ML20034B378
| ML20034B378 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1990 |
| From: | Collins S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Dewease J LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9004270074 | |
| Download: ML20034B378 (3) | |
Text
.,e APR l 91990 In Reply Refer To:
Docket:
50-382 Louisiana Power & Light Company-ATTN:
J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations 317 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Gentlemen:
Attached is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
February 3, 1990, letter to NRC and the enclosed exercise evaluation report dated January 12, 1990. The evaluation report covers the emergency preparedness exercise conducted on August 30, 1989, and the results of other drills held on November 7-8, 1989, and December 7, 1989.
The report states that there were no deficiencies identified during the exercise. No response to NRC is required.
If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Nemen M. Tere at (817) 860-8129.
Sincerely, OriS tty sign d By.
i Samuel J. Collins, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosures:
As stated cc with
Enclosures:
Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN:
R. P. Barkhurst,-Vice President Nuclear Operations P.O. Box B K111ona, Louisiana 70066 Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN:
J. R. McGaha, Jr., Plant Manager P.O. Box B K111ona, Louisiana 70066
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l Louisiana Power & Light Company !
Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN:
L. W. Laughlin, Site Licensing Support Supervisor P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN:
G. M. Davis, Manager, Events Analysis Reporting & Response P.O. Box B K111ona, Louisiana 70066 Monroe & Leman ATTN:
W. Malcolm Stevenson, Esq.
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3300 i
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170-3300 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge ATTN: Mr. E. Blake 2300 N Street, NW Washington, D.C.
20037 Middle South Services, Inc.
ATTN: Ralph T, Lally, Manager of Quality Assurance P.O. Box 61000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission One American Place, Suite 1630 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697 Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN:
R. F. Burski, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs 317 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Department of Environmental Quality ATTN: William H. Spell, Administrator Nuclear Energy Division P.O. Box 14690 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70898 President, Police Jury St. Charles Parish Hahnville, Louisiana 70057
Louisiana Power & Light Company Mr. William A. Cross Bethesda Licensing Office 3 Metro Center Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Resident Inspector P.O. Box 822 K111ona, Louisiana 70066 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Regional Administrator, Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 w/o
Enclosure:
Chief, Technological Hazards Branch FEMA Region 6 Federal Center 800 North Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201-3698 bec to DMB ( A045) 4 bec distrib, by RIV w/ report:
Resident Inspector Inspector D. Wigginton, NRR Project Manager Emergency Preparedness Section File RIV File bec w/o report:
R. Martin B. Beach D. Powers Project Engineer DRP/A DRP MIS System C. A. Hackney R. Erickson, NRR 1
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@ Federal Emergency Manage Washington, D.C. 20472 Fi.T 1y Mr. Frank J. Congel Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555
Dear Mr. Congel:
Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report of.the August 30, 1989, exercise of offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans site-specific to the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station.
This was a full-participation exercise with the State of Louisiana and the Parishes of St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, St. James, and Tangipahoa.
Also included in this report are the results of the November 7-8, 1989, shift-change drills at the Raceland Fire Department in Raceland; Tangipahoa Parish Emergency Operations Center in Amite; Hammond F. ire Department in Hammond; and South Vacherie Volunteer Fire Department in Vacherie, Louisiana; and the December 7, 1989, unannounced and off-hours drills conducted at the St. Charles Parish and the St. John the Baptist Parish Emergency Operations Centers.
The final exercise report was prepared by the Region VI Office staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
There were no deficiencies identified as a result of this exercise.
However, there were a few areas requiring corrective actions.
A schedule of corrective actions is included in the report.
Based on the results of this exercise and the drills which addressed the previously untested objectives, the offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station and the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on July 15, 1985, remains in effect.
l g
t If you have any questions, please. contact Mr. Craig s. Wingo,-
chief,-Technological Hazards Division at 646-3026.
Sincerely, i
['
p' p,s -. Dennis H. Kwi,atkowski.
Assistant Associate Director office of' Natural'and Technological ~
-Hazards Enclosure t
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,' o FINAL RADIO!AGICAL DERSIBCY PREPAREDNESS EEERCISE REPORT Nuclear Power Plant: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Licensee: Imuisiana Power and Light Company location of Plant: State of 14uisiana St. Charles Parish Killona, Louisiana Date of Report: January 12, 1990 Date of Exercise: August 30, 1989 Date of Shift Change Drill:
November 7 8. 1989 Date of Off Hours Unannounced Drill:
December 7, 1989
Participants:
State of Louisiana St. Charles Parish St. John the Baptist Parish St. James Parish Tangipahes Parish Ochsner Hospital St. Charles Ambulance Service FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region VI Tederal Center 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201
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l 1
FINAL j
i RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT Nuclear Power Plant: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Ideensee: Louisiana Power and Light Company Location of Plant: State of Louisiana i
i St. Charles Parish Killona, Louisiana Date of Report: January 12, 1990 Date of Exercise: August 30, 1989 Date of Shift Change Drill: November 7 8, 1989 Date of Off Hours Unannounced Drill:
December 7, 1989
Participants:
State of Louisiana St. Charles Parish St. John the Baptist Parish St. James Parish Tangipahoa Parish Ochsner Hospital St. Charles Ambulance Service e
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region VI Federal Center 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201
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CONTENTS ABBttEVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS iv v
INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY 1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND I
1.1 Exercise Summary 2
1.2 Federal Evaluators...
4 3
4 1.3 Exercise Objectives 1.4 Guidelines For Off site Participation 7
1.5 Exercise scenario Summary 8
1.6 Evaluation criteria 10 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION 12 2.1 Louisiana State Operations.
12 2.1.1 State EOC 13 2.1.2 Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) Operations at Waterford 3 EOF.
15 2.1.3 LNED 14b Operations 15 2.1.4 State Field Radiological Monitoring Teams 15 2.1.4.1 State Field Radiological Monitoring Team wi 15 2.1.4.2 State Field Radiological Monitoring Team e2 18 2.1.5 Media Relations.
19 2.2 Local EOCs and Support Organizations.
21 2.2.1 St. Charles Parish EOC.
21 2.2.2 St. John the Baptist Parish EOC 24' 2.2.3 Tangipahoa Parish 27 2.2.3.1 Tangipahoa Parish EOC 27 2.2.3.2 Southeast Louisiana University Hammond Reception /
Care Center 29 2.2.4 St. James Parish......
31 2.2.4.1 St. James Parish EOC.
31 2.2.4.2 Raceland Monitoring /Decon Station 33 1
2.2.4.3 South Vacherie Monitoring /Decon Station 34 i
2.2.5 ochsner Hospital /St. Charles Ambulance Service.
35 2.3 Utility Issues.
36 3 TRACKING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT EXERCISE DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 38 4 FEMA OBJECTIVES TRACKING.WATERFORD 3 STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 45 1
TABLES l
1 Corrective Actions for the Waterford 3 Exercise 39 2 FEMA Objectives Tracking Chart Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station 46 iii
e ';
ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS Argonne National Laboratory ANL
+
Department of Energy DOE Department of Transportation DOT l
Emergency Broadcast System EBS I
Emergency Class Level ECL Emergency Medical Service EMS Emergency News Center ENC Emergency Operations Center EOC Emergency Operations Facility EOF Environmental Protection Agency EPA Emergency Planning Zone EPZ Federal Emergency Mansgement Agency FEMA General Emergency CE Health and Human Services HHS Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEL Potassium Iodide KI Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division LNED Loss of Coolant Accident LOCA Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness LOEP Louisiana Power & Light Company LP&L Milliroentgens per hour mR/h Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Protective Action Guide FAG Protective Action Recommendation PAR Protective Action Section PAS Public Information Officer PIO Regional Assistance Committee RAC RADEF - Radiological Defense Reactor Coolant System RCS Radiological Defense Officer RDO Radiological Emergency Preparedness REP Site Area Emergency SAE Standard Operation Procedure SOP Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TLD
. United States Department of Agriculture USDA t
iv 4
INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY On December 7,
1979, the President directed the Tederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead role responsibilities for all off.
site nuclear power facility planning and response.
TEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear racility Radiological Emergency Response Planning include:
Taking the lead in off. site emergency response planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans, and ensuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in NUREG.06$4/TEMA REP.1, Rev, 1 (November 1980).
Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the ' basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions.
Coordination of the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies.
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by TEMA.
. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
. U.S, Department of Energy (DOE)
. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
. U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) i l
V I
,4 g
1 1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND The sixth Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise for the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (W 3) was conducted on August 30, 1989.
The State of Louisiana and four parishas, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, St. James, and Tangipahoa, fully participated in the exercise.
The initial, qualifying, Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise was conducted February 8,
- 1984, with all involved jurisdictions participating. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has participated in evaluating the off site radiological response capabilities of the State and local jurisdictions in all graded exercises.
e On August 31, 1989, following the exercise, three meetings were held --
a 7:30 a.m.
11:00 a.m. review by the 21 member Federal evaluation team, with the Region V1 RAC Chairman, of the preliminary results of the exercise; a 1:00 p.m. critique for State, local and utility officials to present a preliminary t
overview of the exercise results; and a 5:00 p.m.
Public Critique of the exerciae at the St. Charles Parish Courthouse in Hahnv111e, Louisiana.
Subsequent to the exercise of August 30, 1989, drills were held to demonstrate FEMA objectives that had not been previously tested.
The drills were for the purpose of satisfying the requirement that all Category B & C objectives must be demonstrated at least once during the initial six year interval. No more than six years can lapse between subsequent demonstrations.
On November 7 8 shift change drills (objective 34) were conducted at the Raceland Fire Department in Raceland, Louisiana, Tangipahoa Parish EOC in Amite, 1
Louisiana, Hammond Fire Department in Hammond, Louisiana, and South Vacherie Volunteer Fire Department in Vacherie, Louisiana.
On December 7,1989 FEMA objective 36 (unannounced and off hours drill) was demonstrated at the St. Charles Parish EOC and the St. John the Baptist EOC.
Although scheduled to be conducted during the November 7 8 Drill, postponement was necessary due to excessive flooding that precluded demonstrating this objective, as the EOCs were already activated to respond to the flooding problems.
Section 2 of this exercise report provides narratives, together with descriptions of Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for improvement (if any) for each of the participating jurisdictions and field activities tested in the exercise.
Section 3 provides a summary listing of any Deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, including those needing priority attention.
This summary is in tabular format and provides space for State and local jurisdiction responses and schedules for corrective actions.
There were no Deficiencies found during the evaluation of this exercise or subsequent drills.
s Section 4 of this report compiles, in tabular format, all TEMA Objectives met or yet to be achieved (based on the requirements of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1) as well as a separate summary sheet of those FEMA Objectives which have not been satisfactorily met or tested to date.
l Ihe findings presented in this report have been reviewed and approved by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region V1.
FEMA suggests that State and local l
2 jurisdictions take corrective actions in response to any problems indicated in the report, and that the State submit a schedule for addressing these problems, The Regional Director of FEMA Region VI is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action have been or will be corrected, and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.
The following provides a brief narrative overview of the exercise performances of the State of Louisiana and participating parishes.
More detailed discussions of performance by individual agencies or exercise activity locations are provided under the appropriate location in Section 2.
1.1 EXERCISE
SUMMARY
State of Louisiana Operations The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) participated in the Waterford 3 exercise.
Both agencies demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for dealing with a radiological emergency.
Operations were well managed by the LOEP and LNED personnel, and the entire staff was involved in decisio'n making.
As described in previous exercise reports, physical
- aspects of the State EOC are adequate to support continuous emergency operations and maps, displays and other support materials were available and were effectively utilized. Com-munications facilities, equipment and procedures functioned well throughout the exercise.
Detailed evaluations of performance at each State location are provided in Section 2 of this report.
Local Government operations Local jurisdictions participating in the exercise included the two parishes located within the 10 mile plume EPZ, St. Charles Parish and St. John the Baptist Parish with Tangipahoa and St. James Parishes in a support role.
These local participants capably demonstrated the resources, knowledge and initiative necessary to alert their citizens, and to implement appropriate protective actions for safeguarding the health and safety of the affected populatio'n in the event of an incident at Waterford 3.
Facilities at the Farish EOCs are adequate and provide space, equipment and other resources to support emergency operations.
Effectiveness of EOC communications equipment, procedures and staff was adequately demonstrated.
The drills of November 78 and December 7,
1989 vere successfully demonstrated with no issues being identified.
Detailed evaluations of performance at each State location are provided in Section 2 of this report.
s
.s 3
4 1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Evaluator Arency Location Gary Jones FEMA Overall Coordination Rachael Rowland FEMA LA State EOC Al Lookabaugh ANL LA State EOC Charles Hackney NRC W 3 EOF (LNED Operations)
Brad Salmonson INEL W 3 EOF (LNED Operations)
Marty Simonin ANL State Field Radiological Monitoring Team al Harry Harrison FEMA State Field Radiological Monitoring Team a2 Frank Vilson ANL LNED Lab Operations
~
Roy Smith FEMA Emergency News Center Dana Cessna FEMA Emergency News Center Bill Gasper ANL St, Charles Parish EOC Nancy Culp FEMA St. Charles Parish EOC I
Leland Peyton FEMA St. John the Baptist Parish EOC l
l Ernie Boaze FEMA St. John the Baptist Parish l
EOC 1
Jacques Mitrani ANL St. James Parish EOC Marc Madore ANL Tangipahoa Parish EOC Tom Carroll ANL Ochsner Hospital and St.
