ML20034E315
| ML20034E315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1980 |
| From: | Malsch M NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034E275 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436 2.206, SECY-A-80-15, NUDOCS 9302250293 | |
| Download: ML20034E315 (82) | |
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3 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 ADJUDICATORY secy_,.so. 3 aamuary n, uso COMMISSIONER ACTION For:
Tue Cv w isolvu From:
Martin G. Malsch, Deputy General Counsel
Subject:
REVIEW OF DIRECTOR'S DENIAL UNDER 10 CFk
Facility:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
Purpose:
To inform the Cocaission of a Director's Decision dich
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Review Time Expires:
February 6, 1980 Discussion:
Tne Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy (TCSE) filed four letters with the NRC (April 24, May 23, June 12, and July 9, 1979) urging that the Davis-Besse operat-ing license be modified to upgrade e:ergency planning and preparedness, especially with regard to 10-mile planning zones -detailed in the joint
!GC/ EPA Task Force Report, !a EG-0396.
The nine allegations, summarized in Appendix D of the Director's Decision, are all directed at the licensee's performance under existing requirements, such as the adequacy of arrangements with off-site personnel, assignments to particular employees, drills, etc.,
and proposed changes, such as the EPZ concept and other specific items found in the !1RC proposed rules.
TCSE re-quested that !EC shut down the reactor information in this record es dMebd pending revisions to the emergency plan.
in a:cordancn with the heedom of inbrmati:n Act, ccmptions In responding to the TCSE request, f01A -
92 - VJ6 Mr. Denton specifically found that Davis-Besse now meets all current NRC requirements and its operation does not constitute an undue risk to the public
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health and safety.
However, Mr. Denton J
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Contact:
b rk E. Chopko, GC b
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l emergency-planning! requirements for-allofacilities-and that Davis-Besse's i
emergency' capabilities. including..it_s j
particular plans for-upgrading emergency-j preparedness and coordination with State.
j and local officials, would be speci--
t fically reviewed by an:lRR site-team in-early 1980. - See Director's. Decision,-:
Appendices A TT.. Accordingly,: the.
- l requested relief was judged unnecessary.
and, therefore, denied.
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_j Recommendation:
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l Martin C; Malsch
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Deputy General Counsel Attachments:
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Director's Denial, 1/17/80 2.
Ltrs, 4/24,: 5/23, 6/12
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7/9/79, fra Toledo
~i Coalition
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Ltra, 6/8 & '7/16/79, from
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t 3-Comissioners' coments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by l
c.o.b. Wednesday, February 6, 1980.
Cornission Staff Office coments, if any, should be submitted to the Cornissioners NLT February 4,1980, with an information copy to the Off 'e of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and concent, the Cornissioners and.the Secretariat should be apprised of when cornents may be expected.
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Uf41T E D STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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January 17, 1980 Docket No. 50-346 l
Mr. Terry J. Lodge, Chaiman TCSE Legal Action Comittee P. O. Box 4545 Toledo, Ohio 43620
Dear Mr. Lodge:
In rny letter to you dated June 27, 1979, I indicated that a portion of-your petition on behalf of the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy had been separated out for treat:nent under 10 CFR 2.206 and that the remainder had been forvarded to the Secretary of the Comission for docketing as a petition for rulemaking.
I have considered the subject matters addressed in your petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 to modify the coerating license of the Davis-Besse plar.t.
At the present time the Davis-Eesse Emergency Plan sneets current regulatory requirements. However, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission is taking irrnediate steps to upgrade the emergency plans for all operating nuclear power plants, including Davis-Eesse.
On this basis, I have concluded that the institution of proceedings to modify the operating license for Davis-Besse and to hold public hearings on this raatter are not called for.
A discussion of the actions being taken by.the NRC and the reasons.for this decision are enclosed.
Also enclosed is a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
Sincerely, s:n A
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.205 2.
Notice cc w/ enclosures: See next page
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f Toledo Edison Company cc w/ enclosure (s):
Mr. Donald H. Hauser. Esq.
Director, Technical Assessnent The Cleveland Electric Division Office of Radiation Programs.
Illuminating Company t
P. O. Box 5000
-(AW-455).
Cleveland, Ohio' 44101 U.- S. Environmental-Protection Agency Crysta) Kali 12 Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
' Arlington, Virginia 20460 Shaw, Pittman, Potts U. S. -Environmental Protection Agency and Trowbridge Federal Activities Branch 1800 M Street., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036-Region V Office ATTN: -EIS COORDINATOR 230 South Dearborn Street Leslie Henry, Esq.
Fuller, Seney, Henry and Hodce Chicago, Illinois 60604 -
300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43604 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Ohio Department of Health Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division ATTN: Director of Health Suite 420, 7735 Old Georgetown Road 450 East ic e Street Bethesda, Paryland 20014 Columbus, Ohio. 43216 f
Mr. Lowell E. Roe.
Ica Rupp Public Library Vice. President, Facilities -
i 310 Madison Street yQel p ent Port Clinton,0hio 43452 Edison Plaza-3 President, Board of County Corr,issioners of Ottawa-County
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Por: Clinton, Ohio 43452 Hon. Toby floffett;- Chairnan Attorney General Subcornittee on Environment. Energy and Department of Attorney General Natural Resources 30 East Broad Street Comittee on Government Operations i
Columbus, Ohio 43215 United States-House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515 Harold Kahn, Staff Scientist Power Siting Corr.ission 361 East Broad Street
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Columbus, Ohio 43216 lir, Rick Jagger Industrial Commission State of Ohio 2323 9est 5th Avenue
.t Columbus, Ohio 43216 Mr. Ted !1yers Licensing Engineer i
Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 fiadison Avenue Toledo, 0hio 43652 4
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA fidCLEAR REGULATORY CO'ftISSION 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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i HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR i
In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-346 THE TOLEDO EDISON COPPANY AND THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIKATING l
(10 CFR 2.206) i COMPANY (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, b
Unit No.1)
)
f DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 by letters dated April 24, May 23 June 12, and July 9,1979,
, Terry J. Lodge, on behalf of the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy (TCSE),
f petitioned for modification of the operating license for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1.
In thes_e various letters, TCSE generally asserts that the Davis-Besse facility.has_ inadequate emergency and_ evacuation plans._
TCSE requested in its June 12th letter that the Comission treat portions of TCSE's earlier letters as a petition for rulemaking to be consolidated with the petition filed by Critical Mass Energy Project, el al., in Docket No. PFJi 50-23.
TCSE asked that the remaining portions of its April 24th, May 23rd and June 12th
.i letters be treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206. As TCSE requested, the Staff referred TCSE's various letters to the Secretary of $he Cceraission on June 27,1979, for inclusion in Docket No. PRM 50-23. The Staff treated the l
' remainder of TCSE's letters as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206.M Notice that the Staff was treating TCSE's April 24th letter as a petition 1/
under 10 CFR 2.206 had been published in the Federal Reoister on June 8,1979.
33192(1979). The Licensees responded to TCSE's April 24th request 44 Fed. Reg.
in a letter of June 8,1979, from their counsel.
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'TCSE's June h2th letter urged that the Comission hold hearings on TCSE's requests and further order the Licensees to show cause why emergency and evacuation procedures for the Davis-Besse plant should not be rodified prior to resumed operation of the plant. On June 12th, the Davis-Besse plant was shut down, subject to the Cocnission's Order of May 16, 1979, which required the Licensees to undertake certain corrective action prior to resumed operation.M n '
I accordance with the Comission's Order, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation found on July 6,1979 that the Licensees had satisfied the conditions of the Order and could thereby resume operation of the Davis-Besse plant.U TCSE had been informed prior to this authorization that a decision on TCSE's petition would probably not precede the authorization to resume operation.O y
44 Fed. Reg. 29767 (1979).
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Letter from H. R. Denton to L. E. Roe (July 6,1979). Jet.44 Fed. Re9, 40987 (1979).
27, 1979). Of course, final y Letter from H. R. Denton to T. J. Lodge (Juneaction on TCSE's petit In analogous circumstances, the Cocr:iission held that the pendency by law.
of proceedings on the May 16th Order did not legally bar restned operation Toledo of the Dam-Besse facility on tenns consistent with the Order.
Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Unit 1), CanissioTURer at 2 (Docket No. 50-346, July 5,1979). If the pendency of proceedings on an Order does not bar restned operation of a facility,it would follow that the Staff is not required to take final action on a 10 CFR 2.205 petition which raises r.atters unrelated to the shutdown under an existing More-order prior to authorization of resume 6 operation of t e facility.
over, as the D.C. Court of Appeals has recognized, tha Staff is not bound to suspend operation of a facility and institute proceedings sic: ply
"[An age.ccy) r.ay properly because the petitioner ask.s for such relief :
undertake preliminary inquiries in order to detemine whether the claim is substantial enough under the statute to warrant full proceedings."
78-1556,
~ Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walto" ' eaoue v. NRC, No.
Slip Op. at 11 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6, 1979 a---
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3 TCSE then filed on July 9, 1979, (1) a % tion" seeking action by the NRC to shut down the Davis-Besse facility pending revisions to the emergency plans, i
and (2) a " Complaint and Mercrandum of Particulars
- which detailed TCSE's allegations and bases for its ' Motion'.. The Commission referred TCSE's July 9th sutnittal to the Staff for treatment under 10 CFR 2.206. On July 16, 1979,_
j the t.icensees filed a response to this latest filing from TCSE.
TCSE's July 9th
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submittal essentially reiterated its earlier requests but provided substantial elaboration on the bases for these nequests. As its request for relief, TCSE asked that the Comission:
i a.
Find that the plant is not safe to operate and is an j
imediate threat to health and safety.
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b.
Suspend operation pending correction of deficiencies alleged i
and other necessary action.-
j c.
Order the licensees to conduct-full-scale emergencyldW11s.
d.
Order posting of emergency and evacuation infomation in public f
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places within 50-mile radius of the plant.
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Order the licensees to enclose emergency instructions in billings to customers at least annually.
I have considered the substance and the bases of the TCSE allegations, and I find that the TCSE has a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationships acong regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, and NRC report recornendations.
f At the present time, the Davis-Besse etargency plan meets all current regula-As such, a finding that the plant is not safe and poses-tory requirements.
In an icnediate threat to the public health and safety is not appropriate.
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light of the events following the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident, however.
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the NRC is taking irmediate steps to upgrade emergency preparedness for all nuclear power plants, including Davis-Besse. Among the steps to be taken will i
be the implerentation of the requirement that energency plans include provisions for periodic dissemination of emergency planning informtion to occupants around the plant who could be directly affected by a release of radioactivity.
Also, requirements for periodic drills will be upgraded.
A discussion of current NRC requirements and guidelines on emergency planning, current efforts to upgrade emergency planning requirements, and specific allegations forwarded by the TCSE are contained in Appendices A through
. D, which are attached hereto and ude a part of this decision.
In light of the Cornission's current effort to upgrade emergency planning and on the basis of the staff's review of TCSE's petition, I have concluded that no modification of the Davis-Besse operating license is required at this time and that public hearings on the Davis-Besse emergency plans should not be convened.E The request for relief by the TCSE is denied.
A copy of this decision will be placed in the Comission's public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20555, and the local Public Document Room for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. I located at the Ida Rupp Public Library, 310 Madison Street, Port Clinton, Ohio 43452.
