES HAVE BEEN/ARE REPLACED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

CABLE AMPACITY IS LESS THAN WHAT IT WOULD BE WITH AN ADEQUATE MARGIN.

CORRECT VOLTAGE DROP PROBLEMS AND PROVIDE FOR BETTER COORDINATION.

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e REPLACED THE FOUR ( 4160 VOLT ) CABLES TO THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS. THESE ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED.

MOTOR OPERATED VALVidS 1

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES HAVE /WILL HAVE THEIR MOTORS AND GEARS CHANGED OUT TO OPERATE AT THE SLURS SETPOINT.

DISTRIBUTION A NEW SAFETY RELATED DISTRIBUTION PANEL WAS ADDED TO REMOVE SAFETY RELATED LOADS FROM A NON SAFETY RELATED DISTRIBUTION PANEL.

PROTECTIVE RELAYS PROTECTIVE RELAYS ARE BEING RESET TO PROVIDE BETTER COORDINATION.

BREAKERS TRIP ELEMENTS WERE REPLACED ON SEVERAL 480 VOLT SWITCHGEAR BREAKERS TO OPERATE THE BREAKER WITHIN ITS SHORT CIRCUIT INTERRUPTING RATING.

DIESEL GENERATOR CHANGED THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BLOCK TIMING RELAYS TO MORE ACCURATE SOUD STATE RELAYS.

PAGE 20 MAJOR ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS CONTINUED DIESEL GENERATOR REARRANGED THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BLOCK LOADING SEQUENCES TO IMPROVE THE VOLTAGE DROP DURING STARTING. BLOCK LOADING WAS INCREASED FROM FIVE STEPS TO SIX STEPS.

TRANSFORMERS REPLACEMENT OF THE 4160/480 VOLT ES TRANSFORMERS:

ONE IS COMPLETE.

o ONE IS BEING DONE IN THE FUTURE.

OFFSITE POWER A NEW NON SAFETY POWER SOURCE WAS ADDED TO THE SOUTHWEST BERM.

OFFSITE POWER THE SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS ( SLURS ) HAD THEIR SETPOINT CHANGED TO HELP SOLVE VOLTAGE DROP PROBLEMS.

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CALCULATION WRITE-UPS FROM MARCH 12,1991 i

l NRC/FPC MEETING i

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TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS FOR ELECTRICAL DC SYSTEM REVALIDATION PROGRAM I

A total of thirteen calculations have been prepared and issued in FPC system to complete the Electrical DC System Revalidation

)

Program.

The following is the brief description of all the calculations.

1 1.

E-90-0099 - Class lE Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation

Purpose:

The purpose of this calculation is to verify the adequacy of the capacity or size (number of positive plates / cell) of presently installed 125V DC C&D type LCR-25 batteries and

j evaluate the adequacy of the ampere size of the existing i

i station battery chargers.

Methodoloav:

The adequacy of the equipment is determined from a comparison of actual battery and battery charger sizes to the calculated required battery and battery charger sizes.

Battery sizing and battery charger sizing calculations utilized the i

methodologies described in IEEE Standard 485-1983 and IEEE Standard 946-1985 respectively.

Calculated battery and charger sizes are based on load profiles established for each of the following plant operating scenarios:

I 1.

2-HR design profile with all existing loads prior to I

Refuel 8.

2.

2-HR design profile with loads that will exist after Refuel 8.

3.

4-HR Station Blackout (SBO) loads that will exist after Refuel 8.

2.

E-90-0101 - DC system Short Circuit Calculation

Purpose:

The purpose of this calculation is to determine the maximum fault current levels of the buses on the existing Class lE 250/125V de System for the Pre-Refuel 8 and Post Refuel 8 configuration of the system.

It is the intent of this analysis to check the rating of the de distribution panel bus

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bracing for adequacy and the interrupting ability of protective devices.

Methodoloav:

dcVOLTPRO program perforced the short circuit calculations.

It requires the netwc.*k topology, branch circuit parameters, and equivalent short circuit resistance of the sources of short circuit current of the system analyzed.

Common sources of short circuit current include generators, motors, battery cha rgers, synchronous converters, and electrolytic cells.

Page 2 of 8 Once these are established, dcVOLTPRO transforms the network parameters into a series of simultaneous equations ([E] = [R)

X [I)) and the program obtains a Thevenin's equivalent circuit for each fault and solves for the Thevenin's equivalent current.

Since the main purpose of this study is to check the adequacy of the rating of the de distribution panel bus bracing and the interrupting ability of protective devices, the most stringent operating condition is considered.

All motors which could possibly contribute to the fault are assumed to be operating prior to the fault.

This includes valves, back up de pumps, alternate de air compressors, and spring charging motors of switchgear breakers that could trip at the same time.

The 250/125 dc system is subject to three different types of faults.

1.

Line to neutral fault.

2.

Line to line fault.

3.

Line to line to neutral fault.

Among the three types of faults, the line to line to neutral fault was considered to be the worst short circuit current producing fault and the calculated short circuit current values are based on this scenario and most conservative assumptions such as:

1.

Battery chargers ampere contribution to be 125% of the rating.