Charles Ambulance Service Bill Knoerzer ANL Southeast Louisiana University Reception / Care Center Julio Muzzarelli ANL Southeast Louisiana University Reception / Care Center Carl McCoy FEMA Raceland Mon /Decon 6
South Vacherie Mon /Decon Station l
i Jim Cox DOT Raceland Mon /Decon & South Vacherie Mon /Decon Station A
4 Evaluator Acency Location November 7 8, 1989 shift. change drill Lee Peyton FEHA Raceland VFD Tangipahoa Parish Hammond Fire Department South Vacherie VFD December 7, 1989 Unannounced off. hours drill Dana Cessna TEMA St. John the Baptist Parish Russell Backser FEMA St. Charles Parish I.3 EXERCISE OBJECT 7.VES l
The exercise objectives selected for the State of Louisiana and the participating local jurisdictions were designed to provide the opportunity to demonstrate that their off site emergency response plans, operations and capabilities were adequate to cope with a radiological incident at the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station.
JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUMBER AND TEXT State Local (See Note) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to X
X 1,2,6,7 monitor, understand and use Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario.
The four ECia are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site i
Area Emergency, and General Emergency.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to X
X ALL fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field based emergency functions.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to X
X 1,2.6,7,8,10 direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
w a
5 JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUMBER AND TEXT State Local (See Notei 4.
Demonstrate the ability to X
X ALL communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
5.
Demonstrate the adequacy X
X 1,2,5,6,7,8,10 of facilities, equipment, displays and other. materials to support emergency operations.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to X
X 2,4,6,7,11,12,13 continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
7.
Demonstrate the appropriate X
4 equipment and procedures for detetuining field radiation measurement.
8.
Demonstrate the appropriate X
4' equipment and procedurbs fer the moasurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10 E.7 microcuries per cc in the presence of t
i noble gases.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to X
3,4 obtain samples of particulate q
activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analysis.
l
- 10. Demonstrate the ability, within X
2 l
the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to make X
X 2
appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors.
6
6 JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUMBER AND TEXT State Local (See Note)
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to X
6,7 initially alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an i
l instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate state and/or local official (s).
t
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to X
X 1,2,5,6,7 coordinate th* formulation and disseminacion of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.
- 14. Demonstrate the ability to X
X 5,6,7 brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner.
X X
5,6,7
- 15. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.
- 21. Demonstrate t,he adequacy of X
X 9
procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registrition, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.
- 22. Demonstrate the adequacy of X
X 9
facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacuees.
- 23. Demonstrate the adequacy of X
13-vehicles, equipment, procedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.
24 Demonstrate the adequacy of X
13 medical facilities, equipment, procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.
7 JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE h'UHBER AND TEXT State Local (See Notei
- 25. Demonstrate the adequacy of X
X 11,12 facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal.
t
- 34. Demonstrate the ability to X
X 10 i
maintain staffing on a continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis by an actual shift change.
NOTE:
The locations where various exercise objectives were denonstrated are indicated by numerical codes as follow:
.Q2pl TEAM ELEMENT OR FACILITY NAME LOCATIO!j 1.
Louisiana State EOC Baton Rouge 2.
LNED Operations W 3 EOF 3.
LNED Lab Operations Baton Rouge 4.
State Field Radiological Monitoring Teams (2)
Field 5.
Media Rslations New Orleans 6.
St. Charles Parish EOC Hahnville, LA 7.
St. John the Baptist Parish EOC
-La Place, LA 8.
Tangipahoa Parish EOC Hammond, LA 9.
Southeast LA Univ. Reception / Care Hammond, LA 10.
St. James Parish EOC Convent, LA 11.*
Raceland Mon./Decon. Station Raceland, LA 12.
South Vacherie Mon./Decon. Station South Vacherie, LA 13.
Ochsner Hospital New Orleans, LA On November 7 8, 1989 objective 34 (shift change) was demonstrated at the Raceland Monitoring /Decon Station, Tangipahoa Parish EOC,. Southeast Louisiana University Reception / Care Center, and South Vacherie Monitoring /Decon Station.
On December 7,
1989 objective 36 (unannounced off hours) was demonstrated at St. Charles Parish EOC and St. John the Baptist Parish EOC.
1.4 GUIDELINES FOR OFF-SITE PARTICIPATION All state agencies and four parishes (St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, St. James, and Tangipahoa) will fully participate in this exercise.
The State EOC at Baton Rouge will be fully activated.
Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) will activate its headquarters, dispatch field monitoring teams for
c ',.
8 sample collection, activate the laboratory for sample analysis and dispatch a dose assessment team to the Emergency Operations Facility for control of the field teams and the making of protective action recommendations. The State will demonstrate its media operations at the licensee's Emergency News Center, which is located in downtown New Orleans.
All four parishes will fully activate and staff th'eir respective EOCs, including their executive groups for decision making, but personnel will not be deployed to the field for implementation of protective actions.
Any field activity required by the scenario, such as the mobilization of vehicles for evacuation and the setting up of traffic control points will be simulated.
Normal activities will be conducted in the parish EOCs such that requirements of the exercise scenario are satisfied. These activities include direction and control, use of procedures and internal displays, communica'tions, security, emergency worker exposure control, and notification of the public.
The capability for alert and notification of the public, institutions, and industries within the plume exposure EPZ will be demonstrated consistent with the scenario but sirens will not be activated.
The Sheriff and fire responders will participate only to the extent that they engage in exercise related communications. Transportation resources or other resources outside of the risk parishes will not be activated, except as necessa.ry to demonstrate objectives associated with a medical dri,11, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, and activation of a reception / care center.
Various resources may be notified as procedure dictates, depending on scenario events, as a part of exercise related communications.
Special facilities, including schools, hospitals, nursing homos, and jails will participate only to the extent that they will be included in exercise related communications which affect those specific institutions.
The demonstration of EMS and hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated injured persons will be performed by Ochsner Foundation Hospital and St. Charles Ambulance Service.
The demonstration of reception /
t care activation, with monitoring and decontamination of " evacuees" will take place in Tangipahoa Parish at the Southeast Louisiana University Reception / Care facility at Hammond, La.
Monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers l
will be demonstrated at the Raceland Monitoring /Decon station by members of the l
Raceland Fire Department and at the South Vacherie Monitoring /Decon station.
Those jurisdictions that have not demonstrated objectives 34 and 36 will demonstrate them at drills to be held on November 7 8, 1989 for shif t change and on December 7, 1989 for unannounced off hours, v
^
1.5 EKERCISE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The sequence of events hypothesized in this exercise is provided to test the integrated emergency response capability of organizations established to protect the public should an actual emergency occur.
In order to achieve a sequence of events that will mobilize these emergency organizations in ful-l fillment of the objectives of this exercise, the scenario must contain incredi-ble plant situations, unlikely equipment failures and failure sequences, and-improbable operator actions.
It is stressed that off site personnel (e.g. the public) should not be misled into believing that an event causing the radiolo.
1
l, 9
gical consequences postulated by this scenario could occur.
The following is a summary of these events:
The plant is operating at 100% powar at the end of core life.
Fuel failure of 0.037% is indicated by chemistry conditions.
The "B LPSI pump is out of service for the replacement of the mechanical seals.
The "B" containment spray pump is out of service for the annual oil change PM and replacing the seal water packing.
At about 7:35 a.m., the main turbine governor valve #4 closes due to a blown fuse on the Servo Driver Card. I&C maintenance will be dispatched to repair the card.
At 8:00 a.m., a small tube leak develops in *2 S/G.
The condenser vacuum pump exhaust and blowdown radiation monitors go into alarm.
A mechanical failurs of the motor operated valve on the condenser vacuum exhaust prevents diverting the gas through the filters.
This results in the release of radioactivity to the turbine building roof.
The Shift Supervisor declares an Alert based on Emergency Plan Implementing Precedure EP 001 001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions TAB A.' Alert EAL #A4 The Alert declaration results in the activation of the Technical Support Center, the Operational Support Center and the Emergency News Center.
Shortly thereaf ter, the A charging pump trips and the B charging pump is started.
A packing leak on blowdown valve BD 103B occurs and the area radiation monitor for the 4 Wing Area goes into alarm.
This results in a radioactive release from the #2 S/G to the atmosphere via the plant ventilation system to the plant stack.
The release continues until blowdown isolation valve packing leakage is secured.
At 9:15 a.m., the SPDS display fails in the TSC due to a defective cable plug.
The TSC personnel will need to obtain plant parameters via an alternate means until the SPDS console can be repaired.
At 10:00 a.m., a RCP shaft seizure occurs on the 2A RCP. This causes a small break LOCA through the RCP seal, a reactor trip, and increased fuel damage (approximately 4%).
When the 2A RCP shaft seizure occurs, RCP breaker will fail to trip causing a loss of the 6.9 KV bus.
The LOCA will cause pressuriser level-to decrease and containment pressure and radiation levels to increase. The Emergency Coordinator declares a Site Area Emergency based on Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EP-001 001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions, TAB B, Site Area Emergency EAL *A1.
10
)
j The near site and off site emergency organizations are mobilized and the
{
Emergency Operations Facility and the Corporate Command, Center are staffed.
When containment spray is activated, the "A" containment sprsy pump will trip.
Containment pressure will continue to increase to about 30 35 psia in approximately one hour.
At 10:20 a.m.,
the 2A RCP electrical penetration fails releasing radioactivity into the annulus.
As annulus pressure increases, the Shield Building Ventilation System will cycle between recirculation and exhaust to control the annulus at a negative pressure. This results in a release to the atmosphere via the plant stack. When the containment failure is identified, the Emergency Coordinator declares a General Emergency based on Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EP 001 001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions, TAB D, General Emergency EAL #A2 QB TAB B, General Emergency EAL #A2.
At 10:45 a.m.,
lightning strikes the backup meteorological tower resulting in the failure of the power supply.
I&C maintenance will be dispatched to restore the meteorological tower to operation.
The radioactive release will continue until containment spray is restored (via either a LPSI or a CS Pump) and containment pressure is at or below atmospheric pressure.
When the release has been terminated, the EOF Director should begin to consider downgrading the emergency classification.
At this point the exercise will be terminated.
1.6 EVALUATION CRITERIA The Waterford 3 exercise evaluations that follow in Section 2 of this report are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREC 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980). The exercise was evaluated using the Exercise Evaluation Methodology forms described in Guidance Memorandum (GM) EX 3.
Following the narrative for each jurisdiction or off site response activity, Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Actions and Areas Recommended for Improvement are presented with accompanying recommendations. Any identified Deficiencies would result in a finding that the off site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear facility in the event of a radiological emergency.
At least one Deficiency in this category would result in a negative finding and require a remedial drill within 120 days to demonstrate that appropriate corrections had been made.
As noted previously, there was no Deficiency.
identified in this exercise.
Areas-Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) include those activities where performance demonstrated during the exercise was evaluated and considered faulty; corrective actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate e
f.
11 that reasonable assurance could be given that, in the event of a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can 6 be taken to protect the health and safety of the public.
This category should be relatively easy to correct in comparison to those classified as Deficiencies.
An ARCA will be corrected no later than the next scheduled exercise.
Areas Recommended for Improvement are also listed, as appropriate, for each jurisdiction or off site activity.
c '.
12 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG 0654/PDiA REP 1, REV.1 (November 1980), and pre approved exercise objectives, an evaluation has been made of the August 30, 1989 exercise at the k'aterford 3 Steam Electric Station and the November 7 8 and December 7, 1989 drills.
The results of this evaluation, including any observed Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Improvement are presented herein. FEMA Region VI will maintain close liaison with the State and local governments in determining the required corrective actions (including timeframes for accomplishing the corrections) in accordance with established criteria and guidelines. There were no Deficiencies identified in this exercise or drills.
2.1 LOUISIANA STATE OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State EOC The State of Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) success-fully demonstrated their ability to monitor, understand and use Emergency Clasaification Levels (ECLs) through the appropriate implementation of emergen-cy functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario.
The UCLs were prominently displayed in the EOC so that the staff was aware of the current level.
The State alerted, mobilized and activated their staff in a timely manner after receiving notice of an Alert at 8:33 a.m.,
and after verification of the ECL had been made. Telephone calls were made to staff who were not already on duty and the EOC was declared fully operational at 9:15 a.m.
Calls were made to the State agencies and they were placed on standby in case they were needed at the EOC.
Public information officers were dispatched (pre positioned) from the EOC to the Emergency News Center in New Orleans.
The LOEP representative in the Executive Group at the EOC. was in charge of the State EOC operations during the exercise.
The operations officer effectively controlled all activity throughout the exercise from the operations room.
Periodic briefings were held throughout the exercise and appropriate staff were included in the decision making process'.
Internal message handling was excellent. Messages were received, duplicated, controlled and issued to all appropriate staff in a timely manner.
Recommendations for protective action (PAR) initially made by the utility for sheltering and/or evacuation, were not coordinated with LOEP or LNED representatives at the State EOC before sending the PAR to the parishes.
According to procedure, the utility should consult with LNED for concurrence prior to issuing PARS to the parishes.
