ML20033A462
| ML20033A462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1981 |
| From: | James Smith LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033A463 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.8, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-TM SNRC-638, NUDOCS 8111250461 | |
| Download: ML20033A462 (18) | |
Text
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O r
n-n, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY FLd'O SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COL,NTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 m
November 23, 1981 SNRC-638 6
Mr. Harold R.
Denton, Director p
i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
~
':9!
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ip NOVg 4 OOlh6 Washington, DC 20555 tr as E
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322 p
Reference:
(1)
Letter USNRC to LILCO, Mr. Robert L.
Tedesco to Mr. M.
S.
Pollock, August 31, 1981, Staff Positions - Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (2)
Letter SNRC-599 dated July 20, 1981
Dear Mr. Denton:
Enclosed herewith are sixty (60) copies of the items listed below, submitted in response to concerns identified in the SER Supplement No. 1 and in Ref. 1:
(1)
NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3 - Post Accident Sampling -
NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.28 - Qualification of ADS Accumulators - Leak Testing; (3)
SSER No. 1 Open Item No. 62 - Remote Shutdown Panel Single Failure; and (4)
NUREG-0737 Item I.C.8 - Emergency Procedures - Revised as a follow-up to NRC review and simulator verification.
It should be noted that NRC letter dated August 31, 1981 establishes the Staff position that the remote shutdown system must be capable of achieving cold shutdown assuming a single failure in the systems required for effecting safe shutdown.
0 9
8111250461 811123 k)
PDR ADOCK 05000322 E...~
November 23, 1981 SNRC-638 Page 2 We do not recognize the basis in regulation for application of the single failure criteria to the remote shutdown system.
The Shoreham design is in compliance with the applicable regulation (General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10CFR50) as described in the FSAR which was first issued in September 1975.
To our knowledge, the only area where this issue is discussed is Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 7.4 which was subsequently issued in November 1975.
That ambiguously worded reference to single failure criteria in the SRP was not interpreted by either the Staff or the industry as being applicable to the remote shutdown panel.
This section of the SRP was recently revised in July 1981 where, for the first time, the NRC position was clearly stated.
Nevertheless, we have analyzed the remote shutdown system consider-ing single failure and have demonstrated the required shutdown capability is achievable as described in our response to SER Open Item No. 62.
The Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Emergency Procedures (as listed in Attachment 1) have been revised since last submitted via Ref. 2 to account for the following:
1.
Incorporation of NRC comments based on the simulator demonstration at the Limerick simulator on 10/16/81 and the SNPS Control Room walk through on 10/17/81; 2.
Rewriting of the procedures to the procedure format as recommended by the NRC; and 3.
Incorporation of changes required per Revision 1B of the BWR Owners' Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines.
If you require additional information or clarification, please do not hesitate to contact this office.
Very truly yours,
/'
v J.
L.
Smith Mar ager Special Projects Shoreham Nuclear Power Station RWG mp Enclosure cc:
J.
Higgins
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Emergency Procedures Title SP Number Revision Level Control Emergency Procedure 29.023.01 F
Cooldown Emergency. Procedure 29.023.02 F
Containment Control Emergency Procedure' 29.023.03 F
~
Level Restoration Emergency.
Procedure 29.023.04 F
Rapid RPV Depressurization Emergency-Irocedure 29.023.05 F
Reactor Pressure Vessel Flooding Emergency Procedure' 29.023.09 F
Transient with Failure to Scram Emergency Procedure 29.024.01 E
l
fh II.B.3 - POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING CAPABILITY The NRC, in Supplement No. 1 to the SER, has stated the requirement that the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) have the capability of operating within thirty minutes of an accident in which there is core degradation, assuming loss of offsite power.
The LILCO electric generation and transmission network is such that power can be restored to Shoreham in less than thirty minutes from any one of many offsite generator sources with black start capability.
Procedures for restoration are being prepared, with Shoreham Nuclear Power Station considered as the first priority.
Upon restoration of offsite power, the PASS would be able to function normally, as described in our response to TMI Item II.B.3.
