ML20032A621
| ML20032A621 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/31/1981 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0090, NUREG-0090-V04-N02, NUREG-90, NUREG-90-V4-N2, NUDOCS 8110300479 | |
| Download: ML20032A621 (29) | |
Text
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l' Available from NRC/GPO Sales Program Superintendent of Documents Government Printing Of fece Washington, D. C. 20402 A year's subscription consists of 4 issues for this publication.
Single copies of this publication are available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Microfiche of single copies are available from NRC/GPO Sales Program Washington, D. C. 20555
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Vol. 4, No. 2 Report ta Congress on Abnormal Occurrences April - June 1981
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Dato Published: October 1981 t,
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wcshington, D.C. 20555
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Sectih?!,'$68 ofs?the Energy.ReorganizationMc&.of ~19/4 identifies an abnormal occurrence as yr. pnscheduled incider.t or event-which ti e Nuclear Regulatory--
Commission dtstermines 'to be jigr.ificant from the standpoint of puolic.. health -
% *f.or.safetyiand requires @ 'qugtterly report of such events to be made to Congres
. J' Tjiis repor;, covergthe 'pe'riqd fgm April.1 to' June-30,1981.
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Ttere were no abnor. mal-occur,mnces during the reporting period.
The report eglainsinformation(updatingsomepreviouslypeportedabnormaloccurrences.
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v CONTENTS PAGE
'fii ABST3ACT...........................................................
PREFACE..............................
vii INTRODUCTION..................................................
THE-REGULATORY SYSTEM.........................................
vif REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES........................................
viii ix AGREEMENT STATES..............................................
- REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES, I
APRIL-JUNE 1981..................................................
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS..........................................
1 FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES (Other than Nuclear Power Plants).......
1 OTHER NRC LICENSEES (Industrial Radiographers, Medical Institutions, Industrial Users, Etc.)...............
I AGREEMENT STATE LICENSEES.....................................
1 APPENDIX A - ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE CRITERIA..........................
3 APPENDIX B - UPDATE OF PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES....
7 7
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS..........................................
14 OTHER NRC LICENSEES...........................................
15 AGREEMENT STATE LICENSEES.....................................
AFPENDIX C - OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST..............................
17 19 REFERENCES (FOR APPENDICES)........................................
J 9
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vii PREFAC'.
INTRODUCTION The Nuclear Regulatory Commission reports to the Congress each quarter under provisions of Section 208 of the Energy Reorga. ization Act of 1974 on any dbnormal occurrences involving facilities and activities regulated by the NRC.
An abnormal occurrence is defined in Section 208 as an unscheduled incident or event which the Commission determines is significant from the standpoint of public health or safety.
Events are currently identified as abnormal occurrences for this report by the NRC using the criteria delineated in Appendix A.
These criteria were promul-gated in an NRC policy statement which was published in the Federal Register on February 24, 1977 (Vol. 42, No. 37, pages 10950-10952).
In order to provide wide dissemination of information to the public, a Federal Register notice is issued on each abnormal occurrence with copies distributed to the NRC Public Document Room and all local public document rooms.
At a minimum, each such notice contains the date and place of the occurrence and describes.its nature and probable consequences.
The NRC has reviewed Licensee Event Reports, licensing and enforcement actions (e.g., notices of violations, civil penalties, license modifications, etc.),
generic issues, significant inventory dirferences involving special nuclear material, and other categories of information available to the NRC.
The NRC has determined that only those events, including those submitted by the Agreement S h tes, described in this report meet the criteria for abnormal occurrence reporting. 'This report covers the period between April 1 to June 30, 1981.
Information reported on each event includes:
date and place; nature and probable consequences; cause or causes; and actions taken to prevent recurrence.
THE REGULATORY SYSTEM The system of licensing and regulation by which NRC carries out i+s responsi-bilities is implemented through rules and regulations in Title'10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
To accomplish its objectives, NRC regularly conducts licensing proceedings, inspection and enforcement activities, evaluation of operating experience and confirmatory research, while maintaining programs for establishing standards and issuing technical reviews and studies. The NRC's role in regulating represents a complete cycle, with the NRC establishing standards and rules; issuing licenses and permits; inspecting for compliance; enforcing license requirements; and carrying on continuing evaluations, studies and research projects to improve both the regulatory process and the protection of the public health and safety.
Public participation is an element of the regulatory procesc.
i viii-t-
In the licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants, the NRC follows the philosophy that the health and safety of the public are best assured through the establishinent of multiple levels of protection.
These multiple levels can be achieved a.1d maintained through regulations which specify requirements which will assure the safe use of nuclear materials._ The regulations include design I
and quality assurance criteria appropriate for the various activities licensed by NRC.
An inspection and enforcement progrui helps assure compliance with the regulations.
