ML20034F047
| ML20034F047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1993 |
| From: | Bernhard R, Cantrell F, Hughey C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034F028 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-92-28, NUDOCS 9303020224 | |
| Download: ML20034F047 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1992028
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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rapart No.:
50-416/92-28
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Jackson, MS 39205
Docket No.:
50-416
License No.: NPF-29
Facility Name:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Inspection Conducted: December 20 1992 through January'16, 1993
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Inspectors:
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R. W.'Bernhard, SenioF Rjsider}t' Inspector
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C. A~.~H ghey, Resident"I(spector
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Approved by:
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.hvf.S.Cfntrell,
Chief
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Reactor Projects Section IB
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope:
The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the following areas:
operational- safety verification; maintenance observation; surveillance
observation; licensee self-assessment capability; and reportable occurrences.
The inspectors conducted backshift inspections on December 28, 1992, and
January 3 and 11, 1993.
Results:
A violation was identified for inadequate. control-room manning when an SR0
left the control room for a short period on January 11, 1993 (Paragraph 3a).
An additional violation was identified for failure to. complete a procedure
during a steam jet air removal rotation, which 'resulted in an unposted very
high radiation area (Paragraph 3b).
Inspections in the areas of maintenance
and surveillance activities did not identify any weaknesses.
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9303020224 930204
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
W. Cottle, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- L. Daughtery,. Superintendent, Plant Licensing
M. Dietrich, Manager, Training
- J. Dimmette, Manager, Performance and System Engineering
- C. Dugger, Manager, Plant Operations
C. Ellsaesser, Assistant 0perations Manager
- C. Hayes, Director, Quality Assurance
- C. Hicks, Operations Superintendent
- C. Hutchinson, General Manager, Plant Operations
- M. Krupa, System Engineering Superintendent
F. Mangan, Director, Plant Projects and Support
M. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Aff airs
D. Pace, Director, liuclear Plant Engineering
- J. Roberts, Manager, . Plant Maintenance
- R. Ruffin, Plant Licensing Specialist
- W. Shelly, Technical Coordinator, Training
Other licensee employees contacted included superintendents,
supervisors, technicians, operators, security force members, and
administrative personnel.
_
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
The plant operated in Mode 1, power operations, during the entire
reporting period. At the end of the reporting period, the unit had been
on-line for 163 consecutive days.
During the week of January 11, 1993, Region II, Division of Radiation
,
Safety and Safeguards, Safeguards Section personnel conducted a review
of Grand Gulf's security and safeguards program. The results of
inspection are contained in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-416/93-01.
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3.
Operational Safety (71707 and 93702)
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of
the plant operating staff. -The. inspectors made frequent. visits to the
control room to review the. status of equipment, alarms, effective LCOs,
temporary alterations, instrument readings, and staffing. Discussions
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were held as appropriate to understand the significance of conditions
observed. . Plant tours were routinely conducted and included ' portions. of.
the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building, radwaste.
building and outside areas.
These observations included safety related
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tagout verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping
and general plant conditions. Additionally, the inspectors observed the
status of fire protection equipment, the control of activities in
prograss, the problem identification systems, and the readiness of the
onsite emergency response facilities.
No deficiencies were identified.
The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the below listed
events:
a.
The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with an incident
in which the control room was not manned by an SRO. The incident
occurred after midnight on January 11, 1993.
Based on a review of operator and security guard written and oral
statements, interviews with involved personnel and their
supervisors, and security card access history printouts, the
inspectors determined the following represents the most likely
sequence of events:
On January 11, 1993, immediately prior to 0040 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />, the control-
room was manned with three SR0s (a shift superintendent, a shift
supervisor and a plant supervisor) and three R0s. At 0040 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />,
the shift superintendent turned over command function to the shift
supervisor and exited the control room' and the control building to
take a break. At 0043 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br />, the shift supervisor turned over
command function to the plant supervisor and joined the shift
superintendent outside the control building.