2.

Batte.'f chargers float voltage to be 132V dc.

3.

Short circuit contributions for the MOVs and breaker spring charging motors are included for conservatism even though these motors have a short time, intermittent duty operation.

4.

Battery temperature factor of 1.02.

5.

Battery aging factor of 1.0, etc.

This calculation determined the fault levels on the trains A and B systems for pre Refuel 8 and post Refuel 8 loading conditions.

3.

E-90-0100 - DC System Voltage profile Calculations Puroose :

The purpose of this calculation is to analyze voltage drops on the Class 1E, 250/125V de system and identify instances when the voltage across the Class 1E inverter and motor loads in the de system are outside the manuf acturers' recorcended limit for proper operation.

Only the minimum operating voltage for the equipment is a concern for this study because the study is based upon the battery chargers not being available to support the operation of the battery.

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I Page 3 of 8 This calculation also determines whether the voltages across the termi6als of the Class IE 250/125V de batteries 3A and 3B prior to and after the Refuel 8 outage and during the worst i

loading scenario are within the limits identified in Section 8.2.2.6 of the Final Safety Analysis Report and the Design

)

Basis Document for the Class lE dc System.

Methodoloav-The voltage profile of the de system is calculated by dcVOLTPRO program.

This program is applicable to radial type j

system applications only.

The program obtains the de system topology, branch data parameters and load profile from the master data base.

The data along with the cable impedance (resistance) data and battery discharge characteristics from the library database file are used in'a system solution to determine the bus and load voltages and currents at each time interval defined in the battery duty cycle.

dcVOLTPRO calculates the per unit resistance, converts it to per unit admittance, resolves the system data into the equation listed below, then solves for [E).

i

[I) = [Y)

• [E)

To compensate for the non-linear characteristics of the r

battery and the effect of voltage dependent loads, dcVOLTPRO i

uses an iterative method of solution for calculating systems voltage or current for each tine interval of the duty cycle.

The iteration continues until the difference between the assuned value and the resulting value is between +0.2 and -0.2 percent.

This calculation calculates the voltages and currents at each panel and major power loads, such as inverters and motors, of the de system for the following scenarios.

a.

Loss of off-site power with loss of coolant accident (LOOP /LOCA) considering the system configuration prior to i

the Cycle 8 Refueling Outage (Pre Refuel 8, 2-HR).,The battery chargers are unavailable as the diesel generator fails to start.

b.

Ih0P/LOCA considering the system configuration after the Cycle 8-Refueling Outage (Post Refuel 8,

2-HR)..

The battery chargers are unavailable as the diesel generator fails to start.

c.

Four-hour Station Blackout (SBO) considering the system configuration after the Cycle 8 Refueling Outage (Post Refuel 8, 4-HR).

During the Cycle 8' Refuel Outage, a large portion of the non-1E loads on the dc system will be moved to a new non-1E de system with its own battery.

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Page 4 of 8 The voltage of the components in the de control circuits such as auxiliary relays, starters, lights, etc. are calculated and analyzed in another calculation.

4.

E-90-0103 - DC Control Circuit Voltage Drop Calculation

Purpose:

The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate the adequacy of the calculated operating voltage available at individual Class 1E dc control circuit components during their required time of operation.

The operating voltage available at individual Class IE de control circuit components is calculated for the 2-Hour Design Profile for all loads (safety-related and non safety-related) connected to the safety-related batteries (2-Hour, Pre-Refuel 8), for the 2-Hour Design Profile for safety-related and those non safety-related loads that are to remain connected to the safety-related batteries (2-Hour, Post Refuel 8), and for the 4-Hour Station Blackout scenario for safety-related loads and those non safety-related loads that are to remain connected to the safety-related batteries (4-Hour, Post Refuel 8).

The analyses of these. three plant operating scenarios included the evaluation of those Class 1E dc control circuits that operate under conditions of ac power unavailable and those Class 1E de control circuits that operate under conditions of ac power available (battery chargers in service).

Methodoloov:

The program "VDROP" was used to calculate the operating voltages at safety-related dc control circuit devices.

In order to calculate the operating voltages at de control components in any safety-related circuit resistance diagrams were developed.

The resistance diagrams were generated through a five-step process:

1.

Analysis of the elementary (schematic) diagrams, which represent the operation of the de system control circuit devices, to deter.nine which devices would be operating and to identify any mutually exclusive devices (i.e. two or more devices that cannot operate simultaneously).

2.

Review of the elementary diagram to identify any devices other than cables (i.e. resistors and fuses) which will contribute to the voltage drop to an operating control circuit device.

3.

Review of the block diagram (s) associated with a given elementary diagram to identify the control circuit cable number (s) and the cable conductors required for the operation of the various control circuit components.

j Page 5 of 8 4.

Review of the CR3 Cable Inventory and the CR3 Cable l

Routing Circuit List to determine conductor lengths and sizes for the control circuit cable number (s) identified in item 3 above.

5.

Manual calculations of cable resistances (lengths) were performed for alternative current paths to each operating control circuit component to identify the worst case resistance (maximum voltage drop) path.

