ML20033C463
| ML20033C463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/19/1981 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033C454 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112030276 | |
| Download: ML20033C463 (19) | |
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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN REGARDING PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION l
ENCLOSURE B 8112030276 811104 PDR COMMS NRCC:
CORRESPONDENCE PDR
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGARDING PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION ENCLOSURE B 8112030276 811104 PDR COMMS NRCC I
CORRESPONDENCE-PDR
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Report To The Congress 1.
Introduction -
The NRC' Authori.?ation of Appropriations Bill for 1980 (PL 96-295) amended the Atomic Energy _ Act of 1954, as amended, by adding a new Section 147, SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. - This Section directs the Com-mission to prescribe such regulations, after notice and opportunity for public comment, or issue such orders, as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of safeguards information which specif-ically identifies a licensee's or applicant's detailed control and accounting procedures or security measures for certain activities licensed by the Comission.The amendment conpels the Comission to
-limit the scope of any regulation or order to information which if disclosed in an unauthorized manner could' reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increas-ing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage. The amendment further directs the Commission to exercise the authority contained therein so as to apply only the minimum restrictions needed.
On December 29, 1980, the Commission published for comment a pro-posed rule implementing the provisions of Section 147.
In response to comments received, the rule was extensively modified particularly in regard to a reduction in the scope of activities covered. The 4
Commission has now approved.the final rule for publication in the Federal Register.
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I Subsection a.- of Section 147 requires the Commission, upon prescribing or. issuing any' regulation or order, to submit to Congress a report that:
(1). specifically identifies the type of information' the Commission in-tends to protect from disclosu e.
(2) specifically states the Commission's justification.for determining that unauthorized disclosure of the information meets the "signifi-cant adverse effect" standard, and (3) provides justification, including proposed alternatives, that only minimum restrictions have been applied.
2.
Type of Information to be Protected
-The scope of the rule is limited to information regarding the physical protection of (herein after referred to as Safeguards Information):
- All activities involving formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (for information not otherwise classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data).
- Operating nuclear power reactors, and
- Spent fuel shipments (but not routes and quantities).
The rule does not cover (i) control and accounting procedures, (ii) security i
measures for source material or byproduct material, or (iii) security measures for activities involving less than a formeia quantity of strategic special nuclear material. These types of information have been excluded from the rule on the basis that they do not satisfy the "significant adverse effect" standard contained in subsection a. 4
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For'the three activities covered by the rule the types of Safeguards Information to be protected include:
- The overall physical security and safeguards contingency plan
- Drawings, sketches and diagrams that show locations of site safeguards features
- Details of the intrusion alarm system
- Guard orders and procedures
- Details of on-site and off-site response forces Drawings that explicitly identify certain areas or equipment
.at power reactors as being vital for purposes of physical pro-tection
- Portions of guard training and qualification plans that dis-close specific safeguards features or response procedures
- Schedules for spent fuel shipments
- Correspondence, inspection reports and audits that contain any of the above or that disclose uncorrected weaknesses in the protection system.
Section 73.21(b) of the rule precisely defines these items (Attachment 1) 3.
Justification for Protecting This -Information (1)
Significant Adverse Effect The final rule applies only to those facilities, nuclear materials or transport activities for which there exist significant potential for ham to the public health and safety if the nuclear materials or faci-lities are intentionally misused or damaged. For nuclear power reactors there are several reports prepared by Sandia Laboratories (Secret l L
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l National Security Infonnation) that describe the sabotage potential of such facilities.
In this regard these reports note that the worst case health effects that might be produced through an act of sabotage are the same as for a worst case accident.
For spent fuel shipments a Sandia Laboratories report (NUREG/CR-0743, July 1980) estimates that significant radiological consequences might result if a spent fuel cask were to be attacked by high explosives in a-heavily populated area.
In regard to the theft of significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material, there is general agreement that terrorist groups might have the skills and resources to fabricate a clandestine, fission explosive with kiloton yields.
(Note that much of the information re-garding the physical protection of this type of nuclear material is classified National Security Information unoer NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 95. Certain items such as response arr3ngements made with local police and protection measures for irradiated fuel remain unclassified and therefore have been placed within the scope of the new rule).
(ii)
Increasing the Likelihood of Theft or Sabotage The Safeguards Information being protected under this rule if disclosed in an unauthorized manner would significantly increase the likelihood of theft or sabotage by:
- Reducing deterrence value. A good example is the passenger search system at airports which worked extremely well for years because the performance characteristics of the system were not known.