A In addition to its request for issuance of an order to show cause, TCSE 5/
asked that the Comission hold hearings on its petition to modify the Davis-Besse operating license. See TCSE Letter of June 12, 1979. TCSE is not entitled to a hearing on its petition, because the conside' ration of a petition under 10 CFR 2.206 is tot a proceeding within the meaning of Section 189a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Illinois v. NRC, 591 F.2d 12, 13-14 (7th Cir.1979).
copy of this decision will also be filed with the Secretary of the Comission for its review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Comission regulations.
As provided in 10 CFR 2.205(c), this decision will constitute the final action of the Comission 20 days after the date of issuance, t.nless the Comission on its own motion institutes the reviea of this decision within that time.
t WYY k
arold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 17th day of January,1980.
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Appendix A Present Connission Reouirements and Guidelines on Emeroency Preparedness Current Commission requirements concerning Emergency Preparedness are f
set forth in 10 CFR 50, Section 50.34 and Appendix E.
These regulations require that an applicant for a construction permit or operating license submit information to allow the staff to assess the capability of the applicant to deal with energencies at the proposed facility. Section 50.34 (a) (10) requires that the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) contain:
"A discussion of the applicant's preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Appendix E sets forth items which shall be included in these plans."
Section II of Appendix E establishes the minimum requirements for the contents of the PSAR. At this stage, the applicant is not required to submit a fincl proposed Energency Plan, but is required to forward "su"icient information to assure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans with facility design features, ' site layout, 'an'd site location with resp 2ct' to
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such considerations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, and land use." Paragraphs A through G of Section II detail the items which, as a minimum, shall be included in the PSAR.
In order to assist applicants in providing sufficient information to allow the staff to properly a ssess that the requirements of 10 CFR 50 are being met, the Commission has issued " Regulatory Guides" via its Office of Standards Development. Regulatory Guide 1.70,' Standard Format and Content of Safety Av.alysis Reports for Light Water Reactors" Section 13.3, provides current guidelines concerning infonnation relating to Emergency Planning that should be provided in the PSAR.
Regulatory Guide 1.70, as well as all other Pegulatory Guides, was issued not as a statement of
2-4 regulatory requirer.ts, but rather as an acceptable method of implementing Methods of compliance not set out in.the the Comission's requirements.
guides can be found acceptable if they. provide a basis for the findings-requisite to the issuance or continuance of a pemit or license.
50.34 (6) (6) (v) requires that a Final Safety Analysis Report Section (FSAR)contain:
" Plans for coping with emergencies which shall include the items specified in Appendix E."
Section III of Appendix E states that the FSAR need not contain details of Rather, the the emergency plan, nor details of the methods of implementation.
plan submitted must include sufficient description of elements set forth in Section IV of Appendix E to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate mea can and will be taken in' the event of emergencies to protect public health and safety and to prevent damage to property. Reguletory Guide 1.70 states that, although details of the plan need not be included in the F5AR, a comprehen Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Plann'ing for plan should sa submitted.
Nuclear Power Plants," has been provided to applicants to further assist them in developing emergency plans. This guide provides an acceptable method to NRC staff for complying with the Conrnission's regulations with regard to the content of emergency plans.
The above requirements and guidelines specifically deal with an Although no applicant's or licensee's plans for dealing with emergencies.
Federal regulations exist that detail requirements for the contents of State and local agencies' emergency plans, many of the responsibilities' in-In this connection, a Task dealing with emergencies lie with these agencies.
Force of NRC and Environmental Protection Agency representatives was fon
3 in 1976 to provide a basis for Federal, State, and Local government emergency preparedness organizations for deteminino the aooroc*iate decree of emergency response planning efforts for the areas surrounding nuclear power plants. The
' Task Force report, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Lightwater Nuclear Power Plants * {NUREG-0396, EPA 520/178-016), was issued in December 1978. The Comission recently endorsed the guidance contained in the NRC-EFA Task Force Report as NRC' policy. 44 Fed. Reg. 61123 (October 23, 1970).
In sumary, Sections 11 and III of Appendix E contain the requirements for the contents of a Safety Analysis Report with regard to a proposed facility's emercency plan. Regulatory Guide 1.70 has been provided to assist an applicant in fulfilling these requirements.
In the case of the FSAR, the details of the energency plan need not be subritted. The FSAR need only contain a comprehensive scope of the emergency plan and a description of how regulatory requirements are to be carried out at the proposed facility.
Some of the infomation to be contained in the FSAR, as called for in Regulatory Guide 1.70, is not required to become part of the emergency plan f
itself. This information serves as background to the NEC staff in assess.
j ing the adequacy of the proposed emergency plan. The conter.t of the emergency plan implemented at the proposed facility must at least satisfy j
the requirements stipulated in Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. A presently acceptable method of implement'ng these requirements is described
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Currently, no NRC regulations exist that stipulate the contents of i
State and local emergency plans around a nuclear facility. A discussion se Y
-4 of the NRC's intent to implement the recocmendatiQns of NUREG-0395 and to backfit the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101 to operating plants such as Davis-Besse is contained in Appendix B to this decision.
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l Appendix B Current Efforts to Upgrade Emergency Plans _
Although all licenswes meet present regulatory requirements regarding plans.
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activities are currently taking place which would result in a significant upgrad-
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ing of regulations as well as the degree of emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. These activities include:
A rule change proceeding,which would result in an interim upgrade of NRC 1.
emergency planning regulations to provide prompt clarification and expansion I
in areas that have been perceived to be deficient as a result of past experi-ences. 44 Fed. reg. 75167 (December 19,1979). The proposed rule changes are deemed interim because the NRC staff anticipates that further chMges in the emergency planning regulations may be proposed as nore experience is gained by implementing these revised regulations. Also, changes may be proposed as the various Three Mile Island investigations are concluded and the results become available for efforts in such areas as instrunen-The proposed tation and ronitoring and generic studies of accident models..
rule changes involve: ' ~
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a) A req.uirement that the utility emergency plans, including State and Local plans, be submitted to and concurred in by the NRC as a condition for license For operating plants, this requirement may be a condition for issuance.
continued operation.
b) A requirement that emerger.cy planning considerations be extended to
" Emergency Planning Zones" as defined in " Planning Basis for the Development 1
of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Lightwater Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0396, December 1978; A requirement that detailed emergency planning implementing procedures c)
This of both licensees and applicants be submitted to the NRC for review.
review would detemine the acceptability of such procedures in providing reasonsble assurance that emergency measures can be taken to protect the
2 public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency.
2.
Irnediate steps to improve licensee emergency preparedness at all operating power plants. This will involve a review of licensee emergency plans against the most recent guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.101 as well as additional 7
areas where improvements in emergency planning have been highlighted as particularly significant by the Three Mile Island accident. Acceptance criteria that will be used in this review are attached hereto as Appendix C.
In this regard, the present schedule callt for a staff review and site visit to the Davis-Besse facility in January 1980, with a final report to be issued describing the inccrporation of the acceptante criteria into the Davis-Besse emergency f
i plans by April 1980.
The interim rule, for plants such as Davis-Besse, would require the submission of detailed utility, State, and local emergency plans to the NRC for review. Approval of the utility plan and concurrence in the State and local plans may be required for continued operation. The plans will j
be reviewed against criteria that embody the presently accepted minimum standards for emergency plan content. A condition would be eventually added to the Davis-Besse license that would require the licensee to main-tain in effect and fully implement the provisions of the Commission i
approved emergency plan.
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I Appendix C j
4 Emercency Plannine Accettance Criteria j
for L.fcensed Nuclear Power Plants j
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INTRODUCTION Licensees will submit updated faciOty plans eithe'r before or after the site -
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visit by the NRR review teas, together with the appropriata State' and local-plans, which will be evalua*ed collectively against the requirements of j
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50,. the positions ' set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.101, and the accep'tance criteria contained herein. The criteria contained herein will be used in conjunction with the aforementioned regulations and guidance to assure that the folicwing emergency planning c jectives have been -
i achieved.
.t (1) Effective coordination of emergency activitjes among all organi:ations having a response role.
(2) Early warning and clear instructions to the population at-risk in the e
event of a serious radiological emergency.
(3) Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both onsite and offsite.
(4) Effective implementation of emergency seasures in the environs.
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(5) Continhedmaintenanceofanadequatestateofemergencypreparedness.-
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It should be noted that the planning herein identified for the Emergency _
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Planning Zones (NUREG-0396)' need not be fully implac>ented at this time in order to meet the acceptance criteria. Evaluation of the planning.for the f
plume exposure pathway should be based on what is feasible on the time scale t
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of these reviews with firm comitments to extend such provisions throughout i
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the entire Emergency Planning Zone by January 1,1981. Also, the Comission has not yet spoken on the "50 mile" aspect of the Emergency Planning Zone f
associated with the ingestion pathway. Hence, the use of the relatid accept-t ante criteria in the, evaluation need not be applied to the full extant' implied
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in NUREG-0396. Mcwever, the plans must demonstrate that a" capability exists l
e to protect the public from exposure via the ingestion pathway.
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I ACCEDTANCE CRITERIA F
To assure effective coordination of emergency activities among all l
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g organizaticns having a response role I
y A.
Licensee plans will:
i Provide for an emergency coordinator at all times, including an 1.
individual onsite at the time of an accident, having the authority
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f and responsibility to initiate any emergency ictions within the i
provisions of the emergency plan, including the exchange of information with authorities responsible for coordinating j
offsite emergency measures.
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2.
Provide for the augmentation of the minimum onsite emergency i
i organization within 60 minutas for all classes of emergencies tbove the " alert" level.
t Identify and define by means of a block diagram the interfaces l
3.
between and among the onsite functional areas of emergency l
activity, licensee headquarters su' port, local services support.
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The and State and local government response organizations.
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4 a
3 above shall include the onsite technical support center and the -
f operational support center as disc'essed in NUREG-0578.-
. Describe the location and role of the onsite technical support I
4.
See ites 3 of Section 3.3.3.b of Appendix A to 1
center.
NUREGdO578 (e.g., comunications with NRC and the offsite i
" ec,ergency operations center).
Describe the location and role of the onsite operational support 5.
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See ite: 3 of Section 2.2.2.c of Appendix A to!
t center.
t NUREG-0578.
Provide for the dispatch of a representative to the principal erergency operations center establ4.shed by the offsite agencies 6.
(not required if licensee's offsite emergency operation center is at the sace location as that described in item I.B.4).
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B.
State / local plans will:
Identify authorities responsible f'or coordinating offsite f
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.ecergency activities for the Emergency Planning Zones discus in NUREG-0396.
- l Designate the authority and specific responsibility for each 2.
coordinating authority.
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Describe the' concept of cperations from the perspective of.eaci 3.
i official having a coordinating role, including the operational' l
interrelationships of all Federal, State, and local organiza--
t tions providing emergency support services.
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4.
Identify the predetermined'lecation of the Emergency Operations.
Center to be used for the coordination of all offsite emergency support activities.
5.
DescrJbe the communication plan for emergencies, including tities anY alternates for both ends of the.communicationllinks ;
and the primary and backup means of communication.. Mare consistent with the agency function, these plans will include:'
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Provision for prompt and assured activation of the. State / local-a.
emergency response network.
b.
Provision for acministrative control metnods for assuring' l
effective coordination and cor. trol of Federal, State, and'
~j local emergency support activities.
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Provision for comunications with contiguous Stitte/loca1H c.
govertsents within the ' Emergency Planning Zones.
d.
Provision for communications with federal.eeergency response organi:ations.
e.