It should be noted that worst case resistance (maximum voltage drop) path is determined with consideration of both the magnitude of current flowing through a given cable and the size and length of that cable.

The final version of the Resistance Diagrams represent the worst case operating situation for an individual control circuit.

That is, they represent the simultaneous operation of control devices at their worst case current (inrush if applicable) values with the highest resistance current path (maximum voltage drop) to the device.

VDROP Proaram Operation The VDROP computer program finds the equivalent circuit resistances using standard resistance reduction methods and, for any given source bus voltage, calculates the cable voltage drops and available operating voltages at the de load component terminals based on nodal analysis using basic electrical circuit theory (i.e. Kirchoff's Law).

Since the computer program can be used for calculating ac or de voltage drop, a power factor of one (1.0) and a phase angle of zero (0 degrees) were input for de circuit evaluations.

Output Reports

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Each Resistance Diagram corresponding to a particular 125-volt battery section (i.e.,

Battery "A"

Positive, Battery "A"

j Negative, Battery "B" Positive, and Battery "B" Negative) has a maximum of six sets of output reports.

The first set of i

output reports was produced for calculations which considered all de loads for a given batiery section for the 2-Hour Design

)

Profile scenario and for a given battery section for ac~ j5ower unavailable conditions (2-Hour, Pre-Refuel 8). The second set of output reports was produced for calculations which considered all safety-related loads and those non safety-related loads which were to remain on the safety-related batteries for the 2-Hour Design Profile scenario for a given battery section for ac power unavailable conditions (2-Hour, Post-Refuel 8).

The third set of output reports was produced for calculations which considered all safety-related loads and those non safety-related loads which were to remain on the safety-related batteries for the 4-Hour Station Blackout scenario for a given battery section for ac power unavailable conditions (4-Hour, Post Refuel 8).

The fourth, fifth, and

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sixth set of output reports are similar to the first three sets except they are for ac power (battery charger) available conditions.

The Results of Circuit Evaluation Report provides a summary by resistance Diagram, component tag, component operating voltage ranges, component calculated operating voltage values, and an identification of which components have a calculated operating voltage below the minimum recommended operating voltage.

5.

E-90-0102 - DC System Coordination Calculation Pu rpose:

The purpose of this calculation is to determine whether there is selective time-current coordination between dc System protective devices and whether dc System cables are protected from overload and short circuit conditions.

In general, this calculation evaluates the following concerns:

1.

Are the ampacity rating of the feeder cables adequate relative to their steady state loads?

2.

Are the ampere ratings of the branch circuit fuses adequate relative to the branch circuit cables' derated, continuous current rating?

3.

Is each branch circuit cable protected by its branch circuit fuses from the flow of short circuit current in the event of a fault?

4.

Will the fuse protecting the branch circuit cable clear a fault, rather than the fuse protecting the feeder circuit cable to the dc Distribution Panel, in the event i

of a fault on the branch circuit (i.e.

fuses are selective)?

Methodoloov:

To satisfy the purpose of the calculation, the following six bases were developed:

1.

Whether the derated current carrying capacity of, the branch circuit cable exceeds 125% of its load's steady state current value and whether the derated current carrying capacity of the feeder cable to a

de Distribution Panel exceeds the main bus ampere rating of j

the panel, i

2.

Whether the derated current carrying capacity of the branch circuit cable exceeds the ampere rating of a fuse one size smaller than the installed branch circuit fuse.

3.

Whether the peak let-thru current values of the branch circuit fuses are less than, or equal to, the short circuit withstand current rating of the branch circuit cable at.008 seconds.

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+e Page 7 of 8 4.

Whether the short circuit current curve for each feeder circuit cable exceeds, for all current values, the melting time-current curve for the fuse of the feeder circuit to the de Distribution Panel containing the i

branch circuit under fault.

In addition, the peak let-thru current of the fuse for the feeder circuit is compared to the sum of the peak let-thru current of the worst case branch circuit with which it must coordinate and the summation of the connected current values of all the other branch circuits on the de Distribution Panel.

5.

Whether the melting time-current curve for the fuse of the feeder circuit to the dc Distribution Panel exceeds, for all current values, the adjusted melting time-current curve for the branch circuit protective fuse.

This adjusted melting time-current curve is the melting time curve of the worst case fuse plus the maximum, total connected steady state current (positive side or negative side) on the panel.

This adjustment factor is conservative since it includes the steady state l

contribution of the branch circuit under evaluation.

6.

Whether the melting "I squared-t" value of the fuse of the feeder circuit to the dc Distribution Panel containing the branch circuit under fault, exceeds the sum of the clearing "I squared-t" value of the worst case branch circuit fuse and the "I squared-t" value for.0CE seconds representing the summation of the values of all l

the other branch circuits on the dc Distribution Panel.

In order to conclude that the feeder and branch circuit fuses are selective, the characteristic plots must be drawn to prove that the melting time-current curve for the fuse protecting the feeder cable exceeds the adjusted melting time-current curve for the branch circuit under fault.