(The l i
FAA has protected their security information under specific
. legislative authority since the early 1970's.) Once it was found that the systems could not detect certain items, some of the deterrence was lost.
- Allowing for possible compromise of,the intrusion detection system and successful covert intrusion. Most alam systems used to protect nuclear facilities are tamper resistant and tamper indicating, making compromise all but impossible for even sophisticated adversaries. However, with knowledge of the electrical details and performance characteristics of alam eqt'ipment, defeat becomes possible.
- Providing an opportunity for advance planning.
In this re-gard the Generic Adversary Characteristics Report (NUREG-0459) states: " Professional criminals many terrorists groups, some extremist protest groups, and certain disoriented persons plan carefully and thoughtfully before initiating a given criminal mi ssion. Many of these adversaries will abort planned encoun-ters when security or other interruptions occur." Opportunity to plan is a key element in target selection, and an essential element in a successful operation.
- pinpointing target areas for power reactors - As part of a security plan review, Los Alamos National Laboratory provides to the NRC a detailed list of vital areas for a specific power reactor, a rank ordering of the importance of each vital area l
and sets or combinations that if sabotaged as a group would cause an offsite release. This information would be protected K
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under this rule. Obviously, such infomation would be valuable to an adversary planning an attack for without it the probability of successful sabotage would be small.
- Allowing an adversary to plan for and pick the time and place to ambush a _ spent fuel shipment, thereby placing the driver and escorts at a significant disadvantage.
- Providing a blueprint for the defeat of the physical protection system. Disclosing details of an uncorrected weakness or vulner-ability in a safeguards system might be more harmful than the release of the security program itself.
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Justification that Minimum Restrictions Have Been Apolied The Commission considered several courses of action before adopting t'he provisions of the final rule.
Included were the following procedural alternatives:
a.
Maintain the Status Quo At the present time there are n_1, NRC regulations requiring licensees or other persons to protect unclassified safeguards information against unauthorized disclosure.
Persons who have such information are not sub-ject to sanctions if the information is inadvertently or intentionally disclosed. Within the NRC, unclassified safeguards infomation is pre-sently withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR Parts 2 and 9 and protected in accordance with NRC Manual Chapters.
Clearly, Section 147 requires the Commission to place some restrictions on persons who have access to Safeg'uards Information. Paragraph a. of Section 147 states "...the Commission shall prescribe such regulations
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.4 to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of...", and in regard to sanctions' notes that "Any person...who violates any regulation adopted under thi s. section...". Accordingly, maintaining the status quo would not satisfy the legislative provisions, at least in regard to licenseet and. o,ther persons.
b.
Issue Regulations Without Soecific Recuirements A regulation could be issued that would merely direct licensees and other persons to protect Safeguards Information against unauthorized disclosure without specifying what is to be protected and how it is to be done.
This course of action would result in the greatest degree of flexibility and posst*oly
'(but not necessarily) the least cost to the industry (since protection systems would vary greatly there is no way to estimate the costs of this option). The main problem with this method is ncn-uniformity of application.
Comments received on the proposed rule indicate that there is a wide divergence of opinion across the industry in regard to what l
constitutes a minimum level of protection, and to what should l
be considered Safeguards Information.
In addition, inspection and enforcement of such a rule would be very difficult. A sub-set to this alternative would be to specifically define what types of information are to be protected. This would tend to improve the uniformity of application and remove some of the uncertainty in regard to the intent of-the rule. n
c.
Issue Specific Regulations That Define Types of Information To Be Protected, Level of Protection and Access Criteria This action would assure consistency of application and a level of protection generally agreed to be adequate.(at the expense of flexibility).
It would reinove the uncertainty regarding acceptability and inspectability of infomation protection systems and provide reasonable assurance that Safeguards:Infomation could not be compromised without detection.
The Commission, after concluding that only option C satisfied the provi-a
.sions of Section 147, considered several technical alternatives in regard'
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to level of physical protection to be applied and access criteria. Con-cerning physical protection requirements the options considered were:
- Adopting the system used for the protection of Limited Official Use information
- Adopting the system used for the lowest category of classified National Security Infomation.
The first method is the least the NRC Safeguards staff could conceive that provides some protection against forced entry or clandestine acquistion
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of Safeguards Infomation. The second option would satisfy Section 147 but would apply more restrictions than the Commission considers necessary.
The specific requirements in regard to marking storage and trans-mission of Safeguards Information are contained in Section 73.21 paragraphs.(d) through (1).
It is noted that information protec-tion. procedures used by State and local police units are deemed 8
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in the rule to be adequate, i.e. specific requirements would not apply to these organizations.