Provision' for comunications with the nuclear' facility, State anflor local emergency operations centers, and field _
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assessment teams.
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II. To assure early warning and clear instructions to the population-at-risk j
in the event of a serious radiological emergency l
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A.
Licensee plans will:
1.
, Provide an emergency classification scheme as set forth in.
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Establish specific criteria, including' Emergency Action Levels (EAL) as appropriate, for declaring each class of emergency.
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a.
- EALs for declaring a " site emergency" will incidde instrument i
pendings and system status indications corresponding to,an airborne fission product inventory within containment-
'which, if released, could result in offsite doses equivalent-to the lower limit of the EPA Protective Action Guides(PAG),
for e'xposure to airborne radicactive caterials.
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.i b.
EALs for declaring a " general emergency" will include
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instrument readings and system status indications corresponding : -l to an airborne fission product' inventor / within containment; j
which, if released, could result in' offsite doses; equivalent to the upper limit of. the EPA Protective Action Guides I(PAG) for exposure to airborne radioactive materials..
3.
Provide 'a clear and explicit methodology for relating Eats to-
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PAGs.
4.
Identify the onsite capability and _resourcesito properly assess l
and categori:e accidents including:
i a.
Instrtmentation for. detection of inadequate core cooling.
See item 3 of Section.2.1.3.b of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
- j b.
Radiation monitors. See item 3 of-Section.2.1.8.b of-Appendix A to NUREG-0578..
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5.
Provide for recossending protective actions to the appropriate.
State and local authorities, based on projected dose to the l
population-at-risk, in accordance with the reconsendation-set d
forth in Table 5.1 of the Manual of Protective Action Guides.
js. -
t i
.a
.. ~.
h R
6
.;o h
and Protective Actions. for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-520/1-75-001.
Upon declaration of a " general eme'rgency", b ediate notification-shall be made directly to the offsite authorities responsible for implementing protective measures within the Energency.
Plann$ng Zone as discussed in NUREG-0396..
.l 6.
Describe the onsite c6emunications capability for assuring l
contac't with the offsite authorities responsible for implementing i
protective measures including'a primary and backup seans of '
i i
ce==unications.
7.
Provide for periodic dissemination of. educational information -
{
to the public within the plur, exp sure Emergen:y Planning Zone j
re;arding the potential warning methed: logy in the event of a
]
serious ac:ident.
B.
State / local plans willi ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~
i 1.
Identify authorities having a re,sponse role within the Emergency'
~f Planning Zone as discussed in NUKEG-0395.
2.
Designate the authority anc specific responsibility for each of the responding authorities.
3.
Provide for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day manning of conmunication link by authorities responsible for implementing offsite protective measures.
4.
Provide an emergency classification schame that is consistent-n with that established by the licensee.
g 5.
Describe the resources that will be used if necessary to provice early warning and clear instructions to the populace within the l
T l
7 Eocrgency Planning 2cne associated, with the plume exposure pathway (NUREG-03gS) within 15 minutes following notification from the facility operator (e.g., tone alert systems, sirens and radio /TV).
^
6.
Provide for posting information regarding the potential warning
~
methodology and expected response in areas visited by transients within the Es.ergenky Planning Zone (e.g., recreational areas).
7.
Identify prewritten emergency messages for response organizations and the public consistent with the classification scheme.
8.
Pfovisiens for testing the overall ccmmunications link to assure that the criteria specified in item 5 ateve is cet on a c:ntinuin; basis.
III. To assure continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both onsite and offsite A.
Licensee plans will:
1.
Identify the onsite capability and resources to provide valid and continuing assessment throughout the course of an accident including:
a.
Post-accident sa=pling capability. See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.;
of Appendix A to RUREG-0578.
b.
In plant iodine instrueentation. See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.c of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
c.
Plots showing the containment radiation monitor reading vs. time following an accident for incidents invol'ving we E
em
- b
=8.
100% release of coolant activity,100% release of gap activity,1% release of fuel inventory. -and 10% release of -
fuel inventory.
2.
Ident,ify the ' capability. and resources for field monitoring 1.n,
'theenvirons'oftheplantinciuding-theadditionaldesinetry
~
specified in th's revised *echnical position'is' sued by the NRC-
~
' Radiological Assessment Eranch'for the Environmental. radiological monitoring prograr..
j 1
B.
State /iccal plans will:
5 1.
Iden.ify the agencies having a radiological assessment role' witnin the Ecergency Planning Zones as discussed in NUREG-0396, including the lead agency for data coordination.
i 2.
Designate the specific responsibilities for each agency having-l
~
an assigned assessment role.
3.
Describe the arrangements established with the Department ~ of -
Energy Regional Ceordinating Office for radiologica1' assistance under the RAP ano-IRAP programs.
)
4.
Designate a centralized coordination center for the receipt and i
analysis of all field monitoring data.
5.
Describe the methods and equipment to be employed in determining I
the magnitude and locations of any radiological ha:ards followingL liquid or gaseous radioactivity releases.
l
.i l
i
l I
r
--!t 9
1 IV.. To assure effective inglementation of emerge..cy seasures in the environs A.
1.icensee plans will:
}
i 1.
Provide written agreements with each Federal, State.'and local
]
agency and other support organizations having an-emergency.
j response role within the. Emergency' Planning Zones as discussed
[
in NUREG-03SE. The agreements will identify the emergency
[
i measures to be provided and the nutually acceptable criteria
[
for their implementation.
f
't t
B.
State / local plans will:
1.
Designate protective acticn guides anc/cr other criteria to be j
used for implementing specific protective actions in acordance
[
t with the recoceendations of EPA regarding exposure to -a radioactive.
l gaseous plume (E?A-520/1-75-001)- and with those of HEW /FDA I
regarding radioactive contamination of human foodiand animal.
. 15, 1978 l
fee:is as published in the Federal Register of December (43 FR 58750).
?
2.
Designate the informational needs (e.g., dose rates, projected dose levels, contamination levels, airborne or waterborne activity levels) for implementing the protective actions identified j
i in item 1 above.
j
~
3.
Describe the evacuation plan and/or other protective sensures i
for the Emergency Planning Zone associated with the plume exposure pathway (NUREG-0396) including:
-i Io i
\\
e
u 10 4
Maps showing, evacuation routes as well its relocation and-a.
shelter areas,
~
b.
Pcpulation and their distribution around the nuclear facility.-
c.
Means for' notification of'all segments of the' transient and resident population.
d.
Plans for protecting those persons whose mobility say be r
impaired due to such factors.as institutional confinement, j
e.
Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particular1y'
~
for emergency workers, including quantities, storage, and.
g means of distributien.
I f.-
Means of effecti,ng relocation.
4 g.
Potential egress routes-- and their projected traffic capacities-under asergency'use.
z.
~
h.
Potential. impediments to use of ' egress routes,' and potential
~
contingency neasures.
4.
Describe the protective metsures to be used for the Emergency.
l l
Planning Zone associated with the ingestion' pathway (NUREG-0396) including the methods for ' protecting the public frca consumption k
of contaminated foodstuffs.
t 5.
Provide. for maintaining dose records of all potentially exposed
.l emergency workers involved in response activities.
?
-l r
l i
s3-.
y-l V.
- To assure continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency ' pre;iatedness i
i A.
Licensee plans will:
l 1.
Provide, in addition to the drills and exercises identified in l
Regu14 tory Guide 1.101, a joint exercise involving Federal -
t State, and loca], response organizaticos. The scope of such an exercise should test as such of the emergancy plans as is reasonably achievable without involving full public participation.
j Definitive performance criteria vill te established for all.
levels of participation to assure an objective evaluation.
This joint test exercise will be scheduled about once every
'l.;
five yea-s.
1 i
j S.
State /lecal plans will:
l 1.
Provide for emergency drills and exercises to test and evaluate i
the response role of the agen:y, including previsions for j
critique by qualified cbservers.
2.
Provide for participation in'the joint Feder 1,- State, local and licensee exercise described in' A.1 above.
l 3.
Describe the training program for those individuals having an emergency response assignment.
-l 4.
Provide for periodic review and updating of the emergency.
]
response plans of the agency.
i j
i i
Appendix D L.scussion of TCSE Allegations as Contained in its Filing of July 9, 1979 I.
Allegation The Planning Radius known as the LPZ in the Davis-Besse Emergency i
Plan is insufficient and inappropriate to guarantee public health and safety.
A.
The LPZ has a radius of 2 miles from the plant, whereas the NRC/ EPA
" Planning Basis" (NOREG-0396) recommended that a 10 mile zone be used for the LPZ.
B.
The current LPZ is inconsistent with 10 CFR Part 100.
Discussion The use of a 2-mile radius in determining the LPZ for Davis-Besse has been found to meet the aquirements of 10 CTR Part 100 as documented in the staff's Safety Evaluatien Report (NUREG-0136) of December 1976. Also, the LPZ as determined in accordance with 10 CFR Part 100, and the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) as recornended by NUREG-0369.in connection with State and local emergency plans, are not necessar ly identifiable with each other.
In the staff's forthcoming review of the Davis-Besse emergency plans, the i
recor:mendation to use a 10 mile radius in establishing evacuation plans or the plume exposure pathway. will be incorporated. This will not, however, alter the size and the purpose of the Davis-Besse LPZ with respect to 10 CFR Part 100.
'~
II.
A11egation
~
Licensees have failed to consider more than one possible offsite accident sequence in selecting an adequate evacuation radius, placing nearby residents j
outside the present radius in unnecessary danger, NUREG-0396 states that more than one accident sequence should be considered A.
i for credible emergency / evacuation planning.
The Utility Plan does not utilize either the " plume exposure pathway" or B.
a%ction eroesure pathway" as described in NUREG-0396.
+u
2-I Discussion As stated in the discussion of Allegation I above, the 2 mile LPZ was de siting requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, and.
by the licensees in accordance with the this LPZ was found acceptable by the NRC staff.
NUREG-0396 discusses the use of a spectrum of accidents in determining The recommendations emergency planning bases for State and local emergency plans.
requirements, will be used as of NUREG-0396, although they do not represent ifcense l
t guidelines in assessing the adequacy of the utility, State, and local energency plans in the upcoming revieu.
III.
A11ecation Licensees' provisions for offsite treatment of radiation victims are inadequate, unworkable and do not definitively provide for transport and treatment.
Reg. Guide 1.70 advises licensees to identify and fomulat.:
arrange-A.
l ments with 2 hospitals.for treatment of radiological accident victims a'n to provide other medical planning in utility emergency' plans.
~
l"-
l The licensees' plan includes contractual arrangement's with several B.
l parties, t;t these arrangements are inadequate:
No guarantee that even one physician will be available in case 1) of an accident.
Coordination of emergency transportation arrangements for medical 2) services are inadequate.
No changes in medical support procedures have been entered in the l
3)
Utility Plan since October 1975.
.a___._
3 C.
The Ottawa County Board of Health plan is inadequate witn respect to the Board's assumd responsibilities concerning radioactive raterial, accidental spills, and fall-out procedures.
Discussion Requirements related to offsite treatment of radiation victims are described in Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
In complitnce with these requirenents, the licenseest emergency plan currently contains arrangements for the services of a physician, for tiansportation of victims to offsite treatment facilities, and for treatment of victims at offsite facilities. Regulatory Guide 1.70 contains guidelines for the submission of information in a safety Analysis Report (not the emergency plan) and its contents do not represent regulatory requirements. The licensees' emergency plan meets current requirements in this regard.
