ML20031F252

Proposed Tech Specs 3.8.1 & 4.8.1 Re Sources Electrical Power Sys Limiting Condition for Operation.Safety Evaluation Encl

ML20031F252
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/12/1981
From:	ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20031F249	List: ML20031F248 ML20031F252
References
NUDOCS 8110190422
Download: ML20031F252 (5)

Text

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3/c. 8.1 A.C. SOUP.CES 0 e, -..,. TI.,m,,.

LIMITING C"NDITION FOR OPERATION

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3. 8.1.1 As a cinicua, the following A C. alectrical p: war scurces shall ba C.o.:., L:.

a.

7.c physically independant circuits between the effsita t.ansmissi:n

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b.

Two sepa.ata a-i irdepenSent diesel generator sets (Set A:

OG 1-2A and OG-lC, 5=: E: '0G-23 and OG-2C) each with:

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of feel fcr the 4075 kw diesci cenerators and 700 gal'.:ns of fue1 f:r tha 2350 kw diesel generator.

2.

A se:arata fuel transfer pu p for each diesal.

c.

A fuel s:: are systen consisting o' four indeaen:'ent st : z;e tanks er:: ::ntaining a minicu: ef 25,000 gallens of fuel.*

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a.

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remainin; A.C. sources by perforcing Surveillance Require. ants

".S.I.l.i.a and c. S.I.l.2.a.4 within one hcer anc at least :nce pe-8 hours thereafte: ; resi; ore at least two offsite circuits t: 0?E.%3LE status wit..in 72 h:urs or be in at legst HOT STANCEY nithin the naxt

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b.

'dith ne diasal generator set inoperable, denenstrate the ::erability Of the racaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Recuirements 4 5.1.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within one hcur and at least ca:e per 5 h:.r's"thareaf ter.

Restore both diesel ganarat:r sets to ?E.:9.3LE

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state within 72'Ecurs or cceply with the foileving:

1)

Ee in at least HOT STAND 3Y vithin the next 5 h:urs and in COLD 5HUTOCWN wi.hin the follcwing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

"One in peracia fuel stcrage tank is equivalent to one ineperable diesei c_ a n a..r...

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• • 0ne tice cnly exception for repair of Diesel 1-2A-the 72 h:Ur actic. s a:ement for operability of Diesel 1-2A

-may be extanded to a period of 6 days pr:vided Diesel 1-2A is returned to ~0PERABLE status as soon as maintenanc=.>=.....e:s:.

The provisens of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable for :nis :-e the : San e.

' "*0ne time only exception during repair of Diesel 1.2A - the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> interval test is extended to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

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I!ith both of the above required diesel generator sets incperable,

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de::nstrate the 0?ERASILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits bv performing Surveillance Recuirement 4.8.1.1.'1.a within 1 'h:ur and

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at least once per S hours *thereafter; restore 7t least cne of the ineparable diesel generator sets to OPERA 5LE status within Z hcurs er be in at least HOT STAN05Y within the next 6 hcurs and in COLD SHUT.F,0%N within the following 30. hours.

Restore both diesel gaherator sets to C?E?.A3LE statas within 72= hours from time cf

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initial loss or be in least HOT STAN05Y within the naxt 6 hcurs are in COLD SHUID0%N within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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".2.1.1.1 Ea:h cf the ab:ve required independent circuits between the offsite trans.missi:n netw:rk a.-d the :nsite-Class 1E distributica systaa shall be:

a.

De ermined CFE?.A5LE at least once per 7 u.js by verifying correct breaker alicaments, indicated power availability, and b.

Can:nstritad _...

- at least once per 18 =cnths during sF.ete:wn by transferring uni: pcwar supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.

4.3.1.1.2 Each diesel ;encra r shall be demonstrated OPERA 3LE:

In accordar:e with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 en a a.

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uc 1.

Verifying the fuai level in the day tank,.

2.

Verifying :he fuel level in the fuel, storage tanks,

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Verifying the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfars 3.'

fuel frc the storage syst,em to the day tank, 4.

Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and i

accelerates to at least S00 rpm, for the 2S50 ka generator and 51 rp: fer the 4075 kw generators, in less than or ecual to

.0 se :nds.

The generator voltage and frequency shall be 13552 vel:2 and a 57 Hz within 10 seconds after the start sienal.

5.

'ierifying.the generator is synchronized, leaded to greater than er equal to its continuous rating, and operates for greater than er e:ual 50 minutes,

-One time only exception for repair of Diesel 1-2A - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement' for operability of Diese.1 1-2A n.ay be extended to a period of 6 days provided l

Diesel 1-2A is returned to OPERABLE status as soon as maintenance is completed.

The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable fer this one time change.

• • 0ne time only exception during repair of Diesel 1-2A - the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in5erval test

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is extended t: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

AME.qcME 7 0. 9 FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 8-3 1

ATTACHMENT 2 Safety Evaluation for Change to the A. C. Socces - Operation Technical Specification I.-

BACKGROUND While performing routine preventive maintenance on Diesel Generator 1-2A, it was determined that the engine driven jacket water pump bearing needed to be replaced due to failing. A new bearing was obtained frcm the plant storeroom, cooled with liquid nitrogen and installed in the bearing bore contained in the bearing housing. During re-assembly, the inside diameter of the bearing was found to be 0.007 inches under-size. The bearing was pressed from the bearing housing and a dimensional che:k indicated that the bearing housing inside diameter was 0.007 inches undersize. A new bearing. housing with the proper bearing bore dimensions was obtcined fr m the plant storeroom. While installing the bearing (cooled with liquid nitrogen), it was dropped into the bearing bore causing the bearing to crack. No ar'ditional spare bearings were available on-site.