Requirements or reporting incidents or events exist which help identify deficiencies early and aid in assuring that corrective action is taken to prevent their recurrence.
After the accident at Three Mile Island in March 1979, the NRC and other groups (a Presidential Commission, Congressional and NRC special inquiries, industry, special interests, etc.) spent substantial efforts to analyze the accident and its implications for the safety of operating reactors and to. identify the changes needed to improve safety.
Some deficiencies in design, operation and regulation were identifled that required actions to upgrade the safety of-nuclear powei plants.
These included modifying plant hardware, improving emergency preparedness, and increasing considerably the emphasis on human factors such as expanding the number, training, and qualifications of the reactor operating staff and upgrading plant management and technical support staffs' capabilities.
In addi-tion, each plant has installed dedicated telephone lines to the NRC for rapid communication in the event of-any incident.
Dedicated groups have been formed both-by the NRC and by the industry for the de+ ailed review of operating experi-ence to help identify safety concerns early, to improve dissemination of such information, and to feed back the experience into the licensing and regulation process.
Most NRC licensee employees who work with'or in the vicinity of radioactive materials are required to utilize personnel monitoring devices such as film badges or TLD (thermoluminescent dosimeter) badges.
These badges are processed periodically and the exposure results normally serve as the official and legal record of the extent of personnel exposure to radiation during the period the badge was worn.
If.an individual's past exposure history is known and has been sufficiently low, NRC regulations permit an individual in'a restricted area to receive up to three rems of whole body exposure in a calendar quarter.
Higher values are permitted to the extremities or skin of the whole body.
For un-restricted areas, permissible levels of radiation are considerably smaller.
Permissible doses for restricted areas and unrestricted areas are stated'in 10 CFR Part 20.
In any case, the NRC's policy is to maintain radiation exposures to levels as low as reasonably achievable.
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES Since the NRC is responsible for assuring that regulated nuclear'activi_ ties are conducted safely, the ~ nuclear industry is required to report incidents or events which involve a variance from the regulations, such as personnel ~over-exposures, radioactive material releases above prescribed limits', and malfunc-tions of safety-related equipment.
Thus, a reportable occurrence is any. incident l
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ix or event occurring at a licensed facility or related to licensed activities which NRC licensees are required to report to the NRC.
The NRC evaluates each reportable occurrence to determine the safety implications involved.
Because of the broad scope of regulation and the conservative attitude toward safety, there are a large number of events reported to the NRC.
The information provided in these reports is used by the NRC and the iridustry in their continuing evaluation and improvement of nuclear safety.
Some of the reports describe events that have real or potential safety implications; however, most of the reports received from licensed nuclear power facilities describe events that did not directly involve the nuclear reactor itself, but involved equipment and components which are peripheral aspects of the nuclear steam supply system, and are minor in nature with respect to impact on public health and safety.
Many are discovered during routine inspection and surveillance testing and are corrected upon discovery.
Typically, they concern single malfunctions of com-ponents or parts of systems, with redundant operable ccaponents or systems continuing to be available to perform the design function.
Information concerning reportable occurrences at facilities licensed or other-wise regulated by the NRC is routinely disseminated by NRC to the nuclear industry, the public, and other interested groups as these events occur.
Dissemination includes deposit of incident reports in the NRC's public document rooms, special notifications to licensees and other affected or interested groups, and public announcements.
In addition, a biweekly computer printout containing information on reportable events received from NRC licensees is sent to the NRC's more than 120 local public document rooms throughout the United States and to the NRC Public Document Room in Washington, D.C.
The Congress is routinely kapt informed of reportable events occurring at licensed facilities.
ASREEMENT STATES Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, authorizes the Commissior, to i
enter into agreements with States whereby the Commission relinquishes and the States assume regulatory authority over hyproduct, source and special nuclear traterials (in quantities not capable of sustaining a chain reaction).
Comparable and compat.ble programs are the basis for agreements.
Presently, information on reportable occurrences in Agreement State' licensed activities is publicly available at the State level.
Certain information is also provided to the NRC under excitange of information provisions in the agree-ments.
NRC prepares-a semiannual summary of this and other information in a document entitled, " Licensing Statistics and Other Data," which is publicly available.
In early 1977, the Commission determined that abnormal occurrences happening at facilities of Agreement State licensees should be included in the quarterly report to Congress.
The abnormal occurrence criteria included in Appendix A
x r
is applied uniformly to events at NRC and Agreement State licensee facilities.
Procedures have been developed and implemented and abnormal occurrences reported by the Agreement States to the NRC are included in these quarterly reports to Congress.
k.
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES APRIL-JUNE 1981 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The NRC is reviewing events reported at the nuclear power plants licensed to operate during the second calendar quarter of-1981.
As of the date of this report, the NRC had not determined that any were abnormal occurrences.
FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES (Other than Nuclear Power Plants)
The NRC is reviewing events reported by these licensees during the second calendar quarter of 1981.
As of the date of this report, the NRC had not determined that any were abnormal occurrences.
OTHER NRC LICENSEES (Industrial Radiographers, Medical Institutions, Industrial Users, etc.)
There are currently more than 8,000 NRC nuclear material licenses in effect in the United States, principally for use of radioisotopes in the medical, industrial, and academic fields.
Incidents were reported in this category from licensees such as radiographers, medical institutions, and byproduct material users'.
The NRC is reviewing events reported by these licensees during the second calendar quarter of 1981.
As of the date of this report, the NRC had not deterr.ined that any were abnormal occurrences.
AGREEMENT STATE LICENSEES Procedures have been developed for the Agreement States to screen unscheduled.
incidents or events using the same criteria as the NRC (see Appendis A) and report the events to the NRC for inclusion in this report.
During the second calendar qua.ter of 1981, the Agreement States reported no abnormal occurrences to the NRC.
3 i
APPENDIX A ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE CRITERIA The following criteria for this report's abnormal occurrence determinations were set forth in an NRC policy statement published in the Federal Register on February 24, 1977 (Vol. 42, No. 37, pages 10950-10952).
Events involving a major reduction in the degree of protection of the public health or safety.
Such an event would involve a moderate or more severe impact on the public health or safety and could include but need not be limited to:
1.
Moderate exposure to, or release of, radioactive material licensed by or otherwise regulated by the Commission; 2.
Major degradation of essential safety-related equipment; or 3.
Major deficiencies in design, construction, use of, or manage-ment controls for licensed facilities or material.
Examples of the types of events that are evaluated in detail using these criteria are:
For All Licensees 1.
Exposure of_the whole body of any individual to 25 rems or more of radiation; exposure of the skin of the whole body of any individual to 150 rems or more of radiation; or exposure of the feet, ankles, hands or forearms of any individual to 375 rems or more of radiation (10 CFR Part 20.403(a)(1)), or equivalent exposures from internal sources.
2.
An exposure to an individual in an unrestricted area such that the whole body dose received exceeds 0.5 rem in one calendar year (10 CFR Part 20.105(a)).
3.
The release of rad'oactive material to an unrestricted area in concentrations which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, exceed 500 times the regulatory limit of Appendix B, Table II, 10 CFR Part 20 (10 CFR Part 20.403(b)).
4.
Radiation or contamination levels in excess of design values on packages, or loss of confinement of' radioactive material such as (a) a radiation dose rate of 1,000 mrem per hour three feet from the surface of a package containing the radioactive material, or (b) release of radioactive material from a package in amounts greater than the regulatory limit (10 CFR Part 71.36(a)).
4 5.
Any loss of licensed material-in such quantities and' under such 4
circumstances _that substantial hazard may result-to persons in unrestricted areas.
6.
A substantiated case of actual or attempted theft or diversion of.
licensed material or sabotage of a facility.
7.
Any substantiated loss of special nuclear material or any substantiated inventory discrepancy which is ' judged to be significant relative to normally. expected performance and which is judged.to be caused byz theft or diversion or by substantial breakdown of the accountability system.
8.
Any substantial breakdown of physical security or material control (i.e., access control, containment, or accountability systems) that significantly weakened the protection against theft, diversion or-sabotage.
9.
An accidental criticality (10 CFR Part 70.52(a)).
10.
A major deficiency in design, construction or operation having safety implications requiring immediate remedial action.
11.
Serious deficiency in management or procedural controls in major areas.
12.
Series of events (where individual events are not of major importance),
recurring incidents, and incidents with implications for similar facilities (generic incidents), which create major safety concern.
For Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 2
1.
Exceeding a safety limit of license Technical Specifications (10 CFR Part 50.36(c)).
4 2.
Major degradation of fuel integrity, primary coolant pressure boundary, j
or primary containment boundary.
3.
Loss of plant capability to perform essential safety functions such that a potential release of radioactivity in excess of 10 CFR Part'100 guidelines could result from a postulated transient or accident (e.g., loss of emergency cora cooling system, loss of control rod system).
4.
Discovery of a major condition not specifically considered in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or Technical Specifications that requires immediate remedial action.
5 5.
Personnel error or-procedural' deficiencies.which result in loss of plant capability to perform essential safety functions such that a potential release of radioactivity in. excess of 10 CFR' Part 100
. guidelines could result from a postulated transient or accident (e.g., loss of emergency core' cooling system, loss of control rod system).
For Fuel Cycle Licensees 1.
A safety limit of license Technical Specifications is exceeded and a plant shutdown is required (10 CFR Part 50.36(c)).
2.
A major condition not specifically considered in the. Safety Analysis Report or Technical Specifications that requires immediate remedial.
action.
3.