Although arrangements with offsite support organizations were reviewed and found acceptable prior to the issuance of the Davis-Besse_ :
operating license, the arrangements will again be reviewed against presently accepted criteria during the Spring 1980 review.
Written 7
agreerents with all offsite support organizations will be reviewed to assure adequate capability for handling emergencies. This review will include emergency transportation arrangements and medical services. Altho. ugh current i
regulations do not require the NRC to review State and loc.1 plans, these will also be included in the upcoming reviev Y
I 6
e
i i
2i l
IV.
Allegation j
The licensees assign excessive tasks' and responsibilities to the
{
plant shift foreman which could not be realistically perfomed in an.
j emergency.
A.
Too much responsibility is delegated to one person.
B.
10 CFR part 50, Appendix E (IV) (H) requires proper training of.
f employees and offsite personnel to carry out their responsibilitie The Utility P.lan includes no arrangements for training of'off-- l emergency.
site personnel.-
j Discussion l
Current NRC requirements concerning organization for coping with radiol emergencies and training of personnel involved are contained in Section IV.of l
Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
In compliance with these requirements, the Davis-Besse !
I emergency plan describes the emergency organization including assigned auth-
.i orities, responsibilities, and duties. Also, the emergency plan -includes
,-j i
provisions' for training of onsite as well as offsite personnel whose services...
might be required in an emergency.
There are no NRC requirements or guidelines which limit the amount.of!
l authority which can be placed upon a. single -individual within the emergency l
response organization. However, it is reasonable and prudent that a single l
1 person be made responsible for emergency response actions at a nuclear; j
facility. This does not mean that this. individual would personally, carry.
.{
..out all of the actions under.this responsibility, but that the authority -
1 for many actions would be delegated to others as conditions dictate..The NRC considers that the TCSE is in error in believing that_ the shift fore-
]
man would be responsible for personally performing all of the actions-l t
spelled out in its allegation.
l t
i I
q
i i In the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans, compliance with the :
guidelines of Regulato ry Guide' 1.101 concerning onsite emergency organization and coordirP. ion with offsite support organizations will be assured.
In addition, training requirements of the plans will be reviewed to assure that all potential
~
participants in a radiological emergency maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness.
V.
A11ecation Licensees have failed to comply with NRC guidance concerning identifi '
cation of milk processing plants in the EPZ.
A.
NUREG-0396 sets a 10-50 mile radius to advise protective actior.s to minimize milk and food cnntcmination.
B.
Utility Plan makes no mention of existence of a milk plant within 10 miles of the plant.
i Discursion NUREG-0396 generically suggests the use of a 50 mile radius for the EPZ in connection with the ingestion exposure pathway.- Present' NRC regulations
~
do not require a 50 mile radius EPZ nor identification of milk processing plants within this EPZ.
It is recognized, however, that the existence i
of such plants is an important element to be considered in determining action to l
be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Although it is not expected that identification of milk plants or other food processing plants will be l
appropriate for the utility plan, the use of the recomended 50 mile radius EPZ ar ;
the identification of these plants within the EPZ will be used in assessing the adequacy of State sad local emergency p14ns in the upcoming-review.
l VI.
A11ecation Licensees have failed to conduct emergency drills, in contradiction of NRC guidelines and licensees' own arrangements.
A.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E (IV) (I) requires licensees to periodically hold drills.
B.
The licensees have never conducted any drills with cooperating Federal.
State and local officials and other parties.
Discussion The licensees' emergency plan, in accordance with Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, includes provisions for periodic drills. These drills have been conducted annually by the licensees to include onsite and local offsite personnel.
Cor:oliance with the guidance of F.eculatory Guide 1.101 that the annual drills be conducted to include participation of State agencies will be incorporated in the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans.
~
Provisions for a periodic joint exercise involving Federal, State, and local response organizations will also be incorporated. The. review will ensure that these drills.nrovide continued raintenance of an adequate state of eosrgency preparedness.
~
VII.
A11ecation The licensees have failed to quantify estimated evacuation times and expected required times to notify the population in the LPI.
A.
The licensees' emergency plan does not contain information required by Appendix E. Sections IV(C) and (D), to 10 CFR 50.
B.
The licensees' emergency plan does not contain information required by Regulatory Guide 1.70 concerning estimated evacuation times and the i
time required to. notify the population in the event of an accident.
. Discussion As previously stated, the licensees' emergency plan meets all of the current requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
Concerning the alleged deficiencies of the licensees' energency plan to contain requirements of Regu-latory Guide 1.70, the guide does not contain any requirements for the contents of emergency plans. Rather, Regulatory Guide 1.70 contains guidelines that an applicant for a license would use in submitting information in a Safety Analysis Report ('not an emergency plan). This information would be used as background by the hRC staff in assessing the adequacy of the proposed emergency plan.- The information would not necessarily be incorporated into the erergency plan itself.
In the case at point, estirated evacuation times and time required to notify the population in the event of an accident are not currently required to be part of the emergency plan.
In the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans, guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101 will be used in assessing the adequacy of the plans. In particular, the plans will be reviewed to assure that they contain the reans and time required to warn or advise persons within the EpZ. Also, State and local plans will be reviewed to assure the capability to provide early warning to the populace within the EPZ as well as the capability to evacuate and take other protective measures.
VIII. A11ecation Licensees have omitted from the utility plan any identification of egress routes and their capacity characteristics and have failed to identify LPZ residents having special eYacuation needs, A,
Regdatory Guide 1.70 recuires utility emergency plans to specify
8.
potential routes and their capacity.
B.
Heither the Utility Plan nor the County Plan specifies such routes.
Neither plan identifies special evacuation problems.
Discussion Regulatory Guide 1.70 does not stipulate any requirements for the content of emergency plans. The informat~ ion identifieId as not being present in the current utility plan is appropriate for State and local plans since evacuation, when necessary, is the responsibility of the State and local authorities.
In the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans, the State ara local plars will be reviewed to assure that they contain potential egress routes with their projected traffic capacities under emergency use. These plans will also be reviewed to assure capability of protecting' persons whose mobility ray be impaired.
IX. A11ecation Licensees' plant has a poor operating record and hence a greater need for workable plans.
A.
Region III rates Davis-Besse poorly on operator performance, B.
Other recent problems Discussion In those situations in which an event at Davis-Besse involved safety-related concerns, inmediate action has been undertaken to correct any deficiencies. Although there is no correlation between the operating history of Davis-Besse and the need to upgrade emergency plans, the review of the plans has been given a high priority.
The present schedule calls for completion of the review by April 1980.
h
E!
-7590-01
~
a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.l NUCLEAR PIGULATORY COMMISSION 7.
TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY & _
_ Docket No. 50-346
'i CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY-(Davis-Besse Nuclear. Power Station, Unit No.1) l L
NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF DIRECTOR'S DECISION.
UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 By letters dated April 24, May 23, June 12, and July 9,1979L the Toledo 1
Coalition for Safe Energy (TCSE) petitioned' for modification of the operatingL license for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit.No.1. TSCE, generally asserted that the Davis-Besse facility has inadequate erergency and evacuation-plans. TCSE's various letters have been treated as a recuest' for action under j
10 CFR 2.206. Notice that' the NRC staff was treating TCSE's. April 24th letter under 10 CFR 2.206 was published in the Federal Recister 44 FR 33192 (1979).
Upon consideration of TCSE's letters and other relevant information,_ I have ~
l J
determined not to order modification of the Davis-Besse license at this time.
q Accordingly, TCSE's request far action is denied. A copy of the " Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206" which fully explains the reasons-for this decisior.
will be placed in the Comission's Public Document Room at:1717 H Street, Wash -
j ington, D.C. 20555 and in the local public document. room for the Davis-Besse j
y, facility at the Ida Rupp Public Library,.310 Madison Street Port Clinton,~ Ohio j
43452. A copy of this decision will also be filed with the' Secretary for the
l 1
Comission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of:the Corrnission's regula-
{;
tions.
Harold R. Denton, Director 1
-l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-'
(
~i Dated at Bethesda, Maryland i
this 17thday of January,1980.
j
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s:
s ATTACHMENT-2
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- - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _, __ ___ - - - - - ~ --
d51-:
- +~
Toledo Coalition for 5afe Energy j
P.O. Box 4545 -
,o l
A Toledo, OH 43520 -
(419)243-6959 a
G April ~24,.1979 gl
("T WT':"k M k
,/
N c\\Y'g ~.9.
l j
u: w1 V:.
g-Mr. James G. Keppler. DirectorNuclear Regulatory Comissio ep.y'g fg t
4 Office of Inspection and Enforcement s
5 799 Roosevelt Rd.
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 the actions of the
Dear Mr. Keppler:
We have followed with considerable interestBesse nuclear pla l
i After reading your coernents in thel pe NRC and Toledo Edison, operator.of the Dav s-the Three Mile Island disaster.
Toledo Blade concerning personne sibility of the NRC.
Besse, we are greatly concerned about the irresponbefore nu-April 20,1979 i
decisien to allow Davis-Besse to go back on l ne I
questions have been answered.
l 19 findings of the Our concerns have been redoubled by the Apri docu ents the gross t of a serious Ohio Public Interest Research Group (OPIRG) that of energency and evacuation plans in the even The NRC appears to be an accomplice in a d utility to return to inadequacies situation. allowing a less-than-public spirites to maintain incom accident at Davis-Sesse.
i power generation while that utility cont nuestaff y demands that the~
'i following steps be taken by your office ime i
ly:
opening Davis-That Toledo Edison officials be restrained from real p i
I Besse until such tirre as all possible operat on 1/
enical, have been corrected; ted in, visible That revised and updated evacuation plans be posf Dl public places within a 50 mile radius o D-B's reopening:
2/
your receipt of this notice, and prior to ithin a 10 mile d
q That a full-scale disaster drill be conducte wto power radius of the plant prior to its return.
itten description of 3/
land Electric -
l That all consurers in the-Toledo Edison a bills prior to the startup Illuminating jurisdictions receive a complete wr 4/
i emergency procedures with their last electr c t of full and of. Davis-Besse-That these and other matters become the subjecC open public _ hearings initiated by the NR t requests will be 5/
l t
Your earlest written response to these urgen (F
'R 2 7 l979 j
5 c
W
ci-:.y Mr. Jares G. Keppler it. '
. 4/24/79
^-
Pg. 2 greatly appre:iated. Thank you.
f J[ g.
Sincere Ter
- ). L(cge Cha pn TCSE Legal Action Comittee Members, U.S. Nuclear F.egulatory Comission ec
Washington, D.C. 205,55 Senator Howard Metzenbaum
~
234 Sumit St.
Toledo, OH 43604 9
b f
g 40 e
P.O. Box 2091 Toledo, OH 43503
.;.w.T. 7.f 14ay 23,1979
, Efei;,.. '...,...
p_
lir. Stenhen Burns Office Executive Legal Director RE: Complaint of Toleda Nuclear xegulatory Comission Coalition for safe 1717 H Street, N.W.
Energy
!!ashington, D.C. 20555
Dear lir. Burns:
I I am writing in confirmation of our telephone conversation of !!onday, May 21. at which time you apprised me of the fact that your office is j
l treating my April 24 letter as a request for a formal hearing per {
!i2.206, r
my client, the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy, and wish to preserve t
TCSE's procedu-al rights to properly pursue this matter.