Concerning the criteria for granting access to Safeguards Information, the Commission considered:
- a formal federal personnel clearance program
- a licensee administered clearance program
- need-to-know only
- need-to-know with limitations on occupation groups who would be granted access
- no access requirements The first option was rejected in that Section 147 contains no authority for a federal clearance program. A licensee administered program would not cover persons who have access to Safeguards Information but are not under license to the NRC. A need-to-know only criteri,a might permit a wider distribution than the Commission believes to be necessary. An information protection system that had no access restrictions could hardly be considered an effective program.
The Commission therefore adopted the need-to-know with the additional requirement that access be limited to certain employment groups.
(See section 73.21(C)of Attachment 1).
Accordingly, access to Safeguards Information would be granted, among others, to members of Congressional Ccmmittees and to parties in agency proceedings.
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4 11.
Section 73.1 it amended by adding a new paragraph-(b)(7) to read as follows:
5 73.1 Purpose and scope.
(b)
(7) This part prescribes requirements for the protection of Safeguards Infonnation in the hands of any person, whether or not a licensee of the Comission, who produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information.
12.
Section 73.2 is amended by adding new paragraphs (jj), (kk), (11) and (mm) to read as follows:
5 73.2 Definitions (jj)
" Safeguards 'Information" means information not otherwise classified as National Security 'Information or Restricted Data which specifically identifies a licensee's or applicant's detailed, (1) se-curity measures for the physical protection of special ruclear material, or (2) security measures for the physical protection and location of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of production or utilization facili-ties.
(kk)
"Need to Know" means a determination by a person having respon-sibility for protecting Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's i
access to Safeguards Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment.
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- ATTACHMENT 1 l
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" Person" means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, finn, association, trust, estate, public or-private institution, group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department of Energy (DOE), (except that the 00E shall be considered a person to the extent that its facilities are subject to the licensing and related regulatory authority of the Commission pursuant to Section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and Section 104,105, and 202 of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978),
any state or political subdivision of a state, or any political subdivision of any government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, repre-sentative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
(mm) " Security Storage Container" includes any of the following reposf-tories:. (1) For storage in a building located within a protected or controlled access area, a steel filing cabinet equipped with a steel locking bar and a three position, changeable combination, GSA approved padlock; (2) A security filing cabinet that bears a Test Certification Label on the side of the locxing drawer, or interior plate, and is marked, " General Services Administration Approved Security Container" on the exterior of the top drawer or door; (3) A bank safe-deposit box; and (4) Other repositories which in the judgement of the NRC, would provide comparable physical protection.
- 13. A new I 73.21 is added to read as follows:
5 73.21 Requirements for the Protection of Safeguards Information.
(a) General performance recuirement - Each licensee who (1) possesses a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material, or (2) is authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor, or (3) transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport, a fomula quantity of strategic special nuclear material or more than 100 grams of irradiated reactor fuel, and each person who produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Infonnation shall ensure that Safeguards Information A
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is protected against unauthorized disclosure. To meet this general perfor-
. man.e requiment, ifcensees and persons subject to this section shall es-tablish and maintain.an'information protection system that includes'the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (1) of this section.
Infor-mation protection procedures employed by State and local police forces are deemed to meet these requirements.
(b)- 'Information to be protected - The specific types of.infor-mation, documents, and reports.that shall be protected are as follows:
(1) Physical Protection.at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information reisting to the protection cf failities that i
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possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material,
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and power reactors.
j Specifically:
(i) The composite physical security plan for the_ nuclear facility or site.
(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.
(iii) Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion
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detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alann system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alanns.
(iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules.
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(v) Details of tne on-site and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes.
(vi) Lock combinations and mechanical key design.
(vii) -Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipinent explicitly identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection, as J
contained.in physica1' security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant. specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.
(viii) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or si te.
(ix) Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disc 1nse features of the physical security system or response procedures.
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(x) Response plans to specif,ic threats detailing size, disposition, response times, and armament. of responding forces.
(xi) Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reserve forces.
(xii) Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces committed to respond to safeguards emergencies.
(2) Physical protection in transit Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information. relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. and spent fuel.
Specifically:
(1) The composite transportation physical security plan. ~.
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'(ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments. (Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld frem public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel ' shipments may be released 10 days s#ter the last shipment of a current series.)
(iii) Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and comunication systems.
(iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.
(v ) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone comuni-cations.
(vi). Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.-
(3)
Insoections, audits and evaluations Information not otherwise classified as National Security Infor-mation or-Restricted Data relating to safeguards inspections and reports.