1 J
f~
ADS ACCUMULATOR TEST REQUIREMENTS In accordance with the response submitted for TMI Item II.K.3.28, and previous discussions with NRC personnel, the ADS accumulators will be tested initially and periodically thereafter on a schedule consistent with the Shoreham integrated leak rate test to verify their pressure retaining capability in the immediate period following a postulated LOCA.
As previously specified, the accumu-lators will be tested for a period of 10 minutes by initially pressurizing the accumulators to 90 psig and verifying that each accumulator does not decay below 70 psig.
In addition, the accumulator system integrity will be further qualified by extending the pressure decay test, and verifying that the pressure does not decay below 55 psig at the end of 30 minutes.
The acceptance criterion was determined by applying a 25 psid allowance for valve operation to the 30 psig contain-ment pressure.
Analyses have shown that the containment pressure will not exceed 30 psig within 30 minutes after initiation of the accident for a steam pipe break size of 0.1 ft2 or less.
f
/
Questions from Staff Position Letter dated August.31, 1981.
In the. event of loss of habitability of the ccatici 1:mm for reasons other than fire, we are concerned that random. single failures in the. instruments and controls of systems controlled from the remote panel or in the systems themselves may prevent attaining cold or hot shutdown from the shutdown panel.
It is our position that you demonstrate a carability to attain and maintain hot shutdown and subsequently cold shutdown. ~from outside the control
- room, assuming a
single failure in the sy' stems required for affecting aafe shutdown.
Offsite. power should be assumed to be unavailable.
Your respense to this issue should address the following specific requirements.
These requirements must be met in order.to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A (GDC-19),
Appendix K, and Appendix R.
1.
The design should provide redundant safety grade capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown from a
location (s) remote from the control room, assuming no fire damage to any required systems and equipment and assuming no accident has occurred.
Credit may be taker. for manual actuation (exclusive of continuous control) of systems from locations that are reasonably accessible from the Remote Shutdown Panel.
Credit may not be taken for manual actions involving jumpering, rewiring, or disconnecting circuits.
2.
The design should provide redundant safety grade capability for attaining subsequent cold shutdown through the use of suitable procedures.
3.
The design should be such that the manual transfer of control to the remote location (s) should not disable any automatic actuation of ESF functions while the plant is attaining or maintained in hot shutdown, other than where ESF features are manually placed in service to achieve or maintain hot shutdown.
It is permissible to' disable automatic LPCI acutation in this manner only when necessary in order to enable control of the RHR system from the remcte location and while operating this system to effect cold shutdown from hot shutdown.
4.
The design should
- provide, as a minimum, non-redundant safety grade systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown from either the control room or from a remote location (s) assuming a postulated fire in any fire
- area, including the control room or the Remote Shutdown Panel.
Credit may be taken for manual actuation (exclusive of continuous control) of systems from locations that are reasonably accessible from the control room or the Remote Shutdown
- Panel, as applicable.
Credit may not be taken 1
f~
for manual actions involving jumpering,
- rewiring, or disconnecting circuits.
5.
The design should
- provide, as a minimum, non-redundant safety grade systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown frem either the control room or from a remote location (s).
The design snould be such that in the event of fire damage in any fire area, systems could be repaired or made operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if required for cold shutdo'.;n.
Resoonse:
1,2)
The remote shutdown system for Shoreham is described in detail in FSAR Sections 7.4.1.4, 7.4.2.4, 7.5.1.4, and 7.5.1.5.
The remote shutdown panel (RSP) contains the necessary instrumentation and controls to bring the reactor to cold shutdown in an orderly fashion.
In
- addition, an analysis has been performed to consider single failure of systems controlled from the RSP.
The analysis concludes the following:
1.
The plant can be brought to hot shutdown without leaving the RSP.
2.
The plant can be brought to cold shutdown with some control away from the RSP.
3.
The above will be achieved with the use of additional local instrumentation considering the assumed system failures.
The following assumptions were used in concluding the above:
1.
single failure of any system controlled from the RSP, including loss of any single power supply train, 2.
no accident, 3.
no fire damage, 4.
credit taken for accessibility of equipment and controls not in control room or relay room and outside primary containment, and 6.
credit taken for automatic operation of systems not on RSP.