Enclosed per your request are the April 20, 1979 Toledo Blade news
- l article referenced in my April 24 letter, and the WednesdayDiril 18, t
1979 news release of the Ohio Pt;blic Ihterest Research Group concerning inadequacies of evacuation preparations at the Davis-Besse I Nuclear
~
Power Station near Port Clinton, Ohio.
You are doubtless aware that C3vis-Besse is a Babcock & Wilcox reactor, It is i
closely related from a design standpoint to Three 14ile Island I.
thus understandable that the. Coalition might draw unsettling conclusions from the juxtaposed comments of James G. Keppler of the NRC Region III office, and the publicly-proclaimed inadequacies of emergency plans.
In the coming weeks, legal research p'eople Yrom TCSE will be' attempting
~
to verify the existence of other questionable aspects of both the utility As all of this help and State of Ohio emergency plans for Davis-Besse.
will come from volunteers, we ask that you allow us the time to take up j
our inquiry where OPIRG 1 eft off.
While I will not reiterate all of the elements of relief which my l
client seeks through the complaint process, I hope that the NRC will' be able to make a policy determination that the safety aspects of this poorly-managed reactor override the economic considerati 5
addressed.
i Sincerely T
fy lo g
~
J Attorne l lition for Safe Energy ToledoiCoa V
enc t
O e*
de
I
.P.O.
Box 2091 Toledo, CH 43603 June 12,1979
.Q:'
...G3.
' ' Dr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reacter Regulation RE:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Station, Unit No.1, Docket 1717 H. Street, N.W.
No. 60T346 I
Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Dr. 'Denton:
I am in receipt of your June 1,1979 letter confirming the NRC's ini-tiation of the processing of the complaint filed April 24, 1979 by the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy.
I hereby respectfully petition this Comission to bifurcate its treatment of that letter and the information subsequently I
fontarded by me on May 23 to Mr. Stephen Burns of the Office of the (NP.C)
Executive Legal Director in the following way:
(1) That my May 23 letter and information and the second paragraph of the April 24 letter from the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy to Jares G. Keppler of NRC-Chicago, which addresses inadequate l
emergency and evacuation plans of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
~
Station, Unit I be treated as a petition for codification of
]
the operating license granted to Tcledo Edison Company and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company pursuant to 10 CFR !2.206 and applicable sections of 52.202 and 550.---;
(2) that the thHd through eighth paragraphs of the April 24 letter be treated as a Petition for Rulemaking per 10 CFR 52.800 e_t.
seo., and consolidated with the feti, tion,for F.ule Making filed by critical Mass Er,ergy' Project, et. al., on flay 9,1979 (Docket No. PFJi-50-23), an:. acted upon accordingly; (3) That a hearing on paragraph (1) herein be scheduled prior. to the issuance of any NRC clearance to the operators of D-BI to restart the plant, and that counsel for the licensee utilities be instruc-ted pursuant to 10 CFR 52.202 to show cause why the emergency and evacuation procedures for Davis-Sesse and the State of Ohio should not be modified prior to any startup of Davis-Eesse; (4) That said hearing be held without delay.
I am in receipt of a letter from Mr. Bruce W.. Churchill, Counsel for TECo and CEI, licensees of Davis-Besse, BMed June a,1979 requesting relief from you in the form of dismissal of TCSE's petition..I am not aware that you sit in the position of either an administrative law judge or hearing officer as of this date. Moreover,10 CFR 52.206 does not appear to grant to a licensee the right to respond to the ICSE petition at this stage of the proceedings. Theref6re, I respectfully request an order from you that counsel for licensees' letter be stricken and excluded from the record and from consideration of further NRC action on the TCSE petition. Failing
~__
8 Dr. Harold Denton Page 2 5
M
.;3.5...,.
that, I will treat counsel for licensees' letter as a motion for dismissal, albeit quite clearly outside of the self-explanatory provisions of 52.205 and 12.700 et._seg.
The following response is for the specific purpose only of I
answering Mr. Churchill's ex parte letter in defense of the TCSE petition, and is not to be construed as an exercise or waiver of any rights which TCSE has under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. or Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Counsel for licensees evidently cannot grasp the distinction between the complaint embodied in the April 24 petition, and the request for relief therein.
Instead of addressir.g the substance of that complaint - that there are documentable inadequacies in the emergency and contingency arrangements for the utility and the State of Ohio concerning Davis-Besse I - counsel for licensees has treated the,TCSE request for relief as the corpus of the complaint. This treatment of the petition misses the point entirely, and is a disservice to this Commission in its determination as to whether the terms of the existing Davis-Sesse license should not be modified.
D-B 1 is closely related, Trem a technical design standpoint, to the Three Mile Island II reactor.
Disturbingly, D-B is also closely related to TMI in terms of the totally deficient emergency / evacuation procedures, the consequences of which was omincusly depicted in the ignorance and indecision of Pennsylvania utility and government officials in March and April.
It is for these reasons that TCSE seeks the above-enumerated relief from this Commission, and specifically that Davis-Besse be restrained from startup until appropriate changes to emer5ency/ evacuation preparedness and procedures be imposed upon licensees in the form of license modificatiocs.
l Section 50.100 of the CFR empowers the HRC to modify a license
...because of conditions revealed. by the application or license or statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other means, which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application...
Simply stated, NRC guidelines set as a standard that the Comission review licenses which have been granted according to whether it would grant a license on the basis of obsolete license application components. Would
,the NRC approve, today, after Three Mile Island, the woefully insufficient emergency procedures which are currently applicable to Davis-Besse? TCSE thinks not.
We await your earliest expeditious', action upon the TCSE petition and
?
L r
p Harold Canton Fage 3
. au-=
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.E.h upon the requests herein. Thank you ve,y much.
Sincerely.
um f.e J
Ter p
Lc e Coun 1 for the Toledo Coalition for are Energy, Petitioners t
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Mr. Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RE: Davis-Besse Nuclear power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 50-345 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
Thank you for your correspondence of June 27, 1979. I believe that the enclosed mignt be of assistance to the Commission in revisiting its decision to allow Davis-Besse to restart.
Please find herein a verified. copy of (1) a motion by the-Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy to this Comission seeking a preliminary in, junction or any NRC order having the practical effect of closing down-Davis-Besse pending sweeping revisions to eme gency plans for the plant; and (2) a Complaint and Memorandum of Particulars in support of that-(
motion. We have included a number of document:ry appendices i_n support of our allegations which we hope will facilita:c NRC staff assessment and verification of our conclusions.
In light of the chaos that prevailed among the public and state i
emergency preparedness officials during the Three Mile Island crisis, l
it is ireperative that the NRC place increased stress upon emergency
~
preparations in the event of nuclear accidents. To do less is to ignore -
i the threat to public health and safety which is posed by nuclear power.
With particular respect to Davis-Besse, the incredibly poor operator and technical perfomance record of the plant underscores the need for i
emergency plans to be revised and proven workable now, before they might be required.
Becaus.e of the imminent threat to health and safety which is posed by lax arrangernents for emergencies at Davis-Eesse. I hereby_
recuest that the NRC take all steps to expedite TCSE's complaint.
If we do not have confimation of definitive action by the NRC within fourteen (14) days of this date, we will be forced to e.xamine the options of federal court facilitation. However, I am certain that 1
the NRC is not willing to see the chaotic emergency preparations during-the TMI crisis repeated, and will adopt the same dim view of Davis-
+
Besse emergency plans that TCSE has, and that the Commission will act
~
quickly and responsibly.
We await your earliest processing of our complaint"and request
[a(\\-
for restraining order. Thank you for your timely consideration.
Respectfully,
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TerryT. Lodge Counse.1for(TCSE
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Mr. Harold R.
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Of fice of Nuclear' Reactor Regulation-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Washington, D. C.
20555 1
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Re:
Unit No.
1, Docket No. 50-34 6 j
Dear Mr. Denton:
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By letter dated April 24, 1979, the Toledo Coalition 1
for Safe Energy has made several demands related to the'.
1 operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit /
This letter is being treated by the Director-of
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Nuclear Reactor Regulation as a request for action' under:
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10 C.F.R..52.206.
l The first demand, related to "all possible operational l
problems, human and mechanical", is so-broad and! vaguellt
.i must be dismissed; its lack of specificity. permits no.
reasoned response by the NRC Staf f..
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are all related to emergency' plans, and. are.- actions ;which
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-l are nelther required nor authorized -by NRC regulations;.
if - at.all,' only as a as : such they could be considered,and not as actions relatingito" request for rulemaking, The fifth and-finali the status of: a particular license.
demand -- for a hearing on the previous ~ four demands '--
i;t is thus an empty ' request.
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SHKN. P11 T M AfJ, PO1T S h TROWDRIDG E Mr. Harold R. Denton Page Two June 8,
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,, Accordingly, the Licensees respectfully submit. that the Coalition's request should be denied.
Sincerely yours,'
/Y 1
ChNchill i
Br e W.
Counsel for The Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland -
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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reacter Re.gulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Cc:=ission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
Davis-Sesse Nuclear Pcwer Station, Unit No. 1, Docket No. 50-346
Dear Mr. Centon:
~.-
a We have before us four letters from the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy--one to James G. Reppler, Director, Region III, dated April 24, 1979, one to Stephen Burns, OELD, dated May 23, 1979, and two to you dated June 12 and July 9,1979--related to operation of the Davis-Bese; Nuclear Power Starion, Unit No. 1.
The July 9 letter forwarded to you a document entitled " Motion for Preliminary Injunction," with an acco=panying " Complaint and Memorandum of Particulars," in which the Coalition asks that the Davis-Besse plant be shut down until certain actions are taken with respect to the emergency plan associated with the plant.
The May 23 and June 12 letters make it clear that the Coalition, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.206, is requesting the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to institute a proceeding under 10 C.F.R. 52.202 by serving on the Licensees an order to show cause "why the emergency and evacuation procedures for Davis-Besse and the State of Ohio should not be modified prior to any startup of Davis-Besse."
Although the Coalition's Motion and Complaint are captioned as if they were before the Co=missien, they were directed to you,
. SHAW. PITTHAN. POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Mr. Harold R. Denten, Director Ju_y 16, 1979 Page Two rather than the Co= mission, under cover of the July 9 letter, and each of the two documents indicates on its face that it is being filed within the context of the request to you under section 2.206.
Chis is consistent with your two letters of June 1 and June 27 in which you informed the Coalition that its request would be acted upon by you as a section 2.206 request concerning matters within the juris-diction of your office.
Accordingly, we believe the four letters taken te-gether should properly be construed, and were intended to be construed, as a request for action by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation pursuant to section 2.206, with the July 9 Motion and Complaint constituting a specific request for the issuance of an im=ediately effective shew cause order mandating shutdoyn of the plant pursuant to section 2.202.
The Licensees' respense to the Coalitien's section 2.206 request has been prepared on this basis and is enclosed for your censideration.
As shown in our response, the Coalition's Complaint is characterized.by error, emissien, and misinformation to the extent that it provides no basis for the issuance of a shew cause order.
A major thrust of the Coalition's argn=ent apparently lies in its allegation that the
~
Licensees' emergency plan fails to cceply in certain respects with an NRC/ EPA planning basis document.
In attempting the ccmparison between the Davis-Besse emergency plan and the planning basis document, however, the Coalition (a) used the wrong document as the Licensees' emergency plan, and is apparently unaware of the newer and more comprehensive document which contains the emergency plan, (b) atte=pted to compare a plant emergency plan document with a planning basis document, NUREG-0396 (2G?A 520/1-78-016), which is applicable only to state and local government plans, and (c) mischaracterized the planning basis document, an interagency report providing guidance to govern =ent agencies, as a book of NRC requirements.