In addition, the melting "I squared-t" value of the fuse protecting the feeder j

cable must exceed the adjusted clearing "I squared-t" value of the branch circuit. The adjusted clearing "I squared-t value" is the sum of the clearing "I squared-t value" for the branch circuit fuse under fault and the "I squared-t" value for.008 seconds representing the summation of the values of all the other branch circuits on the de Distribution Panel.

An evaluation was performed in this calculation to satisfy the requirements of Items 1, 2,

and 3 for each branch cable and panel feeder cable and to satisfy the requirements of Items 4, 5, 6 for the worst case branch circuit on each dc Distribution Panel.

6.

E-90-0104 and E-90-0105 - DC Master Database These calculations include the complete master database for the electrical de system.

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Page 8 of 8 7.

E-90-0093 throuch E-90-0098 - Program User.'s Manuals These calculations include the program user's manuals for the six verified / validated computer programs used for performing de system revalidation program calculation described above.

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TECHNICAL DISCUSSION IO2

.I ELECTRICAL M SYSTEM REVALIDATION PROGRAM l

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Title:

CB 2 M short Circuit Analysis:

I This analysis determines the maximum f ault duties at various Pu rpose:

equipment and busses under accident conditions.

The f ault analysis was performed for accident conditions l

4 Methodoloov:

when the plant was operating at full power prior to accident conditions, with the of fsite power available through the CR 3 start-up transformer.

l Under these conditions, all the non safety related busses, the safety related busses and the Reactor Coolant Pumps are on the start-up transformer. Therefore the contribution of nearly all non safety the contribution from nearly all safety related motors is applied, related motors is applied and also the contribution of the RCP motors is applied.

The switchyard contribution is applied to the primary of the 4

For further conservatism the switchyard voltage start-up transfor:er.

is assumed to be 243.6 KV which is the high end of switchyard design voltage.

The analysis was performed using Computer programs Lotus 123 and AFault 300.

All the design information needed to perform short circuit i

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calculations was gathered from. design documents.

As much as possible, l

the design information was field walkdown.

Before inputting the design information into the fault analysis program AFault 300 certain g

calculations were performed using Lotus 123 on the design information to i

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put it in a form acceptable by AFault.

For example, Lotus 123 was used l

to calculate motor Xd" from the motor nameplate information and then changed from naneplate voltage base to bus voltage base.

The Xd" at bus 3

voltage bhse was then input into AFault 300.

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Arault 300 was used to calculate f ault duties at various busses and For 480V level, the symmetrical f ault duties were calculated i

equipment.

i for all safety related as well as non safety related switchgear, Motor l

Control centers and selected distribution panels.

At 4160V and 6900V levels momentary duty utilizing the actual X/R ratio at the fault location was calculated and Interrupting duty for symmetrically rated 5 cycle breakers was calculated.

For relay applications minimum fault 1

duty at 30 cycles was calculated.

The momentary and interrupting duty at the 6900V busses was calculated when fed from the Unit Auxiliary transformer side as well as the start-up transformer side.

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,. -.. _,. ~.,. -.., _ _ -. _.. _.. _..

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Page No. 2 of 5

Title:

CR 3 Voltage Drop and Load Flow Analysis This calculation determines steady-state voltages and loading Purcose:

safety related busses and equipment under anticipated accident and at operating conditions.

The voltage drop and load flow analysis was perfor:ed using Methodolcov:

for several accident and computer programs Lotus 123 and Dapper 1000,non accident scenarios when ES The =ethodology for Transformer or the New Of fsite Source Transformer.

limiting case for each of fsite source and evaluation under minimu-the acceptable ES busses voltage is explained below:

The analysis was perfor=ed for accident conditions when the 1.

plant was operating at full power prior to accident conditions, with Under of fsite power available through the CR 3 start-up transfor=er.

these conditions the loads of non safety related busses, the loads of the safety related busses and the Reactor Coolant Pu=ps are on start-up transformer.

For further conservatism, the switchyard voltage was assumed to be 236.4 KV which is the low end of switchyard design voltage.

J The analysis was perfor=ed for accident conditions when the 2.

plant was operating at full power prior to accident conditions, with of fsite power available through the New Of fsite source transformer.

This transfor:er is rated the same as the CR 3 start-up transformer.

Under these conditions the loads of safety related busses are on the New Of fsite source transformer.

There are no loads from the non safety For related Unit busses or Reactor Coolant Pu=ps on this transformer.

further conservatisn, the switchyard voltage was assumed to be 236.4 KV which is the low cnd of switchyard design voltage.

The analysis was perfor:ed for accident conditions with minimum 3.

acceptable voltage of 3852V at ES 4160V busses.

This minimum acceptable voltage level is the low end of the Second Level Undervoltage Relays i

(SLUR) setpoint.

These relays provide protection against sustained degraded grid conditions.

All the design information needed to perform voltage drop and load flow calculations was gathered from design documents.

As much as the design information was field walkdown.

Before inputting

possible, the design information into voltage drop and load flow program Dapper 1000, loading information was created from design information using Lotus 123.

Where field test information was available, it was used.

In certain cases calculated loading was validated with loading information f rom simulator run.

For miscellaneous loads such as those fed from AC distribution panels it was conservatively assumed that at any given time 75 % of the panel connected load is operating.

Field testing is currently being performed on selected panels to validate this assumption.