See Attachment 1
for a
detailed summary of the single failure analysis performed for the remote shutdown system.
2
.)
r-3)
Automatic actuation of E3F cyatema is not required while the pinnt is attaining, or maintained in hot shutdoun.
Once the operator takes centrol of the systems on the RSP i
the auto-actuation circuits for these cyctems will be disabled.
However, other ESF systema not controlled fr:m the RSP uhich have automatic features will function automatically, as
- required, even after the operator has transferred control to the RSP.
During operation frca the control
- room, the RSP is adminictratively.inaccccsible and therefore transfer to this location is not possible.
The only other controls transferable to local control are the diesel controls.
However, auto-actuation is not blocked while in this mode.
4,5)
S PS cceplies see SMRC-572 dated 5/21/81 paragraphs j
III.G and III.L.
l 3
i 9
ATTACHMENT 1 sit;GLE FAILURE ANALYSIS - REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEi!
1.
Ascumed single failures a.
Total failure of any system located on remote shutdown
.panci and its asscciated instrumentation.
(Tables 1
and 2) b.
Failure of blue diesel generator.
(Tables 3 and 4) c.
Failure of orange diesel generator.
(Tables 3 and 4) d.
Failure of rod battery.
(Tables 3 and 4) e.
Failure of blue battery.
(Tables 3 and 4) f.
Failure of red diesel generator.
(Tables 3 and 4) g.
Failure of MG bus.
(Tables 3 and 4) 2.
Determine the following:
a.
Assuming any one of the above single failures, which of the systems remaining on the remote shutdown panel could be used to reach hot and cold shutdown.
b.
Assuming any one of the above single failures, which components of systems not on the remote shutdown panel would be required to reach hot and cold shutdown.
9 A-1 9
System Failure Table 1 Alternate Syctems Not PSPLSyctem far Syctems On ESP Loc.ited on F P 5"tich Which Total ~
Which Can be Used are Required ~to Failure is Assumed for Shutdown Reach Shut down l
. Residual Heat RCIC/SRV's to Not required Removal System achieve hot shut-down l
i l
Cold Shutdown RHR "A" System and (Note 1)
Service Water "A"'
System j
Reactor Core SRV/RER'(LPCI)
HPCI (Auto between Isolation Cooling to achieve hot' Lev 2 and Lev ~S)
(RCIC) and cold shutdown (Note 2)
Fuel Pool Cooling Not required for i
1 System hot / cold shutdown Reactor Building RCIC/SRV's Required Closed Loop Cooling to achieve hot Water System chutdoun (RBCLCW)
SRV/LPCI/ Service Not required water required to achieve cold shutdown Nuclear Boiler RCIC/SRV's Not required System required to (3 SRV Valves) achieve hot hot shutdown RCIC to 50 psig Not required then RHR shutdown cooling. mode to achieve cold shutdown Compressed Air RCIC/SRV's Not required-System (SRV required to
[
Accumulators) achieve hot shutdown To achieve cold Not required shutdown RCIC will be used to 50 psig then RHR-shutdown cooling mode 1_of 2 J
TABLE 1 (CO'T'D):
' Alternate Systems Mot-RSP Syatem-for ISystems On-RSP Located on RSP Which!
Which Total Which Can be Used-are Required to-Failure is Assumed-for Shutdown Reach. Shutdown Reactor Recirculating RCIC/SRV's required Mot required System (Note 3) to' achieve hot shutdown
'SRV/LPCI/SU-Not required; required.to achieve cold shutdown Service WaterSystem RCIC/SRV's to achieve hot shutdown Colo Shutdown Service Water (Note 4)'
System "A" NOTE:
1.
' Depending on which mode is lost the operator may:
a.
Use alternate system on RSP-(i'.e.,
long term cooling alternate path' ADS /LPCI/ Service Water.
~
b.
Use valves on RSP and start "D" pump locally.
c.
Start RHR "A" system locally.
2.