(See Utility Issues section.)
Throughout the exercise, the communications center at the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness was adequately staffed with a communications officer and two communication technicians.
The communication specialists were knowledgeable and accomplished their activities in a professional and timely manner.
Equipment and personnel were adequate to receive, verify, and'
13 4
, distribute messages from commercial telephones, radios, facsimile machines, and
' the dedicated hot line.
The initial process of authenticating the Alert message with the facility a supposedly silent telephone line and a-was hindered by a busy signal on miscommunicated alternate number given by the utility Technical Support Center (TSC).
Despite the eventual verification -of the Alert message af ter eight minutes, this delay inhibited the conveyance of the Alert.to the essential LOEP-staff, LNED and the five participating parishes.
For authentication purposes, the telephone confirmation number at the facility should be a silent one and' used only by the LOEP communications center to initially confirm the emergency classification.
Problems arose periodically with some of the telephone connections to some of the support parishes.
(See-Utility Issues section.)
The State EOC is located in the basement of the Land and Natural Resources Building in Baton Rouge. It is an excellent facility with sufficient space, furnishings, lighting, rest rooms, ventilation, backup power, and supplies necessary for extended operations.
Security was simulated for this exercise.
Necessary maps and status boards were on display. The boards were kept current at all times and were positioned for viewing by the staff.
The State EOC dispatches public information officers to-the Emergency News Center at the Alert ECL.-
In addition, a PIO stays at the State EOC and l
maintains contact with the PIOS at the' Emergency News' Center by telephone and-by facsimile machine.
Some information for the public is developed at the State EOC and l
furnished to the Emergency News Center where it. is presented to the public j
through news releases and briefings. The state public affairs staff has access j
to all current information at the State EOC and furnishes the'information to their representatives at the Emergency News Center, t
l In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 13 were met at j
this location.
i l
DEFICIENCIES: NONE I
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 1
1 2.1.2 Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) Operations at Waterford 3 EOF The LNED staff was notified of t.he emergency status by Louisiana Power and Li.ght by telephone. LNED emergency response team personnel arrived at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at 10:56 a.m., approximately two hours-and fourteen minutes after departing from Baton Rouge (response = time is not real due to an agreement to pre stage in the interest of time and scenario con-straints).
Upon arriving at the EOF, LNED personnel logged in on the dosimeter log-and contacted the LP&L emergency director for a briefing on the status of the emergency.
In the interest of monitoring. emergency worker exposure, all-i
14 i
personnel,were issued 0 5 R and 0 200 mR dosimeters and a TLD prior to departing i
Baton Rodge for the EOF.
Field personnel were periodically reminded to read their dosimeters and log the results, j
Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) were understood by all personnel.
This was demonstrated as LNED staff members reacted appropriately as the EC...
changed.
Communication with the State and parish EOCs vg ny cowarcal telepho-ne and hot line. The number of telephones was adequto L2D at the EOF com-municated with the field monitoring teams by radio. Thee o dio operator at 5 0 did not know how to properly use the base radio and resorted to a backup hand-held radio.
After some instruction, the operator was able to effectively use the base radio.
Communication was adequately demonstrated at the EOF.
The LNED dose assessment team demonstrated the ability to calculate dose f
projections for off-site impact on the public.
Dose projections made by LNED were compared to projections made by LP&L personnel. In one instance, the. dose assessment input was incorrect but was discovered through this cross-check procedure and corrected.
The thyroid dose projections were compared to the Environmental Protection Agency protective action guides.
Rather than keep a log book, LNED. dose assessment personnel used individual note sheets. A log book, properly updated as events developed, would minimize the possibility of losing information.
Also, the maps used by LNED dose assessment were different from those used by the utility but posed ' no problem.
Both the State and the utility should be using the same maps.
LNED dose assessment also did not utilize status boards.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 13 were met at this location.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE i
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-1
==
Description:==
The radio operator was not-trained in the proper use of the base radio.
(NUREG-0654 F.1.d)
Recommendation: Designate specific persons as radio operators and give them training in the use of all radios to be used.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
Status boards were not used and a log book was not maintained.
Recommendation: Use the status board.and maintain a log
- book,
==
Description:==
There appeared to be no quality assurance e
procedure for verification of input data' for the dose calculation prior to releasing the projection for PAR development.
/ '.
15-Recommendation:
Develop' a procedure to assure. the correctness of input data prior to calculating the dose proj ection.
's
==
Description:==
Maps used by LNED were different from those-o used by the utility.
Recommendation:
LNED and the utility should agree upon which map to.use and both should use the same map.
2.1.3 LNED Lab Operations The LNED laboratogy was activated at the appropriate time'(8:37 a.m.)
~
with adequate staffing to perform required emergency analysis. As this' exercise occurred during working hours, only a staff briefing was required to notify the staff and give them an update on the plant status.
During non working hours, telephone pyramid alerting system is implemented - to notify the laboratory a
staff.
The laboratory is equipped with numerous telephones and has available a facsimile system. The laboratory staff phone in the results of their analysis and follow this up with hard copy from the facsimile system to the requestor.
The staff was well trained and very professional in the performance of their duties.
All the equipment was in calibration.
One. particulate sample was used to demonstrate the laboratory's method for accepting the sample..The l
sample was delivered to the back of the laboratory where it was checked for contamination, logged in and analyzed.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2,
4, and 9 were met at this location.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE i
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.1.4 State Field Radiological Monitoring Teams 2.1.4.1 State Field Radiological Monitoring Team #1' The LNED director was informed of the Alert declaration by.the utility
~
at 8:36 a.m.
All staff members were promptly paged over the public address system and requested to report to the briefing room.
The staff was briefed as to meteorological data and plant status.
This information was also verified with the utility.
Af ter the briefing, the field teams were deployed to their respective staging area.
Field team #1 was provided with a multi-channel radio as their primary communication system with commercial telephone as a back up.
Timely communica-
16 tions were maintained with the other field monitoring team and the EOF during the exercise using the LNED frequencies.
The team was provided with high and low range direct-reading dosimeters, which were zeroed,. a TLD and a radiation exposure record card.
Radiation exposure readings were recorded every 30 minutes and transmitted to the EOF.
Both team members were knowledgeable in radiation exposure control procedures.
Personal protective equipment, such as gloves, boots, Anti-C coveralls and respirators were available for both team members. Respirators were properly stored; however, the team has never been fit tested for the respirators nor did they have procedures and equipment available to do so.
The team was provided with a 0-200 mR/hr survey instrument.
A high-range survey instrument (0 50R) was not available in the vehicle, although the plan states in Table 1, chapter 6 (page 54) that a 1 mR 1000R/hr instrument was available at the LNED office.
The survey instrument used had been recently calibrated and was checked for proper operation.
Ambient radiation monitoring was performed by taking both beta / gamma and gamma only readings at waist level, but near ground level readings were not performed. The readings were logged and promptly communicated to the EOF.
The team was able to arrive at monitoring locations promptly. However, they were only dispatched to two locations due to the scenario time constraints and never traversed the plume in order to better define and verify the plume within the 10 mile-EPZ.
Field team #1 was provided with both a recently calibrated air sampling pump and a single-channel analyzer connected to a gamma scintillation probe.
l Air samples were efficiently taken in accord with procedures.
The procedures should be revised to clearly state the minimum amount of air (10 cubic feet) that has to pass through the silver zeolite cartridge. The team was instructed by the EOF where to go for purging and counting the air samples taken. Samples were removed from the combination air sample holder, double bagged and properly labeled.
The air sample media was counted - using a single-channel analyzer by _
placing the sample and the probe into a fixed geometry holder.
However, the single-channel analyzer should have been properly set up using a Ba-133 check-source to verify that optimum detection levels are maintained for determining the presence of radioiodines within the plume.
l Two air samples were taken using two combination air sample holders.
However, if more air samples were requested, there was no means provided for decontamination of the combination holders and tweezers.
Field team #1 adequately demonstrated obtaining two particulate _ filter samples.
Team #2 was instructed to transport their two samples to the state laboratory in Baton Rouge. Both field teams counted the particulate filter for radioiodines using the single-channel analyzer in accord with their procedures.
i In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 were met at this location.
1 17 DEFICIENCIES: NONE
-AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-2
==
Description:==
Field team #1 did not take both beta / gamma and gamma only readings at a near ground level (about 1" above the ground).
(NUREG-0654 1.11) l Recomoendation: The field team members should receive additional train-ing in proper procedure for performing ambient radiation monitoring.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
Field team #1 was provided with respirators f
but they were never trained how to properly use them nor
..1 were they fit tested. The plan states on page 86 (v.B.3) l that respirators will be used as required.
Recommendation: Field team' members should be fit tested for a respirator, trained in its use, and provided procedures and equipment to fit test a respirator when donned.
Description:
Field teams were provided with only one survey instrument having a range of 0 200 mR/hr, Recommendation: Field teams should be provided with a survey instrument having a range of at least 50R/hr, in accord with FEMA-REP-2, Rev 1.
Description:
The field ceams were dispatched to only two monitoring locations due to scenario time constraints, but were not instructed to traverse the plume.
Recommendation: Field teams should be instructed to traverse the plume, track it, and verify the projected dispersion of the plume.
Description:
Field team procedures were vague as far as stating the minimum quantity of air that should be drawn through the air sample media before the pump is stopped.
Recommendation: Field team procedures should be revised to state that a minimum of 10 cubic feet of air is required to be drawn through the air sample media.
Description:
Field teams were not provided with a
-radioactive check source for verifying that the single-channel analyzer is properly set up.
Recommendation:
Provide the field teams. with a Ba 133 source for use in determining that the single-channel analyzer is properly set up at the optimum detection level for radiciodines within the plume.
18 r
Description:
Field teams were not provided'with a'means for.
decontamination of the combination air sample holder if more-than two samples were requested.
Recommendation: Provide the field teams with a means of decontaminating the-combination air sample ! holder and tweezers.
2.1.4.2 State Field Radiological Monitoring Team #2.
Team #2 was a part of the regular staff of LNED, which reported for-normal duty on exercise day. At 8:37 a.m., a meeting was called announcing that an Alert notification had occurred at 8:16.a.m.
The Team Leader. provided -
meteorologica1' data and announced that monitoring kits. had been-checked and autos had been - serviced.
An inspection : of the. calibration dates. of ' the instruments indicated that all had been calibrated within the appropriate time intervals.
At 8:44 a.m.,
it was-decided that the field teams should be dispatched to their respective locations =near the Waterford plant. The ability to
- alert, mobilize, and activate the necessary staff was adequately l demonstrated. Team #2 departed INED at 8:59 a.m. with a G M instrument turned:
"0N".
While en route, a G-M instrument remained turned on and radio contact was maintained with the sample runner vehicle and LNED.
While Team #2 was en route, its members determined that the proper approach would be from - the south, which was upwind as determined from the meteorological data that had been previously given at the LNED briefing. Team
- 2 is to be commended for this action taken on its own,=especially since: the-
'leam Leader was also en route to his duty station at the plant EOF.
Team #2 arrived at its staging location at 10:22 a.m.
and waited for further instructions from the Team Leader.
At 10:44 a.m., the Team Leader announced that he was set up at the EOF and that a General Emergency had been declared. During the wait period, a background radiation measurement was taken and an air sample was taken to determine background readings.
At 11:15 a.m., the Team Leader gave a briefing and stated that-a General Emergency had been declared at 10:31 a.m. ; meteorological data was given; and teams were informed that an evacuation was in progress. At 11:24 a.m., the Team Leader directed Team #2 to proceed to monitoring location 9E at 6N on the East-Bank; also dosimeters were to be read. At 12:00 noon, the Team Leader gave the field monitoring teams another briefing including meteorological data. At 12:13 p.m., Team #2 was told that their instrument readings were 6.1 mR/hr open window and 3.7 mR/hr closed window.
Team #2 demonstrated good monitoring techniques in this effort.
An air sample was also requested by the Team Leader and one team member donned gloves and shoe covers and used appropriate techniques in taking the requested air sample. Team #2.used a charcoal cartridge to collect the iodine sample and displayed a silver zeolite cartridge that is contained ~in the monitoring kit.
Upon completion, 'his team member immediately did a teardown, monitored himself, got inside the vehicle and requested departure from the radiation area.
The Team Leader directed Team #2 to monitoring location 8E at 3N. Team
- 2 proceeded at 12:26 p.m. toward this location. At this location, the charcoal 4
19 4
cartridge was counted in accordance with written procedures and the results were reported to the Team Leader.
Double bagging was performed by one of the team members.
This procedure should have been a two-person effort with the second person holding the outside bag to assure a clean outside surface.
At 1:17 p.m., the Team Leader announced that the exercise was concluded and both field radiological monitoring teams should report to the EOF, In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 vere met at this location.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
?
Description:
One field team member had difficulty in double bagging a - potentially _ contaminated sample by himself.
Contamination could have been spread to the outside of the outside bag.
Recommendation:
Additional training should be given to field radiological monitoring team members on procedures for bagging potentially contaminated samples.
2.1.5 Media Relations Media activities were conducted at the LP&L Emergency News Center. (ENC) l in New Orleans.
Representatives from LP&L, LOEP, LNED, and St. John the Baptist and St.
Charles Parishes adequately demonstrated their capability to conduct media response duties.