An event which seriously compromised the ability of a confinement system to perform its designated function.
1
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7 APPENDIX B UPDATE OF PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES During the April through June 1981 period, the NRC, NRC licensees, Agreement States, Agreement State licensees, and other involved parties, such as reactor vendors and architects and engineers, continued with the implementation of actions necessary to prevent recurrence of previously reported abnormal occur-rences.
The referenced Congressional abnormal occurrence reports below provide the initial and criy updating information on the abnormal occurrences discussed.
Those occurrences not now considered closed will be discussed in subsequent reports in the series.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090-10,
" Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
October - December 1977," and updated in subsequent reports in this series, i.e., Vol. 1, No. 4, and Vol. 2, No. 4.
It is further updated as follows:
77-8 Generic Design Deficiency As previously reported, five facilities had a potential deficiency in the design of the Containment Recirculation Spray (CRS) system and the Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) system.
The facilities affected were North Anna Units 1 and 2, Surry Units 1 and 2, and Beaver Valley Unit 1.
The modifications required have been described in previous reports.
The NRC staff has completed its review of this issue and the required modifications.
All modifications have been completed by the affected licensees.
This incident is closed fo, purposes of this report.
The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090-10,
" Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
October - December 1977," and updated in subsequent reports in this series, i.e., NUREG-0090, Vol. 1, No. 1, Vol. 1, No. 2, Vol. 2, No. 2, and Vol. 3, No. 2.
It is further updated as follows:
77-9 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment Inside Containment The licensees have submitted information to the NRC for the qualification of electrical equipment important to safety exposed to a " harsh" environment.
This was ir, response to IE Bulletin 79-01B and its attached guidelines (Ref. B-1).
The review of this information has been completed.
In additicn, a large part
of the information has been incorporated into the Equipment Qualification Data.
Bank.
This system is presently being used by the Equipment Qualification Branch of the NRC Office of Nuclear ~ Reactor Regulation (NRR) for cross referencing and cross checking of qualification data.
As previously reported, the Commission Order required the NRC staff to complete safety evaluation reports (SERs) for all operating plants by February 1, 1981.
The Order also required that,-by no later than June 30, 1982, all electrical equipment important to safety in all operating plants be qualified..All of the SERs have been issued by NRR.
The staff evaluations showed'that equipment qualification sometimes was not clear and inadequately documented.
In some cases, installed equipment was not qualified to conditions commensurate with expected' service conditions.
Corrective actions and documentation are being accomplished by the licensees.
A meeting to enhance the licensees' understanding of NRC requirements regarding qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment important to safety was held in Bethesda on July 7 0, 1981.
Further reports will.be made as appropriate.
A A
A A
A The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 1, " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
January - March 1979,"'
and updated in subsequent reports.in this series, i.e., Vol. 2, No. 2, Vol. 2, No'. 4, and Vol. 3, No. 1.
It is further updated as follows:
79-2 Deficiencies in Piping Design As previously reported, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered five plants to shut dowa on March 13, 1979, until reanalysis and necessary modifications were made to safety-related piping systems to bring them into conformance with requirements for withstanding earthquakes.
The plants ordered shut down were Beaver Valley Unit 1, James A. FitzPatrick, Maine Yankee, and Surry Units 1 and 2.
The required reanalysis and necessary modifications have been completed for Beaver. Valley Unit 1, Maine Yankee, Surry Unit 2, and FitzPatrick.
For Sun.f Unit 1, an Order was issued on August 22, 1979 to lift the suspension of operation'of the unit required by the Show Cause Order ba_ sed on partial'com-
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pletion-of reanalyses and necessary modifications required by the Order.
Currently, all the reanalysis and modifications for the design basis earthquake (DBE) loading condition have been completed.
The required operating-basis earthquake (OBE) reanalysis and possible modifications will be completed prior to_startup from the. steam generator repair outage.
r
9 This incident.is closed for purposes of this report.
A A
A A
A The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 1 " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences: _ January-March 1979," and updated in' subsequent reports in this series, i.e., NUREG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 2, Vol. 2, No. 3, Vol. 2, No.
4, Vol. 3, No. 1, Vol. 3, No. 2, Vol. 3, No. 3, Vol. 3, No. 4, and Vol. 4, No. 1.
It is further updated as follows:
79-3 Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island Reactor Building Entries Three reactor building entries (the 10th, 11th, and 12th since the March 28, 1979 accident) were made during the second calendar quarter of 1981.
During the 10th entry, which occurred on May 14, 1981, eight samples of the teactor building sump water were obtained.
These samples were subsequently analyzed and used in a testing program for selecting the zeolite resins to be used in the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS).
Two men completed a beta and gamma survey of the control rod drive structure in preparation for future work on the reactor head.
The survey included swipe samples and area radiation surveys.
