ML20034F279
| ML20034F279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1993 |
| From: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Hehl C, Hodges M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034E974 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9303020542 | |
| Download: ML20034F279 (10) | |
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ATTACliMENT 1 8(paaccg k
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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JMi?6 K3 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Marvin W. Hodges, Director, Division of Reactor Safety Charles W. Hehl, Director, Division of Reactor Projects FROM:
Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) CHARTER -
DEGRADED SHUTDOWN COOLING AT OYSTER CREEK DURING MSIV LEAK RATE TESTING, JANUARY 25,1993.
As a result of an event which degraded shutdown cooling at Oyster Creek on January 25, 1993, NRR and AEOD senior management and I have determined that an' Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection should be conducted to verify the circumstances and evaluate the significance of this event.
The Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) is directed to conduct the AIT with James Beall as the Team Leader. Further, DRS, in coordination with the Division of Reactor Projects, is responsible for the timely issuance of the inspection report, the identincation and processing of potentially generic issues, and the identification and completion of any enforcement action warranted as a result of the Team's review.
Enclosed is the charter for the Augmented Team delineating the scope of this inspection. The inspection shall be conducted in accordance with NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.3, NRC Inspection Manual 0325, Inspection Procedure 93800, and this memorandum. The -
bases for this inspection, per MD 8.3, are: the staff's need to fully understand the causes'of the event and the staff's need to determine if there are potential generic issues. worthy of staff action associated with this event.
Preliminary information indicates that plant conditions were established by procedure to support main steam isolation valve (MSIV) leak rate testing which did not provide'an adequate amount of shutdown cooling. These conditions lasted for an extended period of-time until elevated vessel metal temperatures were noted. Following identincation of these conditions, adequate shutdown cooling and primary containment were rcestablished.
OBJECTIVES l
The general objectives of this AIT are to:
a.
Conduct a timely, thorough and systematic review of the circumstances surrounding.
the event, including the sequence of events that led to and followed the degraded -
shutdown cooling on January 25,1993;
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9303020542 930223 PDR ADOCK 05000219 O
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Marvin W. Ihxiges 2
Charles W. Hehl b.
Collect, analyze, and document relevant data and factual information to determine the
. causes, conditions, and circumstances pertaining to the event, including the response to the event by the licensee's operating staff; Assess the safety significance of the event and communicate to Regional and' c.
Headquarters management the facts and safety concerns related to the problems -
identified; and, d.
Evaluate the licensee's review of and response to the event and planned and implemented corrective actions.
SCHEDULE
.5 The AIT shall be dispatched to Oyster Creek so as to arrive and commence the inspection on January 27,1993. A written report on this inspection shall be provided to me within three weeks of completion of the onsite inspection. During the site portion of the inspection resident and clerical support is available.
TEAM COMPOSITION The assigned team members are as follows:
Team Manager:
Wayne Lanning, DRS Onsite Team Leader:
James Beall, DRS Onsite Team Members:
Scott Stewart, DRS Alex Dromerick, NRR WarTen Lyon, NRR John Kauffman, AEOD j
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<v Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
Augmented Inspection Team Charter
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Enclosure Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Charter Oyster Creek SCOPE OF THE INSPECTIOB The AIT should identify and document the relevant facts and determine the probable causes of the event. It should also critically examine the licensee's response to the event. The Team Leader shall develop and implement a specific, detailed inspection plan.
The AIT should:
a.
Develop a detailed chronology of the event; b.
Determine the root causes of the event as a result of the AIT's evaluation and document equipment problems, failures, communications and/or personnel errors which directly or indirectly contributed to the event.
Potential items to be considered:
Licensee staff actions before, during and following the event. Licensee staff sensitivity.to plant conditions, including indications of degraded cooling or abnormal integrated system performance.
Core and thermohydraulic response for cooling and stratification.
Configuration controls; including the engineering safety evaluation and changes to the procedure for shutdown cooling.
Management oversight and administrative controls to minimize shutdown risk in place before, during and following the event.
Coordination of maintenance and operations activities before and during the event.
Schedular impacts related to the performance of the MSIV leakrate testing, including performance of testing at other, perhaps more critical, times during the outage.
c.
Determine safety significance of the event.
d.
Determine the expected response of the plant and compare it to the actual response.
Oyster Creek AIT Charter c.
Determine the adequacy of the responses of the operations and technical support staffs to the event and the initial licensee analysis, and decisions on NRC notification including event classification and reportability, f.
Determine the management response including the scope and quality of short-term actions and gather information related to the long-term actions intended to prevent recurrence of this event, including internal and external communications / dissemination of licensee-identified concerns and corrective actions.
g.
Determine the relationship of previous events or precursors, if any, to this event.
h.
Determine the potential generic implications of this event and recommended lessons learned, as well as necessity for generic industry communications.
i.
Although not tasked to propose Notice of Violations, sufficient details should be developed to support future enforcement action.