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' Spect fical,1y:
n (i) Pcrtions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's or ap-plicant's physical security :ystem or that disclose uncorrected defects, wednesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Infor-mation regarding defects, weaknesses or vulnerabilities
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may be released after corrections have been made. -Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation
,has.been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other author-
' lties;' a.g..' the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).
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(4)~CorrespondeEce Portions of correspondence insofar as they contain Safeguards Information specifically defined in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this paragraph.
E c (c) Access to Safeguards Information - (1) Except as the Comission may otherwise authorize, no person may have access to Safeguards Information
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unless the person has an established "need to know" for 'he information and is:
(i) An emp1,oyee, agent, or contractor of an apt
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the Comission, or the United States Government; (ii) A member of a duly authorized comittee of the Congress; (iii) The Governor of a State or designated representatives;
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(iv) A representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA 1
Safeguards Agreement who has been certified by the NRC;
' (v ) A member of a state or locP law enforcement authority that is responsible for responding to requests for assistance during safeguards emergencies; or (vi) An. individual to wnom disclosure is ordered pursuant to f2.744 (e) of this chapter.
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(2)
Except as the Comission may otherwise authorize, no person may disclos'e Shfeguards Information to any other person except as set forth in' paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
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U$bb 42YU (d) Protection while -in use or storage - (1)
While in use, matter
- 0 containing Safeguards Information shall be under the control of an auther-h,f ized individual.
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(2) While unattended, Safeguards Information shall be stored in a
'.i~,fki CQ locked security storage container. Knowledge of lock combinations pro-tacting Safeguards Information shall be limited to a minimum number of f..
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' k.5,(i personnel for operating purposes who have a "need to kr.: ' and are other-
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l@d wise authorized acceu to Safeguards Information in accordance with the
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y-provisions of this section.
(e) Preparation and marking of documents - Each document or t.d other matter that contains Safeguards laformation as defined in paragraph i
ig (b) in this section shall be marked " Safeguard: Information" in a con-c4 spicuous manner to indicate the presence of protected information (portion g
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marking is not required for the specific items of information sec forth V,i in paragraph 73.21(b) other than guard qualification and training plans e
. s.,.. u and correspondence to and from the NRC.) Documents and other matter ron-taining Safeguards Information in the hands of contractors and agents of licensees that were produced more than one year prior to the effec-tive date of this amendment need not be marked unless they are removed from storage containers for use.
(f) Reproduction and destruction of matter containing Safeguards l
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Information - (1)
Safeguards Information may be reproduced to the minimum
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extent necessary consistent with need without permission of the originator.
l (2)
Documents or other matter containing Safeguards Information may be l w
destroyed by any method that assures complete destruction of the Safeguards 3
Informatian they contain.
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-(g) External transmission of documents and material - (1)
Documents or other matter containing Safeguards Information, when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or storage, shall be packaged to preclude disclo-sure of the presence of protected information.
(2) Safeguards Information may be transported ty messenger-courier, United States first class, registered, express, or certified mail, or by any individual authorized access pursuant to 5 73.21(c).
(3) Except under emergency or extraordinary conditions, Safeguards Information shall be transmitted only by protected teleccmmunications cir-cuits (including facsimile) approved by the NRC. Physcial security events required to be reported pursuant to 573.71 are considered to be extraordinary conditions.
(h) Use of automatic data processing ( ADP) systems - Safeguards.
Information may be processed or produced on an ADP system provided that the system is self-contained within the licensee's or his contractor's facility and requires the use of an entry code for access to stored in-formation. Other systems may be used if approved for security by 'he.1 (i) Removal from Safeguards Information category - Documents originally containing Safeguards Information shall be removed from the l
Safeguards Information category whenever the information no longer meets the criteria contained in this section.
- 14. Section 73.80 is revised to read as follows:
I 73.80 Violations l
An injunction or other court order may be obtained prohibiting any violation of any provision of the Atomic Energy. Act of 1954, as amended, '
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A court order may be obtained for the payment of a civil penalty imposed pursuant to t.ection 234 of the Act for violation of section 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 82,101,103,104,'107,109, or 147 -
of the Act, or section 206'of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, or any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder, or any term, condition, or-ilmitation of any license i sued thereunder', or for any violation for which a license may be revoked under section 186 of the Act.
Any person who will-fully violates any provision of the Act or any regulation or order issued there-under may.be guiltj of a crime and, upon conviction, may be punished by. fine or imprisonment or both, as provided by law.
Dated at k'ashington, D.C. this [f7 day of M
For the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1
C JM C
. Samuel J. CnilK
' Secretary of th Co:37.ission L1
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