A decontamination experiment was performed on a 2,000 square foot area of the reactor building at the 305 foot elevation.
High and low pressure hot water sprays were used.
The sprays had a very noticable visual cleaning effect on the reactor building floor and resulted in decontamination reduction factors of 20-30.
During the decontamination experiment, the reactor building purge flow was monitored for an increase in effluent radiation levels.
No increase was detected.
The lith entry into the reactor building was completed on May 28, 1981. All the tasks scheduled for the entry were completed.
The entry tasks included the following:
Polar crane personnel safety equipment installation, Sump survey with portable gamma spectrometer, Lighting relay repair, Replacement of an inoperable radiation monitor, Repair on the reactor building intercom system, t
10 Surveillance, servicing, photography, and radiation surveys of com-ponents in the vicinity of the pressurizer, Floating sump pump discharge hose connection to the SDS.
The radiation survey of the area near the pressurizer indicated that the ambient radiation levels on top of the pressurizer were approximately 3 R/hr (gamma).
Radiation hot spots were detected at boron deposits under valves on top of the pressurizer which apparently leaked at one time. There was no indication of recent leakage (the primary system is depressurized to less than 100 psig).
The radiation levels at the hot spots were 8 to 10 R/hr (gamma) and approximately 30 Rad /hr (beta).
Ambient radiation levels below the plane of the pressurizer top were approximately 1 R/hr.
A contact reading of the insulation on the top of the "A" steam generator was approximately 1 R/hr.
A cursory radiation survey on the polar crane indicated 80 mr/hr (gamma) and 80 mrad /hr (beta).
During the 12th entry, on June 25, 1981, problems developed with the mechanical interlock mechanism on the reactor building personnel airlock doors.
The resultant delays caused the scheduled inspection of the polar crane to be cancelled.
All the other scheduled tasks were completed successfully before the door problem developed.
The polar crane inspection was rescheduled for a special entry on July 3, 1981.
The following tasks were completed successfully during the 12th entry:
Closed circuit television maintenance, Lighting circuit repairs, Installation of lights in the enclosed stairwell, Intercom repairs, and Smear surveys and sample removal.
Advisory Panel The NRC's Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of Three Mile Island Unit 2 held a public meeting on June 4, 1981, in the Lancaster City Council Chambers, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
The topics of discussion were radiation worker exposure health effects and disposal of high activity wastes.
Panel member Dr. Cochran extensively discussed with NRC staff members, Dr. Congel and Dr. Gotchy, the numerical estimates of genetic defects and cancers that could result to workers, involved with decontamination of Unit 2, and their offsprings.
Dr. Cochran stated his opinion that the larger health impact of the Unit 2 decontamination would be to workers doing the cleanup and not to the members of the public exposed to radioactive effluents.
He also stated his opinion that it would have been better if NRC st. *f had expressed occupational radiation risks in a range of projected incidences of genetic defects and cancers in the text of the PEIS (Programmatic' Environmental Impact Statement - Ref. B-2) rather than
11 the use of single mean values in the text with inclusion of the range values in an Appendix to the text.
The NRC staff stated that the PEIS text clearly agreed with Dr. Cochran that the relative impacts of.the cleanup were greater for the workers than for the public, and that the use of mean values in the text with ranges in the Appendix were reasonable representations of the impacts.
It was also announced at the meeting that the Department of Energy (DOE) had responded in writing to NRC inquiries.concerning the ultimate disposition of high activity wastes generated by the Submerged Demineralizer System (see below for details).
Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS)
On June 18, 1981, the NRC staff approved the-licensee's proposal to use the SDS, with possible effluent polishing by the EPICOR-II system, for decontamination of the highly contaminated water in the reactor building sump (approximately 700,000 gallons) and reactor coolant system (approximately 95,000 gallons).
This approval was in the form of an Order by the Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation requiring that the licensee expeditiously initiate and complete the processing of the contaminated water.
The Order was made effective immediately since the NRC staff had concluded that the public's health, safety, and interest required-the expeditious processing of this water.
The SDS will initially be used to process approximately 100,000 gallons of inter-mediate level water currenty stored in the Auxiliary Building tankage.
The SDS has a maximum flow capacity of 10 gallons per minute; however, due to expected system outages, decontamination of the highly contaminated water is expected to require approximately one year.
The Department of Energy (00E) has expressed its willingness to utilize and retain for research, developmer,t and testing purposes the high specific activity zeolite solid wastes resulting from operation of the SDS.
The DOE program is included in their FY 82 funding currently being considered by Congress.
Low specific activity wastes generated by the licensee's planned operation of the EPICOR-II system in polishing the SDS eff%ent are expected to be suitable for 7
disposal by shallow land burial.
EPICOR-II Liners The last of the 22 lower level EPICOR-II polishing resin vessels (second and third stage liners) was shipped from the TMI site to U.S. Ecology, Richland, Washington on June 27, 1981.