Much of the Coalition's confusion seems to arise from a misunderstanding of the regulatory distinction between-a state Tovernment emergency plan and a plan developed by a reactor licensee, and the Coalition seems to be unaware of the existence of the State of Ohio Emergency plan.
Most of the Coalition's concerns should be, and are, covered in the Ohio plan.
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TRCWBRIDGE Mr. Enrold R. Denton July 16, 1979 page Three The Davis-Sesse emergency plan is in full cc=pliance with all NRC regulatory requirements.
The Coali. tion's allegations to the centrary are based on misinformatien and The Coalition has a misunderstanding of NRC regulations.
failed to note, or is unaware, that ec=pliance has been de=cnstrated by continuing and recent inspections by NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
The Coalition has also failed.to note, or is unaware of, the extensive efforts that have been undertaken by both the State of Ohio and_ the Licensees in the upgrading and enhancement of emergency preparedness.
Al= cst without exception, the Coalition's many allegations of inadequacy of the emergency plan are in-For convenience, these allegaticns, and the correct.
Licensees' responses, are supmarized in an appendix to our response.
t The Cealition has not mentioned the extensive and ongoing NRC programs related to emergency planning, and of course could not have kncwn cf the Co==issien's recent 4
rdvance netice of proposed expedited rule =aking for in-
~., cased emergency readiness.
In its June 12 letter, hew-the Coalitien has petitioned the Cc= mission for
- ever, rulemaking with respect to some ~ cf the same points it is attempting to make in this case.
Any concerns the Coalition may have about the Davis-Eesse emergency plan--a plan which =eets existing NRC regulatory requirements--
should be taken up in the context of the NRC's generic consideration of energency preparedness.
For all of the above reascns, as = ore completely the Coalition's l
discussed in the accompanying response, for issuance of a show cause order should be denied.
request Sincerely yourF, 7
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d-2e W. Churchill m-SWC:cp Enclosure cc:
Cerry Lodge, Esq.
Leonard Bickwit, Esq.
i James P. Murray, Jr., Esq.
e-N-July 16, 1979 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTCR REGULATION TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY AND
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
)
Docket No. 50-346 ILLUMINATING COMPANY
)
)
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER
)
Request under STATION, UNIT NO. 1
)
10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 LICENSEEc' RESPONSE TO TOLEDO COALITION FOR SAFE ENERGY'S RECUEST CNCER 10 C.F.R.
f 2.206 By letter to Mr. James G.
Keppler, Director, Region III, Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement, dated April 24, 1979 (as clarified in a letter to Mr. Stephen Burns, OELD, dated May 23, 1979, and in a letter to Mr. Harold Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated June 12, 1979), and l
by letter to Mr. Barold Denton dated July 9, 1979 (enclosing a
" Motion for Preliminary Injunction"
(" Motion") and a " Complaint and Memorandum of Particulars" ( " Compl ain t" ) ), Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy ('TCSE") requests the Director to institute a proceeding to cause-certain modifications to the emergency plan for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1.
Further, in the Motion, TCSE moves "for a preliminary. injunction or suspension of power generating operations at Davis-Eesse Nuclear Power
Station, Unit No. 1, with an injunction to Toledo Edison Company (TEco) and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI)
[" Licensees")...
pending a ' final determination of the need for and implementation of definitive corrective measures to be taken upon the operating license issued to said respon-dents, from restarting Davis-Besse I..."
Licensees hereby respond to TCSE's request.
As will be demonstrated below, TCSE is misinf ormed, has alleged f actually inaccurate statements, and has net demonstrated that Licensees are in violation of any NRC regulations or that a to institute potentially harardous condition, exists sufficient a "show cause" proceeding under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.202.
- Further, to move for a preliminary in unction, and TCSE has no righ'c even if it did, TCSE has not, and could not, make a showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of success on the merits which..
would justify even considering the extraordinary legal remedy of injunction.
I.
TBE DCCUMENT WITE WHICE TCSE FINDS FAULT IS NCT LICENSEES' EMERC-ENCY PLAN The gravamen of TCSE's Complaint and the basis for its recuest under 5 2.206 is the allegation that Licensees "have failed to formulate a comprehensive, workable and dependable emergency and evacuation plan, and have thus ignored federal recuirements."
(Complaint at 3).
TCSE apparently i
.__-_---_-_-_---__--_m
believes Licensees' presently ef fective emergency plan is the document entitled " Davis-Besse Nuclear Pcwer Station Emergency Plan" found at Appendix 13-D of the " Final Safety Analysis Report of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station" ("FSAR").
In fact, the ef fective emergency plan, which is incorporated into the cperating license for Davis-Eesse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1, is an Administrative Document entitled " Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Statior Unit No. 1, Administrative Procedure AD 1E27.00, Emergency P:an" (the "Eme rg ency Plan"), which was originally issued en November 12, 1975.
The Emergency Plan is s ur..r e r ted bv. twe n ty-f ou r Ex e r c. e.n c y Plan Implementing Procedures, all bound in a volume over two inches thick.
No mention is made by TCSE of chis documenc.
The Emergency Plan ar.d the Encrgency Plan Irplerenring Procedures provide spe-cific, detailed guidance for actions.and respcnsibilities of plant personnel in the event of an emergency, as compared to the more general guidance found in the FSAR Energency Plan.
Thus the document with which TCSE seeks to find fault is not Licensees' Emergency Plan.
II.
LICENSEES' EMERGENCY PLAN MEETS ALL APPLICABLE NRC RECUIREMENTS Licensees' Emergency Plan meets all NRC requirements.
The Emergency Plan has been inspected against all applicable NRC requirements annually since 1975 by Region III, Of fice of.
~~
Inspection and Enforcement ("I&E").
The most recent inspec-tion, cenipleted on June 15, 1979, resulted in one deviation t
from requirements -- the documentation of the station review of the Emergency Plan was entered three days late.
As required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, an annual drill to test the The Emergency Plan's effectiveness has been held since 1975.
last such drill, conducted in 1978, was observed by Mr. Al Januska frem Region III, I&E.
In addition to having reviewed the wrong emergency plan, TCSE used the wrong documents in attempting to determine if the emergency plan met NRC requirements.
For example, TCSE faults the FSAR Emergency Plan for not corplying with the recommendations of the NRC and EPA's Task Force on Emergency Planning in " Planning Basis for the Eevelopment of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response' Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants", NUREG-0396/ IPA 520/1-78-016 (Eecemher, 1978)
(" Planning Sasis").
The purpose of the Planning Easis "is to provide a basis for Federal, State and local government emergency preparedness organizations to determine the appropriate degree of emergency response planning ef. forts in the environs of nuclear power plants."
(Planning i
Easis at i).
The Planning Basis does not address directly licensee emergency plans and, in any event, is only a report which makes recommendations to the Commission; its recommenda-tions are not requirements of the NRC or-any other federal l
agency.
TCSE has misapplied this document.
j i i
s
1 In Appendix A (atte;hed hereto) we address TCSE's l
l specific allegations in the Complaint of Licensees' failure to 7
t meet NRC requirements.
6 III. TEE COMMISSION EAS INITIATED PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO DEAL WITH TEE ADECUACY AND ACCEPTANCE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AROUND NUCLEAR FACILITIES ON A GENERIC BASIS; 1
INSTITUTING A SECW CAUSE PROCEEDING CONCERNING LICENSEES' EMERGENCY PLAN WEICE MEETS PRESENT COMMISSION REQUIREMENTS r
WOULD BE AN INAPPROPRIATE AND INEFFICIENT METEOD CF DEALING WITH THE GENERIC ISSUES TCSE's request raises a number of generic issues that are presently under consideration by the Commi:sion as part of i
a comprehensive - riew cffederkl, state,localandlicensee emer gency planni..g and ccordination.
As a result of the lessons learned during the Three Mile Island accidente emer-l gency planning is undergoing intensi.ve review within the
~
u - - -..: w.
Commission and throughout the countrv by federaT~, state and local governmental units.
As indicated in the nex.t section, this has been especially true for Licensees 27d the State of Ohio who have been actively evaluating their present emergency 4
planning assumptions and procedures.
Even before Three Mile j
Island, emergency planning was undergoing Commission review as indicated in the NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, ~ Planning Easis.
The Commission has currently pending a proposed rule which w.
_d require licensees to address emergency planning con-siderations.to areas outside the low population zone.
43 Fed.
Reg. 37473 (August 23, 1978)..
i i
i Turthermore, a number of organizations, including
--Critical Mass and Public Interest Research Groups, have joined t
in a petition for rulemaking con'cerning the operational details of evacuation planning.
See 44 Fed. Rec. 32486 (June 6, 1979).
l TCSE specifically agreed to treat the " demands" set forth in its April 24, 1979 letter to Mr. Keppler as a petition for rulemaking to be consolidated with the Critical Mass petition.
See TCSE letter to Mr. Harold Denton dated June 12, 1979.
The t
issues raised by TCSE with respect to emergency planning are f
appropriately addressed in a rulemaking proceeding.
more On June 7, 1979, the Commission established a Task i
Force on Emergency Planning, which was given the following charter for its initial phase of activities:
Task 1 - Develop for Commission-consideration a list of major issues, with tentative alternative solutions, that should'be 3
addressed through rulemaking proceedings.
Task 2 - Concurrently with Task 1, describe and
~
obj ectively criticue NRC's cur rent emergency planning process, especially considering recent TMI lessons learned.
Task 3 - Define and recommend an approach for developing a comprehensive plan that would formulate the scope, direction, i
and pace for NRC's overall emergency l
planning activities.
t Task 4 - Brief the Commission on results of Tasks 1-3, issues requiring Commission guidance, and future plans.
I The second phase assignment of the Task Force is to develop a comprehensive plan for the Commiss' ion to deal with emergency I.
planning issues by early August, 1979.
(See memorandum to all NRC Office Directors from Lee Gossick dated June 11, 1979.)
The Task Force briefed the Commission on June 28, 1979, identifying the major issues to be addressed.
The Task Force noted that additionally I&E and the NRR Task Force on
" lessons learned" from Three Mile Island were both delving into the emergency planning issues.
Some of the issues raised by TCSE (such as the 10 mile Emergency Planning tone for state emergency plans) were discussed by the Task Force as issues to be censidered.
(See Transcript of NRC Commissioners' Public Meeting, Eriefing on Emergency planning Task Force, Washington, D.C.,
(June 2c, 1979)).
On July 12, 1979, the Ccmmission published an Advance j
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (attached hereto as Appendix B)
~
soliciting public comment on " objectives for ef fective plans, u -.
.4.
acceptance criteria for State / local emergency plans, NR'C'~
~
concurrence in State and local plans as a recuired.ent for issuance of an operating license or for continued operation of a nuclear facility, and coordination between licensee plan and State and local plans."
The public, including TCSE if it so
)
desires, will have 45 days af ter publication in the Federal Recister to comment on the proposed rulemaking.
Moreover, as mentioned above, TCSE is already participating in the proposed t
rulemaking initiated by the Critical Mass petition.
It is clear that the Commission is actively considering the issues raised by TCSE and many other emergency -
planning issues on a_ generic basis.
Because the Licensees presently meet NRC requirements, it would be inappropriate and i
inefficient for the Director to deal with these same issues in a show cause proceeding.1 IV.