The. HPCI system could be used in the auto mode with the ADS valves on the RSP in a feed and bleed =cde.down to 100 psig
- then RHR in long term cooling mode.
3.
Required to prevent short cycling the core in RHR long term cooling for cold. shutdown.
4.
Two service water pumps are on the RSP, loss of one is.
acceptable.
A complete loss of service water "B"
the operator would start /line up "A" System to cross tie with
[
"B" system.
i l'
L 2 of 2 -
'li V
iw-
n e
TABLE'2 JJiS"'Riyr"T FM L'mE Alternate Indications Description Indications On Not Located On RSP and RSP Nhich Can Which could Be Uced Instrument Be Used For Shutdown To Reach Shutdown
. RCIC. Flow Reactor Water Level Not Required 1C61-FIlO4 1C61-LI004 RCIC Turbine
-Reactor Water Level Not Required Speed IC61-LICO4 RHR "B" Flow Supp' Pool Temp Not Required IC61-FIC01B Reactor Water I evel Reactor Press SRV Air Header Not Required Press 1C61-FIO6 for Shutdown RHR Conductivity Not Required 1C61-CI0l6 for Shutdown Reactor Water None B21-NO26 A Level Note 1 1C61-LI004 Drywell Temp Not Required Not Required IC61-TIO21 for Shutdown for Shutdown
\\
Reactor Press None IC61-PIOO6 Drywell Press Not Required Not Required 1C61-PIO12 for Shutdown for Shutdoun l
l Service Water Not Required Not Required Header Press for Shutdown for Shutdoun 1C61-PIO11 l
l Supp Pool Temp No Problem, Redundant i
IC61-TIO22A Channels Provided
(
IC61-TIO22B i
Supp Pool Level Not Required l
1C61-LIO26 for Sautdown Note If loss-is due to electrical power-failure, operator may use local transmitter B21-NO26B.
If loss is due to mechanical
- failure, operator may use the additienal instrument B21-NO25A located on the the rack,
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s TABLE 3 (CONT'D1 125V 125V DC-101 (Pe<f t DC-102 fBlue)
DC-103 fornnqql Battery A gattery B MG-Hiss 11?v C61-RO11 E11-f003B E51-f-046 1C61*P1006
- E11*MOV035B 1E51*MOV038 Nucica r Itoi ter Heat Exch.
Lubo Gil Cool-Pressure-Shell Side Out-ing Wa te r Va lve let Valvo IP50*MOV103A 1 P41 "f10V037B Turbino Trip &
.SRV Comp. Air HtsCLCW Hea t Exch Trottle Valvo Outbd Isol Outlet Valvo 1 E51 *MOV04f Valve 1P50*HOV10$A E11-f0480 Borometric Cond.
Srv comp. Air 1E11'MOV034B Vacuum Poinp inboard Isol licat Esch Shell 1E51*P-076 Valve Sido bypass Valve IP50*MOV113A-
[51-f085
~
B210r013C Srv Comp Air 1E51*HOVol7 1D2181(V092C 6
fio rina l Supply Wa s in Up L i ne Manual Olowdown a
. Valve Isolation Valve Valvo IP50*MOV114A C11-T0280 B21-F013D SRV Comp Air 1 E 11 *i10V040B 1821*hV0920 Emergency Sup-Conta ininent Spray Manual fil owdown ply valvo isolation Valve Valvo
[11-f0478 E51-F013 1011*MOV03315 1L51*MOV035
' llea t Esch Shell Pump Dischargo Sido intet Valvo VV. From E51-r012 D31-f023B E51-t012 1831 *t10V0310 1 E51 *MOV03 fs Recirc fump Pump Dischargo
~ Suction Valvo Valvo E11-f010 E51-IO19 IE11*HOV050 1 E51 *t:0V0 36 RHR Cross Header Minimum flow To Shutoff Valve-Suppr.' Pool Valve E11-f016B E51-r084 1E11*MOV038B I E51 *t:0VO49 Conta inment Spray
.Turbino f>haust isolation Valvo Vac. Dreaker valve E11-f0020 1P41*MOV034B fleat Escle Cig.