Rather than using design cable lengths actual pulled cable lengths were used.

The Program Dapper 1000 was used to calculate voltages at all modelled busses and load flow in all modelled feeders connected to each bus.

The lead flow is in arps, KVA, KVAR and KW.

Page No. 3 of 5

Title:

ACDP breaker, fuse, overload and cable sizing.

Purpose:

This calculation sizes breaker, fuse and overload heaters and also sizes and evaluates protection of the cables feeding the safety related equipment fed from AC distribution panels.

Methodoloav:

Cable Evaluation: For each cable the following evaluations are performed. 12 Cable Derated Arcacity: The cable derated ampacity is calculated.

This calculation accounts for the cable installation (tray or conduit), ambient temperature and any other applicable derating.

22 Cable Recuired Apoacity:The cable required ampacity is calculated at 1.25 times full load a=ps and it is ensured that the dorated a=pacity is equal to or greater than the required ampacity.

12 Cable overload Protection: For thermal magnetic breaker protecting the cable against overload it is evaluated that the derated cmpacity of the cable is equal to or greater than the breaker rating.

Where overload heater is protecting the cable, it is evaluated that the dorated ampacity of the cable is equal to or greater than the overload heater trip range.

12 Cable Short Circuit Protection: The maximum short circuit that the cable will see at the first termination point downstream from the panel is calculated.

This first termination point can be, for example, a terminal box between the panel and load or the termination point at the load.

For termination point between load and panel, the short circuit from the panel side as well as the load side is calculated.

The respective cable section is evaluated for applicable short circuit.

Cable short circuit withstand curves from Std. IEEE 242-1986 are then utilized to evaluate if the cable can withstand this short, circuit bef ore the circuit brea'<er will interrupt the short circuit.

Load Evaluation: The ACDP leads are evaluated as follows for protection:

12 Non Motor Loads: These are normally fed from thermal nagnetic breakers.

The breaker rating is chosen to be the value closest to 1.25 times the full load amps.

The magnetic setting on most of these breakers is not adjustable and is usually 10 to 13 times breaker rating.

22 Ko!2r Loads: The overload protection for the motors is provided by the overload heaters which are sized in accordance with vendor recommendations and any applicable FSAR commitments.

The short circuit protection is provided by adjustable magnetic breakers, that are adjusted to values between 1.6 times locked rotor amps and 13 times full I

load amps.

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Title:

Safety Related AC control circuit voltage drop calculations.

This calculation determines the voltage drop in all ' safety Purnose:

related 120V control circuits and calculates minimum voltage available l

l at the actuating device terminals during steady state and in-rush This minimum voltage is then compared to the minimum conditions.

acceptable voltage rating of the actuating devices and those cases that j

do not meet the design minimum ratings are identified.

Methodoloav:

Create impedance diagrams for all safety-related control 1.

This includes determining basis for preparing impedance 1

circuits.

the worst case circuitry, cable lengths and other pertinent j

diagrams, l

equipment data for each actuating device.

Input voltage at the primary of the control transformer will be 2.

the worst case steady state voltage obtained from CR 3 AC Voltage Drop I

and Load Flow Analysis.

Voltages at the space heaters and indicating light terminals 3.

chall not be calculated; however, the current contributions by these devices shall be included in the voltage drop calculations.

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4.

Develop basis for these calculations.

5.

Based on the results of these calculations, the actuating control voltage at the terminals of these devices during steady state and in-rush conditions will be determined and compared to the minimum acceptable rated voltage.

Devices that do not comply with these minimum ratings will be identified.

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Vital Bus Safety-Related circuit voltage drop calculations.

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Title:

This calculation performs voltage drop calculations for safety l

harcose:

related circuits and determines the voltage at the terminals of I

Source actuating devices during steady state and in-rush conditions.

vital bus panel voltage will be assumed minimum output voltage rating of the inverter.

i Create impedance diagrams for all safety-related circuits fed Methodolocy:

This includes determining basis for 1.

from vital bus distribution panels.

the worst case circuitrv, cable lengths.

preparing impedance diagrams, and other pertinent equipment data for each actuating device.

Source Vital bus panel. voltage will be assumed minimum output 2.

voltage rating of the inverter.

l Develop basis for these calculations.

3.

Based on the results of these calculations, the voltage at the 4.

1 terminals of the actuating devices during steady state and in-rush

)

conditions will be determined and compared to minimum acceptable rated Devices that do not comply with these minimum ratings will be l

voltage.

l identified.

Vital Bus Distribution Panels Circuit Breaker / Fuse and cable

Title:

sizing calculations.

This calculation determines the coincidental load on each

Purpose:

cafety-related circuit fed from the vital bus distribution panels and determines the size of each breaker / fuse combination is adequate from as well-as the' l

overload protection standpoint to protect the load (s)

Vital bus short circuit protection has already been reviewed cable.

under calculaticn I-90-0034, Rev.0 1

Methodolocy:

Develop the criteria and basis f or performing the calculation.

l 1.

Cable derated ampacity shall be determined in accordance with 2.

i FPC cable design criteria.

3.