At 8:38 a.m., the ENC Director received a message that an Alert had been declared at 8:18 a.m.
She promptly began using a call-down list to notify key staff members to mobilize for duty. The call-down process was completed by 9:00 a.m.
The ENC was operational within 15 minutes af ter the Alert message was received.
A bank of commercial telephones, some with conferencing capability, and a facsimile machine system, adequately demonstrated the ability to communicate
~
with key organizations including the Technical Support Center (TSC), the. EOF, I
LOEP, LNED, the Governor's office and primary and support EOCs.
However, a problem developed early on concerning the transmission of plant site notifica-tion forms from the TSC to the ENC via the fax machine.
After receiving the initial notification form from the TSC, an interval of almost two hours passed (10:36 a.m.) before any more notification forms were received. The information on these forms appeared illegible and it took a while for ENO personnel to l
decipher the numbers, etc.
(A short discuscion regarding this matter will be l
addressed under " Utility Issues" later in Section 2 of this report).
l l
[-
t 20-i While the ENC provided ample space, furnishings, lighting,. rest rooms g
and ventilation to support emergency operations, several concerns were noted e
regarding the implementation of display maps / status boards in the news briefing For one, the display board depicting the schematic drawing of the plant area.
used during the news briefings was too small and could not be clearly viewed or read from where the audience was seated.-
It was also positioned behind the table around which news briefing spokespersons were seated and nearly below eye level of the audience.
Likewise, an evacuation / sheltering zone map, while adequate in size, was awkwardly placed behind a large concrete pillar and could not be clearly viewed by the news briefing audience.
The lack of a status (time / events) board in the news briefing area, to help the media update the chronology of disaster activity, was also noted. Because the only status. board of this type is located in the ENC director's office and because the media is barred from enterin5 this area, it is important that a similar status. display be located in an area accessible to the media.
Following the Alert notification, the first news release was produced within 35 minutes and, although the release possibly could have been' drafted I
sooner, it should be pointed out that the utility officials _ responsible for producing the news releases selected total accuracy as more important. than speedy dissemination in producing this first release. A careful check to verify radiation release figures announced by the plant was first-made before drafting the news release.
The ENC staff is to be commended for taking this cautious approach.
The first news release, as ' with ' subsequent ' news releases, however, failed to note an originating time anywhere on the release. To avoid confusion among media representatives and other interested persons as to the credibility-and timeliness of emergency information,. it is vital that the time of issuance / origination ' be noted at the top of each release.
Another. problem occurred when utility news release #4 incorrectly listed the time of the General Emergency declaration as 10:40 a.m. instead of the correct time of 10:31 a.m.
A subsequent news release carried the correct time.
The ENC exercise participants are to be commended for their very timely and generally accurate implementation of news gathering and dissemination procedures amidst the backdrop of a more rapidly developing than normal scenario of events.
l Four news briefings were conducted in a timely and well organized manner with the utility ENC staff providing _ sufficient advance time prior to the briefings to advise LOEP, LNED and parish public information-representatives about the substance and impact of information to be presented-and discussed at the briefings.
Functioning of the rumor control operation was demonstrated professionally and effectively with nearly 100 calls being logged through a well trained utility staff of operators.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 5,13,14 and 15 were met at this location.
.o 21 DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE i
AREAS REC 0KKENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
1
==
Description:==
The display board depicting the schematic e
drawing of the plant used during news briefings was too small and could not be clearly viewed or-read from where the audience was seated.
It was also positioned behind the table around which news briefing spokespersons were seated and nearly below eye level of the audience.
Recommendation:
Enlarge'the size of the schematic drawing for easier viewing and reading and bring it out to the side of the news briefing spokestable or position it on top of j
some type of a raised platform.
==
Description:==
An evacuation / sheltering zone map was l
awkwardly placed behind a large concrete pillar and could not be clearly viewed by the news briefing audience.
i Recommendation:
Position the zone map to afford easier
~
l viewing by the news-briefing audience.
==
Description:==
A status (time / events) board to help the media e
update the chronology of disaster activity was missing from the news briefing area.
1 Recommendation:
Position a status board somewhere in the' I
news briefing area because the only status board of this l
type is located in the ENC director's office, which is off l
limits to media personnel.
It is important that a status board be made accessible to the media.
==
Description:==
The first utility news release, as well as subsequent releases, failed to note an originating or issuance time anywhere on the releases.
Recommendation: Make sure all news releases include a time of origination to provide credibility and timeliness to all.
emergency information.
2.2 LOCAL EOCS AND SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 2.2.1 St. Charles Parish E00 The Parish EOC, located in the basement of the Parish Courthouse in Hahnville, Louisiana, is a permanent, hardened facility that is designated for use in support of emergency operations in the parish.
The EOC incorporates office spaces, operations areas, communications room, kitchen and bunking areas well-organized facility.
It is equipped with emergency power and into a
22 designed to operate for an extended period if required. The facility contains excellent maps, displays, and status boards that were posted and ' maintained throughout the exercise.
The St. Charles Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) Director was notified,- by the utility hot line,,at 8:33 a.m., of an Alert emergency classification level (ECL).
The ECL was received directly in the EOC com-munications room, because the exercise began during normal work hours, All ECLs were received in this manner: Site Area Emergency was received at 10:25 a.m. _ and General Emergency at 10:54 a.m.
Upon receipt of the Alert notification, the EOC Director activated the E00.
All staff members were called by phone using a current and correct roster; the EOC was fully staffed by 9:00 a.m.
Upon activation of the EOC, access was controlled by the Sheriff's Department.
The EOC Director and his assistant, working in conjunction with the Parish President, were effectively in charge of the emergency operations.
In accordance with the plan, the Director oversees and manages the EOC staff, utilizing input from the agencies-represented.
The Parish President, who has ultimate authority in decisions affecting the parish populace, relies on the recommendations and decisions made by the Director.
Periodic briefings were conducted and personnel were involved-in decision making.
In order to assure-that the EOC Director is kept informed of all emergency activities performed by all the agencies at the EOC, a system has been developed which uses written messages that are passed between agencies and ultimately to the Director for his signature. This is a very effective system, which minimizes misunderstand-ings and erroneous activities.
All messages were logged, reproduced, and distributed as appropriate.
EOC communications systems and procedures, manned by three persons, worked exceptionally well throughout the exercise. Telephones, with conferenc-ing ability, hot lines, radio links (33), industrial lines (25), and fax machines were utilized during the exercise.
All calls received in the EOC Communications Room were also received / taped in the Sheriff's Department, located upstairs, as a backup system. Problems were observed in the receipt of information over the utility hot line recorded on the notification message form.
The plant communicator, while relaying information to the State and parishes, was continuously interrupted for clarification and/or verification of message content.
This caused delays in receipt of messages.
The parish EOCs rely on the information contained in these cessages to formulate their protective actions.
The plant communicator should be allowed to complete the entire message before accepting questions or requests for clarification.
A further enhancement would be for all parties on the hot line to receive a hard copy of the notification message form via fax machine, followed by verification using the existing system.
All emergency workers at the EOC, and those sent into the plume EPZ, were issued two direct reading dosimeters (high and low range) plus a TLD. Each field team had a charger, an exposure record, instructions for use of equipment, and were told who to contact in case of high exposure. The Assistant Director gave an excellent briefing to all the staff regarding dosimeters,. including wearing, reading, and recording.
The EOC staff was reminded every 30 minutes to record their dosimeter readings.
/.
23 The St. Charles EOC has responsibility for notifyitg and alerting the parish population residing in areas affected during an incident at Waterford,3.
Upon receipt of protective action recommendations from the ' utility, the EOC Director reviews the parish status and with the concurrence of the Parish President orders implementation of protective actions.
The Alert / Notification system was activated at 10: 55 a.m., immediately following the receipt of the General Emergency.
Sirens were sounded (simulated) and an EBS message was transmitted to the designated radio station.
These actions were accomplished within the 15 minute time limit. All EBS messages and parish news releases were drafted at the EOC by the parish Public Information Officer (PIO).
Content of news releases was coordic.ated with the parish PIO located at the Emergency News Center and issued to the media at that location, i
Rumor control was demonstrated at St. Charles E00.
The parish PIO coordindtes information with the rumor control operators located upstairs at the parish courthouse.
Eight telephone' lines are available for rumor control r
The telephone number is the same number as the parish President's day to-use.
day commercial line. This number is published in the phone book, listed in news -
releases, printed in the message transmitted over the parish cable station, and included in the emergency information distributed periodically to the public.
A drill was held at the St. Charles Parish EOC on December 7, 1989 to demonstrate FEMA objective 36, unannounced and off hours activation of EOCs in as required the 10 mile EPZ and other appropriate call-down notifications according to procedure.
At 7:00 p.m., the St. Charles Sheriff's Department received Ihe call from the Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Plant that a rite area emergency had been declared.
The dispatcher completed the proper notification message form, and' contacted the St. Charles Parish Director of Emergency Preparedness via the hot line telephone at 7:04 p.m.
At 7:10 p.m., the Chief Administrative Officer for the Parish arrived and opened the EOC.
The call-down to notify.the EOC staff and the industries within a two mile radius began at 7:15 p.m. and was complete at 7:30 p.m.
LOEP was notified at 7:35 p.m.
that the EOC was activated.
A total of 15 EOC personnel responded.
The drill was terminated at 7:46 p.m.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14 and 15 were met at this location. Objective 36 was met during the December 7,1989 drill.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.2.2 St. John the Baptist Pariah EOC.
The St. John the Baptist Parish EOC, located at'the Parish Courthouse Annex, in La Place, LA, is a new facility, occupied only three days prior to the exercise, that will be an excellent EOC when completed, The short occupancy
~
l o '.
24 of the facility resulted in several problems that will be resolved as the parish emergency preparedness staff settles into their new quarters. The new facility has appropriate space, furnishings, equipment, lighting and other amenities.
EOC communications are still located in the old EOC area but will soon be moved into a new Emergency Services Dispatch Center in the new EOC. Some communications problems resulted from operations split between the two facilities. Also, the telephone company servicing the old EOC area " pulled the-plug" on the facility early in the exercise. The EOC communications staff immediately shif ted to backup systems, until telephone service was restored, and maintained all essential communications links. The telephone system serving the new EOC area is unfamiliar to the staff and its use resulted in a few problems that will be resolved as the staff becomes familiar _vith the new system.
The initial notification of an emergency condition at the Waterford 3 plant, an alert, was received from the control room, over the " hot line" system; at 8:33 a.m.
The EOC communications staff immediately activated the staff alerting system, consisting of pagers and a telephone call list. By 9:20 a.m.,
the EOC was fully staffed and activated.
Each EOC staff member has a pre-assembled kit of materials, in boxes stored in the EOC, consisting of appropriate plan segments, procedures, forms, contact lists and other materials, ready for emergency use. On arrival at the EOC, they draw their " kit" and take their place in the EOC operations - room.
Telephones at each staff officer position provide the capability to contact other operating locations and support organizations. Radios, using local -
government frequencies, are a backup to the telephone system, and are also used for emergency message traffic. The dedicated telephone " hot line" system, connects this EOC with the utility, State emergency operations offices and St.
Charles Parish. Some delays in transmission of hot-line' messages were observed, mostly due to frequent interruptions of the message for repeats of specific data items. It is recommended that requests for repeats not be allowed until the full message has been transmitted. Any requests for repeats of specific data from the message should then be included in the message acknowledgement statements from each receiving location. Each of these hot line messages should be followed-up with hard copy versions of the messa6e, transmitted simultaneously over the facsimile message system.
Following the activation of the EOC, the parish Emergency Coordinator briefed the staff on the emergency situation and indicated that they should initiate actions appropriate to the EC level. Staff briefings, held at each change of EC level, and continuous interchange between the knowledgeable and dedicated EOC staff, insured that all personnel were well informed on changing conditions and on actions undertaken in the parish. The parish Police Jury President and the parish Emergency Coordinator acted together to effectively manage the EOC staff and all EOC operations.
The parish Radiological Defense Officer (RDO) issued dosimetry to all EOC staff shortly af ter their arrival at the EOC, and called for periodic ~
readings during the course of the exercise. He also prepared dosimetry kits for parish emergency workers. He initiated a requert, to the State, for additional t
low-range dosimeters to equip the number of emergency workers anticipated to be needed in the parish.
l.
25 All of the maps and status boards that will be available in the EOC are not yet mounted. However, the appropriate displays are available and were' used, and updated, as information arrived at. the EOC. The " Event Status" board is limited to only a few entries and, as new items are entered. old information must be erased, and is therefore lost. We recommend that the fixed board be replaced with a " flip" or roller chart that will retain the old entries for reference if required.
Following the declaration of the general emergency, at 10:43 a.m.,
the parish EOC management concurred, on a conference telephone call, with the recommended Protective Action Recommendation, and the evacuation of the recommended areas. The parish sirens were sounded (simulated) and an EBS message was issued to parish residents within the 15 minute time requirement. The planned helicopter alerting system was also activated (simulated) to alert those areas of the parish not covered by the fixed siren system. Follow up messages, providing information on school evacuation and other protective measures were also prepared and issued to the EBS station.
Assistance from support parishes, in the form of school _ buses to augment transportation resources, was requested when the situation reached the stage where evacuation appeared to be imminent. Approximately 9,000 school children, and 3,000 other persons without transportation, would need assistance under the scenario of this exercise.