LICENSEES AND THE STATE OF OHIO HAVE INITIATED THEIR
_OWN REVIEWS OF EMERGENCY PLANNING The Licensees have been actively engaged in a continuing program for upgrading, updating, and improving the Emergency Plan.
Imnediately af ter the Three ~ Mile Island r
accident in March, this program;was intensified and formalized I
with the formation of ar Emergency Plan Task Force under the direc; ion of the Davis-Eesse Nuclear Power Station Administrative Coordinator.
Plant employees assigdec " to the Task Force have already expended considerable effort in discharging their assigned responsibilities to ensure that current regulatory requirements are satisfied, to continually review and test the Emergency Plan to ensure that it is practical and workable, to ensure that the lines of communica-tion between ccmpany and outside officials are kept open and 1
Nowhere in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, or in the transcripts of the Commissioners' meetings estab-lishing or being briefed by the Task ' Force on Emergency Plan-ning, or in the NRC/ EPA Planning Basis, has the suggestion be made tha t the public health and. safety requires immediate revisions to emergency plans.
! Ii
t i
current, to work with local and State government officials to I
ensure coordination of emergency preparedness,'and to ensure I
that adequate reporting and information dissemination will be available.
In reviewing and upgrading the Emergency Pla', the n
Licensees have gone well beyond current NRC regulatory require-ments.
The Task Force, for example, is currently in the process of modifying the plan to meet the latest NRC recommen-dations in Regulatory Guide 1.101, guidance which is not a requirement under the Davis-Besse license.
f In addition, a corporate level task force, under the direction of the Vice-President for Administrative Services, f
f was formed to develop comprehensive emergency plans which encompass not only plans for the station but additionally such areas as the edequacy of security, communicatios, public protection, support facilities,' and liaise'n h~ith the press and l
l governmental bodies.
While the Davis-Besse Emergency Plan, including the r
response of its outside supporting agencies, has been tested annually, The Toledo Edison Company is assuming a role of
[
f 1eadership in planning a much more comprehensive test of emergency planning this year which will coordinate the efforts for all levels of emergency planning in the State of Ohio.
1 Planning efforts have already been initiated with the partici-pation of the Ohio State Nuclear Preparedness Officer, the NRC and the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.
A briefing for i
agencies representing Ottawa County has been scheduled in the
-9
t near future.
A series of coordinating meetings will be carried j
out to effect an annual drill which will exercise on a coor-dinated basis the Ohio State, Ottawa County and Davis-Besse
~
station emergency plans.
As part of the Davis-Besse emergency preparedness program, the Licensees have had continuing contact.with representatives of the public to provide information regarding emergency planning.
These efforts have included meetings with State, Ottawa County and Carroll Township officials and governing bodies, as well as testimony before the Committee on Energy and Environment of the O}cio State House of Representatives.
Toledo Edison officials have also been involved in the extensive, activities by the State of Ohio in the review and modification of the Ohio State, Emergency Plan...The State has,_
i had an emergency plan in effect since before Davis-Besse became operational, and has recently made comprehensive c'hanges to the plan for the purpose of conforming with all 70 elements of the' NRC's primary emergency planning guidance.
The revised Ohio i
State Emergency Plan, which was submitted to the NRC in June, includes evacuation and emergency planning for Ottawa County and Carroll Township, and encompasses at _ least the area within t
a ten-mile radius of the plant.
In addition, the Governor of Ohio has appointed a Task Force on Nuclear Plant Safety to review safety programs at the three nuclear power plants in Ohio, with specific ~ attention
- _. j directed toward existing emergency plans and the procedures for i
coordinating the plans with local officials.
The investiga-tions are ongoing, but the Task Force reported to the Governor in April of this year its initial findings that the plans in effect meet the standards of the Federal government and are considered adequate for the health and safety of Ohio citizens.
e V.
AS A MATTER OF LAW TCSE IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE a
EMERGENCY RELIEF REQUESTED IN THE MOTION a
There can be no question that TCSE's series of submissions, including four let,ters and the ins tant Complaint and Motion, constitute and were intended to constitute a request under 10 C.F.R.
S 2.206 for the institution of a S 2.202 show cause proceeding.
Moreover, the Motion is, i f...
anything, a request to the Director to issue an immediately.
effective order under 10 C.F.R.
S 2.202(f) shutting down the reactor while the show cause proceeding runs its course.
TCSE has no right to file a request for an immediate-ly effective order.
While 10 C.F.R.
S 2.206(a) permits "[aJny person [to] file a request with the Director...to institute a T
proceeding pursuant to S 2.202 to modify, suspend or revoke a r
license, or for such other action as may be proper", both the decision on whether to institute the proceeding and, if so, whether to issue an immediately effective order, lie entirely within the discretion of the Director.
Section 2.202( f) states:
4 *
'i r
l l
i When the Dir ector... find s tha t the public health, safety or interest so requires or that' the violation is willful, the order to show.cause may provide, for stated reasons, that the proposed action be temporarily effective pending further order.
Thus, the issuance of an immediately ef fective order cannot be compelled by a " motion" or petition from a party outside the Commission and, if the Director fails or refuses to issue 'such an order, his decision is not reviewable by the Cour ts.
Honicker v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 590 t
F.2d 1207, 1209 (1978).
On the other hand, the Director may find it necessary to make an order immediately effective if one t
or both conditions in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.202(f) are met, i.e.,
if
" rhe public health, saf ety or interest so reccires" or if the licensee's " violation is willful".
Nuclear Engineering 1
Company. Inc. (Shef. field, Illinois Low-level Waste Radioactive i
Disposal Site), Docket No. 27-39 (June 6, 1979), slip cpinion at p. 5.
The powers vested in the Director by 10 C.F.R. 5 2.202(f) (and in the Commissien as reflected in a parallel provision in S 2.204) have been exercised sparingly, and appropriately so.
The action taken under these provisions of ten involves (as would be the case here)
"a drastic. procedure which can radically and summarily affect the rights and interests of others."
Such emergency powers "must be respon-j sibly exercised."
Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 404 (1978); Licensees Authorized to i
Possess or Transcort Strategic Ouantities_ of Special Nuclear Material, CLI-77-3, 5 NRC 16, 20 (1977).
In determining whether to order an operating reactor to shut down, the decide whe ther the f acts alleged and information Director must supplied by the petitioners "candated the recuested relief in order to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety are protected."
Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, supra, 7 NRC at 404-405; Licensees, supra, 5 NRC at 20-21.
Because of the drastic nature of the remedy, the-cases in which a 5 2.202(f) ord,er have been issued are few and always involve extreme situations.
The'most recent instance of such an order was in Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc., supra, where the Commission upheld an order by the Director,. Nuclear
~
Materials Saf ety and Saf e~ guards, to an operator of a low-level radicactive waste disposal site to resume its license respon-i sibilities immediately, af ter the licensee had unilaterally-terminated all patrol, maintenance and environ = ental activities at the site.
The Commission held that the immediately ef fec-tive order was justified because the operator's refusal to maintain and monitor the site was willful and constituted a
?
possible violation of health and safety regulations, and f
because that refusal could be reasonably expected to lead to off-site migration of radioactive materials which could expose Nuclear Engineering the public to health and safety dangers.
(.
1 I
i
Inc. supra, slip opinior, at 6.
Another analogous
- Company, situatien was found in Consumer Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units where the Commission 1 and 2), CLI-74-3, 7 AEC 10-12 (1974),
upheld an order by the Director of Regulation directing a licensee to suspend certain construction activities because an inspection showed quality assurance violations that could have resulted in structural defects not correctable in the future.
Needless to say, the circumstances in this case are not even remotely similar to those presented in those two actions.
Her e, there is neither an imminent threat of danger to the public, as in Nuclear Engineering Company, nor a substantial:
shortcoming that may not be ccrrected in the future, as in Tnerefore, there is absolutely no need Consumer Power Company.
for emergency relief.
In deciding whe ther.an immediately ef fec tive orde r.
~
should be issued it may also prcve helpful, by analegy, to review the criteria set forth in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.788'(e) for l
determining whether a stay of the decision of a Licensing or These criteria,_
Appeal Board should be granted pending appeal.
which are based on Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v.
Federal Power Ccmmission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.
Cir. 1958),
are: (1) whether the petitioner has made a strong showing that j
is is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether the peti-tiener will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted; j
(3) whether the granting of a stay would harm other parties; I.
e
t and (4) where the public interest lies.2 While these criteria may not be directly applicable to a S 2.202(f) order, they illustrate the considerations that would have to be borne in mind before an immediate shutdown could be granted.
With respect to the second of these four factors, neither TCSE nor the public in general will suffer irreparable injury if the Davis-Besse unit is not shut down immediately.
Even assuming (contrary to fact) that the Emergency Plan were deficient, there is not the slig hte s t indication that the Plan will need to be put into effect while the show cause proceeding (if instituted) is pending.
Absent,.such a clear shcwing of irreparable injury, emergency relief must be denied.
- See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power S tation, Units 1. and 2), ALAB-521, 9 NRC 51, 52 (1979); Public Service Co. of Oklahema, e t al (Black Fox. Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAE-505, 8 NF,C 527, 530 (1978); Public Service Co. of 2
These criteria are also identical to those employed by the courts in deciding whether to grant prelimi-nary injunctive relief in judicial proceedings.
Thus, it is well established that preliminary injunctive relief is an " extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion".
Canal Authority of State of riorida
- v. Callaway, 489 f.2d 567, 573 ( 5 th Cir. 19 7 4 ) ;
the power to issue such relief should be sparingly exercised, and only upon "a clear showing that there is clear likelihood of success and irreparable injury".
Schneider
- v. Whaley, 541 F.2d 916, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1976); Sierra Club v. Bickel, 433 F.2d 24, 33 (9 th Cir.1970 ),
a??Td on otner grounds sub. nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Dorfman v. Boozer, 414 P.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969)..
Indiana, _Inc._ (Marble Sill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 i
and 2),
ALAE-493, 8 NRC 253, 270-271 (1978) and ALAB-437, 6 NRC 630, 631 (1977).
By contrast, the Licensees and the ratepayers stand to lose hundreds of thousands of dollars a day i
l in added power costs if Davis-Besse is shut down, thus_the third factor strongly points against the granting of emergency relief.
And, to the extent that the public interest might require a review at this time of the emergency and evacuation i
procedures currently in force at Davis-Eesse and other nuclear plants, such a require =ent is being met by the ongoing generic t
Commission investigations of the matter.
In this i
energy-conscious era, the public interest is not served by a t
wastef ul and expensive shutdown of an oper ating power plant power, if available at all, is (particularly where replacement, most likely to be oil-fired gener a, tion)..
In light of the way in which the other rhree facrors point against a shutdown of Davis-Sesse, "it would'take an overwhelr.ing showing of likelihood of success on the merits"'
t for TCSE to cbtain the extraordinary relief it seeks.
Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), supra, 6 NRC at 635; Florida Power & Licht Co.
(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB 404, 5 NRC 1185, 1189 (1977).
Instead of such a showing, our preceding discussion shows that TCSE's charges are gratuitous, inaccurate 3
and misinformed and would stand little chance of being upheld f
3 The Complaint cannot be relied on by the Director as T
(continued next page) s i
'i instituted.
by the Director were a show cause proceeding to be Therefore, no basis exists for a shutdown of the plant and i
3 TCSE's Motion must be summarily rejected.
l THE REQUEST FOR A SEOW CAUSE PROCEEDING SHOULD BE DENIED
.1 VI.
l The Director, of course, is not required to institute a show cause proceeding upon a filing of a request under 10 C.F.R. $ 2.206.