Disposal of these 2;. vessels by shallow land burial had been approved by the NRC on March 25, 1981.
As part of a DOE sponsored resin characterization study, one (PF-16) of the 50 more highly loaded first stage vessels was shipped to Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL) in West Jefferson, Ohio on May 19, 1981.
This research effort is to supplement th'e development of technology for safely processing contaminated resins and to evaluate liner material compatability.
PF-16 was part of the first stage EPICOR-II treatment process for the accident generated water collected in the Auxiliary Building.
12 Prior to shipment, special preparations were made to ensure that PF-16 did not contain significant quantities of nonradioactive gases that could be generated by organic resin degradation (e.g., H, hydrocarbon gases, etc.).
While gas 2
generation was indicated (a result of the approximately 16 month on-site storage period), the PF-16 liner pressure was reduced to atmospheric.
No increase in airborne activity levels was detected during this procedure.
The liner was then placed in a type "B" shipping cask which is designed to withstand a trans-portation accident.
The shipping cask weighs 32 tons and is constructed of steel and lead.
The PF-16 liner is constructed of steel with thicknesses ranging from 1/4 inch to 5/8 inches and contains approximately 1,150 curies of radioactive cesium and strontium.
The shipment arrived safely at BCL without incident after the one day trip.
The research effort started immediately and is expected to last over a 2 1/2 year period.
Further reports will be made as appropriate.
The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 2, " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
April - June 1979." It is further updated as follows:
79-5 Indication of Low Water Level in a Boiling Water Reactor The NRC staff has completed its review of the May 2, 1979 Oyster Creek event and the corrective measures undertaken by the licensee.
Based on changes made to the Technical Specifications and the NRC Safety Evaluation, the NRC concluded that recurrence should not occur.
Similar corrective action has teen taken on those plants considered susceptible to such an event.
This incident is closed for the purposes of this report.
The following abnormal occurrence was originall/ reported in NUREG-0090, Vol. 2, No. 3, " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
July - September 1979."
It is further updated as follows:
79-8 Major Degradation of Primary Containment Boundary The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff and Consumers Power Company of Jackson, Michigan, have filed a proposed settlement of a civil penalty involving the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant near South Haven, Michigan.
The filing was made l
with a Commission Administrative ~ Law Judge.
In December 1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement imposed a $450,000 civil penalty on Consumers Power Company for alleged violations involving opera-tion of the Palisades plant for a period of time with two isolation valves in the reactor containment building locked in an open rather than a closed position.
A 4-4 m-+r 4
13' I
i The utility subsequently requested a public hearing on the matter, which was to be heard by the Commission Administrative ~ Law Judge.
No hearing was held since subsequently the NRC staff and the licensee agreed to a reduced civil pe ;1ty of $225,000.
In the cettlement agreement, the parties' stated that,' based on new information provided by Consumers Power Company, they agreed that the precise number of days that the plant was in noncompliance with NRC license requirements is subject to dispute.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's performance history and its actions to improve performance and has found that the licensee has taken all corrective' action required as a result of the 1979 notice of violation.
The settlement agreement states that the licensee agrees.that the noncompliance continued for at least more than-one day, but.does not concede that the integrity-of-the reactor containment building was violated during power operation of the plant.
I The proposed agreement was submitted to and approved by the Administrative Law l
Judge and, on August 17, 1981, the licensee paid the $225,000-civil penalty.
- This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
1 4
The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090, Vol. 3, No. 1, " Report to Congress on-Abnormal Occurrences:
January - March 1980,"
and updated in a subsequent report in this series, i.e., NUREG-0090, Vol. 3, No. 3.
It is further updated as-follows:
80-2 Transient Initiated by Partial loss of Power As previously reported, the Director, NRR issued a Confirmatory Order on April 14, 1980, addressing commitments made by the licensee (Florida Power' Corporation) to make systems and procedural changes to reduce the p'robability of recurrenca.
g of the event at Crystal River Unit 3.
These changes were' completed and tested by July 31, 1980.
NRC-personnel witnessed major portions of the testing of' the revised systems as well as reviewing the system and procedural modifications.
The plant was returned-to operation on August 8, 1980.
The NRC has concluded that the systems and procedural changes made by the licensee at Crystal River Unit 3 improve the plant design with respect to concerns about a loss of an instrument bus.
Similar Orders were issued to all other licensees wito Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) designed plants.
The Orders included the recommendations of the joint. report (Ref. B-3) of-the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and the Nuclear Safety-
[
Analysis Center (INP0/NSAC), dated March 11, 1980.
All of the affected licensees have implemented the corrective actions and the Orders have been terminated.
J I
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l 14 This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
A A
A
.A A
The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090,-Vol.13, No. 4, " Report to Congress on Abnormal-Occur:ences:
October - December 1980."