I The present plan calls for the school children evacuated from St. John j
the Baptist Parish to be taken to Lucher High School in St. James Parish, and-held there until they are either picked up by their parents, or are provided 1
further transportation to one of the two reception / care centers (Nichols State University in Thibodaux or Southeast Louisiana University in Hammond).
This
" holding point" concept would allow the buses to make a second pick up run_if it is required. Parents would be advised of their children's location, and availability for pick-up, by EBS radio.
It was observed that there is no planned capa'bility to monitor the buses or passengers for possible contamination as they arrive at the Lucher High i
School holding point, Additionally, there is no plan for communication with the buses should they need to be re-directed at some point along their route. Also, the drivers from the support parishes have no dosimetry to ensure their safety if they are required to make a second run into a potential plume area, i
Consequently this problem represents a planning inadequacy.
School i
evacuation plans should be reviewed and amended to ensure that one of the following alternatives -is included: (1) precautionary evacuation of school children is carried out, prior to the spread of contamination from a radioactive plume, (2) appropriate capability is developed, at Lucher High School, to monitor the vehicles and children as they arrive, or (3) the children be taken directly to one of the reception / care centers,-where monitoring capability has j
already been planned. Additionally, some system of contact should be es-tablished, perhaps through law enforcement officers at traffic control points, to re-direct the busses if'necessary.
A parish PIO representative was dispatched to the Emergency News Center in New Orleans. He maintained frequent contact with tha EOC and coordinated public information issues with the EOC staff.
l
86 Throughout the exercise, the parish _EOC staff, mostly volunteer person-nel, made significant contributions to the success of _ the operation. Of particular note is their ability to anticipate possible future courses of action, and to plan accordingly.
The unannounced drill for St. John the Baptist Parish (December 7,1989)-
was initiated with a call over the hotline phone from the Waterford 3 plant to I
the parish Sheriff's dispatcher at 7:00 p.m. announcing a Site Area Emergency.
The dispatcher immediately began a call-down of key EOC staff, including the Parish Civil Defense Director, who arrived at the EOC at 7:12 p.m.
The Director declared the EOC operational at 7:22 p.m. upon determining that all key members of his staff had arrived and signed the log in register.
Thus, objective 36 was met.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14 and 15 were met at this location. Objective 36 was met during a drill on December 7,-
1989.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-3
==
Description:==
A planning inadequacy, related to the _ school evacuation plan, was discovered when it was noted that there.was no capability to I
monitor the vehicles or passengers on their arrival at the holding point at Lucher High School. (See additional details in the text). -(NUREG-0654 J.9 & J.10.G)
Recommendation: Review and revise the school evacuation plan to ensure l
that one of the following alternatives is included: (1) Precautionary evacuation of the school children prior to possible plume contamination exposure; (2) development of monitoring capabilities at the Lucher High School holding point; and (3) transportation of the students directly to one of the two reception / care centers. Additionally, the revised plan should include a system for contacting the school buses while en route should changes in destination be ordered.
AREAS RECONNENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
j!
==
Description:==
Some problems developed in the use of the new e
telephone system in the new EOC.
Recommendation: Provide staff training in the use of the new system.
==
Description:==
All of the maps and display boards are not yet e
mounted in the EOC. Also, the emergency actions display has limited capacity, requiring erasing old items before new ones can be entered.
Recommendation: Complete the mounting of displays and develop a new emergency action display, on flip charts or roller panels, so old actions can be retained for reference.
i
f.
27-2.2.3 Tangipahoa Parish 2.2.3.1 Tangipahoa Parish EOC The EOC,for Tangipahoa Parish, a support parish located on the third -
floor of the parish courthouse, is a well lighted facility with ample space and furnishings.
Equipment available to support operations include a typewriter, a photocopy machine, and kitchen facilities.
Access to the facility, through j
the parish Sheriff's Office, was controlled.
Maps used in the EOC included a single plume EPZ map with planning areas and evacuation routes labelled.
No status boards were available for use.
Officials of' Tangipahoa Parish, particularly the director of Tangipahoa Parish Office of Emergency Management (TPOEM), deserve praise for the ef forts they have-undertaken to develop-a first class operations facility.
The space currently occupied by the EOC' was once parish-jail space.
With virtually no funding, the parish has renovated the space into a comfortable and functional emergency operations facility, and additional expansion of the facility is expected in the near future.
At 8:57 a.m., the TPOEM received notification of an Alert declared at
. the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station.
The call, from the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP), was received at the parish courthouse by the receptionist. Emergency procedures provide for the Sheriff's Office to receive the call and then notify the parish Emergency Management Director, who then activates the parish E00.
Because the receptionist was unfamiliar with parish emergency procedures, the call was routed directly to the-TPOEM EOC, where it was received by the acting Assistant Director of ~ Emergency Management. The net result of the receptionist's action was-that the official parish warning point, the Sheriff's dispatch office, was bypassed.
Following his receipt of the Alert notification, the acting assistant director began notifying parish staff by telephone, directing them to either wait on standby or, as appropriate, report directly to the parish ' EOC.
All staff notifications were completed by 9:35 a.m., with all appropriate staff arriving at the EOC by 10:15 a.m.
After receiving notification that the incident had been upgraded to a Site Area Emergency, the director of TPOEM deployed to Southeastern Louisiana University at 10:45 a.m., where he set up an auxiliary EOC.
Following receipt of the notification of a Site Area Emergency, the director of the TPOEM lef t the parish EOC and proceeded to the University Center at Southeastern Louisiana University in Hammond, where he set up an auxiliary EOC. Prior to leaving the EOC, the director briefed his assistant and EOC, staff l
as to the status of the incident at Waterford 3.
Parish elected and appointed officials were present at the primary EOC ' and much involved in the early 1
activity.
Upon leaving the EOC, the director delegated to his assistant the responsibility of advising the parish president.
The extent of response coordination and staff involvement in decision making were not fully observed as the evaluator accompanied the director to Hammond, and did not. observe many of the activities that were to have occurred at the primary EOC.
, ?, ' :. ', ;
28 Each staff person had a copy of the latest revisions of the parish radiological emergency management response plan. Message forms were completed for incoming and outgoing messages but no message logs were kept.
Message problems noted during the course of exercise play included failure to provide complete information on the message forms, and duplicate numbering of messages.
Coordination problems, partially attributable to communications failures, were also noted between the TPOE'M and the_ University Center in Hammond. Message flow between the TPOEM and Hammond was slow, with some.information intended for personnel at the reception center taking as long as 45 minutes to be relayed from the parish EOC through the auxiliary EOC and to the intended recipients.
The auxiliary EOC was never notified that the incident had been upgraded to a General Emergency.
TPOEM has multiple and' redundant communications capabilities, including eight commercial telephone lines, high and low band public service f requency radios, and two meter (HAM) radio, Communication links were established with area police and fire departments, the Tangipahoa Sheriff's Office, the ' Acadian Ambulance Service, and the Southeastern Louisiana University Center in Hamnand.
Communications from the parish EOC were observed only during the early stages of the exercise and no delays in communications flow were observed.
The use of the two meter (HAM). radio as a backup was successfully demonstra,ted from the auxiliary EOC at the Southeastern Louisiana University Center. However, there were some communications problems. After the auxiliary EOC was established in Hammond, the director of TPOEM advised that the primary communication system, the low-band emergency management radio, would not be used because the parish did not have an antenna.
The' backup system, two portable telephones, did not function throughout the entire exercise.
To communicate with the primary EOC, the director of TPOEM relied upon the use of a two meter (RAM) radio located outside the University Center in a Hammond Fire Department Hazmat van.
This backup functioned well but was physically removed from 'the room designated as the auxiliary EOC.
The director had to walk out to the van periodically to determine if he had any messages from the primary EOC and to send any messages to the primary EOC.
The - physical - arrangement of the communication system made coordination with the primary EOC difficult.
At 11:00 a.m., during a drill on November 8, 1989, the Director of the Parish Emergency Management Office, and his Deputy Director, demonstrated their ability to relieve one another (shift change) during extended emergency operations. This demonstration successfully met objective 34.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 3, 4 and 5 were met at this location. Objective 34 was met during a drill on November 8,1989.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-4
Description:
The courthouse switchboard operator failed to route the initial notification call through the designated parish warning point, the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office radio room.
(NUREC-0654 F.1.e)
fe' l,
39
~
Recommendationt Switchboard operators should receive additional training with regard to the proper routing of emergency calls for the Office of Emergency Management.
89-5
==
Description:==
Some TPOEM message forms did not provide complete informa-tion and were periodically misnumbered, including the use of, some numbers more than once.
(NUREG-0654 E.1)
Recommendation: All EOC staff should receive specific. training on the proper completion of message forms.
The EOC should also institute a message numbering system to assure that each message has a unique number.
89-6
==
Description:==
The primary means of communication for the auxiliary EOC, 1
at SLU in Hammond, was not operational because an antenna was not available for use. The backup system, portable telephones, also did not operate properly during the exercise. A second backup, ham radio in the Hammond Fire Department Hazmat van did function properly.
(NUREG 0654 F.1.d)
Recommendation: An antenna, for use at the auxiliary EOC, should be obtained and its use demonstrated during the next exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
Coordination between the primary EOC in Amite and the auxiliary EOC in Hammond - was-weak.
Information exchange between the two facilities was slow and some t
significant information (i.e.
upgrade-to a
General Emergency) was not forwarded to the auxiliary EOC.
Recommendation: The TPOEM should follow the parish emergency response plan and send a liaison, not the director, to the congregate care center in Hammond. Also, emergency response k
training should be provided to EOC staff to ensure improved coordination between the primary EOC and the auxiliary EOC.
i
Description:
The Tangipahoa Parish EOC only had a 10 mile-plume - exposure pathway EPZ map and no status board for tracking response activities.
Recommendation: The facility could be improved by providing a status board and a 50-mile ingestion pathway map for use-by EOC staff.
2.2.3.2 Southeast Louisiana University-Hammond Reception / Care Cencer The Reception / Care Center is located at Southeastern Louisiana Univer.
sity in Hammond, La.
Southeastern Louisiana University personnel activated the Reception-Center at the University Center on the campus of SLU.
The call initiating l
j activation of the Reception Center facilities and mobilization of staff was made I -
. ?,
a *,l 30
~i by an EOC official from Tangipahoa Parish. Reception Center staff were alerted in a timely manner.
Communications at the University Center consinted of three different systems.
Commercial phone lines were the primary means of communication.
Twenty four phone lines were installed at the University Center.and eight jacks were. Installed on the auditorium floor for communication capability if necessary.
Hand held radios were also utilized for communication between the -
university building management, maintenance services and security ' officers.
Hand held radios would also be used for communication backup by the Reception Center emergency workers. A communication station was also set up by two radio amateurs to assist the Parish EOC Director.
The agencies represented at the Reception Center included American Red Cross, Office of Eligibility Determination, Hammond Fire Department and SLU personnel. Also a representative frca Tangipahoa Parish EOC was present.
All j
emergency workers-were registered at the separate entrance from evacuee i
registration.
Radiation monitoring, which was done by the Hammond Fire Department, consisted of two stations.
The first station was the vehicle monitoring.
station, Registration and monitoring of the vehicle took place at this station.
The vehicles found to be contaminated were moved to a decontamination area. The clean vehicles were directed into the. University Center parking area.
The j
second station consisted of evacuee monitorin5 This station was. located inside j
the University Center.
A pre-determined area was marked off with - rope for
-)
monitoring.
An evacueo determined to be. contaminated was diverted. to shower facilities for decontamination and further monitoring.
Decontamination areas were properly monitored by members of.the Hammond Fire Department.
Thero were separate areas for male and female decontamination.
Emergency workers were issued two direct-reading dosimeters (0-20 R and 0 200 R) and a TLD badge.
CDV-700 survey meters were used at the monitoring
^
stations.
Operational checks were made on ' the survey meters and gloves and booties were worn by emergency workers.
After an evacuee was found to be clean, he was instructed to proceed to the center floor to be registered by the Office of Eligibility Determination.
The evacuee was registered using a four-part American Red Cross' form. One copy of the form was kept on file and the other copies of the form were sent.with the evacuee to his designated shelter location.
The Southeastern Louisiana University campus is an ideal reception / care center.
The primary shelters ware located.on the SLU campus'and were able'to house 1800 people.
These shelter locations included the SLU Gymnasium, the Health and Physical Education Building and the Student Union.
Included in the reception center plan were twenty four additional shelter locations.
The facilities have adequate space, rest room and kitchen facilities and emergency services capability.
At 1:00 p.m.,
during a drill on November 8, 1989, the four two-person, first-shift, monitoring teams assembled at the Hammond Central Fire Station (substituting.for the University R/C Center). All monitoring station personnel l
have been provided training by State and utility instructors and have l
-Jr-r-
'to
I,.Q-31 demonstrated their capabilities in past exercises.
At 1:15 p.m.,
the second-shift teams, with equivalent training and exercise _ experience, replaced the first shif t personnel, thus successfully meeting objective 34.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 21, and 22 were met at this location. Objective 34 was met during a drill on November 8, 1989.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.2.4 St. James Parish 2.2.4.1 St. James Parish E00 St. James Parish, a support parish for St. John the Baptist Parish, has its Emergency Operations Center located in Convent, Louisiana and is an outstanding facility.