For each panel, calculate the coincidental load on each cafety-related circuit and determine the adequacy of the breaker / fuse sizes to protect cables and loads against overload.

Identify circuits that do not have adequate breaker / fuse sizes 4.

to protect cables and/or loads.

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' Dig g 6 8 W v s2 C s/= /n Page 1 o'f 5 TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS OF t

AC PROTECTIVE DEVICES COORDINATION STUDY i

Hich. Medium and Low Voltaces Protective Devices Coordination 1.

Calculations i

Puroose:

a)

Review existing protective devices set points from the selectivity standpoints.

This should include review of additions and/or changes to power distribution l

transformers, unit auxiliary buses and power distribution center connected loads.

Complete selectivity is the ultimate goal, although compromises may have to be made due to existing breaker j

characteristics, equipment features and criteria j

instructions.

I b)

Prepare new time current curves to show coordination of all breakers.

c)

Prepare new calibration data sheets for those devices 1

i whose existing settings are different than the calculated I

settings.

d)

Prepare new calibration data sheets for each air power circuit breaker in the facilities, in 480V system.

e)

Provide supporting documentation for tasks (a) through (d).

Methodoloav:

l 1)

Developed 6900V and 4160V motor protective relays setting criteria in accordance with the guidelines of Westinghouse PRSC-2C, July 1986, ANSI Standard C-3.7.96 and NEC Code 1984, Section 430.

This included the settings of:

a)

Time Unit b)

Standard Instantaneous Unit i

c)

HI-Dropout Instantaneous Unit d)

Time Dial e)

Instantaneous Ground Overcurrent Relay f)

Self-Balance Differential Relay 2)

Developed the criteria for 480V system protective devices coordination set poin's in accordance with NEC Codes 1990, Articles 430, IEEE Standard 242-1975 and ANSI Standard C37.96-1976.

This included the criteria for-r

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Motor Feeder Breakers (Devices 51, 50, 49) b)

Feeder Breakers (Device 52) c)

Tie Breakers (Device 51) l d)

Main Breakers (Protected by non-directional phase.

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over current relays.)

e) 4.16kv/480V Transformers i

3)

Developed the standardized forms for facilitating the l

performance of calculations of different types of protective devices in a consistent manner.

4)

Plot the relays and breakers characteristic curves to ascertain proper coordination with down stream protective devices and cable damages curves is achieved.

5)

Prepare the new calibration data sheets for those protective devices which have different settings than the l

calculated settings.

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In the 480V system, prepare.the new calibration data l

sheets for all the protective devices irrespective of l

whether the settings are different or not from the i

existing settings. This is because of the revised format of the calibration data sheets.

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7)

A total of nine (9) calculations-have been prepared and issued in the system.

'Ihese include all the protective j

devices for i

a)

Start-up and Unit Auxiliary Transformers

(

b) 230kv Plant Line 4 l

c)

Main Generator and Emergency Diesel-Generators d) 6.)kv Unit Auxiliary Buses and 6.9kv Motors e) 4.16kv Unit Buses and 4.16kV Motors

(

l 8)

Eight (8) more calculations are being prepared for 480V j

system power distribution centers, 480V motors, and 4.lEkv/480V unit transformers protective devices.

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E-90-0034 REY 0 VITAL BUS FAULT ANALYSIS PURPOSE The analysis determines the ability of the fuses located on Vital Bus distribution panels to clear faults at the load when the panels are fed from the regulating transformer.

Cable overcurrent protection for i

continuous loads is not addressed by this calculation.

i METHODOLOGY 1)

Construct circuit model.

2)

Calculate transformer impedance, Vital Bus panel impedance and cable impedance.

3)

For each panel, determine the minimum fault current by selecting the cable fed from the panel with the highest impedance and then using the model, reduce the combination of series and parallel impedances to an equivalent impedance and by current division, and find the current through the faulted cable.

5)

Determine if the fuse will clear within 0.01 seconds by utilizing the appropriate melting time vs. current curves.

i In order to avoid the necessity of determining the fault clearing capability of every circuit on the panel, the following reasoning is used:

The circuit with the highest impedance on the panel also i

represents the minimum fault current on the panel for all other circuits that utilize the same size fuse.

If the circuit with the minimum fault current will clear, then all other circuits (which have a smaller impedance and thus higher fault current) with the same size fuse will clear also and need not be analyzed individually.

j Therefore, after the circuit with the minimum fault current for each panel is determined, the remainder of the panel is analyzed by categorizing the panel circuits by fuse size and selecting the circuit with the highest impedance for each fuse size. The fault current for this circuit is calculated and compared with the fuse melting time curves for fuse clearing time. This process is repeated for every fuse size class for each panel.

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3.

E-90-0075 REV 0 MCC CONTROL TRANSFORMER FUSE SIBING t

i PURPOSE i

This calculation determines if the existing control transformer fuses

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are sized properly and are capable of protecting the control transformers located in the motor control centers.

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i METHODOLOGY' j

1)

Control transformer fuse criteria is established by using the vendor instruction manuals and the appropriate section of the National Electric Code (NEC), 1990.

2)

The rating of fuses currently installed in the McC's are' verified I

by walkdown and are tabulated in the calculation.