It is further updated as follows:
80-9 Significant Flooding of Reactor Containment Building Plant Operation In addition to many hardware changes made to prevent recurrence of the incident, Consolidated Edison Company of New York (the licensee) implemented a major' reorganization at Indian Point Unit.2.
The NRC staff approved the reorganization as an amendment to the Technical Specifications dated March 27, 1981.
The NRC staff briefed the Commissioners on April 7,.1981 concerning resumption of operation at Indian Point Unit 2.
The briefing included the staff's evaluation of the effects of.the flooding on the reactor vessel.
At the briefing,-the.
Commission determined that the plant could resume power operation pending satis--
factory resolution of several items.
On May 21, 1981, the NRC ' staff, having completed its review of these items, allowed the plant to resume power operation.
Civil Penalty By letter of March 26, 1981, the licensee responded to the staff's March 2,.
1981 letter and Order which imposed a $210,000 civil penalty.
The licensee contested the imposition of the penalty and decided to defend a collection suit' by the Attorney General.
In i'.pril-1981, the matter was referred to the-Attorney General for collection.
Generic Actions In reviewing responses to IE' Bulletin No. 80-24 (Ref. B-4), the NRC staf r deter--
~
mined that no other plant had a clear potential for this type of event that would require k.. mediate, extensive. corrective actions.
However, the-staff.is' continuing the'long-term review of the adequacy of present NRC requirements.
~
for system leakage detection and identification in containment, system isolation capability, and system leakage testing.
This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
OTHER NRC LICENSEES The following abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090, Vol-. 3, No. 3, " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences: ' July - September 1980."
It is further updated as follows:
-~
I 15 Improper'use and Inadequate Control of Licensed Material (Radiopharmaceuticals) 80-8 As:previously reported, the investigation by the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor was forwarded to'the Department of Justice for whatever action they.
deemed appropriate.
After some mor.ths of consideration and negotiation, the' case was resolved by a-pre-charging agreement which eliminated the need.to criminally charge. 'In return for the government's agreement not to prosecute, the individual principally ~
responsible agreed to renounce certification as a Nuclear Medicine Technician
~
and not seek reinstatement of that certification for a period of two years.
In addition, that individual provided an affidavit acknow', edging -the practice -
f regularly injecting dosages twice as large as those set forth in the standard
.ohospital procedures which had been accepted by the NRC as a condition for its license and admitting to the consistent misrecording of those dosages.
In the i
affidavit, this individual also acknowledged having directed subordinate technicians to do the same things.
The Department of Justice's decision not to prosecute was based upon several factors _ including (1) the significant penalty of the loss of the Nuclear Medicine Technician's certification, (2) the apparent lack of any appreciable. health danger to any of Lateview's patients, (3) the possible perceived authorization from the responsible physician, and (4) the apparent lack of motivation to achieve any personal gain or. evil end.
This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
AGREEMENT STATE LICENSEES The following_ abnormal occurrence was originally reported in NUREG-0090, Vol. 3,
-No. 3, " Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences:
July - September 1980."
t-It is further updated as follows:
i AS80-1 Overexposure of Radiographers As previously reported, the licensee's radioactive material: license was suspended for 90 days.
The licensee did not contest the license suspension and_later submitted corrective actions to preclude futura such incidents.
Subsequently, the license was reinstated.
The medical report on the individual, who received the 198 rem exposure, did not corroborate the initial verbal report. The medical report indicated no blood anomalies.
i This incident is closed for purposes of this report.
a a
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17 APPENDIX C OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST The following event is described below because it may possibly be perceived by the public to be of public health significance.
The event did not involve a major reduction in the level of protection provided for public health or safety; therefcre, it is not reportable as an abnormal occurrence.
1.
Overexposure of a Licensee Contractor Employee On March 5, 1981 during a planned outage at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, a licensee contractor employee received a 21 rem whole body exposure while working in the defueled reactor cavity.
Dresden Unit 2 is a boiling water reactor, operated by Commonwealth Edison Company (licensee), and is located in Grundy County, Illinois.
The exposure occurred during removal of one section of a two pa.rt shield plug upon completion of feedwater sparger replacement work.
The shield plug, which served as shielding and a working platform, rested on a circular I-beam placed on the reactor shroud.
The worker was on the stationary section of the shield plug controlling the lifting of the other section by crane when the exposure occurred.
An area radiation monitor on the floor alarmed and the area was evacuated when the' first half of the shield had been raised approximately three and a half feet.
It is estimated the worker was exposed to radiation levels ranging from 500 R/hr to 1000 R/hr.
The worker underwent medical examination.
The results of blood count tests showed no abnormalities; chromosome aberration and sperm count tests were conducted to further characterize the personnel exposures.