The building is relatively_new, with construction attributes of a civil defense bunker.
It has enough space to satisfy the requirement for utilization as the alternative EOC for St. John the Baptist Parish in the event of an actual emergency and the possible evacuation of the St. John Parish EOC.
St. James EOC has adequate furnishings, equipment. back-up power and other necessary materials needed to support extended emergency 1
operations.
The EOC has several modern computers, one for monitoring the National Weather Service, another with a hazardous material data base, a third for looking at aerial photography of the parish (including a data base of street maps), and a fourth with the SARA Title III data on; file. In addition, the EOC has a facsimile machine with direct and group dialing capability, typewriters, copiers, a h echen for supporting continuous. staff operations, and cots for accomm0 dating staff when 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operations are necessary. The EOC also has_a closed-circuit video system which is controlled from the EOC Director's console.
There are cameras for videotaping, or for broadcasting live EOC operations which can be displayed on a large screen projection system in both the main EOC Operations room and in the training / press room. In case of St. John the Baptist Parish relocating to che St. James EOC during an actual evacuation, the two parishes are easily acec,.:.wdated and staff in other areas can observe the live operations occurring in the E0C Operations room.
The EOC has the following maps displayed for use during an emergency; plume EPZ with appropriate planning areas labelt d, evacuation routes, relocation centers, and ingestion EPZ for agricultural information.
The EOC also had status boards positioned and utilized during the exercise.
The status boards 4
displayed the current ECL and time of declaration.
These boards were updated upon receipt of the change in the ECL.
The EOC has a modern communications system (including an extended 911 system) for use by the Department of Emergency Preparedness, the sheriff's department, and the fire department.
This system has the communication s
capability of a large, major city's system.
It is more than adequate for this parish's needs. Communications from St. James EOC were clear and uninterrupted,
. e.- T s,. ;
32 l
although some incoming communications were. subject to problems -at the originating station.
The EOC received notification of the Alert from'the Waterford 3 Steam i
Electric Station at 8:57 a.m. via telephone from LOEP.
The Emergency Planner, t'
acting as EOC Director for the first portion of the exercise, proceeded to instruct his staff to notify EOC personnel of the event and prepare for. EOC activation.
This call-out was completed within 15 minutes.
The EOC Director and his staff used a telephone call-down list to contact personnel.
At each chnge in ECL, the call down was repeated to inform all support personnel and faciu ties.
The SAE was received at 10:00 a.m.
and the CE at 11:01 a.m.
Statfing included the EOC Director, the Parish President's ' assistant, the Sheriff, the Emergency Operations Communications Officer, the EOC Director's 1
I c.ssistant, and the dispatcher (for communications).
A shif t change ' was demonstrated by the replacement of the EOC Director, the Communications Officer, the Director's assistant, and the dispatcher with new personnel. The incoming personnel were fully briefed as to the status of the event and the actions taken thus far. There were no representatives from the Parish School Board present, nor was there a representative from the School Board Transportation Coordinator at the EOC during the exercise. The need for their presence was identified when the EOC Director was informed of the evacuation of school children from St. John.
Parish to Lucher High and Elementary Schools and had no representatives from-these organizations to discuss the. implication of the evacuation.
This situation shows the need for attendance of key personnel at the EOC during the._
1 exercise.
There are also two plan issues regarding school evacuation which surfaced during the exercise. The issues involve the removal'of the Reception Center Operations Attachment (pg. Q 18) and the information therein and the removal of text regarding the schools in Section VI.D. of the Plan (pg. Q 10).
The EOC Director and his Emergency Planner (actin 6 as Director for the first part of the exercise) were effectively in charge of the EOC during the exercise.
Each man exhibited knowledge and understandin5 of the. plan and the events occurring during the exercise.
Both men involved their staff in discussions on actions to be taken and instructed their staff to'act according to plan requirements. Periodic briefings were held to update staff on conditions at the plant and actions taken by the St. James EOC.
A copy of the plan was available and used throughout the exercise to ensure the EOC didn't deviate from established procedure.
A message log was kept by both the EOC Director's assistant and the dispatcher for all incoming and outgoing communications.
In summary, FEMA Exercise Objective 2, 3, 4, 5, and 34 were met at this l
location.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
The representatives of the parish school board and the parish school' board Transportation Coordinator were not present at the EOC during the exercise.
e 0
f.
33 Recommendation: It is recommended that the parish school-board representatives be present at the EOC ducing the -next
- exercise,
==
Description:==
The revised plan -given to the parish by the e
Waterford 3 Steam-Electric Station-omits pertinent information which might be useful to the EOC Director.
Recommendation: The EOC Director and. Emergency Planner should perform a page-by-page check of the revision to ensure that all pertinent information is included in the plan.
2.2.4.2 Raceland Monitoring / Decontamination Station Raceland Fire Department maintains a 24-hour communications and dispatch facility for LaFouche Parish.
At 8:57 a.m., LOEP notified the Raceland Fire Depe.rtment dispatcher by telephone that Alert status had been declared at the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station.
The dispatcher-immediately made the required telephone calls to all personnel and agencies on the call list.
A current list of agencies and personnel telephone numbers is maintained in-the 1
communications center.
Personnel designated as members of the. monitoring and J
decontamination team were notified by pagers and all had arrived at_the fire station by 9:30 a.m. and began setting up the monitoring and decon facility.
The Raceland Fire Department has an excellent communications center from j
vhich all the parish fire departments in the immediate vicinity -are dispatched.
Most _of the systems present in the communications center are also duplicated in a communications van.
Emergency worker monitoring and decontamination was conducted under the supervision of the maintenance supervisor at Raceland Fire ' Department.
Each monitor / recorder was suited out in " Anti C" clothing, complete with booties and rubber gloves, with all seams taped.
Each was issued a hig'n-and low. range dosimeter plus a TLD. The dosimeters were charged, zeroed and recorded for each individual.
An instruction / exposure record was issued to each monitor.
All personnel were questioned regarding policies and procedures related to technique, maximum allowable exposure and steps to take if. permissible dosages l
are exceeded and all responded appropriately.
l The Raceland Monitoring /Decon facility is large enough to accommodate several contaminated emergency workers and vehicles with the exception of the shower facility, to be addressed below.
There are adequate, separate parking areas to accommodate both con-taminated and clean vehicles.
The monitoring of both personnel and vehicles was within the guidelines.
The contamination levels were properly recorded on standardized forms for both personnel and vehicles. The contamination trigger points were known by all monitors. The decontamination procedures for vehicles were discussed and found to be satisfactory. The decontamination procedures for emergency workers revealed two areas in need of improvement.
- 3
)
l l
,t9(..
34 a
During the decontamination of the emergency worker, masking tape was utilized to remove contamination from the pants leg of the worker..
The procedure was repeated to eliminate the contamination. The worker handled the masking tape both times with his bare hands, allowing the possibility of contaminating his hands, i
Also, the shower facility, while adequate to handle one simulated emergency worker, probably would not be sufficient to handle several workers.
There is only one entrance to the shower facility, which is a women's restroom-without a shower.
The worker would wash-down with a. hand held shower over a floor. drain, then stop back onto clean ' paper to be monitored. again.
If determined to be clean, the. worker would have to walk back down clean paper that was placed over the pessibly contaminated paper on which the worker entered the shower facility.
It is our understanding that a new training building, with showers, is being constructed.
It is recommended that the monitoring /decon functions be moved to this facility upon its completion.
The Raceland Fire Department volunteers and paid maintenance workers are to be commended for their enthusiasm and dedication. to the protection of the residents of LaFouche Parish.
.At 9:00 a.m., dur'ng - a drill on November 7, 1989, the _seven member monitoring / decontamination team was assembled at the monitoring station.
The team consisted of:
a two percon vehicle monitoring section,. a two-person personnel monitoring section, a two-person decontamination section and a team leader.
Each of these individuals have been provided training by State and utility instructors.
At 9:15 a.m.,
the second shift of seven personnel, organized and trained in the same manner as the first shift, reported to-the swation.
A simulated briefing was provided to _ the oncoming shift and they assumed responsibility for station operations.
Additional personnel have'-been trained and are prepared to report to the station if called upon.
This drill met the requirements of objective 34.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 6 and 25 were. met at this location.
Objective 34 was met during a drill on November 7 1989.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
The contaminated worker was allowed to handle the masking tape, used to decontaminate his legs, with his bare hands.
Recommendation: Issue rubber gloves to the contaminated j
person for use during the decontamination process.
2.2.4.3 South Vacherie Monitoring /Decon Station The exercise play for South Vacherie Volunteer Fire Department was conducted outside the exercise scenario due to work schedules of the volunteer l
l
.)e %,*
35 fire department personnel. The personnel were notified by pagers activated by St. James Parish EOC at 9:30 a.m., but pla*y was not to commence until 6:00 p.m.
Two of the volunteers activated the fire department sub station at 10:30 a.m.
to be available for the exercise.
The communications at the fire department sub station consisted. of walkie talkies on fire department frequencies to the main station and parish EOC.
Back up communications is via radios in the fire department. trucks and telephone patch through the parish communications system.
The radiological monitors / recorders wore both high and low range dosimeters plus a TLD.
The dosimoters were charged and readings recorded on the proper forms. The workers read their dosimeters and recorded the readings every thirty minutes. The workers were aware of_ authorized _ exposure levels and the proper procedures if they received a dose higher than authorized.
The South Vacherie Fire Department Sub station - is adequate to accom-modate the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and _ their vehicles. The monitors were very thorough when monitoring the emergency worker-and vehicles.
The monitors were'avare of the contamination trigger point and records were made when contamination was encountered.
l The South Vacherie Volunteer fire fighters and their spouses are to be I
commended for their dedication and professionalism. Both the fire fighters and
)
their spouses have received radiological monitoring and decontamination training and perform their duties very well.
l At 7:00 p.m., during a drill on November 8,1989, the shif t change drill began at the VFD Station. The severe storms and flooding in the area prevented i
the full roster of both the first and second shifts from participating in the l
drill.
- However, discussions with the shift members able to attend, demonstrated, to the drill evaluator's satisfaction, this organizations's ability to maintain operations at the monitoring / decontamination station on a continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis.
Objective 34 was met.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 6, and 25 were met at this location.
Objective 34 was met during a drill on November 8, 1989-.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE t
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE l
t 2.2.5 Ochaner Hospital /St. Charles Ambulance Service The scenario dictated that the patient care and handling at the initial scene be pre staged and not observed by FEMA evaluators.
The hospital recpived a call from the Waterford 3 power plant at 5:19 a.m. stating that an employee had been injured at approximately 5:00 a.m. and was contaminated.
St. Charles Ambulance Service was dispatched to the power plant. Immediate preparations for reception of an injured / contaminated patient 1
l A
. df, g _
- 36 were initiated.
A current call out list for essential staff members was promptly implemented.
At 6:00 a.m., the staff had reported, prepared the -area and dressed in l
protective clothing with the appropriate dosimetry.
Communications were well i
l-demonstrated by transmissions between the ambulance and the hospital concerning the patient's inj ury, vital signs and contamination level.
The ambulance arrived at the hospital at 6:23 a.m.
The patient transfer from the-ambulance to the medical team was l
accomplished with a thorough briefing of the patient's status.
The hospital security force isolated the ambulance and the immediate area until a survey could be performed by the plant Health Physicist.
Both the ambulance crew and the ambulance were thoroughly monitored by the plant Health Physicist prior to returning to service.
Appropriate dosimetry equipment was issued to and worn by both ambulance and hospital staff. Treatment, monitoring and' decontamination of the patient was demonstrated in. an effective, efficient and professional Exit procedures from the treatment area were adequately controlled by I
manner.
(
the hospital Health Physicist with the assistance of the plant Health Physicist.
1 The enthusiastic dedication displayed by all personnel throughout the exercise was outstanding.
In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 6, 23 and 24 were met at this location.
l l
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.3 UTILITY ISSUES A summary is provided below of some of the Louisiana Power and Light Company issues which relate to or impact upon the off site activities performed by the various participating agencies.
FEMA acknowledges that its responsi-bility is not to cite utility Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action, or Areas Recommended for Improvement.
However, the noted issues that follow should be addressed by the NRC and/or utility to prevent their recurrence during future exercises or in a real emergency at the Waterford 3 Station-
Description:
For authentication of alert, the communication center at the State EOC had difficulty reaching the facility TSC. A busy signal on a supposedly " silent"~ line and erroneous information conveyed on an alternate line hindered this activity.
Recommendation:
The telephone number /line should be open only,for use by LOEP communications to confirm ECLs.
Description:
Problems were observed at the State EOC, local EOCs and the ENC in the receipt of information over the e
f, 4,*.
37-9 utility hot line for recording on the notification message form.
The plant communicator, while relaying information to the State and parishes, was co'ntinuously-interrupted for clarification / verification of message content. This caused delays in receipt of messages. The parish EOCs rely on the information contained in these messages to formulate their protective actions.
Recommendation:
The plant communicator should be allowed to complete the entire message before accepting questions or requests for clarification. A further enhancement would be for all parties on the hot line to receive a hard copy of the notification message-form via. fax machine, followed by verification using the existing system.