3)

The installed fuses are compared with the established control transformer fuse criteria.

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Page 5 of 5

Title:

Motor Control Centers i

Puroose:

This calculation sizes the overload elements, instantaneous breakers, thermomagnetic breakers and the magnetic setting for each motor control center loads.

Methodolocy:

i Field data was gathered during the first six months of 1989.

The actual field data was used to verify design information on the drawing.

When there was a discrepancy, the field device was again read. This verified field data was used in place of the drawing information when there was a difference.

The motor nameplate was used along with the manufacturers recommended methodology to establish the overload size.

Additional conservatism was added as covered in the FSAR.

The maximum asymmetrical in-rush current was also calculated.

The breaker instantaneous setting was selected between this value and 13 time motor full load current (NEC requirement).

For non-noter loads, the load current was established and the thermomagnetic breaker was selected per the NEC.

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i FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION EDSFI AWARENESS i

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MARCH 16,1993 5

)

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PAGE 2 AWARENESS ACTIVITIES FLORIDA POWER HAS BEEN PROACTIVE IN MAINTAINING l

AWARENESS OF EDSFI ACTIVITIES SINCE 1989.

WE HAVE DEVELOPED AND COMPLETED THE ELECTRICAL CALCULATION PROGRAM.

WE HAVE REVIEWED THE REPORTS ON EDSFI INSPECTIONS PERFORMED.

WE ARE ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE EDS CLEARINGHOUSE, WHICH REllES ON DEVONRUE FOR ITS TECHNICAL EXPERTISE.

THE SUMMER OF 1991 OUR QUALITY PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT PERFORMED A SELF ASSESSMENT AUDIT. THE NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS (TI) WERE USED AS A GUIDELINE.

DEVONRUE WAS USED AS A CONSULTANT.

THE ACTIVITY TOOK APPROXIMATELY 3 WEEKS.

THERE WERE 10 OPEN ITEMS AND 3 OBSERVATIONS.

a PAGE 3 AWARENESS ACTIVITIES (continued)

OVER 300 POTENTIAL QUESTIONS WERE PLACED IN A DATA BASE ( NOT 300 DIFFERENT QUESTIONS AS SOME WERE SIMILAR BUT STATED

]

DIFFERENTLY). THESE QUESTIONS CAME FROM TWO SOURCES:

130 QUESTION DATA BASE FROM OUR SELF ASSESSMENT WAS CAPTURED.

180 POTENTIAL QUESTIONS WERE DEVELOPED FROM REVIEWING THE NRC EDSFI INSPECTION REPORTS.

A TEAM WAS ESTABLISHED TO EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO THE 300 QUESTIONS.

FLORIDA POWER IS CONTINUING IT AWARENESS ACTIVITIES ON EDSFl:

l NRC NEW EDSFI INSPECTIONS.

MAINTAIN CURRENT ALL OF THE ANSWERS TO THE 300 QUESTIONS TO ENSURE WE STILL HAVE THE BEST ANSWERS.

1 SHARPENING OUR TECHNICAL SKILLS.

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THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (SLIDE).

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EXAMPLE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS l

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SEISMIC ADEOUACY ASSEMBLED ORIGINAL, OR RECREATED SEISMIC CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSES ON KEY COMPONENTS:

e HVAC DUCTWORK (ROOM COOUNG AND COMBUSTION AIR).

e ENGINE-GENERATOR SK!D.

e RADIATOR-FAN ASSEMBLY.

e LUBE OIL FILTERS AND STRAINERS.

e FUEL OIL DAY TANKS AND UNDERGROUND TANKS.

AIR COMPRESSOR SKID.

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UPGRADED LUBE OIL COOLERS.

II.

FUEL OIL STORAGE AND AVAILABILITY:

e CONFIRMED ADEOUACY OF FUEL OIL STORAGE TO SUPPORT OPERATION OF ONE DIESEL FOR SEVEN (7) DAYS.

e CONFIRMED FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP CAPACITY EXCEEDS WORST l

CASE FUEL CONSUMPTION RATE. ( PUMPS ARE IN THE ISI PROGRAM).

CONFIRM ADEOUACY OF FUEL OIL TANK LEVEL MONITORING AND l

ADMINISTRATIVE UMITS.

e CONSIDERED AND ADDRESSED POTENTIAL FOR AIR BINDING OF FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMPS (FOCUSED ON MINIMUM USABLE TANK VOLUMES).

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CONFIRMED ADDITION OF BIOCIDE TO STORAGE FUEL i

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I EXAMPLE EMERGtiNCY DIESEL GENERATORS CONTINUED Ill.

EDG, HVAC, AND AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS:

CONFIRMED SINGLE FAILURE PROOF DESIGN (100% REDUNDANT FANS, Fall SAFE DAMPERS).

DETERMINED THE ACTUAL EDG ROOM HEAT LOAD AT RATED CONTINUOUS LOAD BY TEST AND SUPPORTING ANALYSIS.

CONFIRMED ADEQUATE EDG ROOM COOLING WITH AND WITHOUT EDG l

l OPERATION.