Based on interviews, the remaining SRO.and the three R0s heard a
very loud disturbance outside the east door (0C503) of the control
room at approximately 0050 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. The disturbance was interpreted
to be the sounds of a female under extreme duress.. The SRO and
two of the three R0s responded by proceeding to and opening door
0C503. This door is functional but is very rarely used and exits -
into the_RCA of the plant. The operators called from the doorway.
up a stairwell to the source ofl the disturbance and received no
response. The plant supervisor stated that at this time he was
still concerned that a woman was being beaten and exited through
the control room door to be in a better position to look up the
stairs. The plant supervisor also stated that he was the only
person present with the proper dosimetry to enter the RCA.
He
then gained the attention of two security guards positioned.in the
stairwell. They told him that everything was fine and that they
had trouble with a door (OC619) while performing a routine weekly
security door surveillance. The plant supervisor stated that he
then realized that the R0s had closed door 0C503. At that time he
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proceeded through the turbine building and through the routine
exit point of the RCA instead of reentering the control room.
through door 0C503.
(Reentry of the control room from the RCA
would have also been a violation of plant procedures.) He entered
the control building elevator to return to the control room. The
elevator stopped at the ground elevation, and the shift
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superintendent and the shift supervisor, who were returning from
their break, entered the elevator. All returned to the control
room.
Security Card access histories indicated that all three SR0s
reentered the control room at 0055 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br />.
The control room was
not manned by an SR0 for approximately five minutes. During this
period the plant was in Mode 1, at 100% power, with no significant
activities occurring in the plant.
Written and oral statements by the two security guards involved
indicated that while performing a weekly security door check on
OC619, the female officer was trapped inside the room and could-
not exit because of mechanical problems with the door. This door.
allows entry to the control room envelope in the ceiling spaces
above the control. room and contains a small concrete landing and
some electrical cable trays.- The false ceiling of the control
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room can be seen from this landing. There is no lighting in'this
room.
In order to gain the attention of her co-worker on the
other side of the very heavy door, the officer called very loudly,
banged on the door palm switch and manipulated the door handle.
These noises and the noises from the officer's radio, were
transmitted through the false ceiling and were interpreted by the
control room operators as a female in distress. After several
minutes, her co-worker opened the door from the outside and freed
her. This corresponds to the time when the plant supervisor ~
gained their attention by calling up the stairs after'he had
exited the control room.
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10 CFR Part 50.54(m)(2)(iii), requires, in part, that when a
nuclear power unit is in an operational mode other than cold
shutdown or' refueling, as defined by the unit's technical
specifications, each licensee'shall have a person holding a Senior
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Operator License for the nuclear power unit-in the control room at
all times.
In addition, Technical Specification 6.2.2.b requires,
in part, that while the reactor is in operational condition 1, 2
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or 3, at least one licensed shall be in the control room.
This matter was identified as violation 50-416/92-28-01, Failure
to properly man the control room with an SRO.
b.
The inspectors revs?wed an event that could have resulted in
inadvertent exposur to plant personnel. Health Physics, while
conducting surveys of the_'A' SJAE room on December 27, 1992,~
discovered higher than normally expected radiation levels. The
room was posted as a Radiation Area following surveys taken after
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a SJAE swap over on December 22, 1992, but remained under the
control of a locked door as if it were still a-Very-High _ Radiation
Area.
Radiation levels surveyed on December 27, 1992, would have
required a Very High Radiation Level posting.
Records _ indicated
that no one entered the' room between the two surveys.
Investigation into the cause of the higher than normal _ radiation
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readings showed a valve not properly positioned.
Valve N64 F201A
had not been repositioned as required by step 5.1.2.11 in
procedure S0104-1-01-N62-1, Condenser Air Removal, Revision 37,
dated February 24, 1992. Upon discovery, operations reestablished ~
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the air purge on the ' A' SJAE, allowed the room radiation levels
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to return to normal, and closed the valve. This failure to
perform a procedure step was identified as violation 50-416/92-28-
02.
