ML20033C820

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IE Insp Rept 50-382/81-25 on 810916-1015.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Care & Maint Instructions for safety-related Equipment
ML20033C820
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/10/1981
From: Constable G, Jamarl Cummings, Cummins J, William Jones, Westerman T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20033C815 List:
References
50-382-81-25, NUDOCS 8112040331
Download: ML20033C820 (5)


See also: IR 05000382/1981025

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

IE Inspection Report: 50-382/81-25

Licensee:

Louisiana Power and Light Company

142 Delaronde Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70174

Facility.

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: September 16, 1981-October 15, 1981

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G. L. Constable, Senior Resident Inspector

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E. Cummin ~s, Resident Inspector

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/ W. B. Jones',' Engineering Assistant

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Approved By:

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T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects

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Section 1

Inspection Summary

Inspection conducted September 16, 1981-October 15, 1981 (Report No. 50-382/81-25)

Areas Inspecte.j:

Routine, announced inspection of:

(1) Preoperational Test

Procedure; (E)~ Care and Maintenance of Safety-Related Equipment; (3) Installation

ofSafety-RelatedPiping;(4) Training;(5)FireinContainment;(6) Flooding

in the Reactor Auxiliary Building; and (7) Organization. This inspection

involved 102 hours0.00118 days <br />0.0283 hours <br />1.686508e-4 weeks <br />3.8811e-5 months <br /> of direct inspection effort by two NRC inspectors.

Results: One violation was identified in one of the seven areas inspected.

(Violation-failure to follow care and maintenance instructions, Paragraph 4.)

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

  • S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager

T. K. Armington, Lead Startup Engineer

  • L. L. Bass, QA Engineer

R. Bennett, QA Engineer

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T. F. Gerrets, QA Manager

  • D. B. Lester, Plant Manager

K. Sibley, Electrical Supervisor

B. Toups, QA Technician

  • J. Woods, QC Engineer
  • Present at exit interviews

In addition to the above personnel, the inspector held discussions with

various operations, construction, engineering, technical support, and

administrative members of the licensee's staff.

2.

Plant Status

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Construction of the Waterford-3 site is approximately 90% complete. The

current LP&L schedule indicates initial fuel loading during October 1982.

3.

Preoperational Test Procedure Review

The NRC inspector continued a review of preoperational test procedure

SP0-59-001, " Containment Spray." The procedure is being reviewed for

technical adequacy, compliance with regulatory requirements, and compliance

with licensee comnitments and administrative controls.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Care and Maintenance of Safety-Related Equipment

During the course of the inspection, the NRC inspectors toured the Reactor

Building, Fuel Handling Building, Turbine Building, and the Auxiliary Building

to observe ongoing construction and testing activities from September 16-

October 15, 1981.

Installed equipment was inspected by NRC inspectors to

ensure it was being maintained and protected in accordance with Ebasco Care

and Maintenance Instructions (CMI).

In addition to the inspection findings listed below, the NRC inspectors

also found many safety-related cabinets open to dust and dirt for long periods

of time and several containing used lunch bags, trash and drink containers.

The NRC inspectors expressed concern that the future reliability of safety-

related equipment may be adversely affected unless the licensee enforces

their contractors' established Care and Maintenance Instruction (CMI)

Program.

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(a) September 16, 1981--

Motor space heaters were not energized as required on safety-related

motor operated valves:

2SI-V809A

2SI-V810A

(b) September 21, 1981--

(1) Temperature detector TE-CC-7021B was found to be broken off of

Component Cooling Water Pump B.

It appeared that the detector

had been broken as a result of someone climbing onto the pump.

(2) A Ils ton load-rated come-a-long was lying on Component Cooling

Water Pump A/B. This condition existed for several weeks and

presented the potential for damaging pump instrumentation.

(c) September 23, 1981--

(1) Motor space heaters were not energized as required for motor operated

valve 2SI-V154-9A1.

(2) A supplemental heat source (warm air blower) was not energized as

required for the heater terminals on the underside of the pressurizer.

(3) Globe valve 3CC-V625 did not have protective cover on open end.