ENSURE ACTIVE CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSIS REFLECT THE "AS-BUILT" CONFIGURATION OF THE UPGRADED EDG HVAC SYSTEMS (ROOM COOLING AND COMBUSTION AIR SYSTEMS ARE NOW SEPARATE).

IV.

EDG AUXILIARY SYSTEMS:

CONFIRMED DESIGN BASIS AND ADEOUACY OF EDG AIR START SYSTEM.

CONFIRMED ACCEPTABILITY OF INSTRUMENT SETPOINTS (AIR START, LUBE OIL THERMOSTATS, SWITCHES AND ALARMS, JACKET COOLING THERMOSTATS, SWITCHES AND ALARMS).

CONFIRM ACCEPTABILITY OF EDG FAN COOLING SYSTEM (RADIATORS) IN MAXIMUM EXPECTED AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURES.

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j CONCLUSIONS WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROGRAM WE HAVE NEARLY COMPLETED t

WAS VERY WELL CONCEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN COSTLY.

WE HAVE INVESTED OVER 100,000 MANHOURS AND 5.5 MS, THUS FAR, IN DEVELOPING THE l

PROGRAM.

THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE COST OF THE i

IMPROVEMENTS WE HAVE, ARE OR WILL BE IMPLEMENTING.

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THUS, WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR COMMITMENT TO INVESTING THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO ASSURE OUR ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS ARE HIGHLY RELIABLE.

i WE HAVE CONTINUED TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO LEARNING FROM INDUSTRY EXPERIENCES IN THIS AREA. UNLIKE OTHER AREAS (EO) WHERE THE NRC FAIRLY CRITIClZED US FOR LOSING l

TRACK OF EVOLVING

CONCERNS, WE HAVE CAREFULLY MONITORED THIS AREA AND RESPONDED TO LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER PLANTS.

WE HAVE GIVEN EMPHASIS TO SELF-ASSESSMENTS IN THIS AREA.

BOTH OUR DESIGN AND SYSTEM ENGINEERING STAFFS HAVE BEEN AGGRESSIVE IN FOLLOWING-UP ON CONCERNS RAISED DURING THE ASSESSMENT.

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,r CONCLUSIONS (CONTINUED) e FPC DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A STANDARD EDSFI IS WARRANTED.

i IE SOME FORM OF EDSFI IS STILL CONSIDERED NECESSARY WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT:

THE RESOURCES COMMITTED BY THE STAFF BE REDUCED TO A SMALLER TEAM.

THE DURATION BE REDUCED.

THE LOCATION BE ADJUSTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE STAFF AND RESOURCES AVAll.ABLE IN OUR ST.

PETERSBURG OFFICE.

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i NRC EDSFI TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION ALL OR THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AT CR-3.

EDG LOAD GROWTH NOT CONTROLLED I

BATTERIES AND INVERTERS NOT MONITORED AND CONTROLLED MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED WITHOUT DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF EDS DESIGN BASIS MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF SYSTEM INTERACTIONS OR SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS INSTALLED WITHOUT 10 CFR 50.59 REVIEW ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS NOT TECHNICALLY ADEOUATE OR

=

REFLECTIVE OF FACILITY CONFIGURATION EQUIPMENT UNDERSIZED PROTECTIVE DEVICES NOT COORDINATED PROTECTIVE RELAY SETPOINT C LCULATIONS e

NOT PERFORMED NOT UPDATED 1

SURVEILLANCE, POST-MODIFICATION AND POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING NOT ADEOUATE COMMERCIAL GRADE OR DIFFERENT COMPONENTS USED WITHOUT PROPER DEDICATION FUSE CONTROL LACKING l

IMPROPERLY SIZED FUSES INSTALLED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS NOT PROPERLY INSTALLED

PAST ISSUES Changes Since Self-Assessment of 1991

. Self assessment performed in December of 1991

" Generic Implications of Reactor Trip Events"

• Resulted in recommendations in the following areas:

Operations Maintenance Training Engineering

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KEY ACTIONS

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TAKEN IN OPERATIONS T

Trained operators on lessons learned from the December 1991 trips.

Established guidance for bypassing ES systems.

Reviewed and balanced shift composition.

Increased the number of Chief Nuclear Operators l

to assure experienced operators remained at the 4

controls.

Many of the CNO's are SRO licensed.

Provide startup training to operating crews prior l

to plant startups from midcycle or refueling outages.

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KEY ACTIONS (continued) l

• Reinforced the roles of the:

Shift supervisor (SRO) - command and control Manager on Call - backup resources / approvals Shift technical advisor - technical advice and event oversight to assist the shift supervisor

• Added new position of Shift Manager Currently on two shifts / day,5 days / week l

Department head level managers, current or ex-SRO i

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• Placed shift technical advisors on-shift i

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KEY ACTIONS

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(Continued)

• Revised annunciator response procedures (ARP's) and emphasized their proper use

• Completed revision to emergency operating procedures (EOP's) - implementation to l

occur in.1993 l

• Made changes to the production organization to:

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Flatten layers and improve communication B.

Improve maintenance support for operations l

C.

Improve engineering support for operations l

D.

Improve outage support for operations i

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