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ATTACHMENT 2 Licensee Personnel Contacted Barton, J., Vice President and Director, Oyster Creek Behrle, W., Technical Functions Site Director, Oyster Creek Blount, T., Licensing Engineer Bradley, M., I&C Superintendent Button, M., Plant Training Instructor Chrissotimos, N., Manager, Operations Support Clark, P., President Croke, B., Shift Technical' Advisor Czaya, P., Site Licensing Manager, Oyster Creek (Acting)
Deshmukh, S., Technical Functions Dunsmuir, S., Control Room Operator
' Fornicola, J., Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Frank, J., Emergency Preparedness Specialist Freeman; J., Group Operating Supervisor Fuller, S., Group Operating Supervisor Gaydos, C., Supervisor, Operations Engineering Hendricksen, B., Operations Engineer Hildebrand, J., Outage Director l
Hutton, G., Group Shift Supervisor Keaton, Vice President, Tech. Functions Kowalski, J., Manager, Plant Training 3
- ' Levin, S., Director, Operations and Maintenance Long, R., Vice President, Corporate Services Mueller, S., Shift Technical Advisor Perry, J., IAgistical Support Manager Pietruski, D., Group Shift Supervisor Ranft, D., Plant Engineering Director Rone, A., Outage Shift Director 1
Scallon, P., Manager, Plant Operations Sinyak, A., Plant Engineering.
Stewart, W., Safety Review Manager Sullivan, J., Director, Independent Safety Review Group Sweezo, K., Control Room Operator 4
Trikouros, N., Technical Functions Vermeylan, J., Control Room Operator Voishnis, G., Group Operating Supervisor Wiley, J., Plant Engineering Wilson, C., Group Shift Supervisor
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Denotes those present at exit meeting on February 8,1993. Other personnel were also contacted.
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ATTACIIMENT 3 Chronology of Events Initial Plant Conditions. January 23.1993 At 1000, the plant was restoring normal cold shutdown conditions after the completion of the reactor vessel (RV) hydrostatic test. The reactor coolant system (RCS) water temperature.
was being decreased from 190 F to about 110*F with depressurization to atmospheric in progress. The RV metal temperatures were 180-190*F and slowly cooling down from the 190-200'F temperatures during the test.
January 23.1993 1122 Remaining operating reactor recirculation pump (B) is secured with shutdown cooling (SDC) at 3100 gpm. Reactor recirculatien loop A was open, providing hydraulic communication between the core area inside the RV shroud and the annulus region between the shroud and the RV wall. The open loop also provided a path for flow to bypass the core.
2200 RV mid-vessel metal temperatures (91" above top of active fuel) reached lowest post-hydro values at about 150*F. The RV head metal temperature was between 180-185 F and slowly decreasing.
LLnuary 24.1993 0700 RV head temperature reached a minimum of about 180*F. RV mid-vessel temperature was about 170*F and increasing.
2250 Main steam isolation valve (MSIV) leak testing procedure initiated, including closure of RV vent and air pressurization of RV to 42.6-45.6 psig. The RV mid-vessel metal temperature was about 200 F. The RV head metal temperature was about 205*F.
hmuary 25.1993 0200 RV pressure initially indicated on-scale (10 psig).
0300 RV pressure entered test band of 42.6 to 45.6 psig. RV mid-vessel metal and head.
t temperatures were both about 205*F.
0700 Control room operators made the first of several small (~ 1") RV level decreases to.
compensate for RV pressure increase (due to heating of the gases in the void space in the upper portion of the RV).
2 1210 RV mid-vessel metal temperature initially exceeded 212*F. RV head temperature was about 210*F.
1630 Completed MSIV testing. RV depressurization begun.
1650 Reached peak RV metal temperature of about 228*F at the mid-vessel point. RV head metal temperature was about 220*F.
1730 - Control room operators informed of RV metal temperatures >212 F. RV 1800 mid-vessel metal temperature was about 225*F and RV head was about 220 F.
Control room operators took prompt actions which rapidly lowered RCS water temperature to about 120 F. RV metal temperatures took longer to decrease, especially the RV head.
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' ATTACHMENT 4 -
Decraded Core Cooline Transient:
10:00 a.m.1/23/93 - 10:00 p.m.1/25/93 240 b'
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WIDE. wide range reactor vessel annulus level REC 1 - recirculation loop temperature-TO7 - reactor vessel metal temperature at 91 inches above top of active fuel P-
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J ATTACIIMENT 5 Degraded Core Cooline Transient 5:00 p.m.1/25/93 - 9:00 o.m.1/25/93 2A0 -
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WIDE - wide range reactor vessel annulus level REC 1 - recirculation loop temperature TO7 - reactor vessel metal temperature at 91 inches above top of active fuel P-
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v ATTACHMENT 6 Corporate Flow Chart g
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'GPU Nuclear Corporate Number Policy and Procedure Manual 1000. ADM.12 91'. 01 Title Safety Review Process.
Revision-No.
5 EXHISIT b Flow Chart for Matrix Sections I and 18 Documents
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