(d) October 2,1981--

Terminal covers were not in place for safety-related motor cperated

valves:

2SI-V1539B1

2SI-V327A

2SI-V811B

2SI-V1547-B3

(e) October 5, 1981--

Motor space heater was not energized as required on motor operated

valve 2SI-V154-1A2.

(f) October 6,1981--

Dust covers were missing from:

Generators A and B of Emergency Diesel Generators

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Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump B.

(g) October 8, 1981--

Globe valves 2MS-V1505, 2MS-V1510, and 2MS-V1511 did not have protective

covers on the open ends.

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(h) October 15, 1981--

(1) Dust cover was not in place as required on~Ememency Diesel Generator

Control Panel 3B-S.

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(2) A ladder was secured on top of Component Cooling Water Motor A/B

and was used to provide access to elevated eciuipment by climbing

onto the motor, then up the ladder.

The full weight of the ladder

was on the motor housing.

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This failure to properly maintain and protect installed safety-related

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equipment is a violation.

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5.

Installation of Safety-Related Piping

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On October 1, 1981, the NRC inspectors noted that during the weld up.of

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pipe ISI12-119RLIA to valve ISI-V1505TK1A that a come-a-long had been placed

on the pipe in a horizontal direction and was under tension. Section 2.27

of Ebasco instructions PC-1, " Instructions for Erection of Process Piping

and Supports," requires that the contractor align the pipe to the equipment

nozzles and containment penetrations to a tolerance of + 1/8" in a free

hanging position. Pipe shall not be pulled to this position and connected

and no cold spring of piping will be allowed. After further investigation

of this matter by the NRC inspectors and discussions ~with LP&L's QA', it did

not appear as though a cold springing of the pipe existed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Training

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On September 17, 1981, the NRC inspectors attended a safety meeting training

session. The attendees were LP&L employees from the lilant staff and startup

group. The topic was " Disposal of High Level Nuclear Waste." The training

presentation consisted of a movie presenting the ways which are being investi-

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gated to store high level nuclear waste. A brief introdu~ctory talk'was

given by a member of the Health Physic's staff.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Fire in Containment

On Sunday morning, October 11, 1981, a fire was ' discovered in the Conta$ ment

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Building. The fire was in the dunnage used to " crib-up" a steam generator

main steam line. The dunnage was oak of the 6" x 8" x 5' and 8" x 10" x 5'

size. The fire was totally extinguished shcrtly after the arrival of the

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Fire Department. There were some welding cables and IcEvoltage power cables

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draped over the steam line; the insulation was destroyed and conductors

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severely damaged with the exception of about 6 inches on the very top of the

steam line.

Piping was rather heavily smoked. ' A tempstik reading of about

350 F was made on the steam line approximately one. hour after extinguishing.

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Two safety-related trays and three nonsafety-related cable trays were

below the burned out area.

In the top safety-related tray there were two

pieces of charred timber (approximately 3" diameter, 2' long).

There has been no definite, provable explanation as to the cause of the

fire; however, it is not believed that arson was involved. The licensee

pians _to replace the damaged cables and tc check the hardness of the steam

line to verify that it was not inadvertently sprayed down with water during

the fire fighting effort.

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The NRC inspector will review the final report when it becomes available.

No violations or deviations were noted.

8.

F,looding in the Reactor Auxiliary Building

On October 7,

981, an undetermined amount of water flooded onto the Turbine

Building floor to a level of several inches when a valve failed during a

hydro of the condenser. Water entered the Reactor Auxiliary Building

through an unblocked mechanical penetration on the +7 foot elevation. The

water proceeded down to the -4 and -35 foot levels through floor penetrations

and a stairwell.

The maximum depth of water in the Auxiliary Building

appeared to be no greater than 2-3 inches. The licensee surveyed the areas

that. water entered for possible equipment damage and initiated corrective

action on equipment that had gotten wet.

It appears that damage was minor.

Na violations or deviations were noted.

9.

Organization

The NRC inspector discussed changes in the licensee's organization and their

future plans with various members of their staff.

On September 29, 1981, the NRC inspector attended a meeting in Bethesda

between NRC and LP&L. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans for

staffing and management of Waterford-3.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Exit Interviews

The NRC inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in

Paragraph 1) at various times during the course of the inspection. The

scope and-findings of the inspection were discussed.

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