All that the regulations require is : hat
"[v]ithin a reasonable time af ter a reque st...has been re-the requested ceived, the...Dir ector...shall eithe r institute proceeding in accordance with this subpart or shall advise the person who made the request in writing that no proceeding will I
be instituted in whole or in part, with respect to his request, F
and the reasons theref or."
10 C.F.R. 5 2.206(b).
To institute a proceeding to show cause, the Director.
" allege' violations with which the licensee is charged, or must f acts deemed to the potentially ha:ardous conditions or other be suf ficient ground for the proposed action."
10 C.F.R.
j As established above, Licensees' Emergency Plan f
! 2.202(a)(1).
J meets all NRC requirements.
To the extent TCSE believes 1
(continued) the basis for the extraordinary relief requested, in any event, in that the f actual allegations are not of fered in the form of an affidavit to which TCSE has attested under i
oath or affirmation.
In fact, the f actual allegations are a.imos t totally inrccurate.
e
! i
\\
J
changes are warranted in the emergency planning by federal, State and local bodies or by Licensees, such matters are being addressed: (1) generically by the Commission, (2) by the State of Chio and (3) by Licensees' own task forces.
A show cause proceeding raising issues already being addressed, which are beyond present Commission regulations, would be inappropriate and duplicative of present NRC efforts in NRR and I&E, and by the Commission's own Task Force.
Accordingly, no basis in fact, law or public policy exists fer the issuance of a show cause order, immediately effective or otherwise, and the, Director should deny TCSE's request under 5 2.206.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWERIDGE 3
I
\\(
Ml"f1) L f.
I Eruce W.
Churen111 John E. O'Neill, Jr.
Matias T.
Travieso-Dia:
Counsel for Licensees 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Dated:
July 16, 1979 t t
aw a.
.s,e no
. =,
mm Mme.mw ar-Appendix A LICENSEES ' RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF ICLEDO COALITION FCR SAFE ENERGY Following are Licensees' responses to the specific allegations of TCSE with respect to deficiencies in the Davis-Bessa Unit 1 Emergency Plan.
Most of TCSE's errors seem to have arisen (a) from a misunderstanding of the AC/ EPA Planning Basis document, (b) from failure to consult the correct Davis-Besse Emergency Plan document, (c) from misinfor-mation cencerning the Licensees' activities related to its Emergency Plan or (d) from an apparent unawareness of - the existence of the Ohio State Emergency ~ Plan.
j 1.
TCSE alleges that "the planing radius known as Ehe icw 1
populatien ene (LPZ) in the Davis-Besse Emergency' Plan is insufficient and inappropriate to guarantee public health and safety".
(Complaint at 3-8).
a.
Licensees' two mile radius LPZ is established in accordance with NRC regulations in 10 C.F.R. 5 100.11, as set
)
forth in 5 2.1.3.3 of the FSAR and approved by the NRC in 5 2.1
. of the Safety Evaluation Report, b.
The Planning basis does not recommend a ten mile radius to be utilized for the LPZ around light water reactors i
I -
J
^
as alleged by TCSE.
Rather the NRC/ EPA Task Force recommends a r
ten mile Emergency P,lanning Zone for state and local government planning.
In fact, Figure I of the Planning Basis (at page 12) clearly indicates the distinction between the LPZ and the
+
i Emergency Planning Zone.
The Chio State Emergency Plan, in fact, establishes a ten mile Emergency Planning Zone as recommended in the Planning Basis.
2.
TC3E alleges that " Licensees have failed to consider more than one possible offsite accident sequence in selecting an adequate evacuation radius, placing nearby residents outside the present radius in unnecessary danger."
(Complaint at 8).
Again TCSE misapplies the Planning Basis in a.
t comparing it to the Emergency Plan.
The Emergency Plan I
contemplates a spectrum of potential accidents and the sta-tion's response to these accidents.
The Emergency Plan does f
not deal with evacuation procedures.
Evacuation is within the sole purview of state and local authorities and is dealt with I
in detail in the Ohio State Emergency Plan.
3.
TCSE alleges that Licensees' provisions for offsite treatment of radiation victims are inadequate.
(Complaint at 9-13).
Licensees are not required by NRC regulations to a.
formulate arrangements with two hospitals for treatment of radiological accident victims.
Licensees have established an arrangement with Magruder Ecspital and, while not required, plans are being made to establish arrangements with a second hospital as a back-up.
b.
The letter agreements-cited by TCSE in its Complaint (at paragraph 20) are outdated.
Letter agreements.
with hospitals, ambulance services, doctors and the Ottcwa, County Board of Health are renewed each year.
The current agreements are attached to the Emergency Plan, c.
More than one doctor is available at Magruder Hospital to treat radiological victims, and Licensees' agree-ments with Doctors Akins, Wagner and Crisologo provide that all three doctors will be on call in the case of an emergency.
d.
Emergency drills have been conducted by Licensees, and Radiation Management Corporation has par-ticipated in every one of them.
Radiation Managemenc Corporation has annually reviewed the Emergency Plan and has established medical evacuation plans in the event that evacua-tion is necessary.
~
Licensees originally had established emergency e.
After transportation arrangements with Robinson Funeral Home.
Robinson Funderal Home discontinued its ambulance service, arrangements were made with Mid-Counties Ambulance Service, Oak i
Harbor, Ohio, to provide transportation in the event of an emergency.
This agreement has been renewed each year.
TCSE's allegations with respect to Licensees' arrangements for medical I
emergency transportation and medical evacuation are based j
- care, on inaccurate information.
f.
TCSE's criticism of the Ottawa County Emergency Plan (Complaint at 12 and 24, 25) appears to be founded in i
t r
'b TCSE's unawareness of the Ohio State Emergency Plan and the revised Ottawa County Emergency Plan (which-is incorporated in the Ohio State plan and supersedes the Ottawa County Emergency
~
Plan attached to TCSE's Complaint).
The Ohio State Emergency Plan is presently undergoing NRC review for its concurrence based on NRC's seventy criteria.
4.
TCSE alleges that "the utility assigns excessive tasks l
and responsibilities to the plant shift foreman, which could realistically be addressed during an emergency situation."
not f
(Complaint at 13-16).
a.
While the shif t fcreman is responsible for P
actions to be taken under the E=ergency Plan, the Emergency Plan provides a breakdown of actions and responsibilities of station personnel to whom the duties have been delegated during a state of emergency.
b.
The Emergency Plan details training requirements for (1) the Emergency Duty Officer: (2) the Radiation Monitoring Team; (3) the Fire Brigade; (4) First-Aid Team; (5)
Magruder Bospital; (6) the Ambulance Service; (7) Oak Harbor Fire Department; and (B) Corporate Support Personnel.
5.
TCSE alleges that " Licensees have failed to comply.
with NRC guidance concerning the identification of milk i
processing plants in the Emergency Planning Zone."
(Complaint at 16).
There are no NRC requirements for the Emergency a.
Plan to make note of milk plants within a ten mile radius of l
- 1
I The Ohio State Emergency Plan addresses coordina-Davis-Besse.
tion with, and monitoring of impacts of any emergency on, agricultural and dairy facilities.
t I
6.
TCSE clieges that "the Licensees have f ailed to conduct emergency drills, in contradictions of NRC guidelines in their own alleged arrangements." (Complaint at 17-19),
Licensees have conducted annual drills as a.
All such drills required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.
have included the participation of the Ottawa County Sheriff, the fire Department of Oak Harbor, Magruder Eospital, the
[
contracted ambulance service an,d Radiation Management Corporation.
The last such drill conducted 2n 1978 was I&E.
observed by Mr. Al Januska from Region III,
?
TCSE alleges that " Licensees have failed.to -quantify 7.
estimated evacuation times and expected required times to i
notify the population in the LP". "
(Cemplaint at 20-22),
The Ohio State Emergency Plan deals with the a.
estimated evacuation times and expected required times to notify the population in the vicinity of the Davis-Besse Plant..
b.
The Emergency Plan meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E (IV)(C) and (D), including estab-lishment of criteria and procedures for notification and participation of local, State and Federal agencies, Licensees have installed direct, open, continous f
c.
communication ties with the NRC and have committed to report t
r e
-S-
time any unusual or abnormal occurrence within one hour of the the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation.
See Let:er from Mr. J.S. Grant, Vice Pres'ident, Energy Supply, TECO, to Mr. James Keppler, Region III, I&E, dated May 4, 1979.
This prompt notification link is tested daily.
In addition, radio communications with the Ottawa County Sheriff's office is tested at least three times daily.
8.
TCSE alleges that Licensees have completely omitted f rom the utility plan any identification of eg;ess route s and their capacity characteristics, and have summarily failed to identify LPZ residents having special evacuation needs."
(Complaint at 22-23).
Egress routes and any special evacuation problems a.
are dealt with in the Ohio State Emergency Plan.
9.
TCSE alleges that " Licensees have had since at least 1975 to update, revise and upgraded the sta tus of Davis-Sesse Emergency Plans."
(Complaint at 23-25).
The Emergency Plan was originally issued November-a.
t 12, 1975.
It was subsequently revised August 12, 1976; April 7, 1977; May 3, 1978; and June 26, 1979, and is up-to-date.
10.
TCSE alleges that " Licensees' plant has among the poorest operating records of any commercial reactor in the United States, and a consequently greater need for workable emergency and evacuation plans."
(Complaint at 25-28).
a.
The Licensees' operating history and their actions in light of the Three Mile Island accident were the subj ect of detailed review by the Director and Commission.
This review took place prior to the removal of the May if, 1979 I to resume NRC Suspension Order which allowed Davis-Besse Unit operation.
s 4.
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- i c:ngidering new guidance to State and local gover==entz =n e=ergen:
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3 at; w plar.ning, based en an analysis of a joint NRC-EPA Task Fo: ce P
?.eport.
" Planning Easis for Developnent of State and Local Govern-i fi F.adiological E:ergency F.esponse Plans in Support of L15ht
=ent De ce= den l
Water Nuclear ?cwer Plants," NUF.EG-0396/ EPA 520/1-75-016, 1978.
See 43 ?ed. Eer. 58658 (Decenber 15, 1978), see also 44 l
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Fed. M. 23137 (April 18,1979).
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t States (NU:.D-7*/111f lack any of these essential elements?
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L" so, when should power plant with an existing operatin5 this general requirement becc=e effective?
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Under what cire= stances and using what criteria should a 9
licensee notify State, local, and Federal agencies of incidents,
- ncluding energencies?
When, how, to what extent, and by whom she.
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.he Tne connents received will be collected and evaluated by the NRC staff, which will, in tu n, subnit reco=endations en proposed rules to the Centission.
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cf all aspects of the K:.C energency planning and ;repan edness-F
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12.
Sheuld the licensees be required to provide radioloS$ cal e=er-gency response training fer State and local gove:- n=ent: personnel?
If so, to what entent?
Should the Federal government provide such training?
If so, to what extent?
13
':'o what extent should reliance be placed o:1 licensees for the assessnent of the actual er potential consecuences of an accident with regard to initiation cf protective action?
Te what extent shcul:i this responsibility be bctre by Federal, State or local geternnents?
Lt.
Eculd pub'ic part'cipation in radioicgical e=ergency respense
- irill s, including evacua:len, serve a useful p=rese?
If s o, what i
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?cr the Cen-issica
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f
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Secretary of th.e ~
is s '.on Lated at Washington, D.C.,
this I day of July, 1979 e
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.