==
Description:==
The utility TSC did not confer with LNED prior to issuing a Protective Action Recommendation, as required by procedure. A PAR was made without LNED concurrence.
Recommendation: Utility personnel should follow procedure and confer with IEED prior to issuing PARS.
==
Description:==
The utility TSC communicator did not follow the message form format in communicating the information.
This created some confusion at the EOCs.
i Recommendation:
The TSC communicator should give.the information in the order that it is listed on the form.
==
Description:==
The TSC communicator gave release rates. in scientific notation rather than the decimal equivalent (i.e.,
.2+E02 mR/hr, rather than 200 mR/hr).
This was confusing to the EOC personnel.
Recommendation:
Release rates should be given in the decimal format rather than scientific notation.
l
L
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38 3 TRACKING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT EXERCISE DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Individual exercise site narratives, in Section 2 of this report, have provided listings of Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Corrective Action, with corrective recommendations, noted during the August 30, 1989 exercise.
The evaluations were based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section 11 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980), and pre-approved FEMA exercise objectives.
The FEMA Region VI Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any Deficiencies and/or Corrective Actions noted in the exercise will._ be corrected, and that such corrections will be ; incorporated into ' emergency response plans as appropriate.
FEMA Region.VI will request that the State of Louisiana and participat-ing parishes,_ submit measures that they will, or intend to, _take to correct those problems noted in this report. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that a detailed plan, including dates for scheduling and.
~
implementing the corrective actions be provided, if such : actions cannot be-instituted immediately.
Table one provides, by exercise operating location or activity group, a consolidated summary of all Deficiencies. and/or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions.
As noted previously in this report, there were - no deficiencies j
identified during the August 30, 1989 exercise.
The Table is designed so that space is available to add: (1) the proposed corrective actions that will' be undertaken by the State or local jurisdiction, and (2) the projected, and actual date of completion of these' actions.
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TMli 1 -- 5:esmedial Actions Is.r ttee f.ogtest 33 19G9 Vst erior.l 1 Se can Elect ric Station Esercisc
,f
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l FEMA Deficiencies anul/or Areas Requirisig Exercise Proposed FEMA Evaluation of State neml Actual Corrsetive Action - Ulth FEMA /RAC Objective IduttEC 0654 State (S) aint local (l.) Proposed Completion 'Iscal Corrective Actions envi Completion Rw ommesxtations for Correction flo(s)
Refereewe Corrective Actions Date Determination of Adequacy Date DEFICIEftCIES: 140NE AT ANY IJDCATION AREAS REQUIRIt#C CORRECTIVE ACTION IJsltD orFRATloNS AT U-3 EOF 87-1
==
Description:==
4 F.1.d IJtED will train three persons Accepted as submitted.
to operate the base station radio at the Waterford 3 Steam The radio operator was not trained in the troper use of Electric Station's EOF.
Pro-i cedures and directions for the the base radio.
operation of this radio will be Recommeextat ion:
posted at the radio work station.
411 training will be completed Designate specific persons prior to the next scheduled as radio operators and give exercise.
them training in the use of all radios to be used.
STATE FIELD HoltlTORING TFAM #1 89 2 Descriptioi:
7 1.11 The appropriate training will be provided prio*r to the next Field Team si did not take scheduled exere,ise, both beta / gamma and gamma g
only readings at a near.
e grouiul level (about 1" above the groueul).
Ree ammesat:st la.:
The. field team members should receive additional training in proper procedure for performing-ambleent radiation monitoring.
O
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' TJfli 1 -- Rsmedist Actions for the K.ugust 30, 1939 "Jaterford 3 Steam Electric Statfor. Exercise Ft,MA Prog =esed HMA Evaluatters of State meal Actual Deficiencies and/or Areas Requirless Exercise Completion local Corrective Actions and Completion Corrective Actless -- Ulth FErlA/RAC Objective.It0 REG 0654 State (5) seul local (L) Proposed
~
Rweassendations for Correction Mo(s)
Referessee Corrective Actions Date Determinettoes of Adequacy Date AREAS REQUIRif0G CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(CONTINUED)
ST. JotIN Tile RAPTIST FDC 89-3
==
Description:==
19 J.9 &
St. Johr: The Baptist Parish will Accepted as subeltted.
J.10.G modify its plan so that evacuees A planning inadequacy related will be transported directly to to the school evaluation plan, designated reception centers was discovered whe:s it was uhere monitoring stations are noted that there was no cap-available.
ability.co monitor the velsicles or passengers on their arrival at the holding point at incher liigh School.
Recommendation:
Review and revise the school evailuattors plan to insure tiust one of the following alternatives is included:
(1) precautionary evacuation of the school children prior to possible plume contamina-tions exposure. (2) develop-
~
.a meist of monitoring capabil-O
' itles at the Imcher Higts Sclanoi holdless point. or.
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- TAtl1 1, -- Remedl21 Act lens ter tlee August 30, 1989 tasten ford 3 Cteen Electric Statice Erercise
}-
+
m Frer==ed SMt4 Evolnettese of State ne=4 Art wl Defieleweles m eefer Areas Reyf riseg 'F.nercise
. Corrective Action ~ Witte FDem/stAC Ubj ctive asUREC 96%
State (5) esuf imeal (L) Freposed Cearletten lmeal Cerrective Aettene sewf Cearletten Recomumendettens for Correctlen IIe(s)
Referewee Cerreettwe Actleses Dat e Eppterelnettese et Admysocy lpete AltEAS R9WIRIOGG CURRECTIVE ACTIoll:
(CUI8TifsWED) sr. Jo!eJsteE BArrtSTS E(E (CourtlesUED)
(3) transportatleen of time students directly to esse of the two reception / core centers;. Additiestelly, alue revised plan slepold include a system ter con-tacting tl.a seteeel bnees we.t le to route, slinald clienges in destinetten be ordered.
1 se e
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taste 1 -- Eempellel Act ieases f or tlee Aegest 30 198 5 Unt e f eerd J Steam Electric Stet toes Emes eise e
FutA Proposed HMA Evolontlen of State med Aetwal Deficieneles eewt/or Areas Re+guiring Emercise Correctlwe Action -- Ultle FEMA /RAC Objectlwe 98UREG 0654 State (S) ovat teeml (L) Troposed Completten local Cerrective Aettens sawl Completleve Rec _
..astlens for Correctton lee (s)
Reference Cerrective Actlens Date Datetelnettoe of Adegency Date AREAS REQUIRIf0C CURRECTIVE ACTIole:
(CostTif8UED)
TABICIrBlul10A FARISit EDC 4
F.I.e Additloeist training will be pre-Accepted es esteeltted.
89-4 Descriettein:
vided for switeldmoord eperaters The covethowse switchbeerd on the proper routing of operator failed to route the emergency __
m-
..a related Initial ventificatten cell estle prior to next ewercise, in whleh the pertste participates.
threegh tlw designated scleeduled for 1993.
parish warning point, time Tangtpohon parish Steeriff*s Office' radio room.
Recommesmiat ioen:
Switeldsemed operators should receive additional tesInleeg with regard to time proper rowt tng of emerg.ney calls for tie. of fice of Emergency Management.
89 5 Descript ioen:
4
- E.I A
"_ ring system wBil be Accepted es s A ltted.
Institeted and training will be a
Se=e TroFM massage forme did prowleted to tina staff prier to M
swet provide complete leeferee-.
tier 1993 exercise.
tioen amt were perineIIcally misnuuhered, inelteeling time use of same essenhers mere then once.
e 9
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TASIE 1.-
GemedInt &ct loses goe slee Assy:wst 30 1997 Catee f ord 1 Se e*= Electric Station Eserelse I
FFMA Defleteencies meeJ/er Areas Ite=Iwirleeg Ewercise pe epewd HMA Ilsalentlen of State esed Act cal Corrective Aetteen - Ulth ITMA/RAC Objeettre letREC 0654 State (S) and imeal (L) preposed Ceeplet ten imeal Corrective Actlens med Completten Pecommendstlens for Correctlen 18e(s)
Felereence Cerrective Actlens Date EWtereinstlose of Adeqosacy Date AREAS REAMIRING CUPRECTIVE ACTIUM:
(ColtTIleUED)
TANCilv10A FAltISil I.OC (CONTIIeUID)
F*ce**eedEleft:
All EOC staff shoeld receive.
speellte trotnlng een time proper completten of message leves.
The EOC should aloe lastitete a sw songe-mmber t6 system to assere that each message has a unique ennber.
89-6 pescristion:
4 F.I.d Tangipaham Farlsh ecomeesnientleses Ace,pted es swbeltted.
capability will be demonstrated The pr imary means of communt-dering tlee seest ewercise. in cat ten for the awalliery EOC.
which the parite participates.
at St.tl in r
- ". was voet schedeeled for 1995.
eperat tenal leecause mee antenews was sent meallable for use.
Ylee backnp system, portable telei ennes mise elid d
owet crerste properly deelseg t !,e esercise. A seceeed back-e esp. loam eadie In tlee llammmed 9
l'I r e leepartement Ilmmat omae ellel tienet teese prelserly.
e
7A315. L.. Desseil24 Actimes f or thee AsegeSt 30, 1999 t?sterined 3 Steme F.lectric Stetteen EE*frel&e ITJM
~ Defieleescles and/or Areas Re.gestrIng. Emercise Freresed HyeA Evoluettees of $ tate and Actual-98UREG 06%
State (S) meet incel (l.) Freres d Cesselet tese iment Corrective Aettens med Ceartstion
' Cerrect ive Aet teen - Ultle FFJtA/WAC Stejective ' Reference Corrective Aetteens Date Seterefeestlose of.^1,
- f Date Ree
_Stlons for Correctleen Ise(s) i AltEAS REglflRlleC CORRECTIVE ACTICIe:
(COIsTite9ED)
TAIIGirgIIUA rmRISII BUG (ajesTIssutD) stecommendation:
An entenna, for use et the seemillary EUC. steenid be et,teimed and Its use dresse-strated dwelaeg tiee esent emerelse.
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4 FEMA OBJECTIVES STATUS TRACKING - WATERFORD 3 STEAM ELECTRIC STATION y
i Table 2 provides a comprehensive. tracking system of FEMA' exercise objectives, NUREG 0654 Reference-Elements, latest exercise objectives, jurisdictional responsibility, exercise dates, identified deficiencies and/or required corrective actior.s, and the date that specific FEMA objectives were.
met by State and local agencies. This system will track the-progress and status.
.l of this data through the. appropriate time interval within which all FDM objectives must be tested and met at specific locations.
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TJ 81 E 2 FEMA Emeretse Objectives Tracking Chert -- veterford 3 Streen Electric station Fage 1 of 9 Objecttwe Defteieney or Area At This Jurisdiettonal Requiring Corteettve
. Date obtiettve Met IIUltEC-0654 Emeretse Responsibility Date of Action (By tracktrg FEMA Objective 98 umber and Description Reference (Yes/Iss)
State Imcel Exeretse feweber and Date)
State tacel(s)
OBJECTIVE 1 - (Old Obj.18o. 37)
EMERCEl8CY CIA 331TICAT10ft 12 vet,,5 D.4 (S&t.)
Y K
X 8-30-89 8 30-89 8 30 89 Demonstrate the oblitty to monitor, onderstand and use emergency classi-ficetten levels (ECL) through the gi oppropriate implementatten of emergency funettone and settvittee corresponding to the ECte 09JECTIVE 2 - (Old chj. Iso. 1 & 6)
MD6f t.f 7AT10st OF FMERCFJ8CT PEltSOIIIIEL E.1. E.2. I.8 Y
F X
8 30-89 8-30-89 8 30-89 Demonstrate the ability to fully (S&L) ciert. =obillee and activate personnel for both factitty and ftold bened emergency functions OBJECTIVE 3 - (Old obj. too. 3)-
DIRECT 1088 AIID Col 8 TROL A t d. A.1.e.
Y K
K 8 30-89 8-30-89 8 30-89 Demonstrate the ability to direct.
A.2 e coordinate and control emergency (S&t.)
activities OBJECTIVE 4 - (Old chj. Iso. 5)
COMMUI8ICAT10185 E.1.d T
K F.
8-30-89 ARCA 89-I 8-30-89 8-30-89 Demanst rate the sht tity to communt-(S&I.)
8-30-89 ca.te witte all appropriate f ecettens IRm Orves. et mr ergentzettens enet field personnel A8tCA 89-%,6,7 8 30-89 TAf8CIP00fDA Psh. EOC 9
4 L
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Tist.E 2 FEMA Esercise Objectives Tracking Chart -- Goterford 3 Strese Electric Stetten Pege 2 ef 9 Objective Defielency er Area At This Jurisdictional Requiring Corrective
_Date Oblretive Me (
NUREC-06%
Exeretse flesponsibility Date of Action (By tracking FDtA Objective Nimmber and Description Reference (Yes/18o)
State incel Esercise member and Oste)
State 1 meal (s)
OMECTIVE 5 - (Old Obj. Iso. 6) l FACILITIES. BOUlFMENT AND DISFIAYS J.10.a. J.10.b Y
X X
8-30-89 8-30-89 8-30-89 Demonstrate the adequacy of facil-C.3.m. M.2.M.3 ittes equipment. displays and other (S&L) esterials to support emergency operations q
OM ECTIVE 6 - (Old Obj. No. 20)
ENFJtCD8CY unststER EXFUSURE CONTROL K.3.a. K.3.b Y
K X
8-30-89 ARCA 88 1 10-12-89 8-30 89 8-30 89 Demonstrate the ability te con-(S&l.)