\\ltr Discte VV 2 of 4 c
. [ '~l TABLE 3 (CONT'D1 125V-125V.
- 0C-101 (Redl DC-102 fBluel 0C-103 f orannel Ba tte rv A D3tterv B MC-Bus 11?y E11-F027B B21-F013F 1E1.*MOV0418 1821
- RV0')2 F -
Surpression Pool Manual blowdown isolation Valve Valvu-
-1P42*MOV0fs2B E51-F002 RDCLCW lleat 1E51*MOVO46 Exch inlet Valve Vacuum Pump to Suppe. Pool Valvo-1 P42
- P-005B I nve r tu r-125VDC/
RBCLCW Pump 120VAC 60 HZ C61-K002 1G41*P-0238 Powe r Supply-12CVAC 6011Z/ '
Spont Fuol Pool 24VDC C61-K010 Cooling Pump 1C61"E/SO22 Remoto Shutdown Panet Pcwor Supply Controller C61-K005 C51-R001 1C61"E/S 100 1C61-FC104 Remoto Shut-Remoto Shutdown duwn Panoi RCIC Flow '
SRU-1 (Sheet 3)
Squa ro Root Cony.
C61-R013
'C61-K001 1C61-C1016 1 C61 - F K10fs.
RilR llX Shell Remoto Shutdown
-Outlet RCIC Flow C61 -ft005 1C61*F1001 kilR Ma in' flow SRU-14 (Sheet 13)
Controllur"SH 11 C61-RO14 1C61*PIC142 1C61-P1011 Lubo Oil Coo le r Surv. Wtr.
Containment Ild r.
Press.
C61-RO15 1C61-18022B Suppr. Pool Temp.
Situ-4 ( Shoot 131 1E51*PCV142 C61-It016 1C61-Ll026 Luho Oil Cooler Suppr. Pool Level Containment 3 or 4 v
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-Power Supply Failure Table 4
~
Power' 1 Alternate Systems'
~
~
. Supply-That.
Systems on RSP '
Not on RSP That Will.
is Lost For Shutdown
~Be Recuired To Shutdown-
.1 i~
JDG-101 RCIC/SAV's To L
(Red-AC).
Achieve Hot Shut-down ~ 2:CTE :
No vessel level-is avail-able at RSP. Operator-has to go to H21-PO04 to verify level.Use SRV to reduce. press.to allow.
LPCI ::o ficod core SRV/LPCI/SW to achieve cold'chutdown DG-102 RCIC/SPN's To Not Required Achieve Hot (Blue-AC)
~ Shutdown Cold Shutdown -
RHR "A",
SW "A",-Land' SRV Valves From RSP RBCLCW "A" Systems To Drop Press.
Will Have To Be Started Manually Locally.
n-DG-103 RCIC/SRil's To Achieve 7
(Orange AC)
Hot Shutdewn Use SRV's/RCIC to reduce RPV press to 50 PSIG.
2-Then UHR Shut-doun Ccoling Mode.
NOTE:
Single pump SW operation j'
will require thrattle of loads or crosc-tie "A" pump.
I A.
1 1 of 2 4
o U
i TAHLE /, (CO' T' D)'
}
Alternate Systems Not Po' m Supply Systems Cn RSP On RSP That Will Be That_is Lost for Shutdown Required to Shut Down 125VCC RHR In Shutdown HFCI in Auto Setween Div I Cooling Mode / S'.I To Level 2 and Level 6/
(Red)
Achicvo Cold Shutdown.
SRV's to achieve hot NOTE Thi: uill shutdown extend cool down tim.e.
j 125VDC SRV/LPCI/SW To Achieve Not Required i
Div II Cold Shutdown l
(Blue)
NOTE:
Manual closing of RHR"B" pump kkr or starting RER "D" psmp will be done l
locally at switchgear.
l l
MG-BUS 112Y RCIC/SRV's to Achieve Not Required (LPCI Yellow)
Hot Shutdown RCIC/SRV Down To RHR "A" System In 50 PSIG For Cold Shutdown Mode With Shutdown RB Service Water "A"
System f
'O 2 of 2
_