Operation's failure to perform this step could have resulted
in unnecessary exposure to an individual entering the area posted
at lower radiation level than actually existed.
c.
On January 14, 1993, the inspectors directly observed control room
activities during a power reduction from 100% to 60%.
Power was-
reduced to facilitate the repair of some steam leaks associated
with the main turbine moisture separator / reheaters. The inspector
verified that the applicable steps of Integrated Operating
Instruction (101) 03-1-01-2, Power Operations, Revision 33, were
followed during the downpower.
Effective command and control
along with good communications and annunciator response was
observed during this plant manipulation.
d.
On January 3,1993, the inspectors observed control room and plant
activities associated with adjustment of the Plant Service Water
system flows and pressures.
Prior to performance of system
adjustments, briefings were given to the plant operators to insure
personnel understood the possible effects of the adjustments.
Good command and control was exercised by the operations staff.
The inspectors identified' procedural weaknesses, which have been
corrected.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the
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maintenance activity listed below.
The observations included a review
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of the MWO and other related documents for adequacy; adherence to
procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quality controls,
and radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting; and
specified retest requirements.
MWO
DESCRIPTION
079712
Reset open limit switch to stop valve stroke for
lE5-F013.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the
inspections in this area indicated that maintenance activities were
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effective.
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5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillance
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listed below.
The observation included a review of the procedures for
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technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications and LCOs;
verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part
of the actual surveillance; removal and return to service of the system
or component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
acceptance criteria.
06-RE-lC51-0-0001, Rev 31.
Local Power Range Monitor
Calibration.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The observed surveillance
test was performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of
the Technical Specifications.
6.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700)
The event report listed below was reviewed to determine if the
information provided met the NRC reporting requirements. The
determination included adequacy of event description, the corrective
actions taken or planned, the existence of potential generic problems
and the relative safety significance of each event. The inspectors used
the NRC enforcement guidance to determine if the event met the criterion
for licensee identified violations.
On January 8,1993, the licensee notified the Environmental Protection
Agency and the State of Mississippi of an oil spill from a spare
transformer stored onsite within the owner controlled area. 'The
transformer oil contained polychlorinated biphenyl compounds (PCBs).
The resident inspector was notified and a four hour notification was
made by the licensee to the NRC Operations Center per 10 CFR 50.72
(b)(2)(vi).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 19, 1993,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed-by
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the inspectors during this inspection.
The licensee had no comment on.
the following inspection findings:
Item Number
Description and Reference
50-416/92-28-01
Failure to properly man the control
room with an SR0
50-416/92-28-02
Failure to complete procedure for -
SJAE swap over
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Acronyms and Initialisms
ADHRS -
Alternate Decay Heat Removal System
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Automatic Depressurization System
APRM -
Average Power Range Monitor
ATWS -
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
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Boiling Water Reactor
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Control Rod Drive
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Design Change Package
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Diesel Generator
ECCS -
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Engineering Safety Feature
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Flow Control Valve
HPCS -
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Hydraulic Power Unit
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Instrumentation and Control
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IFI
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Inspector Followup Item
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LC0
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Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
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Licensee Event Report
LLRT -
Local Leak Rate Test
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Low Pressure Core Injection
LPCS -
. Low Pressure Core Spray
MNCR -
Material Nonconformance Report
MSIV -
MWO
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Maintenance Work Order
NPE
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Nuclear Plant Engineering
NRC
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PCB
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Polychlorinated Biphenyls
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Pressure Differential Switch
P&ID -
Piping and Instrument Diagram
PSW
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Plant Service Water
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Quality Deficiency Report -
RCIC -
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
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Radiologically Controlled Area
R0
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Reactor Operator
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Radiation Work Permit
SBLC
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System Operating Instruction
Senior Reactor Operator
SR0
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Standby Service Water
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Temporary Change Notice
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Technical Specification
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