The NRC investigation team identified two principal causes of the-exposure:
(1) The water level in the cavity was 27 to 37 inches ' lower than. indicated, therefore allowing the top of the core shroud and possibly part of the top.
guide assembly to be unshielded, and (2) failure to perform radiation surveys when the shield plug was being raised.
The licensee relied upon one means of water level indication which utilized an open reference leg.
An unexplained, and undetected lowering of the water level in the reference leg, resulted in a corresponding error in the indicated water level in the reactor vessel.
Although' two contract radiation safety technicians were assigned to the refueling floor, only one was present during the shield plug removal.
Neither the contract radiation safety technicians nor the licensee's radiation safety representative on duty at the time considered the shield plug removal to present a significant radiological hazard.
flo surveys were made immediately before or during the shield plug removal..The licensee has taken the followirg corrective actions 2
which should prevent recurrence:
(a) Provide two water level indic'ators for similar activities.
Unless required (e.g., for safe-end replacement), the water level will be maintained above the low level alarm of the local water level indicator.
4 m
18 I
(b) Provide a remote' radiation detector inside the reactor vessel when person-nel are working in the refueling cavity while shields or other equipment are being inserted or removed.
.(c) Improve shift management communications.
~
On' August 29, 1981 the.NRC staff proposed a civil penalty of $80,000 for items of. noncompliance in connection with this event and another (minor) overexposure-that occurred during March 1981.
While the worker received a whole-body exposure in excess of t'.e NRC limit for radiation workers (3 rems per calendar qvsrter), no serious health effects are expected.
In addition, the exposure was less than the abnormal occurrence reporting threshold of 25 rems or more whole body.
Therefore, the event is 3.
not reportable as an abnormal occurrence.
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a Editor's Note:
In the. previous report in this series (NUREG-0900, Vol. 4, No.1), Appendix C, Item 2, it was reported that an individual was admitted to the Okmulgee, Oklahoma:
L Hospital on January 20, 1981 with significant' radiation damage to the upper torso and left arm.
In late January, medical c, ; ion was that-the individual may have received a lethal dose of-radiation; however, in May, the individual seemed to still be improving.
t.
-Subsequently, the individual's condition deteriorated and death occurred on n
July 27, 1981.
The cause of death as reported on.the death certificate was-
" multiple complications from radiation burns-accident."
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19 REFERENCES (FOR APPENDICES)
B-1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin No.79-01B, " Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment," January 14, 1980.
Supplements were issued on February 29, 1980, September 30, 1980, and October 24, 1980.t B-2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Related to Decontamination and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes Resulting from March 28, 1979 Accident Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2," USNRC Report NUREG-0683, Volumes 1 and 2, March 1981.*
B-3 Letter from E. P. Wilkinson and E. L. Zebroski, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center / Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, to Harold Denton, NRC,
" Report on Crystal River Unit-3 Incident of February 26,1980, by NSAC and INPO," March 11, 1980.t B-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin No. 80-24, " Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indian Point 2 Event)," November 21, 1980.t tAvailable in NRC Public Document Poom, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, for inspection and copying for a fee.
- Available for purchase from NRC-GPO Sales Program, Division of Technical Information and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and Nationa' Trchnical Information Service, p
Springfield, VA 22161.
m.
NRC r Onu 3's5
- 1. REPORT NUMIE R (Assignedby DOC)
U.S. C'UCLE AD EEfUL ATORY COMMIS$10N.
(y 77).
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-0090, Vol.'4, 'o. 2 S. TIT LE AND SUBTi e'LE (Add Volume Na, uf mprmnate)
- 2. (Leave blank)
Report to Congress on Abnormal Cccurrences April -~ June 1981
- 3. RECIPIENT S ACCESSION NO.
- 7. AUTHORIS)
- 5. D_ ATE REPORT COMPLE TED -
MONTH l YEAR October 1981
- 9. PE RF ORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADOPCSS (/nclude Esp Code)
DATE REPORT ISSUED umin lveAn U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
~
October 1981' Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Washington, D.C.
20555 6 (Leave una*s -
- 8. (Leave Nank)
- 12. SPONSORING ORGANIZ ATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (laclude 2,p Codel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrnission Office for Analysis'and Evaluation of Operational Data s i. CONTR ACT NO.
Washington, D.C.-20555
' Quarterly April - June 1981 IS. SUPPLEMEN TAHY NOTES 11 (Leave hl.wr& A
- 16. ABSTR ACT 000 words or less)
Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 identifies an abnormal occurrence as an unscheduled incident or event which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be significant from the standpoint of public health or safety and requires a quarterly report of such events to be made to Congress. This report covers the period April 1
.to June 30, 1981.
l During the report period, there were no abnormal occurrences' at the NRC licensees.
L In addition, there were no abnormal occurrences reported by the Agreement States.
l The report contains information updating some previously reported abnormal occurrences.
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