U. of N.O.
etnuously monitor and control Reception / Care Centet emergency worker exposure OBJECTIVE 7 - (Old Obj. No. 7)
FIELD IEONITORIl8G I.8, 1.11 Y
X 8-30-89 ARCA 89-2 s-30-89 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment (S)
State Field Tese el and procedures for deteretning field radiation measurements OMECTIVE 8 (Old Obj. No. 8)
RADIO!ODINE SAMPt.ING I.9 (S)
Y Z
8 30-89 8 30 89 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the seasurement of r.Erborne radlylodine concentrations as low as to eterocuries per cc in ti e presence of swale gases 9y T-
't-T-
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I 1
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t TT. ELE 2 FE18A Ewerelse Objeettves Treeting Chart -- Weterford 3 Streme Electric Station Fage s of 9 cbjeettre Deficiency or Area At This Jortsdictional Requiring Corrective
_Dete ObItettve Met WUltEC.0654 Exercise Responsibility Date of Aetton (87 tracking FEMA Objective Ihmeber and Descriptien Reference (Yes/18o)
State Locat.
f.neretse 18 umber and Dete)
State tecal OELIECTIVE 9 - (Itew objective)
FARTICUlATE SAMPLIIsG 1.8, I.11 Y
I 8 30 89 8 30 89 Demonstrate the oblitty to obtain (S) samples of particulate eetivity in the ateborne plume and promptly e
parfore fletd enslysis OFJECTIVE 10 - (Old Obj. see. 10)
FlJJISE DOSE Fft0 JECT 1000 1.10 (S)
Y X
8 30 89 8 30 89 Demonstrate the ability, within the plm exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plane espe.-
eure, based on plant ecd field date OELIECTIVE 11 - (Old Obj. fee. 10)
FIAME FPOTECTIVE ACT10lt DECISI0ftS J.10 (S)
T K
8 30-89 8 30 89 Demonstrate the ehtlity to sehe appropriate protective ection dect.
clons, based on projected or actual dosage. EFA FACs, avallebility of ede<peete shelter, etc.
OELIECTIVE 12 - (Old Obj. No. 13)
FUnl.lc AI.ERTIV8C AND 100TIFICAT10It E.6 App. 3 Y
X 8 30 89 8 30 89 Demonstrate the ability to f eltlally
( I.)
ciert the gmblic within the IO.et te
~
EpZ' and begin disseelnation of an Instructlanal message within 15 el emet es o f a dec t s t on by appr opr i at e
~'
State and/or. local 'of fle tal(s) p 8.
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T19t2 2 FEMA Ewercise Objectives Tracking Chart -- Waterford 3 Streen Electric Station Foge 4 of 9
.+
Objective Deficiency or Aree At This Jurisdictional Requiring Corrective Date Obiective Met.
NUREC-0654 Exercise Responsibility Date of Action (By tracking FEMA objective Ifumber and Description Reference (Yes/No)
State im:el Enarcise M r and Date)
State 1 mal OBJECTIVE 13 - (Old Obj. No. 14&25)
[
EMERCEleCY FUBLIC Il87V0tMAT10li E.5. E.7 Y
X X
8-30-89 8-30-89 S-30-89 Demonstrate the ability to coordt-C.4.b nate the formulation and dissemine-(S&L) tion of acewrote informatten end instreetions to the public in e timely fashion af ter the initial stort/notificatien has occurred OBJECTIVE 14 - (Old Obj. No. 24)
MEDIA BetIEFIteC3 C.3.a. C.4.a Y
X X
8-30-89 8-30 89 8-30 89 Demonstrate the ability to brief the (S&L)
- media in an accurate, coordinated and timeIy manner
' OBJECTIVE 15 - (Old obj. No. 26)
RUNOR CONTROL C.4.e (S&L)
Y X
X 8-30-89 8-30-89 8 30-89 Demonstrate the ability to establish sad operate rumor control in a co-erdinated and timely fashion OBJECTIVE 16 - (Old obj. No. 21&22)
KI ITMt EMEttCEteC7 UORKERS J.10. e. J.10. f N
X X
10-14-87 10-14-97 19 14.GT Demonstrats the ability to malre the (S&L) decision to recommend the use of RI to emergency workers and institwe ton-sitred persons, es well as to distri-bute and ad=Inister it once the de-eisIon has been malc y
4
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?AStE 2 FEMA Esercise Objeettves Trocking Chart -- Waterford 3 Streen Electric Statlon Fag. 5 of 9 Objective Deficiency or Area At This Jortedletional Requiring Corrective Date C M rctive flet Ut8ItEC-0654 Exercise Responsibility Date of Action (By tracktveg FEMA objective Number and Description Reference (Tes/No)
State 1 meal Exercise thmher and Date)
State Iseal OBJECTIVE 17 - (Old Obj. No. 21&22)
. J.10.e. J.10.f N
X X
10-14-87 10-14-87 KI FOR THE GENERAL PUsLic Demonstrate the ability to make the (S&L) decision, if the State plan spect-fles, ce recoemeend the tese of K1 for the general pubite, es well as to distribute and administer it once the deelslon has been made OBJECTIVE 18 - (Old obj. Iso.15&l8)
FlJ3HK fit 0TECTIVE ACTIONS J.9. J.10 N
X X
2-8-84 10-14-87 Demonstrate the abtlity end (S&L) resources necesssry to implement appropriate protective actions for the lepected pitume EFZ population OBJECTIVE 19 - (Old Obj. No. 19) 1
- ARCA 89-3 8-30-89 2854 SQ900L Plt 0TECTIVE ACTIONS J.9. J.lO.g N
Demonstrate the ability and (L) 9t. John the Reptist rosources necessary to implement Farlsh EOC sppropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EFZ OBJECTIVE 20 - (Old obl. No. 16&l7)
TRAFFIC AND ACCF.SS CfNtTROL J.10.j, J.10.k N
X-K 2 8-84 2-8-84 th enetrsete t he organizational (SAIJ ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated anel sheltered areas 1
5
- A l e ha"*r.le nnt an al.jective, pla.nle.r. Inade.pe.wy was I.&ne f f ices.
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A T;.St E 2 FFMA Exercise Objectives Tracking Chart -- Waterford 3 Simoes Electete Statf oss rege 6 of 9 I
Objeettve Deficiency er Area At This Jurisdictional Retstring Cerrective Date Ubiective Met leUREC-0654 Exercise Responsibility Date of Action (By tracking FDtA objective leuwber and Description Peference (Yes/No)
State Local Exercise Weber and Dete)
State leest OeLIECTIVE 21 - (Old Obj. leo. 27)
REGISTRAT10ft. MogelTURIIeG AleD DECOW.
J.12 (L)
Y X
X 8-30-89 8-30-89 s-30 89 Demonstrate the adequacy of proco-dures. faellities, equipment and per-sonnel for the registration, radio-logical monitoring and deconteelne-s.a tion of evacuees OfLIECTIVE 22 - (Old Obj. No.' 28)
CONGRECATE CARE OF EVACUEES J.10.h (L)
Y X
X 8-30-89 8-30-29 8 30-69 Demonstrate the adequacy of facil-1 ities, equipment and personnel for the congregate care of evacuees OBJECTIVE 23 - (Old Obj. Iso. 30) 8-30 89 EMERCFJeCY MEDICAL TRANSPORTATICIe L.4 (L)
Y X
8-30-89 e
Demenstrate the edequacy of vehicles equipment, procedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, in)ered or esposed Individuals
.ORJECTIVE 24 - (Old Obj '. leo. 31)
MEDICAL SFRVICES FACILITIES L.1 (L)
Y X
8-30 89 I
8-30 89 Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital faellities, equipment, procedures and personnei for hand 1Ing centa=1n-teed injured or eng esed individwals
.f
t TietE 2 FEMA Eperetse Objeettves Tracking Chart -- Waterford 3 Streen Electric Stetton Fege 7 ef 9 Objective Defielency or Area At This Jurisdiettonel Requiring Cerreettve
.Dete.0blee_tive Met _
feUREC-0654 Exercise Responsibility wete of Action (By tracking FEMA objective founbet er.J Deserfption Reference (Yes/No)
State imeel Ezeretse hoher and Dete)
State tecet OBJECTIVE 25 - (Old Obj. No. 29)
DECCIETAMIIIATIott K.5.e. K 5.b Y
X X
8-30-89 8-30-89 8-30-89 Demonstrate the adequecy of feell-(L)
Ittes, equipment, precedures and personnel for decontaminetton of
['
emerg ney workers, equipment and vehtetes, and for weste disposal OBJECTIVE 26 - (Old Obj. Iso. 32635)
SUrrtINEltTARY ASSISTANCE fFED/tmlER)
C.I.e, C.4 98 I
I 11-17 89 2-3-84 Demonstrate the ability to identify (S&L)
GCNS the need for enet call upon Federet and other curside support agencies for assistence Oa3ECTIVE 27 - (Old Obj. No. 9) 11-17 87 1peCEST1098 PATNWAY SANFLE C011ECT10lf I.8 (S)
W X
Demonstrate the operopriate use of (CCNS equipment enet procedures for collee-tien and transport of semples of vegetetton, f ood crops, ellk, west, poultry, water and entest feeds OBJECTIVE 28 - (Old Obj. No. 9)
If8CESTieft IAfl0RATORY of7JtAT104S 1.8 (S)
N I
11-17 29 ccNS I W trete ti.e appropriate labore.
tory operations and procedures for onelyzing samples obtelned under c8.Jec t ive 2 7 ley f ield t eams 2
s.
9-
+
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T18tE 2 FEMA Exercise Objectives Trocking Chart -- Veterford 3 Streear Electric St.tson Foge 8 of 9 Objective tkflelency er Area At This Jortsdictional Pegstring Corrective Date oblective Net NUMEC-0654 Everetse Responsibility Date of Aettese (By tracking FEMA Chjective !6 umber and Description Feference (Yes/No)
State tecal Evereise feeseher end Date)
State imeel OBJECTIVE ?9 - (Old chj. No. 11)
INGESTION DOSE 11t0 JECT 10It I.10, 1.11, ft X
11-1F-87 Demonstrate the ability to project J.11 ccWS dessge to the pobile for ingestion' (S) pathway expostare and to determine a,,r.,ri.te, rot ect i.e.e. sores b. sed g
on field data. FDA PACS and other rslovant factors OBJECTIVE 30 - (Old Obj. No. 12)
INCF.STION fit 0TECTIVE ACTION IMPII.
J.9, J. I l N
K 11 17-8T Dennetrate the ehl tity to leptement (S)
CCNS hotle preventive end emergency pro-tective actions for ingestion petinroy horards OnJECTIVE 31 - (Old Obj. No. 33)
TOTAL FOPUTATION EXFostmE N.4 (S)
N 1
11-17-87 Deeenstrate the ability to estimmte CGNS total population espeswee ORJECTIVE 32 - (Old chj. No. 34)
CONT 1totJED ltEglf]EY AND RECOVERT N. I (561 )
W X
X 7 8 84 7.F.94 Denomtrate the ability to determine St. Chseles appropriate messores for controlled 91885 reentry anet recovery based en esti-S t. John mated pape.Intion exposure, EFA PACS and ettwr relevant factors
e TASTE 2 FEMA Esercise Objeettves Tracking Chart -- Waterford 3 Streen Electric Stettnn Foge 9 ef 9 Chjectiva Defielency er Aree At This Jurisdiettonal Requiring Corrective
_ Date obteettwo 28e1 18UREC.0634 Ezeretse Responsibility Date of Action (8f treeking FDtA Objective IStamber and Desertptten Reference (Tes/16e)
State leest Exercise femaher and Date)
State imeal OBJECTIVE 33 - (Old obj. Iso. 34)
SEENTRT AIED REwyr.mi INPt.ENENTATION ff.1 (S&t.)
18 1
X 2-8 84 2 8-84 St. Charles Demonstrate the ability to implement 9 18-w$
oppropriate measures for controlled St. JeM y
reentry and recovery 6
~
OBJECTIVE 34 - (Old Obj. fee. 2)
Zi_P9tfR STAFF IleG A.2.e. A_4 Y
X X
10-12 88 t-30 49 De==wstrate the ability to mainteln (S&t.)
St. Jo es staffing on a continwoes 24-heer Pectsh enty 11-7 59 basis by an metaal shift ebenge Drtll All effwre OBJECTIVE 35 - (Old obj. too. 23)
EVActfATIott OF Off SITE PERS00EleEl.
J.2 (L)
N X
9-13.g3 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate assistence to the evacuation of ore site personn=1
~
OBJECTIVE 36 - (FR.) Reelutre)
UNAffl00Ul8 QED Af00 OFF 190U.15 OPERATIONS PR-1 N
X X
thannowneed 17-7-89 9-25-89 Demonstrate the ability to carry out R t wer Se,wt emergency functlens (i.e., activate EOCs, mobiltra staff at EOCs, estab-Off-stowes lish ec==.micat tnns med ecerlete entl-3-1-89 dam, d einr. '" --
-'*d er off-l.awrs Rn -
estiII er escreIse
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