II. REFERENCE Technical Specification 3.8.3 1.b I

III. BASES A.

Introduction The ons U.e emergency ac power supply for Units 1 and 2 consists of five diesel generators which supply standby power for 4160V emergency service buses F, G, H, J, K, and L of each unit. These buses provide power to the emergen'cy loads.

The emergency loads are divided between the emergency buses of each unit in two balanced, redundant load groups so that the failure of a redundant group does not prevent the safe shutdown of both reactors.

The 4160V energency buses F, 'i and K of each unit and their asscciated loads are designed as the reoundant load group Train A.

The 4160V emergency buses G, J and L of each unit and their associated loads are designated as the redundant load group Train B.

Diesel generators 1-2A and 1C are assigned to the redundant lead group Train A, while diesel generators 1B, 2B and 2C are assigned to the redundant load group Train B.

Diesel generator 18 is uniquely assigned to Unit 1, while diesel generator 2B is uniquely assigned to Unit 2.

Diesel generators 1-2A,1C and 2^ are shared between the two units.

l The capacity of the diesel generators ensures that sufficient power will be available to provide for the functioning of required emergency loads during the worst loading situations.

s B.

Discussion of the Inpact of the Loss of Diesel Generator 1-2A The loss of diesel generator 1-2A results in the Unit 1 and 2 Train A LOCA loads not being supplied during a loss of off-sitt power event.

Currently Unit 1 is in cold shutdown for repair of the main generator and is not expected to return to puwer until January, 1982.

The reasons for acceptability of the extension of the ACTION staterent for diesel generator 1-?A are as follows:

1.

The design basis accidents affected by diesel generator 1-2A being inoperable are loss of off-site power, safety injection actuation with loss of off-site power, and service water pond dam failure with loss of off-site power.

Each case and the implications on equipmant availebility are discussed below:

a.

Loss of Off-Site Power.

For the case of a loss of off-site power, Unit 2 Train A and B loads would be supplied from dicse? generators 1 C and 28. Unit 1 Train B loads would be supplied from diesel generator 1 3.

Therefore, all required loads would be supplied.

b.

Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Off-Site Power.

In the event of a safety injection actuation on Unit 2 and loss of site power for Units 1 and 2, the Train B LOCA loads would be automatically supplied by diesel F'~

generator 2 B.

Although diesel generator 1 C would not automatically supply Unit 2 Train A loads, the operator would manually load some Unit 2 Train A equipment.

Temparary instructions have been provided to the operators so that this manual loading procedure will be available.

Therefore, all Train B loads will be supplied and many 1 rain A loads can be supplied using the manual procedure.

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c.

Service Water Pond Dam Failure with Loss of Off-Site Power.

In the event of a loss of off-site p;;er coincident with a service water pond dam failure, six river water pumps are automatically sequenced on their respective emergency buses (five pumps on Train B and one pump cn Train A). Only two river water pumps are needed for accident conditions with Unit 1 in cold shutdown and Unit 2 in power operation.

The only case in which sufficient river water pumps are not available is in the unlikely event of an additional failure resulting in the loss of the Train B river water supply (from the five pumps) to the service water pump suction.

The probability.of a loss of off-site power concurrent with the simultaneous failure of the service water pond dam and the emergency river water direct to the service water pump suction is extremely unlikely during the six day period of the repair work on diesel 2

(c. continued) generator 1-2A.

Therefore, all required loads would be supplied except for the extremely unlikely event of simultaneous dam failure with Train B direct line failure.

2.

The basis for the Technical Specification limit of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> on the outage time for one train of diesel generators was the low probr.bility of

• loss of o#f-site power concurrent with failure of the redundant diesel generator train during the 72-hour period. Changing the period from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 6 days on~a one time' basis does not significantly incrcase the probability of the concurrent failures.

3.

Alabama Pcwer Company proposes to demonstrate the operability of the remaining A. C. sources by performing surveillance requirecents cf section 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> rather than within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

Due to the expected time required to repair diesel generator 1-2A approximately 30 starts on the remaining diesels would be required by the ACTION statement. Such frequent testing during the period required to repair diesel generator 1-2A is not recommended due to the potential for accelerated wear.

In addition, all transmission lines feeding the Farley Nuclear Plant switchyard are currently operable with no interruption scheduled during this repair.

During the time period of this Technical Specification, the frequency of testing of the three remaining diesels (IC, 28, and 2C) will be modified to be performed on a staggered basis. To implement the staggered testing, plant procefares will be modified to ensure that operators are aware of such conditions while diesel 1-2A is being repaired.

SR0s and Shift Technical Advisors will be briefed of such conditions.

4.

As a result of implementation of Diesel Generator Task Force recommendations, the frequency of failures of the diesels has been significantly decreased from that experienced prior to May 10, 1981.

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